

THE GEORGE W. BUSH
DEFENSE PROGRAM

POLICY,
STRATEGY
& WAR



STEPHEN J. CIMBALA

Featured Review

THE GEORGE W. BUSH DEFENSE PROGRAM: Policy, Strategy & War, edited by Stephen J. Cimbala, Potomac Books, Dulles, VA, 2010, 317 pages, \$24.95.

This collection of essays by an impressive stable of contributors provides the reader with

an objective and contextual analysis of George W. Bush's defense program. The book analyzes military transformation, the exit strategy in Iraq, the status of civil-military relations, coalition war fighting in Afghanistan, and the status of nuclear policy. Unfortunately, the collection does not address many of the topics completely and does not address others that should have been included.

Stephen J. Cimbala and C. Dale Walton's essays on nuclear policy are comprehensive, well-written primers for anyone concerned with the development of nuclear policy, particularly in light of the recently ratified New START treaty. Peter Kent Forster's essay on coalition war fighting looks at the problems confronting NATO in Afghanistan and during the post-Cold War period. An entertaining read, Colin S. Gray's opening essay is a spirited and lighthearted look at the pitfalls inherent in defense planning.

The book has a number of major shortcomings. There is no comprehensive analysis of the decision to invade Iraq and simultaneously limit the resources available for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Several essays address the planning shortfalls in the run up to the invasion of Iraq as well as some of the invasion's unintended consequences. However, there is no stand-alone analysis of the decision. Given the decision's tremendous impact of on defense policy, then and now, it deserves an essay all to itself.

President Bush is addressed almost nowhere in the essays, unlike Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and many of the top military officers, including Secretaries Colin Powell, Robert Gates, and Condoleezza Rice (Rumsfeld is, in fact, excoriated in several of the essays). Yet, the president, the man whose policy all of this ultimately represents, is given barely a mention. To analyze Bush's defense program, it would seem critical that one should understand the president's worldview, thought processes, and objectives.

In addition, so much has taken place in Iraq, Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, and North Korea since the essays were written that many of them border on no longer being relevant. We need more time to analyze Bush's role in the policies ultimately executed. I look forward to the book being revised in five or ten years.

**MAJ Mark Battjes, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

UNMAKING WAR, REMAKING MEN, Kathleen Barry, Phoenix Rising Press, Santa Rosa, CA, 2011, 235 pages, \$17.95.

One key to a successful book is an interesting title. Though Kathleen Barry has succeeded with the title *Unmaking War, Remaking Men*, she has not managed to write a compelling book. The topics are wide-ranging: the expendability of men; how military training brainwashes soldiers; psychopathic national leaders; Israel's illegal war on Lebanon; the unmaking of war; and the remaking of man. Barry, a sociologist, seems to live in a world where people are products of social constructs. To put it simply, men are aggressive and women are nurturing because society has conditioned them to be that way, not because they might naturally be that way. Because society determines such tendencies, they can be unmade. In the end, she

wishes for a world "reshaped" by empathy.

While some of her claims would seem obvious to a person with military experience, other observations are surprising. She maintains that the military trains soldiers to kill without remorse and develops teams where great shame falls upon those who fail their fellow soldiers. Frankly, any responsible citizen who pays taxes to provide for the general defense would neither desire nor expect any other outcome. Oddly, Barry sees military brotherhood, seemingly a virtue, as dangerous and almost perverse, for it creates an elitism where "everyone who is not one of them is their enemy." Dehumanizing words such as raghead and *haj* make killing the enemy easier. Using such derogatory terms is a fairly obvious defense mechanism; consider similarly demeaning descriptions for Germans and Japanese in World War II. Barry breaks no new ground here; one need look no further than Thomas Hardy's 1902 poem "The Man He Killed" to realize that soldiers recognize—but at times must ignore—the enemy's humanity.

Barry seems to live in an alternate reality, where valor is a vice and cowardice a virtue. She explores a Tim O'Brien fictional story about a young man who lacks the courage to swim 20 yards from Minnesota into Canada, an act that would have allowed him to avoid the draft during the Vietnam era. Because of his cowardice, his failure to flee the country, he reports for duty. In Barry's world, true heroes run to Canada while cowards serve in the armed forces. Perhaps her most outrageous claim is "the military functions outside the law, human ethics, and just plain decency." If that is not outrageous enough, try this: the military sees as heroes those who "attack people who are weaker or unable to defend themselves."

Much of this book seems to advance a political agenda. She dedicates a full chapter to “psychopathic leaders” and names Osama bin-Laden, Ariel Sharon, and George Bush as such. Her treatment of President Bush operates at the simplistic “Bush lied. Kids died” level. In a public reading of this book, Barry sealed the deal by mentioning Hitler and Bush in the same breath; when Barry makes the Hitler comparison, she can no longer be taken seriously. Consider Barry’s analysis of President Obama: “Although he does not have the characteristics of a psychopath, he adopted the behaviors of his predecessor.” One would think that acting as a psychopath might be a step toward some classifiable dysfunction, even if only a minor one.

How can the nations of the world “unmake” war? Demilitarization is the answer, Barry says; get rid of all nuclear weapons and state armies and replace the armies with a global peacemaking force manned by people dedicated to serving and protecting people. Ensure all sociopaths, racists, and misogynists do not serve. Train the “force” on developing “an understanding of human rights . . . and a reverence for human beings.”

In fairness, Barry recognizes that her dream is utopian, but this raises a question. What value is a proposal that can exist only in fantasy? Some may find inspiration in William Ward’s “If you can dream it, you can achieve it” axiom, but a realist would likely observe that many dreams go unfulfilled, particularly delusional ones.

The proposal to “remake men” also lies in a gauzy realm. Barry recommends creating a more empathetic world, again assuming that we can condition people to be what we wish them to be. America’s first step would be to “face the atrocities our country commits.” Barry claims that patriotism ruptures our humanity because it divides us and makes empathy impossible, but most will find her definition lacking. She claims the days immediately following 9/11 were days of consolation

and empathy. We helped and comforted each other. Then patriotism reared its ugly head, and we went off to war when we should have “mobilized a defensive network against future attacks.”

Barry misses the point. Patriotism elicited empathy and brought Americans together, reminded us that out of many we become one, and showed the world that if you attack one of us, you attack all of us. Barry fails to understand that a purely defensive network would have us fending off endless attacks. Barry consistently demonstrates confirmation bias, the ability to look only for evidence that supports her position. Once she finds such evidence, her search ends. Moreover, she draws conclusions from insufficient data. For example, she cites Josh Stieber and Conner Curran, two ex-soldiers who display what she terms a new masculinity. They left the military and spread an anti-war message as they biked across the country on what they called the “Contagious Love Experiment.” It is good that Stieber and Curran feel better as they travel, show empathy, and commit random acts of kindness. However, a sample size of two is hardly convincing that the rest of the world is so malleable. For an empathetic person, Kathleen Barry certainly seems to hold great enmity for many Americans who enable her empathy.

**LTC James Varner, USA, Retired,
Platte City, Missouri**

**VICTORIOUS INSURGENCIES:
Four Rebellions that Shaped
Our World**, Anthony James Joes,
The University Press of Kentucky,
Lexington, 2010, 328 pages, \$40.00.

In *Victorious Insurgencies*, Anthony James Joes examines four conflicts in which guerrillas exploited population grievances, counterinsurgents made mistakes, and foreign actors presented opportunities to defeat counterinsurgents. The book’s primary contribution is that it provides the historical context missing in many cursory examinations. Joes provides a deeper

understanding of the factors that ultimately enabled insurgent success. His exposure of common counterinsurgent errors, such as failing to commit appropriate troop levels and failing to isolate insurgents from outside support, is a secondary but important contribution.

Like many texts on insurgencies, Joes begins his book with an examination of Mao Tse-Tung’s guerrilla (and eventually conventional) campaign against the Kuomintang and Japanese. Rather than exalting the infallibility of Mao’s strategic genius, Joes points to the effects of the Japanese invasion and subsequent occupation of China as the decisive factor for Mao’s ultimate success. Although Joes mentions Chiang’s opportunities had Japan not invaded China, his discussion does not devolve into a fruitless “what if” experiment. On the contrary, he presents evidence to debunk the invincibility of the Maoist approach.

In the second case study, Joes provides well supported facts for France’s ultimate withdrawal from Vietnam. He explores the personalities and decisions of the Vietminh and French leaders, reviews the manpower required for the counterinsurgent task at hand, and finds the French commitment sorely lacking.

When Joes turns his attention to Castro in Cuba, he finds similar counterinsurgent errors and concludes that foreign actions, Cuban military incompetence, and the seeming indifference of Batista were the primary factors for Castro’s success. Finally, Joes takes the reader to Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, which is of obvious contemporary interest. Much like the Japanese occupation of China, the Soviet tactics of economic deprivation created a net gain of support for the insurgencies. Again, individual counterinsurgent conduct was abhorrent.

Although each case study provides a deeper contextual understanding of the conflict, Joes is forced to use sweeping generalizations to explain complex subject matter due to text constraints. For example, the historian will revolt

at Joes' abbreviated commentary on the complex interactions of actors during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while a reader with more breadth will appreciate Joes' summation of the facts. Ultimately, military professionals will gain an increased understanding of the historical context behind much of modern counterinsurgency theory and practice. Joes' book is a must read for counterinsurgency practitioners if they wish to arm themselves with more than a checklist of principles in their efforts to outthink their insurgent adversaries.

**MAJ Dustin R. Mitchell, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

INFORMATION OPERATIONS MATTERS: Best Practices, Leigh Armistead, Potomac Books, Dulles, VA, 2010, 153 pages, \$18.00.

Since the introduction of information operations (IO) into the Department of Defense lexicon in 1998, the Joint community has had an ongoing debate about how best to use this combat multiplier and establish U.S. dominance in it. In *Information Operations Matters: Best Practices*, Leigh Armistead enters the fray with an astute study of IO policy and theory and the federal bureaucracy's unwillingness and inability to make the transformational changes to fully exploit this new way of fighting and thinking.

Looking back over two decades, Armistead conducted over 100 background interviews and interpreted the results from two prominent research projects completed by the RAND Corporation, the Defense Science Board, and the Quadrennial Defense Review Board. The author's research provides an overview of IO's many facets, including paradigm-changing technological advances in computer technology—computer network attack, computer network defense, and critical infrastructure protection.

The author outlines shortfalls and gaps that have caused consternation and indecision at the Department of State and Department of Defense. He argues that the absence of a clear

IO definition has created a large gap in IO theory and concept and that a lack of integration among the services has led to a lack of unity in the IO community. He uses a pointed example to best illustrate this dilemma:

Currently, a variety of U.S. government organizations and commands teach over 70 IO courses. These courses have little or no interaction or integration with one another, and if a service member or Department of State or Defense employee completes IO training in one service, he or she cannot serve in a Joint organization without receiving additional specialized training. This example identifies a lack of cohesion that resonates across the IO community.

What emerges from *Information Operations Matters* is a better understanding of the power of IO and the nuances associated with the policy decisions. Although skeptical about the government's ability to close the gaps, Armistead provides innovative recommendations that address the need for development of a set of IO standards and a push to upgrade IO training and education curricula. Armistead believes these initiatives will ultimately lead to a long-term solution. Contemplating his recommendations, I wonder whether the author is too optimistic. Time will tell whether his recommendations will come to fruition, but in my opinion there must be more emphasis on integration and coordination within the IO community before any real change can occur.

Senior leaders across the Departments of State and Defense and students attending the various service-related IO courses should read *Information Operations Matters*. The book will provide decision makers at all levels the ability to articulate their services' needs, goals, and objectives. In the end, the book will be an invaluable foundational tool to allow the development of an integrated and comprehensive IO campaign strategy for the counterinsurgency fight.

**COL James L. Davis,
USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

SOMEWHERE INSIDE: One Sister's Captivity in North Korea and the Other's Fight to Bring Her Home, Laura Ling and Lisa Ling, William Morrow/HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 2010, 322 pages, \$26.99.

Inscrutable.

Rightly or wrongly, Westerners have long used the cliché-charged word stereotypically to describe the tantalizing, seemingly unknowable mysteries of Far Eastern cultures—and the dizzying array of labyrinthine philosophies, thought processes, and diplomatic dynamics that comprise them.

Arguably, no culture—East, West, North, or South—is more inscrutable, more impenetrable to the world's probing eyes and inquiring minds, than North Korea's. The tiny, impoverished Communist country sees itself still technically at war with both South Korea and the United States nearly 60 years after the unfinished fight for dominance over the Korean peninsula began.

In the fevered hearts and minds of the regimented millions who look to Dear Leader Kim Jong Il for inspiration and guidance, the Korean conflict still rages.

It's a given that North Korea doesn't play by the world's rules—or laws of the universe, for that matter—vacillating wildly between war-mongering rhetoric, conciliatory gestures, missile launches, nuclear threats, and general cage rattling, sometimes all in the course of a single week.

That's why readers may welcome the rare ability to catch a glimpse through an unguarded window into Kim's curtained country and its renegade, irrational regime afforded by *Somewhere Inside: One Sister's Captivity in North Korea and the Other's Fight to Bring Her Home*, co-authored by Laura Ling and Lisa Ling.

Written in alternating captioned first-person accounts, the journalist sisters provide versions of a story that are like two sides of a coin: Laura held captive in Pyongyang and *The View* and *National Geographic Explorer* veteran Lisa chronicling

stateside and worldwide efforts to pressure North Korea to release her younger sibling. Laura travails under months of house arrest and trial by a kangaroo court while the better-known Lisa marshals the forces within her mighty rolodex to hit just the right combination of political powerbrokers to help free her sister.

The tandem narrative device, distracting at first because of the temptation to focus on the more exotic “Laura” entries, ultimately helps to give depth and context to a complicated situation, in the process providing two memoirs for the price of one.

The wheels for this international drama were set in motion with Laura Ling’s *Current TV* channel assignment to document the plight of refugees fleeing North Korea’s repression and crumbling economy. But when Ling, producer Una Lee, and another crew member traveled to China for clandestine meetings with these escapees, then naively but knowingly followed a guide across an ice-covered river into North Korea, North Korean guards pursued them as they fled back to the Chinese side of the river bank. There, Ling and Lee were brutally captured, as Laura Ling recounts.

“The soldiers were intent on taking us across the river, and began pulling us toward the ice. We frantically tried to cling to bushes, the ground, anything that would keep us in Chinese territory, but we were no match for the brutal soldiers. The one guard standing above me was particularly ferocious. His grip was strong and his eyes piercing. To let me know he was serious, he kicked my jaw and shoulder with his heavy black boot and then delivered another crushing blow to my shoulder. I felt my neck snap from the first kick, and my whole body went numb from the second one.”

The violence of the capture—it also eventually included a soldier striking Ling’s forehead with a rifle butt—was not publically revealed until after Ling and Lee returned to the West; nor were the Draconian conditions of her captivity: incessant interrogations in dark rooms; no hot

water, little electricity, and at first, no reading materials or other creature comforts.

Perhaps through some form of Stockholm syndrome, Laura Ling eventually forged uneasy bonds with her captors and two young female guards assigned to watch her day and night. Because of the relentless interrogation, she and Lee ultimately confessed to charges of attempting to “bring down” the North Korean government. However, her journalistic powers of observation seem undiminished during her ordeal, giving her recollections the sharp sting of reality.

Lisa’s turns at chronicling the diplomatic efforts are detailed and compelling in their own way. It helped that Laura’s *Current TV* employer was former Vice President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Al Gore. Nevertheless, readers may find themselves perplexed, and maybe even a little angry, that Laura Ling and her crew blindly blundered into a situation spurred by questionable journalistic values that ultimately forced her country to kowtow to Dear Leader’s desire to make the U.S. come calling, hat in hand. Kim managed to reel-in former President Bill Clinton in the quid pro quo deal to save Ling and Lee from years of hard labor in a North Korean prison camp, allowing Dear Leader to bask in the kind of prestige he has so long craved.

In the end, many aspects of *Somewhere Inside* are likewise inscrutable—but fascinating, nonetheless.

**Carol A. Saynisch,
Steilacoom, Washington**

**A TRANSFORMATION GAP:
American Innovations and
European Military Change**, edited
by Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga, and
Theo Farrell, Stanford Strategic
Studies, Stanford University Press,
Palo Alto, CA, 2010, 272 pages,
\$24.95.

In *A Transformation Gap: American Innovations and European Military Change*, the authors, a group of European political and

military scholars, set out to determine the extent of the technological and conceptual gap between European NATO members and the United States. The book’s operating premise is that European NATO member states are increasingly lagging behind the United States in transforming their respective militaries, creating a capabilities gap that undermines the inherent ability of NATO to operate as an effective and cohesive force—a force equipped to undertake the full spectrum of operations in line with the alliance’s level of ambition.

Utilizing a structured case-study approach in probing for military transformation, a representative cross section of European NATO members (Britain, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, and Poland) are analyzed to determine the degree and pace of military transformation. Each country’s assessment is conducted using an analytical framework consisting of three distinct elements: network enablement, effects-based operations, and expeditionary warfare. The elements are further analyzed in terms of their technological, doctrinal, and organizational innovations. The elements and factors selected proved well-suited to substantively measure transformation.

A full chapter is devoted to each of the six assessed countries. Appropriate subject-matter experts accomplish each assessment. Individual chapters are laid out similarly, making for easy country comparisons, yet each chapter can be understood independently. The book concludes with detailed synthesis of country outcomes.

Challenged by myriad weighted factors (e.g., economic recession, growing national debt, shrinking defense budgets, inconsistent political will, and diverging defense priorities), the authors reveal an alliance that is not only struggling to transform state militaries in line with the United States, but also transforming at significantly different rates. Exacerbating matters further are the differing interpretations of what exactly transformation really

means, the dichotomy in transformational purpose among nations (e.g., tailoring force capabilities for peace operations over combat operations), and that national defense priorities are consistently taking precedence over NATO-driven priorities. The result is an alliance with ever-fragmented capabilities/capability development that is less relevant and increasingly dependent on the United States to meet its prescribed level of ambition.

The scholarly research and descriptive analysis in this book are beyond reproach. The authors utilize important NATO and government source documents and top-tier scholarly journal articles and make effective use of interviews with top-level country officials in conducting their assessments. This insightful book is best read by senior European or U.S. military leaders and government officials, international relations or political science scholars, and anyone else interested in a detailed understanding of the dynamics shaping the military capabilities gap between the United States and its European NATO counterparts.

**LTC David A. Anderson, Ph.D.,
USMC, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

INVISIBLE WAR: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions, Joy Gordon, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2010, 359 pages, \$39.95.

U.S. foreign policy failures, particularly in terms of Iraq and the 10-year UN Security Council regime, have been widely debated over recent years, but not as comprehensively and shockingly depicted as in Joy Gordon's *The United States and the Iraq Sanctions*. She describes in detail the moral and ethical dilemmas associated with U.S. foreign policy, international law, and governance. The author has no misgivings on attributing the high mortality rate in Iraq before the second Gulf War in 2003 to the U.S. bombing of critical infrastructure in 1991 and subsequent U.S. policy decisions throughout the 10-year

period of the UN economic sanctions. Gordon's study also reveals that the origin of the ongoing insurgency in Iraq was a result of the 10 years of economic sanctions. Her book is a compendium of knowledge on U.S. strategy, foreign policy, UN resolutions, and the shift of international influence associated with globalization.

A must read for all military and State Department professionals, Gordon's 10-year study exposes a lack of transparency, bureaucracy, and fissures in U.S. policy and incompetence within the UN Security Council committee. She documents how U.S. policymakers continually exploited dual-use prohibitions on humanitarian supplies and equipment to inhibit rehabilitation of critical infrastructure and thus contribute to the large-scale human catastrophe in Iraq: "Despite the frequent protests of the other committee members, the United States blocked salt, water pipes, children's bikes, materials for the production of diapers, equipment to process powdered milk, and fabric for children's clothing."

She also provides evidence associating the economic collapse with the lack of basic Iraqi government structure, policies, and corruption. In later chapters, Joy thoroughly details the Oil-for-Food Program scandal and asserts that the actions of the Security Council "constituted war crimes in violation of the Geneva Convention." Gordon provides sufficient evidence to support her primary supposition that the United States and UN are to blame for the human suffering experienced in Iraq from 1991 to 2003.

Gordon's research methodology is virtually flawless. Over several years, she compiled and analyzed significant amounts of sanction committee meeting notes, UN and Congressional documents, and interviewed numerous civilian officials directly connected with the economic sanctions. However, what the reader may find disconcerting is the author's disclosure that she had never traveled to Iraq. She relied on second- and sometimes third-hand

written and verbal accounts of the evolving environmental conditions in Iraq. Also not surprisingly, the author had no access to classified information. Outside of classified channels, we cannot be entirely sure of the extent of the Iraqi government's involvement in UN sanction violations or what Saddam's foreign policy or civil priorities were over the 10-year period between 1991 and 2001.

The United States and the Iraq Sanctions is important because it highlights important lessons learned. UN economic sanctions "were in gross violation of the principle of proportionality" as a result of flawed policy. The author also notes that globalization created a "risk posed to humanity by international governance." An equally critical lesson for professional strategists is that the prolonged economic sanctions were a means to insurgency. Gordon's findings warrant further study and possible citation in contemporary counterinsurgency manuals.

**MAJ Richard H. Hetherington,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE WRONG WAR: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan, Francis J. "Bing" West, Random House, New York, 2011, 336 pages, \$28.00.

Bing West's *The Wrong War* is a compelling study of close combat, a thoughtful examination of the application of counterinsurgency theory, and a recommended exit strategy from the longest conflict in American history. As with much of his writing, West brings events to life by stepping outside the safe confines of his study to document history as it unfolds. The result is a book that spans the levels of war and guides the reader on a thought-provoking journey through the war in Afghanistan.

More than half of *The Wrong War* takes place on the ground with soldiers, marines, and special operations forces engaged in direct combat with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This is West's forte, bringing the grit of the fight to the

reader. The crisp tales have the stark realism of a first-person lens. The author is at his absolute best when he introduces us to Marine Lance Corporal Dakota Meyer. In near stop-motion detail, West recounts the events of the Battle of Ganjgal, where the young Marine's heroism earned a Medal of Honor nomination, the first living veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to receive the honor.

West expresses his frustration with the conduct of the war through his critique of what he perceives to be a flawed counterinsurgency campaign. Readers familiar with the war will find flaw with the author's analysis and conclusions. West's insistence that we are not actively pursuing operations against the insurgents seems to run counter to the progress made over the past months, as the insurgency suffered a significant loss of capability under the relentless pressure of NATO forces.

Dedicated to an exploration of exit strategy, the book's final chapter (an anti-climactic seven pages in length) asserts that a "stable Afghanistan is helpful, although not critical, to our national security." The cost of the war is not producing the results necessary to justify further investment of blood and treasure, he says, adding that our greatest mistake was to "do the work of others for ten years." Our strategy was flawed and open-ended; this was the wrong war with the wrong strategy.

As a tactical narrative, *The Wrong War* ranks among the finest literary accounts of contemporary conflict. West's writing is superb, his credibility unmatched, and his determination to bring the story home remarkable. For that reason alone, *The Wrong War* is reminiscent of the writing of C.J. Chivers, Craig Mullaney, and Nate Fick. West is at his very best when sidled up to the warfighter, and few other writers have the fortitude at any age to do what he does at 70.

**LTC Steve Leonard, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

UNEMBEDDED: Two Decades of Maverick War Reporting, Scott Taylor, D&M Publishers Inc., Vancouver, BC, 374 pages, \$34.95.

After finishing Scott Taylor's introductory description of his terrifying captivity and inquisition by Turkomen insurgents in Iraq, the reader is likely to think the book might be an exciting read. Well, it slows down markedly through the next 50 pages in this, the author's seventh book, written along the lines of a memoir. Taylor's youth and upbringing and his early ventures into publication subsidized by the Canadian military are mildly interesting, but the truly newsworthy periods of his reporting life were centered around his dogged investigations into corruption, incompetence, and betrayal of the common soldier by the senior ranks of the Canadian officer corps, particularly in Somalia. When he really started digging, Taylor found the Canadian military establishment to be a "resourceful, recalcitrant, and vengeful foe."

Taylor's articles resulted in military investigations, which were more like whitewashes that pointed a finger of guilt at a "few bad apples" within the enlisted ranks. (The author set out to argue and then explain how news initiative is stifled by the protection and logistical support of reporters housed in military units (called "embedding"). When Taylor transformed *Espirit de Corps* magazine, essentially a Canadian military house organ, into a hotbed of investigative digging, he even accomplished some of the early revelations on the army's own nickel.

Taylor reaches his narrative zenith in this book when he traverses dangerous back alleys and trails to report on the warring factions in the Balkans. His ability to infiltrate areas with hazy borders—such as the Western Sahara—places him in a small circle of reporters including those who set up shop in prewar Baghdad.

The unembedded paths he covered included the Balkans and later Iraq. His excursion into Afghanistan

lacks the reporting depth of the others, but it is nonetheless an independent view gathered during an outside-the-wire, unsanctioned trip in 2006 into the volatile Kandahar region. His reporting at that time did not parrot the pie-in-the-sky press releases accepted then (and now) by the Western press. (Here we are five years later, and Kandahar remains volatile.)

Along the way we—

- Learn how Turkomen insurgents concluded—erroneously—that his regimental coin from service in Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry was an electronic device designed to guide Hellfire missiles up the tailpipe of an emir's Land Rover.

- Experience a stop at Casablanca's Holiday Inn (en route to the Western Sahara) where *As Time Goes By* was rendered not by Sam, but by a player piano.

- Hear the words of a UN police officer in Kosovo, who says: "The only locals who were organized and funded to run a campaign in postwar Kosovo were the warlords, thugs, and drug dealers. As a result, Kosovo went from a state full of criminals to a legitimate criminal state."

In the final analysis, Taylor neither proves nor disproves whether a straighter line to the truth emerges from reporters under military care and feeding. However, we should well remember the words of a war correspondent covering the Bulgarian insurrection in 1902. He telegraphed his employer:

"Arriving in Sorrowitz, I was delayed by a dinner with the Turkish general, which it would have been a great impoliteness to decline. Later, visiting a nearby hamlet with my escort of 25 Turkish cavalry, the only native I could find to talk with about Turkish atrocities was a somewhat incoherent 80-year-old Greek. What chance did I, a lone American with a frightened translator, have to find out the truth?"

**George Ridge, J.D.,
Tucson, Arizona**

IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THE BAND OF BROTHERS, Larry Alexander, Penguin Books Ltd., London, 2010, 307 pages, \$24.95.

The author views World War II as a period when young men journeyed to distant, global battlefields to fight an evil force bent on world domination. Through his interest of World War II and the release of the mini-series, *“Band of Brothers,”* Larry Alexander developed a friendship with Dick Winters and other members of Easy Company. Their story eventually became so iconic that the author felt compelled to walk in their footsteps.

As a result, the book’s organization allows the reader to travel a path known only to a few during a dark period of history. It begins with the perils of training to become a World War II paratrooper at Toccoa, Georgia, where the battle cry “Currahee” developed. Arriving in England, the author tours the town and accommodations of the Easy Company soldiers. Then an aging soldier remembers his preparation for the D-Day invasion, and the action he saw during battles at Market Garden and Bastogne. The stories come to life through the memory of historical events that made a lasting impression on a country, a unit, and a soldier.

In the Footsteps of the Band of Brothers is highly recommended to those interested in World War II history as it relates to the airborne soldier. The book’s chronological organization makes for a captivating trip back in time as the author and a former soldier travel from Aldbourne, England, to Normandy, Belgium, and finally Holland. As the author states, “As you visit the now silent battlefields and stop and listen real hard, you will find that an echo remains in the footsteps of those you follow.”

Allen D. Reece,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

SEARCH AND DESTROY: The Story of an Armored Cavalry Squadron in Vietnam: 1-1 Cav, 1967-1968, Keith W. Nolan, Zenith

Press, Minneapolis, 2010, 448 pages, \$30.00.

Keith W. Nolan wrote his first book on Vietnam battles when he was still a high school student in suburban St. Louis, Missouri. *Search and Destroy* is his 12th book but, sadly, the last. Nolan passed away in 2009 from cancer at the young age of 44. In describing Nolan’s key role in writing the history of the Vietnam War, perhaps St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* columnist Bill McClellan said it best in the 101st Airborne Division’s Ripcord Association webpage:

“He developed a following among Vietnam veterans. There is nobody else in the country who has done what he has done. He has written gripping and honest historical accounts of battles and operations that would otherwise have been overlooked by everybody except the people who participated in them.”

Search and Destroy is no exception to that pattern. It is a terrific book that tells the story of the 1-1st Cavalry Squadron, from deployment preparations in the United States to a year of combat with the Americal Division in the northern part of I Corps’ area of operation. Like all of Nolan’s books, this one tells its story from the first-hand accounts of the soldiers and junior officers who fought the war on the ground and from extensive research of official Army records.

Through interviews with dozens of 1-1st Cav veterans, Nolan tells it like it is, warts and all. There are accounts of breathtaking heroism, of leadership that ranges from superb and courageous to badly flawed, and disturbing accounts of atrocities and mindless violence against Vietnamese civilians. We follow combat at the platoon and company level and meet a wide cast of participants. There are the tough NCOs who led green troops, many of whom won well-deserved medals for courage and heroism. But we also meet a rear area executive

officer who manipulated the awards system to his undeserved benefit. There is a squadron commander who repeatedly flew into combat to support his troops, and a platoon leader whose inability to read a map and use a compass brought casualties to his soldiers. We meet a courageous sergeant whose record of atrocities against civilians was ignored, and we meet the young soldier described by another as “the conscience of the squadron.” Nolan draws the reader into the squadron, shows the best and perhaps the worst, but concentrates on the struggle to survive in a hostile environment.

As with his other books, Nolan leaves us with an epilogue that tells what happened to those he interviewed “after the war.” Some were career soldiers, reaching general’s stars and the top stripes of an NCO. Others left the army after their obligated service and took regular jobs, got married, found a career—in other words, found a life after the terror and hardships of a year in Vietnam. Vietnam veterans will enjoy this honest account of a cavalry squadron’s experience during a difficult and challenging year of unrelenting combat.

COL John B. Haseman, USA,
Retired, Grand Junction, CO

WAR WITHOUT FRONTS: The USA in Vietnam, Bernd Greiner, Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2009, 544 pages, \$35.00.

Bernd Greiner’s position in *War Without Fronts: The USA in Vietnam* is that the My Lai massacre was not an aberration but merely an extreme example of the targeting of civilians. Given the ambiguities of a war with unclear objectives at all levels, frustration was inevitable, and conditions were ripe for frustration to break loose in atrocities such as My Lai and comparable episodes. Because the crimes were systemic rather than individual, the blame for My Lai lay not solely with Lieutenant William Calley but also with those who created the necessary preconditions for war crimes. Indicted as part of a broken system are the military chain

of command, the civilians overseeing the war, and the American people. A cultural milieu made American involvement in Vietnam highly likely if not inevitable and success in that involvement highly unlikely.

My Lai is not central to the argument although it receives a detailed examination. Because he believes the killings were representative rather than aberrational, Greiner emphasizes their context: the Cold War, politicians afraid of failure, careerist officers and NCOs, and an overextended military scraping for officers and GIs. All this made Vietnam an aimless war fought by drugged or terrified GIs on search-and-destroy missions that took no territory but added to the body count sought by careerist officers on six-month tours and generals and politicians who used body counts to measure success.

What sets this work apart is the depth of the research. Greiner examined hundreds of boxes of primary documents. Unfortunately replication of the research is now impossible because many records of the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group that became available in 1994 and that Greiner explored have been closed once more. Greiner makes extensive use of the multi-volume Peers Commission report as well as Vietnamese sources and eyewitness accounts. Even so, he continually acknowledges that casual to non-existent record-keeping at all levels made his recapture of the various massacres more difficult than expected.

The decay of the army in Vietnam is well established. The commonness of brutality toward enemies and civilians alike is established by the Winter Soldier testimony of the 1970s. Still, many Americans refuse to acknowledge American forces engaged in atrocities and that superior officers either ignored or covered up those atrocities.

**John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Houston, Texas**

EDOKKO: Growing Up a Foreigner in Wartime Japan, Isaac Shapiro, iUniverse Inc., New York, 2010, 227 pages, \$16.95.

Isaac "Ike" Shapiro has written a charming memoir of growing up in wartime Japan. The fourth son of Russian-born, stateless Jewish musicians, Shapiro was born in Tokyo in 1931, though he spent most of his young life in Yokohama. His grandparents lived for a time in Tokyo, and so the young Shapiro early took to calling himself an *Edokko*, literally, an Edo child, Edo being the pre-Meiji-era name for Tokyo. Technically speaking he was not; an *Edokko* is someone who is of the third generation to be born in Tokyo, but Shapiro found the Japanese were willing to tolerate the fancies of a young, blonde *gaijin* (foreigner). The author spends a short chapter on life in Harbin, Manchuria, where his mother, his three brothers, and he moved when he was only a few months old. The family moved back to Yokohama in 1936, and the bulk of the memoir focuses on Shapiro's school years at three English-language schools in Yokohama and Tokyo (all of which still operate). Along the way, in addition to the Russian spoken in his home, Shapiro picked up Japanese, English, French, some German, and a life-long love of learning and appreciation for other cultures. During the war years, Shapiro and his family evacuated to Tokyo and then farther inland. After the war, Shapiro returned to Yokohama in order to see the Americans landing, and the Americans immediately hired him as an interpreter. From there his life took another fateful turn. Taken under the wing of then-colonel, later lieutenant general, Toby Munn, U.S. Marine Corps, Shapiro finished high school in Hawaii, attended Columbia, naturalized as an American citizen, and embarked on a 50-year career as an international lawyer.

I have two small quibbles. I disagree, when the author declares, "The Japanese especially valued a foreigner's ability to speak their language." While the Japanese tend to be unfailingly polite when a foreigner makes an even minimal attempt to speak Japanese, I heard, more than once while I was there,

that many Japanese do not feel comfortable when a foreigner is "too fluent" in their language. I also think the author missed an opportunity when he discussed living across from the Sirota family, when the Shapiro family evacuated to Tokyo, by not mentioning that Beate Sirota, the daughter, played a key role in writing Japan's postwar constitution, introducing the equivalent of the Women's Equal Rights Amendment.

The book will probably appeal most to readers like me who have spent a great deal of time in Japan, but this is unfortunate. Shapiro's story, and that of his family, encapsulates our troubled previous century. His grandparents left Russia during the 1917 revolution, his parents spent time in the British mandate of Palestine. He, his brothers, and his mother arrived in Manchuria spare months before the Manchurian Incident, the start of Japan's 15-Year War, and they left one month before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which widened Japan's war into mainland China. His account of the (less nationalistic and more muted than one would expect) reactions of the Japanese people during World War II, of the rationing and hunger, and of the incendiary bombing of Tokyo, has a common-man perspective other historical accounts often lack. This is a well-written account of an interesting life.

**COL David Hunter-Chester,
USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

A NATION FORGED IN WAR: How World War II Taught Americans to Get Along, Thomas Bruscano, The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 2010, 348 pages, \$39.95.

In an extensively well-researched and written study, historian Thomas Bruscano shows conclusively that World War II was a defining moment in American history. In *A Nation Forged in War: How World War II Taught Americans to Get Along*, Americans, many for the first time, showed new appreciation for each other. With the large-scale mobi-

lization needed to fight the war, Americans from all over the United States gathered to train and live together in a new and tough environment. This newly found closeness put Americans of different religions, ethnicities, and regions together for the first time. The tough training, poor living conditions, and general discomfort of the newly enlisted soldiers bonded them together and dissolved many long-standing differences.

The author starts and ends the book with the 1928 and 1960 presidential elections. To some readers, it may seem odd, but it works brilliantly. Starting with the 1928 defeat of Democratic candidate and Catholic, Al Smith, Bruscino puts the election in context and writes convincingly that Americans were not ready for a Catholic president, and were not tolerant of Catholicism, Judaism, and people of other ethnic backgrounds. Ending in 1960, the author shows how far American tolerance had grown with John F. Kennedy's election. However, the transformation did not happen overnight, and even during and after the war intolerance lurked under the surface. Instead, it happened over time through military indoctrination and training, hours of boredom at camp and overseas, and ultimately fighting in the war itself. While World War II did teach Americans to get along, the author also states that it still did not teach them to get along with everyone.

While religious and regional tolerance grew out of the war effort, equality for African-Americans remained elusive. However, African-Americans did make gains. The war was, as Bruscino argues, the "jumping off point in the civil rights movement."

A Nation Forged in War is an exemplary study on World War II that will instantly appeal, not only to military history enthusiasts, but also to readers of religious, cultural, and ethnic history. Bruscino makes a convincing case that the change

in ethnic and religious relations in the United States came from the military experience in World War II.
Jon Mikolashek, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

GUNS AGAINST THE REICH: Memoirs of an Artillery Officer on the Eastern Front, Petr Mikhin, Pen & Sword Military, Great Britain, 2010, 214 pages, \$39.99.

Guns Against the Reich is a fascinating, personal account of life on the German-Russian front during World War II. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Petr Mikhin was a 20-year-old college student, but by the war's end in 1945, he would be a seasoned field artillery battalion commander preparing for operations against Japan. The events in between are an intense and often graphic account of war along the front lines.

The story begins with Mikhin and his college classmates eagerly anticipating the romanticism and glory of a quick and decisive victory against Germany. Mikhin and his friends quickly enlist in the military where the author's "political reliability" earns him a commission as an artillery officer. However, after three months of training, he leaves behind the warmth and comfort of school and begins to experience the brutal cold and hunger that came to characterize the German-Russian front. Mikhin vividly captures these images for the reader through such stories as the need to sleep five-to-a-bunk just to keep warm, or his soldiers breaking ranks to ravenously graze on the first shoots of spring grass.

As a young artillery officer, Mikhin began his service as a forward observer supporting the Soviet defense of Moscow. His initial experience with that campaign was the anxiety of having his first live fire exercise also being his first combat mission. However, his account of that event soon pales in comparison to his vivid and horrific descriptions of traversing back and

forth across "no man's land" from his battery to his observation post. Undoubtedly the strength of this book is the recounting of these and similar wartime experiences where through a combination of great skill and luck, Mikhin survives and continues progressing through the officer ranks.

If the memoir has a drawback, it is that Mikhin does not place his extraordinary personnel experiences within their overall historical context. For example, in the chapter titled "Kursk," there is no discussion of the great tank battle, only a thrilling account of when Mikhin, now a battery commander, leads a raid to capture a German soldier. Nevertheless, an understanding of the historical framework that surrounded Mikhin's actions would enhance the reader's appreciation of his exploits. The occasional map would also be useful in tracking Mikhin as he moves from Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Ukraine, and into Czechoslovakia.

One of the book's surprises is Mikhin's treatment of the Communist Party. The book was originally written in 1984—several years before the fall of the Soviet Union. And while the author portrays himself as a loyal, brave, and patriotic Communist Party member, he is less generous toward the political officers assigned to his units. Several times, he relates how his career and even his life were subject to the "cowardly" and absurd behavior of Communist Party officials.

The book is a fast-paced, interesting read that recounts stories of courage under fire and dedication to duty. In addition, Mikhin reinforces many concepts crucial to all levels of warfare such as initiative, technical, and tactical competence and shows the importance of understanding and respecting your "evil, cunning, agile, technically educated, tough, and arrogant" enemy. I highly recommended this book.

W. Kenna McCurry,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

PATTON: The Pursuit of Destiny, Agostino Von Hassell and Ed Breslin, Thomas Nelson, Nashville, TN, 2010, 195 pages, \$19.99.

Patton: The Pursuit of Destiny explores the achievements that propelled General George S. Patton into the history books as one of the most well known and popular American heroes of World War II. Agostino Von Hassell and Ed Breslin do not just rehash biographical dates, times, and events, they attempt to understand Patton's character and why he made certain decisions. Throughout Patton's life, he measured his success as a soldier against relatives for whom he held high esteem, such as his grandfather and great uncle during the Civil War. Disenchanted with the South's defeat, Patton's family decided to migrate west.

Patton's life reached a turning point when his mother was married to Benjamin Wilson, and the family moved to Los Angeles. Colonel John Singleton Mosby (CSA) also known as the "Grey Ghost" captivated Patton with stories of bravery and daring feats. The authors argue that a fear of disappointing or shaming the family history molded Patton's perception of life.

Patton's academic disappointments at the Virginia Military Institute and West Point and his raw determination and fear of disgracing his family's legacy drove him to success. Patton's peers viewed him as rigid because he held them to a standard. Patton's rigid and demanding character aided him in his success in training and increasing units' morale during World War II. As commander of the Third U.S. Army, Patton was a workhorse who demanded much from his soldiers. But he also demonstrated compassion as one of the few three-star general officers who personally awarded the Purple Heart to soldiers wounded in battle instead of delegating the task.

Hassel and Breslin's book draws from Patton's past to explain and justify why he made certain decisions. The book is a must read for military historians to gain an insight

into understanding Patton's decision making process.

MAJ Steven J. Swingle, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FORTRESS RABAU: The Battle for the Southwest Pacific, January 1942-April 1943, Bruce Gamble, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2010, 416 pages, \$28.00.

The massive base at Rabaul formed the lynchpin in Japanese operations in the southern Pacific, playing a key role in the famous battles of Guadalcanal, New Guinea, and the Philippines. For months, it was a staging point for Japanese expansion, threatening Australia and the fragile American presence in the southwest Pacific. Later, it would become a critical target in the Allies' effort to defeat the Japanese Empire.

Despite its title, Bruce Gamble's book focuses more on stories of individuals and small units involved in the air campaign against Rabaul than the operational significance of the base. Those interested in the tactical challenges of mounting an air campaign over a vast expanse such as the southwest Pacific will find the study interesting.

Well-versed in the nuts-and-bolts of air operations, Gamble illuminates the difference between the realities of the air campaign and what it looked like on a planner's map. Reading Gamble's recaps of air missions, one can understand why massive raids of heavy bombers often produced skimpy results. Particularly intriguing is the tendency of both sides to vastly exaggerate kill reports, shedding light on why supposedly "successful" air missions rarely produced decisive results. By extension, Gamble's observations can help explain why ground assaults were usually necessary to defeat Japanese island garrisons.

COL David D. DiMeo, USA, West Point, New York

BOMBER COUNTY: The Poetry of a Lost Pilot's War, Daniel Swift, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York, 2010, 269 pages, \$26.00.

He studies twisted props of disbelief

Wondering what ruin to touch . . .

—John Ciardi, "The Pilot in the Jungle"

Daniel Swift teaches literature, drama, and history at Skidmore College, in New York. During the Second World War, his grandfather, Royal Air Force (RAF) squadron leader Eric J. Swift, served as a pilot in a Lancaster bomber squadron. With the opening line of *Bomber County*, "The beach where the body washed up," the reader is confronted with the heavy toll of war as the author reveals with haunting intimacy that his grandfather vanished off the coast of Holland after a night raid on Muenster on 11 June 1943.

In his research, Swift, along with his father, accessed the lost pilot grandfather's logbooks, attended his old squadron's reunions, examined RAF and British government documents, and German wartime records kept by the cities his father had participated in bombing. Yet Swift's story is more comprehensive than indicated by the title and encompasses a wider field than the sole history of one man. Framed against this background, the author has woven a narrative from poetry, memoir, and biography, as well as literary, cinematic, classical, and military history sources. He sees bomber and bombing poetry as "always of the near distance, its suffering always at a remove . . . The bombed city was quick with literary imagining, and most of all with poetry." As such, Swift includes many excerpts of the finest poems of aerial bombardment that emerged from the war.

Much of Swift's research took place at the Imperial War Museum in London. Here, he uncovered a wealth of poems, unpublished prior to their appearance in *Bomber County*. They are valuable not for being great verse, but for their creative response to the deaths of

RAF bomber poets. Particularly poignant are many poems and letters of airmen who didn't survive the war, and letters addressed to a chaplain from family members of the missing or killed.

Poets took aesthetic regard of the rubble and ruins in the streets of London. In this regard, the first poetry he discusses at length is the haunting, liturgical-like quality of Dylan Thomas's verse, and the emergence of the wartime poems of T.S. Eliot. Virginia Woolf found the terror of it all mesmerizing, as it incited her literary imagination in the days before her suicide.

Swift engages not only British, but American poets as well, especially Army Air Corps poets Randall Jarrell, John Ciardi, and James Dickey. Human frailty and isolation amid war's machinery were these poets' dominant themes.

Throughout, Swift details not only the operational flying experiences of his grandfather, but also his brief excursions home, his letters to his wife, his airplane drawings for his son (Swift's father), all of which heighten the reader's sense of loss as the story proceeds.

The close of Swift's journey is a painstaking reconstruction of his grandfather's last mission, derived from facts and well-reasoned deductions. Swift made some amazing discoveries. His sources include intercepted German radio traffic transcripts, the diary of a Muenster doctor present during the city's bombing, the Royal Netherlands Air Force Salvage and Recovery Unit, a summer day's last annotation in an RAF squadron operations log: "S/Ldr Swift failed to return." On 17 June 1943, having drifted 20 miles in a northbound tide for six days, he came ashore in the middle of a Dutch holiday.

Bomber County comes with my highest recommendation for those interested not solely in aerial bombardment refracted through poetry, but for anyone truly interested in the wartime lives of participants and victims, especially lives affected forever by the European Allied bomber offensive. Swift's research

is refined and exhaustive. He tells a deeply human and heart-rending story, eloquently wrought.

Jeffrey C. Alfier,
Torrance, California

THE BERLIN-BAGHDAD EXPRESS: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power, Sean McMeekin, Belknap Press of Harvard, Cambridge, MA, 2010, 462 pages, \$29.95.

We tend to think of global jihad as a modern phenomenon, something that dates back to events as recent as the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and 9/11. However, in his new book, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, historian Sean McMeekin argues the first attempt to spread Islamic jihad around the globe dates back to World War I. The Allies and Central Powers wanted to bring the Ottoman Empire into the war on their side, Germany had a special interest in bringing the "Sublime Porte" into the conflict. German interest was based a geostrategic analysis conducted well before the war began.

It went like this. Whatever the weakness of the Ottoman regime, it was still the seat of the Islamic Caliphate with some degree of spiritual authority over all the world's Muslims. With the right incentives, this authority might serve as a powerful tool in war against the Kaiser's three imperial enemies, France, Russia, and Great Britain. The French ruled millions of Muslims in North Africa, the Russians ruled millions of Muslims in Central Asia, and the British had a hundred million Muslims within their Indian empire. If these Muslims could be inspired to rise up in holy war against their imperial masters, the effect might be decisive.

Thus, the chief title of the book is deceptive. The real topic of the book is not the railway that symbolized the German-Ottoman connection, but rather the Germans' attempt to use that connection to strike at the Kaiser's enemies around the world. However, as with so many ambitious schemes that cross disparate

cultures, the plan briefed better than it executed. Its chief author, a strange character named Baron von Oppenheim, failed to allow for the divisions within the Islamic world (particularly between the Turks and Arabs) as well as the long reach of British naval power and British gold. So, for example, when the Germans sought to recruit Ibn Saud into a war against the Allies, they found that the Arab leader was already on the British payroll. After courting the Sherif of Mecca, the Germans were thwarted by Lawrence and the Royal Navy's control of the sea routes to the holy city. When a German mission attempted to entice the Emir of Afghanistan into attacking India, they found they could not match British bribes.

McMeekin, who teaches at Bilkent University in Turkey, has used Ottoman, German, Russian, and British sources to create a fascinating account of a little known aspect of the "Great War." The book is full of colorful characters, daring exploits, and secret diplomacy. It reads well and provides invaluable perspective to today's headlines from the Middle East.

LTC Scott Stephenson, Ph.D.,
USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR, William Mulligan, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2010, 256 pages, \$24.99.

Few topics in historical debate are as contested as the causes of the First World War. William Mulligan, writing for Cambridge's *New Approaches to European History* series, admirably summarizes current scholarship on the topic. Mulligan refutes traditional explanations for the war. He argues that the war was not inevitable, but instead a unique breakdown of the usual restraints against war. Mulligan notes the incentives that European powers had against war. His approach is refreshing and enlightening, given the decades-long lull in fighting in Europe after the Franco-Prussian war.

Before 1914, there had been several wars between Serbia and its neighbors. Mulligan argues that concerted action by the Great Powers halted wars in the Balkans in 1912 and 1913, but that “self discipline in Vienna and St. Petersburg was [a] vital element in successful crisis management.” Similar discipline is visible in many of the colonial conflicts, such as the Moroccan Crisis. Mulligan correctly points out that self discipline likely happens only when the vital interests of the state are not at risk. Conflicting claims on tracts of Africa may lead to diplomatic crisis, but no European nation was willing to risk a general war for the Congo.

According to Mulligan, the July Crisis was a complete breakdown of early diplomatic and political norms. He places much of the blame

on Austria-Hungary. In 1914, Vienna placed Austria’s position in the Balkans above the general opinion of Europe and the general balance of power. Mulligan does not point out, as John Keegan does, that if Austria had acted unilaterally and quickly against Serbia after Franz-Ferdinand’s assassination rather than waiting for Germany’s “blank check,” Austria might have crushed Serbian independence without a European-wide escalation. The key flaw in 1914, Mulligan argues, was that the preservation of a military alliance had become an end in itself. Germany did not go to war to assist Austria-Hungary. Germany went to war simply to preserve its alliance. The same could be said of France. Mulligan rightly points out that much of the history of the prewar

period is a teleological search for causes for the First World War. This makes the turn of the century appear much more unstable than it probably was. Emphasizing peace and stability is somewhat counter-intuitive, considering the brutality and cost of the First World War. Mulligan’s suggested perspective on the 44-year peace between the Franco-Prussian war and the First World War, emphasizes that restraints to the use of power, great power diplomacy, and a period of increasing globalization. This helps put the period into its proper place and is consistent with the nostalgia for the stability of the prewar era common among post-war intellectuals.

**John E. Fahey,
Lafayette, Indiana**

MR Letters

William Thayer, *San Diego, CA*—I totally disagree with Jeffrey Sluka’s argument in “Death from Above: UAVs and Losing Hearts and Minds” (*Military Review*, May-June 2011) that UAVs targeting terrorists are a net loss in the War on Terror. Either we can let the terrorists sit with impunity in a sanctuary such as Waziristan or we can attack them. We could attack them on the ground

such as the Seal Team 6 attack on Osama bin-Laden. However, such attacks probably increase the negative response in Pakistan vs. UAVs. Furthermore, even though Seal Team 6 was very, very good, it is inevitable that there would be U.S. losses, and perhaps some troops would be captured, which would be a truly ugly hostage dilemma. If a UAV is “killed or even held hostage,” it is

a total non-event. Therefore, I totally support the current UAV operations.

Air Power and the subset of UAV operations give us a clear advantage over the terrorists. Since they cannot shoot them down (very often), they will try a propaganda campaign against them. Consequently, we will hear protests from Libya to Waziristan that planes or UAVs have attacked weddings or civilians.


MR We Recommend



THE GREAT BIG BOOK OF HORRIBLE THINGS: The Definitive Chronicle of History's 100 Worst Atrocities, Matthew White, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2011, 560 pages, \$35.00.

Evangelists of human progress meet their opposite in Matthew White's epic examination of history's one hundred most violent events, or, in White's piquant phrasing, "the numbers that people want to argue about." Reaching back to 480 BCE's second Persian War, White moves chronologically through history to this century's war in the Congo and devotes chapters to each event, where he surrounds hard facts (time and place) and succinct takeaways (who usually gets the blame?) with lively military, social, and political histories. With the eye of a seasoned statistician, White assigns each entry a ranking based on body count, and in doing so he gives voice to the suffering of ordinary people that, inexorably, has defined every historical epoch. By turns droll, insightful, matter-of-fact, and ultimately sympathetic to those who died, *The Great Big Book of Horrible Things* gives readers a chance to reach their own conclusions while offering a stark reminder of the darkness of the human heart.

From the Publisher.




HEARTS TOUCHED BY FIRE: The Best of Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, James M. McPherson, James I. Robertson, Jr., Stephen W. Sears, Craig L. Symonds, and Joan Waugh, Modern Library, New York, 2011, 1,264 pages, \$38.00.

In July 1883, just a few days after the twentieth anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg, a group of editors at *The Century Magazine* engaged in a lively argument: Which Civil War battle was the bloodiest battle of them all? One claimed it was Chickamauga, another Cold Harbor. The argument inspired a brainstorm: Why not let the magazine's 125,000 readers in on the conversation by offering "a series of papers on some of the great battles of the war to be written by officers in command on both sides."

Hearts Touched by Fire offers stunning accounts of the war's great battles written by the men who planned, fought, and witnessed them, from leaders such as General Ulysses S. Grant, General George McClellan, and Confederate captain Clement Sullivane to men of lesser rank. This collection also features new year-by-year introductions by esteemed historians who cast wise modern eyes on the cataclysm that changed America and would go down as the bloodiest conflict in our nation's history.

From the Publisher.



THE POLITICS OF PRISONER ABUSE: The United States and Enemy Prisoners after 9/11, David P. Forsythe, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2011, 334 pages, \$29.99.

When states are threatened by war and terrorism, can we really expect them to abide by human rights and humanitarian law? David P. Forsythe's bold analysis of U.S. policies toward terror suspects after 9/11 addresses this issue directly. Covering moral, political, and legal aspects, he examines the abuse of enemy detainees at the hands of the United States. Forsythe places the Bush administration at the center of the debate because it displayed disdain for international law, in contrast to the public's support for humanitarian affairs. Forsythe explores the similarities and differences between Presidents Obama and Bush on the question of prisoner treatment in an age of terrorism. The book traces the Pentagon's and CIA's records in mistreating prisoners, providing an account which will be of interest to all those who value human rights and humanitarian law.

From the Publisher.


U.S. Army Order of Battle, 1919–1941

LTC (Ret.) Steven E. Clay

2011

Combat Studies Institute Press

4 Volumes, 2902 pages



This order of battle is more than a simple listing of units. It is an encyclopedia of Army tactical organizations in existence during what has commonly become known as the “interwar” period. This four-volume set was written to fill a distinct void in the history of Army tactical units, especially those of the Organized Reserve (now U.S. Army Reserve). This comprehensive work details the history of every U.S. Army tactical organization from separate battalion to field army, as well as certain other major commands important to the administration and support of the Army. It includes the various units’ changes of station, commanding officers, training camps, accomplishments, and key events such as major maneuvers and, for National Guard units, active duty periods for state emergencies. Also included are maps showing command boundaries and charts illustrating the tables of organization germane to the organizations of the time. In short, this order of battle is the definitive reference for the historian who wishes to understand the history and organization of U.S. Army units between the World Wars.

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DAYS OF THE WEEK ARE DEAD TO ME

Days of the week are dead to me.
Monday, Friday, Sunday, Saturday;
They are all the same.
Days of the week are dead to me
And so they will remain.

The day I saw an IED
Through a Predator's eye
Take out that convoy of Humvees,
That day of that week
With me will remain.
The day I heard the "All Clear" call
After rockets fell from the sky,
That day I will remember, laugh a little and cry.

The day of the week that the sergeant killed
Five of his brothers over by Commo Hill,
I can't recall.
But that day of that week
Was the worst of all.
Days of the week are dead to me
And so they will remain.

But when I return
And enjoy the life
That blood has paid
Many times over and more the price,
I shall rejoice in the days I spend
With family and friends
And not worry about
What day it is, or what day will come,
Because they're all the same to me now
And I will cherish every one.

CPT Thomas J. Carnes, III
Brigade Provost Marshal, 56th IBCT
Texas Army National Guard

1LT Carnes was the night Battle Captain for the Victory Base Defense Operations Center, 11 May 2009, the night a distraught soldier opened fire in the counseling center at Camp Liberty, Baghdad, killing five. Creating art, such as poetry, can build resiliency by strengthening emotional and spiritual fitness.

