FEATURE: Can a Nuclear-Armed Iran Be Deterred?  p 117
Amitai Etzioni

The Operations Targeting and Effects Synchronization Process in Northern Iraq  p 29
Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen, Jr., U.S. Army; Colonel Thomas P. Guthrie, U.S. Army; and
Major Gregory L. Boylan, U.S. Army

Laboratory of Asymmetry: The 2006 Lebanon War and the Evolution of Iranian Ground Tactics  p 105
Captain Marc Lindemann, New York National Guard

Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti  p 2
Lieutenant General P.K. (Ken) Keen, U.S. Army; Major General Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto, Army of Brazil; Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Nolan, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel Jennifer L. Kimmey, U.S. Army; and Commander Joseph Althouse, U.S. Coast Guard
FEATURED ARTICLES

2  Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti

Twenty-six years after becoming friends, two general officers work together to provide relief and assistance to the earthquake-stricken country of Haiti.

13  At What Cost, Intelligence? A Case Study of the Consequences of Ethical (and Unethical) Leadership
   Major Douglas A. Pryer, U.S. Army

The “intelligence at any cost” mindset led some in our Army in Iraq to systematically violate the laws of war. We must prevent its reoccurrence.

29  The Operations Targeting and Effects Synchronization Process in Northern Iraq
   Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen, Jr., U.S. Army; Colonel Thomas P. Guthrie, U.S. Army; and Major Gregory L. Boylan, U.S. Army

In January 2008, the 25th Infantry Division headquarters revised longstanding organizational thinking to adapt its structure to new demands during its deployment.

38  The Revolution in Military Affairs: 12 Observations on an Out-of-Fashion Idea
   Lieutenant Colonel Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Retired

We should think twice about consigning the revolution in military affairs idea to the dustbin of history.

47  Medical Operations in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Desired Effects and Unintended Consequences
   Lieutenant Colonel Matthew S. Rice, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Omar J. Jones, U.S. Army

Battalion and brigade combat teams should not provide diagnostic and curative medical care to civilians, except in emergencies.

58  Harnessing Information Operations’ Potential Energy
   Captain Leonardo J. Flor, U.S. Army

On-scene control of information operations is vital when earning the population’s confidence.

65  Combat Advising in Iraq: Getting Your Advice Accepted
   Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Seagrist, U.S. Army

Tenets of combat advising and measures of effectiveness help in the training of future advisors and their commanders.

73  Achieving Excellence in Small-Unit Performance
   Lieutenant General Michael A. Vane, U.S. Army, and Colonel Robert Toguchi, U.S. Army

We can use advances in human dimension concepts and new decisionmaking tools to obtain a significant leap in small-unit performance.

82  The Parting of the Sulawesi Sea: U.S. Strategy and Transforming the Terrorist Triangle
   Charles “Ken” Comer

The Sulawesi Sea area—the Terrorist Transit Triangle—remains Pacific Command’s primary area of interest for counterterrorism.

Cover Photo: Iran’s Qadr 1 missile is displayed during a military parade to commemorate the beginning of the 1980-1988 war between Iran and Iraq, 22 September 2009, in Tehran, Iran. UPI/Maryam Rahmanian
88  Attack or Defend? Leveraging Information and Balancing Risk in Cyberspace
   Colonel Dennis M. Murphy, U.S. Army, Retired
   Will the Army develop an “Airland Battle” equivalent for cyberspace?

97  Information Operations as a Deterrent to Armed Conflict
   Colonel Blane R. Clark, U.S. Army, Retired
   Applying information operations as a deterrent to armed conflict holds considerable promise.

105 Laboratory of Asymmetry: The 2006 Lebanon War and the Evolution of Iranian Ground Tactics
   Captain Marc Lindemann, New York National Guard
   As negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program continue, the United States should acknowledge the evolution of Iran’s ground tactics and have a plan to address this reality.

INSIGHTS

117  Can a Nuclear-Armed Iran Be Deterred?
   Amitai Etzioni
   A military option targeted to suppress Iran’s nuclear ambitions may be the best answer in the long run.

BOOK REVIEWS

126  REVIEW ESSAY- Black Hearts: A Study in Leadership
   Lieutenant Colonel Paul Christopher, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Retired

130  REVIEWS
A 16:53 LOCAL time on 12 January 2010, a catastrophic 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti, killing over 230,000 people, injuring thousands of others, and leaving over a million people homeless. The earthquake caused major damage to the capital and other cities in the region and severely damaged or destroyed notable landmarks, including the presidential palace and the Port-au-Prince cathedral. The temblor destroyed 14 of the 16 government ministries, killing numerous government employees. The headquarters of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) collapsed, killing 101 UN workers, including Head of Mission Hédi Annabi from Tunisia and his principal deputy, Luiz Carlos da Costa from Brazil.

In less than a minute, life on the small island of Haiti drastically changed. The earthquake prompted offers to send aid and assistance in various forms from governments, nongovernmental organizations, and private foundations. The need for manpower on the ground to orchestrate the relief effort brought together military forces from the world over, to include the United States, which stood up Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H). The combined effort of MINUSTAH and JTF-H in providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Haiti following the earthquake demonstrates the importance of developing strong relationships, both institutional and personal, with partner nation armies.

U.S. and Partner Nation Militaries: A History of Cooperation

Eighteen contributing nations make up the military component of the UN mission in Haiti. These nations include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, India, Jordan, Nepal, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, the United States, and Uruguay. The United States has a long and distinguished history of partnership and
cooperation conducting full spectrum operations with various partner nations. Three notable examples include offensive operations during the Italian Campaign in World War II, humanitarian assistance during the 1965 civil war in the Dominican Republic, and peacekeeping operations in Ecuador and Peru in 1995.

Brazil was the only South American country to send troops to fight in World War II. They formed a 25,000-man Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) made up of Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel led by General Mascarenhas de Moraes. The FEB’s 1st Division, under General Zenóbio da Costa, consisted of three regimental combat teams that fought alongside the U.S. Fifth Army under the command of Lieutenant General Mark Clark in the Italian Campaign. The highlight of Brazil-U.S. cooperation came in February 1945 when Brazil’s 1st Division and the U.S. 10th Mountain Division fought side-by-side in the Battle of Monte Castelo against the German Army under extremely adverse winter conditions. The 10th Mountain Division, supported by Brazilian artillery and the FEB’s 1st Fighter Squadron, captured German defenses surrounding Monte Castelo, allowing the Brazil 1st Division to attack the German forces on higher ground and successfully take control of Monte Castelo itself. Later in the campaign, the FEB also distinguished itself by capturing over 20,000 German and Italian prisoners to help end hostilities in Italy. By the end of the war, over 900 FEB soldiers had paid the ultimate sacrifice with their lives.

The 1965 civil war in the Dominican Republic led to another cooperative effort between the United States and several Latin American countries. The XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters was activated on 26 April 1965 and three battalions from the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, deployed on 30 April and landed at San Isidro Airfield. After intense fighting that day, a cease-fire was established and the paratroopers soon transitioned to peacekeeping and stabilization efforts distributing food, water, and medicine to the residents of San Isidro. A fourth battalion from the 82d’s 1st Brigade joined

An aerial view of the MINUSTAH HQ building that collapsed after the earthquake, 12 January 2010.
the other three on 3 May. That month, the forces present saw the transition to an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). The IAPF consisted of troops from Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Brazil—with Brazil providing the largest contingent, a reinforced infantry battalion. Brazilian Army General Hugo Panasco Alvim assumed command of the Inter-American Peace Force with U.S. Army Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer serving as his deputy from 23 May 1965 to 17 January 1966. During this time, U.S. paratroopers worked in unison with the Organization of American States (OAS) forces in the area of civil affairs providing humanitarian aid to the people of San Isidro.

More recently, the United States worked together with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile on a smaller scale in “Operation Safe Border.” In early 1995, Peru and Ecuador engaged in sustained combat in a remote jungle area where they had not fully demarcated the border. Dozens were killed, hundreds wounded, and escalation of the conflict to population centers was feared. As guarantors of the 1942 Rio Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries, which ended the 1941 Ecuador-Peru war and defined the border, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States worked for a comprehensive settlement by establishing the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP). Brazil offered to provide a general officer to lead the observer mission and the other participating nations agreed to define this role as “coordinator” rather than “commander” to preserve a coequal status. Each nation contributed up to 10 officers led by a colonel, as observers. The United States also provided an element consisting of aviation, operations, intelligence, communications, and logistical support. The Brazilian general, Lieutenant General Candido Vargas de Freire, held operational control over the observers of all four nations while the colonels retained command for administrative and disciplinary purposes. In February 1995, Ecuador and Peru agreed to seek a peaceful solution. By October 1995, MOMEP observers organized the withdrawal of some 5,000 troops from the Cenepa valley and supervised the demobilization of 140,000 troops on both sides. The combat zone was demilitarized and Ecuador and Peru began to contribute officers to the observer mission. In October 1998, Peru and Ecuador signed a comprehensive peace accord establishing the framework for ending the border dispute. This led to the formal demarcation of the border in May 1999. Both nations approved the peace agreement and the national legislatures of both nations ratified it. The MOMEP mission withdrew in June 1999.

The United States continues to engage in security cooperation activities with countries from all over the world. These engagements take the form of bilateral staff talks, multinational exercises, and personnel and unit exchanges to improve relationships, capabilities, and interoperability.

Personal Relationships Also Matter

In addition to cultivating institutional relationships between partner nations, one cannot overlook the importance of developing personal relationships as well. The better we understand each other in terms of culture, language, and operability, the better we will be able to work together. Understanding this dynamic, the U.S. Army has sought to develop a corps of officers and noncommissioned officers that have an in-depth understanding of the culture, language, and military organization of other nations, all toward enhancing interoperability.

The relationship between Major General Floriano Peixoto, the MINUSTAH force commander, and Lieutenant General Ken Keen, the JTF-H commander, exemplifies this goal. In October 1984, then-Captain Keen, S3 Operations Officer for 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, participated in a one-month exchange program with the Brazil Airborne Brigade in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. During the exchange, Keen met then-Captain Floriano Peixoto, assigned to the Airborne Brigade as a Pathfinder instructor. The two initiated what would become a long-standing relationship developed over several parachute jumps and dismounted patrols. Little did either junior officer know that 26 years later they would be general officers working together to provide relief and assistance to earthquake-stricken Haiti.

In 1987, then-Major Keen attended Brazil’s Command and General Staff Course in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The experience gave Keen a greater appreciation and understanding of Brazil, something that would serve him well in future assignments.

In 1988, then-Captain Floriano Peixoto attended the U.S. Army Infantry Officer Advanced Course at
Fort Benning, Georgia. At the time, then-Major Keen worked in the Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization for the U.S. Army Infantry School, and the two continued the relationship they established four years before.

Almost a decade later, then-Lieutenant Colonel Floriano Peixoto taught Portuguese in the Department of Foreign Languages at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. Floriano Peixoto and Keen maintained contact via email, letters, and phone calls, but they would not see each other for another decade.

From 2006 to 2007, as the commander of U.S. Army South, then-Brigadier General Keen worked once again with then-Colonel Floriano Peixoto, who was assigned to the Brazilian Army Staff G5 International Affairs Directorate.

Based on their previous interaction and personal relationship, the first thing Major General Floriano Peixoto and Lieutenant General Keen did when they were brought together by events in Haiti was sit down and develop a combined concept for working through the challenge together.

The UN in Haiti

To understand the international partnering that took place during the Haiti humanitarian relief effort, an understanding of the history that led up to MINUSTAH’s establishment, and its accomplishments prior to the earthquake, is essential.

in Haiti’s history. Aristide took office in February 1991, but was overthrown by dissatisfied elements of the army and forced to leave the country in September of the same year. A provisional government was established, but the true power remained with the Haitian military.  

The UN established a mandate in September 1993 to assist in the effort to democratize the government, professionalize the armed forces, create and train a separate police force, and establish an environment conducive to free and fair elections. The UN effort focused on advising, training, and providing the necessary support to achieve the goals set by the mandate. After a series of incidents, the UN and other international agencies left Haiti in October 1993 due to the instability created by the transitional government and the inability to move forward with the UN goals of reinstating democracy.  

The situation in Haiti continued to decline; diplomacy and economic sanctions had no effect. The United States saw no other option than to initiate military action to reinstate President Aristide. It began “Operation Uphold Democracy” on 19 September 1994 with the alert of U.S. and allied forces for a forced entry into Haiti. U.S. Navy and Air Force elements deployed for staging to Puerto Rico and southern Florida. An airborne invasion was planned, spearheaded by elements of U.S. Special Operations Command and the 82d Airborne Division.  

As these forces prepared to invade, a diplomatic team (led by former President Jimmy Carter, retired U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, and retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell) persuaded the leaders of Haiti to step down and allow Aristide to return to power. This effort was successful partly because the U.S. delegation was able to reference the massed forces poised to enter the country. At that point, the military mission changed from a combat operation to a peacekeeping and nation building operation with the deployment of a U.S.-led multinational force in Haiti. On 15 October 1994, Aristide returned to Haiti to complete his term in office. Aristide disbanded the Haitian army and established a civilian police force. Operation Uphold Democracy officially ended on 31 March 1995 when the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) replaced it.  

The UN remained in Haiti through a series of mandates until 2004 to maintain a secure and stable environment and promote the rule of law. There were a number of positive developments during this period, including the growth of a multifaceted civil society, a political culture based on democratic values, and the first peaceful handover of power between two democratically elected presidents in 1996.  

However, in February 2004, during Aristide’s second unsuccessful term as president, a violent rebellion broke out that led to Aristide’s removal from office once more. Haiti again threatened international peace and security in the region, and the UN passed resolution 1542 on 30 April 2004, effectively establishing the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) on 1 June 2004. Its mandate even now is to support a secure and stable transitional government, the development of a political process focused on the principles of democracy, and the defense of human rights.  

The United Nations originally authorized MINUSTAH up to 6,700 military personnel, 1,622 police, 548 international civilian personnel, 154 volunteers, and 995 local civilian staff. On 13 October 2009, in an effort to curb illegal armed groups, accelerate their disarmament, and support the upcoming elections, the UN increased MINUSTAH’s authorized strength to 6,940 military personnel and 2,211 police. Eighteen countries currently provide military personnel and 41 different countries provide police officers.  

MINUSTAH is under the civilian leadership of a special representative to the secretary general, with two deputies that oversee different aspects of the UN mission. The principal deputy is primarily responsible for the UN civilian police, human rights, justice, civil affairs, and electoral issues. The other deputy is responsible for humanitarian efforts on behalf of gender equality, children’s rights, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, HIV/AIDS issues, and other UN agencies. The military force commander is also under the special representative’s control. The military force consists of ten infantry battalions, two separate infantry companies, and eight specialized detachments (military police, engineers, aviation, medical, and logistics).  

Since 2004, MINUSTAH has created an environment of security and stability that has allowed the
political transition to unfold. Haiti reminds us that security and development are inextricably linked and should not be viewed as separate spheres, because the absence of one will undermine progress in the other. To that end, the professionalizing of the Haitian National Police is close to reaching its goal of having 14,000 officers in its ranks by 2011. By mid 2009, over 9,000 police had been trained.\(^{15}\)

Another measure of success has been the drastic decrease in the gang-related activity that threatened political stability. In Cité Soleil, the most infamous slum district in Haiti, MINUSTAH troops took over the main gang’s operations center and transformed it into a health clinic, which now offers free services to the community. This new level of security, established in 2007, allows agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to approach, assess, and provide assistance without the threat of gang violence.\(^{16}\)

The senate elections in April 2009 marked another step in Haiti’s democratic development. MINUSTAH is credited for its continued support to Haiti’s electoral process and assisting the Government of Haiti in intensifying its efforts to promote a political dialogue in which all voices can speak and be heard.\(^{17}\)

Haiti postponed legislative elections set for February 2010 due to the disastrous effects of the earthquake and has scheduled presidential elections for November 2010. President Préval, who was elected a second time in 2006, said he would not seek office again after his term expires in February 2011, as he has already served two five-year terms, the limit set by Haitian law.\(^{18}\)

While all the troop-contributing countries to MINUSTAH share these successes, U.S. government officials have praised Brazil’s leadership role in the UN mission as a welcome demonstration of Brazil’s emergence as a leader in regional and global arenas.\(^{19}\)

**Earthquake and International Response**

When the earthquake hit on 12 January, it instantly affected a third of the population of Haiti, including those serving in MINUSTAH.\(^{20}\) Immediately after the quake, hundreds of local citizens flocked to the MINUSTAH headquarters compound located in the old Christopher Hotel. The main part of the building had collapsed, killing numerous UN staff members and trapping several others. Staff members that had escaped injury immediately engaged in the search and rescue of colleagues and provided triage and medical care to the walking wounded. Although MINUSTAH suffered enormous losses, MINUSTAH troops quickly took on new tasks such as search and rescue, clearing and opening of streets, providing immediate humanitarian assistance, and preparing mass graves following International Red Cross protocols—all while maintaining focus on their primary security mission.

Lieutenant General Keen was in Haiti on a pre-planned visit on 12 January. Minutes before the earthquake struck, he was with U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Ken Merten on the back porch of his residence overlooking the city of Port-au-Prince. The Ambassador’s residence withstood the quake and quickly became an assembly point for embassy personnel and Haitian government ministers as well as Keen’s link back to U.S. Southern Command in Miami.

Within hours of the quake, the Government of Haiti issued a disaster declaration and requested humanitarian assistance from both the U.S. and the international community at large. That night, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance activated a “response management team” to coordinate and lead the federal government’s effort.\(^{21}\)

The next morning, Keen surveyed the effects of the quake. Rubble from collapsed buildings choked the streets, cutting people off from food, water, and medical supplies. The earthquake had destroyed the control tower at the international airport, making it impossible to fly in assistance. The people of Haiti had to rely on their own devices to survive. Having MINUSTAH already on the ground was a huge benefit, but with the destruction of the UN headquarters and the loss of its senior civilian leadership, the response required was greater than any one organization or country could shoulder on its own. Seeing that the situation demanded

---

**Within hours of the quake, the Government of Haiti issued a disaster declaration and requested humanitarian assistance...**
rapid and robust action, General Keen requested the deployment of U.S. military forces to Haiti.

Early on, the United States decided not to create a combined Joint task force. With the UN already on the ground, a robust multinational force was in place. In addition, MINUSTAH countries contributing additional resources and personnel already had links to their local UN representatives. Creating a combined Joint task force would have conflicted with those efforts. Instead, Joint Task Force-Haiti deployed to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations. The purpose of Joint Task Force-Haiti was to support U.S. efforts in Haiti to mitigate near-term human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facilitate transition to the Government of Haiti, the UN, and USAID. The military possesses significant capabilities that are useful in emergencies, but long-term plans for relief and reconstruction are best left to nonmilitary government agencies.

Major General Floriano Peixoto was out of the country when the earthquake hit. Upon learning of the disaster, he quickly returned to Haiti on 13 January. He took immediate action to reconstitute command and control by establishing an emergency operations center at the MINUSTAH logistics base at the Port-au-Prince Airport. He redistributed his forces by bringing troops from less-affected or unaffected parts of the country into the capital region and downtown Port-au-Prince.

The next day, Keen went to see Floriano Peixoto at his temporary headquarters to exchange information on the relief efforts and the pending arrival of U.S. forces in Haiti. Dropping in unannounced was against normal protocol, but it seemed necessary at the time. As Keen walked into the headquarters, he learned from a Brazilian colonel that Brazilian Minister of Defense Jobim was assembled with his Brazil service commanders and the MINUSTAH staff. Not wanting to interrupt, Keen was about to leave when the Brazilian colonel insisted he join Jobim, Floriano Peixoto, and the Brazilian contingent. The meeting became a unique opportunity as the Brazilian commander of MINUSTAH provided a detailed report of ongoing humanitarian assistance efforts and the loss of 18 Brazilian soldiers, the biggest loss of life for its armed forces since World War II. Jobim asked Keen what forces the U.S. military might deploy. The discussion then centered on how MINUSTAH and U.S. forces might work together and coordinate their efforts. Both leaders knew it was imperative to clearly identify the role of each partner to avoid confusion and duplicated effort. MINUSTAH’s mission of providing security and stability in Haiti would remain as it was. JTF-H would provide humanitarian assistance with U.S. forces executing security tasks only while carrying out such operations.

From this beginning, it was clear that U.S. forces would operate within the envelope of a safe and secure environment provided by the UN forces whose mission was to provide security. While it was recognized this was a permissive environment, it was also a very uncertain time with the chaos following the earthquake, the lack of Haiti National Police presence on the streets, and the escape of over 3,000 prisoners from local prisons.

Floriano Peixoto and Keen later agreed that the most effective way to operate would be combining forces whenever possible. This early dialogue set the stage for the combined operations that followed. They coordinated shared sectors, administered distribution points for food, and provided other humanitarian assistance. To increase communication between their staffs, Floriano Peixoto and Keen established liaison officers in each headquarters. Both organizations also exchanged phone numbers and email addresses of all their branch and section chiefs, senior aides, and advisors. To increase understanding and ensure transparency, both organizations conducted staff briefings for each other during the first week on the ground.

Immediate offers for assistance continued to come in from around the world. Many troop-contributing countries offered additional troops. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Caribbean Community offered to join in the UN effort. Bilateral contributions came from France, Italy, Spain, Canada, and the Netherlands. On 19 January, exactly one week after the earthquake, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1908. The resolution authorized an increase of 3,500 peacekeepers (2,000 military and 1,500 police) due to additional security risks created by the local government’s incapacity and the resulting 20 percent decrease in the effectiveness of the local police. It took time to deploy these additional troops and engineers, but the rapid deployment of U.S. forces helped fill the time gap.
The United States first deployed Special Operations Air Force personnel to open the airfield and manage the huge influx of aid delivered by air. The JTF-H quickly established its headquarters with members of the Southern Command Standing Joint Headquarters and the XVIII Airborne Corps staff. A brigade from the 82d Airborne Division deployed to Port-au-Prince, and the 22d and 24th Marine Expeditionary Units deployed to provide assistance to the west and north of the capital. Ships and aircraft from the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, including the USNS Comfort hospital ship, also deployed. Joint Task Force-Haiti established a “port opening” task force so humanitarian assistance could arrive by sea. By the end of January, the U.S. had deployed more than 22,000 civilian and military personnel (about 7,000 on land and the rest afloat), 16 ships, and 58 aircraft. A robust Joint logistics command also supported the entire effort.

**JTF-H Organization**

The Department of Defense designated the effort as Operation Unified Response. With MINUSTAH responsible for security, JTF-H focused on saving lives and mitigating human suffering. The operation had two primary phases with different priorities for each. Phase I (initial response) lasted from 14 January to 4 February. The priorities were—

- Restore medical capacity.
- Distribute shelter, food, and water.
- Integrate with MINUSTAH and NGOs.
- Support Haitians.

Critical tasks included opening both the airport and seaport so that humanitarian aide could get into the country.

Phase II (relief) began on 5 February. After addressing emergency needs in phase I, it was time to transition to a more deliberate plan. As the government got on its feet and more nongovernmental organizations established themselves in the country, the focus became transitioning JTF-H responsibilities to them. Early on, JTF-H established a humanitarian assistance coordination cell to coordinate its humanitarian assistance efforts with the UN. Phase II priorities shifted to—

- Support efforts to provide shelter, establish settlements, and conduct debris removal.
- Transition JTF-H humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts to capable partners when ready.
- Plan, coordinate, and prepare to execute a phased transition to smaller but longer-term force structure and operations.

**Partnering on the Ground**

With transparency and coordination already established at the operational level between Floriano Peixoto and Keen, and roles clearly defined between MINUSTAH and JTF-H, the conditions were set to coordinate at the tactical level. As units from the 82d Airborne Division arrived in Port-au-Prince, commanders at the battalion and company level linked up with their MINUSTAH counterparts. Each MINUSTAH unit was at a different stage in deployment, but its knowledge of the area and experience on the ground put it in a position to greatly assist the newly arrived paratroopers. MINUSTAH units helped the paratroopers quickly understand their operating environment and gain situational awareness by conducting combined patrols to learn their sectors.

In one example, U.S. Soldiers patrolling with their Brazilian counterparts came across a crowd that had stacked piles of stones in the streets. The paratroopers with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan interpreted this as a roadblock and quickly responded by stopping the vehicles and pushing out security. The Brazilian soldiers, who knew that these people were simply using the rocks to carve out a space to live in the street, quickly explained to the paratroopers what was going on and assured them that there was no immediate threat.

One of the best examples of coordination and cooperation began on 31 January when MINUSTAH and JTF-H troops initiated a combined operation to deliver food and water to the population of Port-au-Prince. The World Food Program—in partnership with the USAID, International Organization on Migration, United Nations Children’s Fund, and numerous NGOs—led this 14-day food drive using 16 distribution points run by MINUSTAH and U.S. forces. Soldiers from various nations worked together, learned from each other, and showed the people of Haiti that the relief effort was truly an international mission. During the first food surge, the food drive delivered more than 10,000 tons of food to over 2.2 million people, a task that would...
have been impossible had not multiple countries worked together.

On 12 January, over 3,000 prisoners escaped from prisons damaged by the earthquake and fled to Cité Soleil.25 A troop from 1-73 Cavalry shared responsibility for Cité Soleil with a Brazilian platoon, increasing troop presence by a factor of four. In addition to increasing the sense of security for the local Haitians, this allowed the Brazilian platoon to focus its efforts on capturing the escaped prisoners while 1-73 focused on humanitarian assistance and supported the Brazilian platoon with information sharing.

MINUSTAH and JTF-H clearly defined their roles for the operation. MINUSTAH was responsible for security. On any given day, MINUSTAH conducted, on average, more than 600 security operations involving over 4,500 troops. MINUSTAH also planned and conducted relief operations. The JTF-H focus was on saving lives, mitigating near-term human suffering, and accelerating relief efforts. As aforementioned, security operations conducted by JTF-H were in direct support of humanitarian assistance missions such as securing food distribution points, relief convoys, and rubble removal. When JTF-H identified a security issue not linked to a humanitarian assistance mission, they coordinated with MINUSTAH through established relationships and responded accordingly.

Relationships Matter

The international military cooperation witnessed during the Haiti relief effort was a unique experience. Two factors had a major influence in the success of the mission.

First, MINUSTAH had already been in Haiti conducting security operations since 2004.26 Having a professional, multinational force on the ground with experience and situational awareness facilitated the response of MINUSTAH and other countries that assisted. MINUSTAH’s existing working relationships with the government also helped accelerate and expedite the processes of disaster relief.

While the UN does not have an established presence in every country where the United States will
conduct operations in the future, the combined exercises we conduct with partner nations around the world provide an important opportunity to learn about each other and how each army operates. Working together during exercises enhances interoperability and will facilitate combined efforts when real world events bring us together.

Second, Floriano Peixoto and Keen’s 26-year personal relationship—with a solid base of trust, confidence, and friendship—provided clear evidence of the effectiveness of our International Military Education Training (IMET) Program and exchanges. Finding two general officers with this preexisting relationship is definitely not the norm, but this case highlights the importance of providing officers and NCOs with opportunities to meet soldiers from other countries, learn about their cultures and languages, and come to understand other world perspectives. Doing so will facilitate future combined operations by developing relationships of trust and understanding.

Lessons Learned

Two months into the relief operation, Floriano Peixoto and Keen reflected on what they thought made a difference during the combined operation. Floriano Peixoto commented that clearly defining and understanding the role that each partner was to play in the relief effort was key. When asked what made this possible, he responded, “Trust.” Based on the relationship they had shared, neither needed a signed document that articulated each partner’s role. A statement of principles was later developed, but only to provide organizations outside the participating military forces an explanation of how MINUSTAH and JTF-H worked together.

Keen commented that the combined military presence on the streets of Port-au-Prince made a difference. “Seeing U.S. Army Soldiers standing side-by-side with MINUSTAH Soldiers at food distribution points during the first few weeks sent a strong message to the Haitian people: partnership and unity of effort. It paved the way for all we would do.”

Floriano Peixoto added that another contributing factor was “coordination.” Keen met Floriano Peixoto the same day he arrived in Haiti, and they immediately decided both organizations would be completely open and transparent with no classified briefs.

When asked why relationships matter, Floriano Peixoto responded, “Relationships are a force multiplier. They are essential if you want substantive results. You increase the speed of achieving results by facilitating, forming, and reinforcing relationships. You need to build these associations at all levels of the organization.”

Keen added, “Fundamentally, in peace or war we need to trust one another. We learn to trust each other through building a strong relationship, personal and professional. That is the key to building an effective team that works toward a common purpose. In Haiti, this proved to be the case within our own military and with our interagency partners, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign partners. When tough issues were encountered, their strong relationships broke down the barriers.”
Keen added, “If our government had one more dollar to spend on security assistance, I would recommend it be spent on the IMET program, not hardware.”

The success of the multinational military contribution to the Haiti relief effort proves that relationships matter—both at the institutional and the personal level. **MR**
At What Cost, Intelligence?
A Case Study of the Consequences of Ethical (and Unethical) Leadership

Major Douglas A. Pryer, U.S. Army

We must remember who we are. Our example is what will cause us to prevail in this environment, not our weapons.
—Major General Martin Dempsey, commander, 1st Armored Division, 30 October 2003, email to his brigade commanders

Tough up, man. This is how the Army does things.
—unidentified interrogator, Forward Operating Base Tiger, in response to a military policeman’s concern about enhanced interrogation techniques

THE SUMMER OF 2003 was a hot, frustrating time for coalition forces in Iraq. In Baghdad, Soldiers experienced temperatures over 100° F for 91 consecutive days. Far worse, contrary to the expectations of most Soldiers and their military and political leaders, the Iraqi insurgency was not only active but growing rapidly in size and lethality across the country. In July, coalition forces experienced twice the number of attacks they had experienced in June. And in August, the country witnessed the rise of “vehicle-borne explosive device” attacks, including a suicide car bombing on 11 August 2003 in Baghdad that killed 11 people and closed the Jordanian Embassy. U.S. Soldiers’ hopes for returning home by Christmas had evaporated in Iraq’s summer heat.

It was in this environment that a military intelligence (MI) captain working in the CJ2X (intelligence) section of Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) sent a 14 August 2003 email to the human intelligence (HUMINT) section leaders of CJTF-7’s major subordinate commands. In the opening salvo of what would become a battle for the soul of CJTF-7’s HUMINT community, the captain requested a “wish list” from subordinates of interrogation techniques they “felt would be effective.” He stated, “The gloves are coming off . . . regarding these detainees.” He said that “the Deputy CJ2 has made it clear that we want these individuals broken.” He concluded, “Casualties are mounting, and we need to start gathering info to help protect our fellow Soldiers from any further attacks.”

This email evoked strongly worded, antithetical responses from the two ideological “camps” of CJTF-7’s HUMINT sections. One camp (to which the CJ2X captain clearly belonged) included Chief Warrant Officer 3 Lewis Welshofer, Jr., of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and an unidentified
HUMINT leader of the 4th Infantry Division. The other camp was represented by Major Nathan Hoepner, the operations officer of the 501st MI Battalion Task Force, 1st Armored Division. The units of all three of these officers operated in the “Sunni Triangle,” the most dangerous part of Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I.

In his reply to the CJ2X captain’s email, Welshofer wrote that “a baseline interrogation technique” should include “open handed facial slaps from a distance of no more than about two feet and back handed blows to the midsection from a distance of about 18 inches.” He also added: “Close confinement quarters, sleep deprivation, white noise, and a litany of harsher fear-up approaches . . . fear of dogs and snakes appear to work nicely. I firmly agree that the gloves need to come off.” The unidentified 4th Infantry Division HUMINT leader submitted a “wish list” that included some of the same techniques, but added “stimulus deprivation,” “pressure point manipulation,” “close-fist strikes,” “muscle fatigue induction,” and “low voltage electrocution.”

In his returning salvo from the other camp, Major Hoepner replied:

As for “the gloves need to come off” . . . we need to take a deep breath and remember who we are . . . Those gloves are . . . based on clearly established standards of international law to which we are signatories and in part the originators . . . something we cannot just put aside when we find it inconvenient . . . We have taken casualties in every war we have ever fought—that is part of the very nature of war. We also inflict casualties, generally many more than we take. That in no way justifies letting go of our standards. We have NEVER considered our enemies justified in doing such things to us. Casualties are part of war—if you cannot take casualties then you cannot engage in war. Period. BOTTOM LINE: We are American Soldiers, heirs of a long tradition of staying on the high ground. We need to stay there.

We Americans, Hoepner was clearly saying, adhere to moral standards that are more important to us than simply winning one battle: to forfeit these standards is to lose our identity as American Soldiers.

The Two Rival Camps: Background

The “intelligence at any cost” mindset of the first camp above has enjoyed a much longer (and more potent) life in U.S. military history than is commonly understood. For example, during the Philippine-American War, the 1902 Senate Committee on the Philippines documented U.S. troops’ systematic use of the “water cure,” a harsher, often fatal version of what we today know as “waterboarding.” More recently, many CIA and U.S. military advisors in the U.S.’s controversial “Phoenix Program” during the Vietnam War did not attempt to stop, and in a few cases even encouraged, the use of torture (including electric shock) by South Vietnamese intelligence officials. In both instances, U.S. Soldiers rationalized that the need for actionable intelligence justified torture.

In its purest form, this rationale is the “ticking time bomb scenario.” In a 2001 interview, French General Paul Aussaresses, a senior French intelligence officer during the French-Algerian War, expressed this rationale as follows:

Imagine for an instant that you are opposed to the concept of torture and you arrest someone who is clearly implicated in the preparation of a terrorist attack. The suspect refuses to talk. You do not insist. A particularly murderous attack is launched. What will you say to the parents of the victims, to the parents of an infant, for example, mutilated by the bomb to justify the fact that you did not utilize all means to make the suspect talk?

Forty years later, CJTF-7, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 4th Infantry Division HUMINT leaders similarly argued that, to save lives, the “gloves” were “coming off” with regard to interrogation techniques.

However, this camp does not represent the dominant tradition within U.S. military history. When Major Hoepner argued that Americans are governed by moral standards, he was speaking from this dominant tradition, a tradition as old as the establishment of America's first colony. In a 1630 sermon, John Winthrop told Puritan colonists (who were soon to disembark from the Arbella and found the Massachusetts Bay Colony) that they should “do justly” and “love mercy” and that their new colony should be “as a city upon a hill” for the rest of the world to watch.
and emulate. Similarly, during the Revolutionary War, leaders of the Continental Army and Congress judged that it was not enough to win the war; they had “to win in a way that was consistent with the values of their society and the principles of their cause.” General George Washington applied this ideal to the treatment of British and Hessian prisoners, adopting an uncommon policy of humanity. In one written order, for example, he directed that 211 British captives be treated “with humanity” and be given “no reason to Complain of our Copying the brutal example of the British army in their Treatment of our unfortunate brethren.” During the more than two centuries that have passed since the Revolutionary War, the U.S. Army’s treatment of its enemies has been largely consistent with this tradition of humanity, with such wars as the Philippine-American War and various Indian wars representing racially motivated exceptions to this rule.

**Case Study Hypothesis**

The decision that may be most critical to the ultimate effectiveness of U.S. leaders in combat is will we let our ideals govern us and reside in the “city upon the hill?” Or, will we attempt to live hidden from view in the “end-justifies-the-means camp?” (Leaders may try to stand in the middle, but they must beware this hill’s slippery slope and watch their footing carefully.) This critical decision may take place downrange, or it may occur months, years, or even decades before deployment. Ultimately, no decision may be more important to a U.S. combat leader than this choice.

This essay uses the case study methodology to explore the hypothesis that the essential ethical position assumed by leaders is the most important determinant of the level of detainee abuse in interrogation units and these units’ strategic effectiveness on today’s battlefield. Perhaps, investigations...
that attributed interrogation abuse to over-crowded detention facilities, untrained guards, immature interrogators, or any of the plethora of other reasons often cited got it wrong. The fundamental reason why interrogation abuse in Iraq occurred may have been a failure in ethical leadership. It may have been that simple.

Continuing the storylines begun with the email exchange above will prove (or disprove) the essay’s hypothesis. If the hypothesis is correct, then interrogation facilities influenced by the CJTF-7, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 4th Infantry Division HUMINT leaders who decided that the “gloves” were “coming off” should have escalated to serious detainee abuse, and conversely, the Task Force 1st Armored Division (TF 1AD) detention facility should have remained relatively free of allegations of abuse. Once this hypothesis is validated, it is applied to the present to indicate what steps our Army still needs to take to prevent future interrogation abuse and the strategic defeat such abuse may create.

We start this experiment with CJTF-7.

**Strategic Defeat at Abu Ghraib**

The head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Paul Bremer, approved coalition use of Abu Ghraib Prison on 3 July 2003. Due to the prison’s notoriety as a site of torture and execution during Saddam Hussein’s regime, Bremer approved the reopening with the understanding that the prison would only be used until a new facility could be built. However, the commanding general of CJTF-7, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, directed that CJTF-7 interrogation operations be consolidated at the facility (now deemed an enduring facility) by 1 October 2003. This decision was probably driven by the perishable nature of intelligence and the fact that Camp Bucca, the Theater Internment Facility, was a full day’s drive south of Baghdad on Iraq’s border with Kuwait.

The Abu Ghraib facility had grave problems from the beginning. It was in a dangerous area and regularly received mortar fire, sometimes with catastrophic results: on 16 August 2003, a mortar attack killed five detainees and injured 67 others. On 20 September 2003, a mortar attack killed two U.S. Soldiers and injured 11 others (including the commander of the Joint Interrogation Center). The facility also rapidly grew overcrowded, holding 7,000 detainees by October 2003. The crowding caused severe undermanning, with just 90 military policemen managing the detainee population—far less than the full battalion that doctrine required for a detainee population of this size.

Alpha Company, 519th MI Battalion, supplied the first group of interrogators at the facility. Fately, this company had served in Afghanistan during the December 2002-January 2003 time period when some enhanced interrogation techniques derived from American “survival, evasion, resistance, and escape” (SERE) training had been systematically employed in Afghanistan. In fact, Criminal Investigation Division agents were in the process of substantiating charges that two of the company’s interrogators had contributed to the brutal treatment and deaths of two detainees on 4 and 10 December 2002 at Bagram Air Base. These same two interrogators later sexually assaulted a female detainee at Abu Ghraib on 7 October 2003.

A few weeks after the CJTF-7 J2X had requested a “wish list” of interrogation techniques, CJTF-7 published its first approved techniques. This 14 September 2003 interrogation policy included three harsh techniques that two HUMINT leaders had advocated via email, namely, “sleep management,” “presence of military working dogs,” and “yelling, loud music, and light control.” It also included other enhanced interrogation techniques inspired by military SERE schools. These other techniques were “stress positions,” “isolation,” “environmental manipulation,” “false flag,” and “dietary manipulation.” The use of three of these techniques required the personal approval of the CJTF-7 commander when employed on enemy prisoners of war. However, since the vast majority of U.S. detainees in Iraq were not enemy prisoners of war (captured enemy soldiers) but civilian internees (suspected insurgents and criminals), there was some confusion as to the applicability of this restriction.

Upon review, Central Command deemed CJTF-7’s interrogation policy to be “unacceptably aggressive.” Therefore, CJTF-7 published a new policy on 10 October 2003. Unfortunately, some interrogators, most notably at CJTF-7’s new “Baghdad Central Correctional Facility” at Abu Ghraib, considered these new guidelines to be nearly as permissive as they had viewed the guidance of the
September policy memo. This permissive interpretation occurred for many reasons. Although the new policy probably intended to take away blanket approval for interrogators to use enhanced interrogation techniques, it gave Sanchez the option of approving such techniques on a case-by-case basis. Thus, for example, Sanchez would approve 25 requests by interrogators to employ the “isolation” technique on subjects. Also, since Colonel Pappas (the 205th MI Brigade commander) apparently believed that he had been delegated approval authority by Sanchez for his interrogators to use the harsh techniques of “sleep management” and “use of military working dogs,” it remained a simple matter for his interrogators to receive approval to use these two techniques.

Worse still was the confusion the new interrogation policy generated when it quoted a rescinded army field manual. Interrogators, the new policy said, should “control all aspects of the interrogation, to include the lighting, heating, and configuration of the interrogation room, as well as the food, clothing and shelter” given to detainees. It is easy to see how some interrogators may have interpreted this vague instruction as blanket approval to use the enhanced interrogation techniques of “dietary manipulation” and “environmental manipulation.” Worst of all, the reference to controlling subjects’ clothing supported some interrogators’ beliefs that they could employ the “forced nudity” technique at their discretion—an enhanced interrogation technique permissible during their previous deployments to Gitmo or Afghanistan but never approved for use in Iraq.

Inadequate ethical leadership also played a role in key leaders failing to either take seriously or to investigate reports of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib by the International Committee of the Red Cross. These leaders largely ignored Red Cross reports stemming from two visits to Abu Ghraib in October 2003 (just as the facility’s most serious criminal abuses were beginning). In a summary of these reports, the Red Cross stated that “methods of physical and psychological coercion used by the interrogators appeared to be part of the standard operating procedures by military intelligence personnel to obtain confessions and extract information.” The Red Cross also described “abuse” (later corroborated by military investigators) that included detainees being held naked for days, yelled at, insulted, threatened, undergoing “sleep deprivation caused by the playing of loud music or constant light,” and held in isolation. However, this “abuse” involved Soldiers implementing enhanced interrogation techniques CJTF-7 Headquarters either formally promulgated or Soldiers believed had been authorized based on their personal experiences in other theaters.

Thus, the decision of key leaders at CJTF-7 Headquarters and at Abu Ghraib to take “the gloves off” set the stage for the “Abu Ghraib Scandal.” This scandal, which erupted after photos of serious criminal misconduct at Abu Ghraib were televised on 28 April 2004, would be intimately entwined with interrogation operations. Investigators concluded that, although enhanced interrogation techniques had not directly caused the most serious criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib, the techniques had perpetuated a climate where such criminal abuse was possible. It is difficult to fathom, for example, how the infamous photographs of naked human pyramids could have occurred if interrogators had not been directing military policemen to employ the “forced nudity” technique as part of “pride and ego-down” approaches.

The Abu Ghraib scandal constituted a strategic defeat for the United States. It severely damaged the credibility of the U.S. within the international community, particularly the world’s Arab community. The Abu Ghraib scandal also energized the Iraqi insurgency: “They used to show events [on television] in Abu Ghurayb,” said one of many mujahedeen inspired to go to Iraq by the horrific images. “The oppression, abuse of women, and fornication, so I acted in the heat of the moment and decided . . . to seek martyrdom in Iraq [sic].” Ominously, for a counterinsurgency force trying
to win the support of the people, Coalition Provisional Authority polls showed Iraqi support for the occupation plummeting from 63 percent before the scandal to just nine percent after the photos were published.46 Most ominously however, the scandal accelerated the decline of U.S. popular support for the war, a decline that eventually caused Congress to try (unsuccessfully) to force U.S. forces from Iraq in 2007.

We move now to the 3d Armored Calvary Regiment (3ACR).

Enhanced Interrogation in Al Anbar

In a February 2004 report, the Red Cross summarized its major findings concerning the treatment of detainees from March to November 2003 in 14 U.S. facilities in Iraq.47 This report assessed two facilities at the CJTF-7 level (Abu Ghraib and Camp Cropper) as “main places of internment where mistreatment allegedly took place.”48 At the division or brigade level, it assessed three facilities as centers of alleged detainee abuse: one (and perhaps two) belonged to the 3ACR. The Red Cross described the facility that clearly belonged to the 3ACR as located in “a former train station in Al-Khaim, near the Syrian border, turned into a military base.”49 This description matches descriptions in court testimony of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Tiger, which the 1st Squadron of 3ACR operated.50 The Red Cross also described a center of detainee abuse as the “Al-Baghdadi, Heat Base and Habbania Camp in Ramadi governorate.”51 While units of the 3ACR operated in the Al Habbaniyah area at the time (July-August 2003) of the Red Cross’s allegations of abuse at this facility, a cursory U.S. Army criminal investigation into this allegation failed to uncover whether a conventional Army or Special Forces unit had committed the alleged abuse.52 The Red Cross report was disturbing, though. Twenty-five detainees at Abu Ghraib alleged that, during their previous internments at Al Habbaniyah, they had undergone such mistreatment as painful stress positions, forced nudity, beatings, dog attacks, and sleep deprivation—all allegations consistent with the use of enhanced interrogation techniques.53

There is no question, however, that the 3ACR operated the detention facility on Forward Operating Base Tiger. Human Rights Watch interviewed a military police sergeant who had served as a guard at the facility from May 2003 to September 2003.54 This guard’s testimony corroborated the Red Cross’s 2004 allegations of abuse at this facility. According to this military policeman, he routinely witnessed interrogation abuse at the facility. He alleged that guards were regularly ordered to subject detainees to sleep deprivation, dangerously high temperatures, hunger and thirst, and prolonged standing (up to 24 hours) while facing a wall.55 He also alleged that he witnessed interrogators beating detainees, threatening them with loaded weapons, and subjecting them to bright strobe lights and loud music.56 According to this sergeant, both Army (including Special Forces Soldiers) and CIA interrogators conducted these abusive interrogations.57

Since this guard was describing enhanced interrogation techniques common to those facilities that employed such techniques, it seems unlikely that he fabricated these allegations. Moreover, the described techniques are consistent with specific techniques (such as “wall standing”) described in recently declassified CIA memoranda.58

Unfortunately, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not limited to the squadron detention facility at FOB Tiger; these techniques were also employed at FOB Rifles (the 3ACR Regimental Holding Area at Al Asad Air Field) as

Private First Class Lynndie England, 372d Military Police Company, is escorted by guards and her defense counsels, CPT Jonathan Crisp and CPT Katherine Krul, from Fort Hood’s Williams Judicial Center on 27 September 2005, after she was sentenced to three years for prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib.
well as at a temporary detention facility that the regiment established east of Al Qaim for an operation called “Operation Rifles Blitz.”59 Like the FOB Tiger facility, this temporary facility was located at a train station.60 The nickname of this facility was “Blacksmith Hotel.”61 The senior interrogator in charge of interrogation operations at these two regimental facilities was Chief Warrant Officer 3 Lewis Welshofer.

As described in the email exchange above, Welshofer’s response to the request for a “wish list” of interrogation techniques was to request the use of techniques resembling those used by SERE instructors.62 CJTF-7’s permissive interrogation policy of 14 September 2003 seemed to permit some SERE techniques, so Welshofer apparently felt he had permission to use all of the techniques he had previously learned as a SERE instructor. Welshofer applied one of these techniques, “close confinement quarters,” in a particularly brutal manner, often wrapping detainees in a sleeping bag to induce feelings of claustrophobia.

This “interrogation technique” had tragic results. On 26 November 2003, Welshofer interrogated Iraqi Major General Abed Mowhoush at “Blacksmith Hotel.”63 At the end of this interrogation, Welshofer placed Mowhoush in a sleeping bag, wrapped the bag tightly with electrical cord, sat on the officer, and covered his mouth with his hand.64 Within minutes, the 56-year-old general was dead. Mowhoush’s death certificate later listed his cause of death as “asphyxia due to smothering and chest compression,” and a 2 December 2003 autopsy stated that, prior to his death, Mowhoush had received numerous “contusions and abrasions along with six fractured ribs.”65 The fractured ribs were apparently due to a group of Iraqis (who allegedly worked for the CIA) severely beating Mowhoush during an interrogation two days before his death.66

This was not the only interrogation-related death in the 3ACR. Five weeks after Operation Rifles Blitz, 47-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Jameel died during an interrogation at FOB Rifles on Al Asad Airfield. According to a Denver Post article, Jameel had been kept in an isolation cell with his arms chained to a pipe in the ceiling.57 When released from these chains, he reportedly lunged at a Special Forces Soldier, causing three Special Forces Soldiers to allegedly punch and kick him “for approximately one to two minutes.”58 This article states that Jameel later escaped and was recaptured.59 Upon recapture, his hands were allegedly tied to the top of his cell door, and at some point, he was gagged.60 Five minutes later, a Soldier noticed he was dead.61 Another article in the New York Times is more specific about Jameel’s gagging, alleging that a “senior Army legal official acknowledged that the Iraqi colonel had at one point been lifted to his feet by a baton held to his throat, and that that action had caused a throat injury that contributed to his death.”62

The coroner who performed Jameel’s autopsy identified the cause of death as “homicide,” describing Jameel’s body as showing signs of “multiple blunt force injuries” and a “history of asphyxia.”63 An Army criminal investigation recommended charging Soldiers from both the 5th Special Forces Group and the 3ACR with crimes related to Jameel’s homicide.64 The report recommended charging two Soldiers with negligent homicide and nine others with crimes ranging from assault to making a false official statement.65 The commanders of these Soldiers, however, ignored these recommendations and determined that the detainee died as “a result of a series of lawful applications of force in response to repeated aggression and misconduct by the detainee.”66

Because of the Army criminal investigation into Mowhoush’s death, Welshofer’s commanding general issued Welshofer a letter of reprimand. In his letter of rebuttal to this reprimand, the unrepentant warrant officer repeated a claim he had made in the email to the CJTF-7 captain, namely, that Army doctrine—patterned as it is on the Law of War—is insufficient for dealing with unlawful combatants.67 Welshofer also referred to Jameel, saying that, before Jameel’s death, Jameel had led Soldiers to the location of a large explosives cache.68 Welshofer used this example to justify his own harsh treatment of Mowhoush, saying that this cache had contained “thousands of potential IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices]” and that
the “bottom line is that what interrogators do is a dirty job but saves lives.”\(^7\) Despite his specious reasoning here (after all, just because Jameel knew where IED caches were does not mean that Mowhoush did), Welshofer was still charged with negligent homicide, and in January 2006, he was court martialed at Fort Carson, Colorado.

Welshofer’s court martial was a media sensation. During his court martial, Welshofer claimed that the only CJTF-7 interrogation policy he had seen in Iraq had been the September 2003 policy (the policy that explicitly authorized certain enhanced interrogation techniques). A warrant officer who had observed parts of Mowhoush’s interrogation testified that Welshofer had used a technique that was essentially “waterboarding” on Mowhoush the day before his death.\(^8\) According to this warrant officer, Welshofer also hit Mowhoush repeatedly on his elbow with a stick.\(^9\) Welshofer’s use of a stick to strike Mowhoush, this warrant officer alleged, “was not that extreme when you consider other things that were happening at the facility.”\(^10\) Also, the company commander of these two warrant officers testified that she had authorized the “close quarters” or “sleeping bag” technique and that she had seen Welshofer slap detainees.\(^11\) Despite evidence that Welshofer had used enhanced interrogation techniques not approved for use by U.S. Soldiers in Iraq and which had clearly contributed to Mowhoush’s death, Welshofer received an extremely controversial light sentence—a letter of reprimand, restriction to his house and place of worship for two months, and a fine of $6,000.\(^12\) Ultimately, the media controversy resulting from Welshofer’s light sentence, though not a strategic defeat of the magnitude of Abu Ghraib, reinforced the U.S. military’s loss of moral standing among Americans.

We turn now to the 4th Infantry Division (4ID).

Troubles in Tikrit

In their February 2004 summary of alleged detainee abuse in Iraq from March to November 2003, the Red Cross identified the “Tikrit holding area (former Saddam Hussein Islamic School)” as an alleged center of detainee abuse.\(^13\) While the 4ID was headquartered at this time in Tikrit, it is unclear from this description if the Red Cross’ alleged abuse occurred in the 4ID’s detention facility on FOB Iron Horse. Also, since this allegation was apparently never investigated, it is unclear exactly what abuse was allegedly committed by whom. As in the case of the Al-Baghdadi, Heat Base, and Habbaniya Camp, it is just as possible that the alleged abuse occurred—if it occurred at all—at the hands of unconventional rather than conventional forces.

Still, the 4ID detention facility at FOB Iron Horse certainly had its troubles. Most significantly, investigators found Soldiers at fault in two detainee deaths at the facility. On 11 September 2003, a guard shot and killed a detainee for allegedly placing his hands too near the concertina wire of his isolation area.\(^14\) The guard was charged with manslaughter, and he was chaptered out of the Army in lieu of a court martial.\(^15\) Also, on 8 February 2004, another detainee died due to medical inattention.\(^16\) In addition, and precisely relevant to this case study, the 4ID detention facility had a case of substantiated interrogation abuse that derived directly from the decision of certain HUMINT leaders to take “the gloves off.”

This case began on 17 August 2003 when the staff sergeant in charge of the 4ID’s interrogation control element submitted the requested “wish list” of more effective interrogation techniques.\(^17\) After this submission, he saved this file onto his desktop, where a new interrogator read it.\(^18\) Soon after, he spoke to the new interrogator about these techniques.\(^19\) They later disagreed in sworn statements about the nature of this discussion. The junior interrogator alleged that his supervisor had given him tacit permission to use the techniques (asking him if he “could handle” implementing them). His superior stated they had discussed the techniques in general and that he had never given this interrogator permission to use these techniques.\(^20\)

The arrival at the facility of a detainee accused of killing three Americans set the stage for two abusive interrogations. The new interrogator was physically imposing (standing six foot, six inches tall). So “to extract time-sensitive intelligence information that could save lives,” the staff sergeant assigned him to conduct this detainee’s interrogation while approving a “fear up” (harsh) interrogation approach.\(^21\) During the first abusive interrogation on 23 September 2003, the new interrogator forced the detainee to assume various stress positions, shouted at him, threatened him, and struck him with a police baton 10 to 30 times on his feet, buttocks, and possibly...
his lower back. Six days later, the same interpreter and a different interrogator forced the detainee to circle around a table on his knees until his knees were bloody. Ironically, just two days before the first harsh interrogation, the 4ID Commander had published a command policy prohibiting “assaults, insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, and reprisals of any kind.” In his statement, the junior interrogator said he would have reconsidered his techniques if he had seen this policy.

The officer who investigated the incidents recommended a letter of reprimand for the staff sergeant and a field grade Article 15 for both interrogators. The staff sergeant’s letter of reprimand admonished him for his failure “to set the proper leadership climate” and for his “inadvertently” leading at least one interrogator to believe he “condoned certain practices that were outside the established regulations.” In his rebuttal, the staff sergeant boldly alleged it was not he who had failed to set the proper leadership climate for his subordinates and blamed the problem on “the command climate of the division as a whole.” In support of his claim, he referred to an illegal practice in which certain 4ID units seized family members of targeted individuals in an effort to coerce them into turning themselves in. The staff sergeant also quoted an unidentified “senior leader” as saying that detainees “are terrorists and will be treated as such.”

Although Lieutenant Colonel Allen West may not have been the “senior leader” who made this remark, West is still worth mentioning in this context. A battalion commander within the 4ID’s 2d Brigade, West was relieved from command for an incident that occurred one month before the abusive interrogations on FOB Iron Horse. To coerce intelligence from a detainee, West had watched five of his Soldiers beat a detainee on the head and body, then had them take the detainee outside and place the detainee near a clearing barrel, where he fired two shots into the clearing barrel. Later, media pundits and even U.S. senators rancorously debated the morality of West’s actions, a debate that sent mixed signals to Soldiers in the field about permissible behavior. West ultimately retired rather than face a court martial.

In short, although the interrogation element at FOB Iron Horse flirted with the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, the actual use of these techniques was never systemic there like it was at Abu Ghrabi or three facilities within the 3ACR. In fact, when such techniques were implemented during two abusive interrogations, a 4ID command policy, coupled with a thorough investigation (and decisive punishment), seem to have eradicated any confusion the interrogators had regarding acceptable interrogation methods. Thus, the media circus about abusive interrogation techniques did not involve the 4ID’s detention facility: this controversy rightly engulfed Lieutenant Colonel West.

We are now ready to examine the 1st Armored Division.

Out Front!

Soon after assuming command of the 1st Armored Division (1AD) on 16 July 2003, Brigadier General Martin Dempsey directed that the division be called “Task Force 1st Armored Division” (TF 1AD). This was a nod to the division’s many attachments, which had more than doubled the size of the division to 39,000 Soldiers. To this date, TF 1AD remains the largest force controlled by a division headquarters in U.S. Army history. Throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom I, TF 1AD operated in Baghdad, an environment as complex and dangerous as any other in Iraq. The lives of 133 TF 1AD Soldiers lost and 1,111 Soldiers wounded in combat serve as profound, poignant testimony to this fact.

The 501st MI Battalion (now inactivated) was 1AD’s organic MI battalion. During Operation Iraqi Freedom I, the unit ran the TF 1AD detention facility and provided HUMINT and other intelligence support to the giant task force. The motto of the battalion was “Out Front!” Its leaders clearly intended the unit to serve as an ethical role model. In the first sentence of his command philosophy, Lieutenant Colonel Laurence Mixon, who commanded the battalion for most of OIF I, calmly asserted that the battalion was a “values-based organization.” Then, in the very next sentence he borrowed the shining “city upon the hill” metaphor by presenting key moral principles as “guideposts, lighting our way ahead.”

The TF 1AD detention facility (which MI personnel called the division interrogation facility or “DIF”) was located at the Baghdad International Airport. This facility struggled with the same basic issues that the 3ACR and 4ID facilities had
struggled with during OIF I. Most notably, it had too few (and too inexperienced) interrogators operating amid mounting U.S. casualties and a growing pressure for intelligence. Nonetheless, the facility had zero substantiated cases of detainee abuse and no cases of alleged serious abuse. The only three instances of abuse at the facility seem to have been extremely minor—two cases of MPs counseled for yelling at detainees and one instance of a contract interrogator fired for verbally threatening a detainee.

In addition, there were none of the potential indicators of abuse at the TF 1AD detention facility that had occurred at some other facilities in Iraq. There was not a single riot, detainee shooting, detainee death, or escape attempt at the facility. Also, the facility passed all Red Cross inspections with no significant deficiencies or allegations of detainee abuse noted. When Stuart Herrington (a retired colonel and one of America’s foremost experts on interrogation operations) inspected CJTF-7 interrogation operations in December 2003, he singled out TF 1AD’s detention facility as “organized, clean, well-run, and impressive.”

Importantly, interrogators at the facility never employed enhanced interrogation techniques, even during the brief period in which CJTF-7 explicitly approved such techniques. In fact, across Baghdad, Brigade S2s and 501st MI Battalion leaders refused to allow their interrogators to employ these techniques. Chief Warrant Officer 3 John Groseclose, who was in charge of HUMINT operations at TF 1AD’s 3d Brigade before taking charge of interrogation operations at the TF 1AD detention facility, said the following:

When that memo [CJTF-7’s 14 September 2003, interrogation policy] first came out, I went to Major Crisman, the S2 at the brigade, and showed the memo to him. I told him that I thought this memo was a very bad idea. It just didn’t look right to me. He agreed. So, we never used those techniques. I didn’t see any purpose for them.

Groseclose’s counterpart at TF 1AD’s 1st Brigade, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Kenneth Kilbourne, echoed Groseclose’s comments. “This memo was idiotic,” Kilbourne said. “It was like providing a new, dangerous piece of equipment to a Soldier...
and telling him that he is authorized to use it, but you don’t have an instruction manual to give him to show him how to operate it.”118

These experienced HUMINT leaders believed that it was not only wrong for American Soldiers to employ enhanced interrogation techniques on real world enemies, but that such techniques were largely ineffective. “For an interrogator to resort to techniques like that [techniques derived from SERE schools] is for that interrogator to admit that they don’t know how to interrogate,” said Groseclose, who was awarded the U.S. Defense Department’s HUMINT Collector of the Year Award for 2003.119 He added, “Our interrogations produced results.”120 Then-Major (now Lieutenant Colonel) Hoepner has credited the battalion’s HUMINT warrant officers and the command climate for the battalion’s stand on the moral high ground.121 His judgment is no doubt correct. In a fragmentary mission order issued four days after assuming command, Dempsey criminalized detainee mistreatment.122 The criminalization included the use of any interrogation technique that could be construed as “mal-treatment.”123 What is more, Dempsey consistently reiterated the need for troops to treat Iraqis with respect and humanity to his brigade commanders, a reminder they hardly needed. As Colonel Pete Mansoor, the commander of TF 1AD’s 1st Brigade, noted:

Whether or not mock executions, naked pyramids, beatings, and other forms of abuse succeed in extracting information, such behavior often slides down a slippery slope to more severe forms of mistreatment, perhaps leading eventually to injury and death. Prisoner abuse degrades the abuser as well as the abused; as Americans we should stay on a higher moral plane . . . We had to remain constantly vigilant in this regard, lest we lose our soul in the name of mission accomplishment.124

Still, despite the best efforts of senior leaders throughout TF 1AD, allegations of serious detainee abuse did occur in TF 1AD, and some of these allegations were substantiated.125 Thus, what was truly unique for a unit of its size was that none of TF 1AD’s cases of detainee abuse involved school-trained interrogators. The principal reason for this was that everyone in these interrogators’ chain of command (from their commanding general to their warrant officer supervisors) knew they should be standing on the moral high ground.

Case Study Findings

In some ways, the Abu Ghraib detention facility had a different tactical problem than the division and regimental facilities in Al Anbar Province, Tikrit, and Baghdad Airport. Abu Ghraib was overcrowded, its military police unit was undermanned, and it operated under nearly constant harassing mortar fires that frightened and sometimes traumatized the troops working there.

Nevertheless, in important ways, the tactical problem was the same: How do we interrogate effectively, when casualties are mounting, higher interrogation policy is permissive, resources are limited, and our interrogators are young and inexperienced?

Tragically, interrogators at Abu Ghraib, in the 3ACR, and at FOB Iron Horse had HUMINT leaders who felt morally justified in sanctioning enhanced interrogation techniques, and this belief led their interrogators to use techniques that slipped into truly serious abuse at Abu Ghraib and in the 3ACR. Furthermore, due to personalities unique to Abu Ghraib, abuse descended further still into the sadistic, sexualized violence that shamed our Nation and nearly led to our defeat in Iraq. In retrospect, it is ironic that, while these leaders had meant to save lives via enhanced interrogation techniques, their actions helped to destabilize Iraq. This destabilization, in turn, created thousands more casualties than these leaders could ever have prevented through tactical methods.

However, the detention facility run by the 501st MI Battalion was a shining example of the type of facility to which most U.S. detention facilities belonged. By using doctrinally sound interrogation methods, leaders at these facilities managed to solve their tactical problem without their interrogators incurring investigations, letters of reprimand, or being court martialed. In addition, their interrogators stayed out of the news.

Of course, those who believe in the efficacy of enhanced interrogation techniques will argue that the 501st MI Battalion was not as successful tactically as it would have been had it employed such techniques. Although this could be true, it is unlikely.
The 501st MI Battalion’s experienced HUMINT warrant officers certainly did not accept such an argument. To a man, they believed that they would have been less successful if they had employed such harsh techniques, and they often said, “Torture is for amateurs, professionals don’t need it.”126 These leaders insisted that Army doctrine is correct in stating that the “use of torture and other illegal methods is a poor technique that yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say what he thinks the interrogator wants to hear.”127 Other sources corroborate their judgment. Matthew Alexander (one of the interrogators who led U.S. forces to Musab al Zarqawi) convincingly argues that interrogators who build rapport with subjects and then intelligently apply doctrinal approaches are more successful than those who unthinkingly rely on brutal methods.128

While enhanced interrogation techniques are decidedly inferior to more intelligent methods, they may extract useful intelligence in very limited circumstances. This does not mean, however, that it is ever wise for the citizens of a Western democracy to employ such techniques. The risk of strategic defeat (as experienced by America at Abu Ghraib and by France in Algeria) is too great on today’s media-saturated battlefield. More importantly, the use of such techniques is simply un-American.

This case study began with the hypothesis that the essential ethical position chosen by leaders is the most important determinant of the level of detainee abuse in interrogation units and, ultimately, the strategic effectiveness of these units on today’s battlefield. Clearly, this hypothesis is valid. As illustrated above, when HUMINT leaders in Iraq chose ethically different solutions to a common tactical problem, the level of interrogation abuse that then occurred within their units was also dramatically different—as were the strategic results.

Surprisingly, the Independent Panel to Review Detention Operations has been the only major investigator of OIF I interrogation operations that emphasized the role that poor ethical decision making played in interrogation abuse. Chaired by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, the five-member panel found that—

For the U.S., most cases for permitting harsh treatment of detainees on moral grounds begins with variants of the “ticking time bomb” scenario . . . Such cases raise a perplexing moral problem: Is it permissible to employ inhumane treatment when it is believed to be the only way to prevent loss of lives? In periods of emergency, and especially in combat, there will always be a temptation to override legal and moral norms for morally good ends. Many in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were not well prepared by their experience, education, and training to resolve such ethical problems.129

The panel concluded that “major service programs, such as the Army’s ‘core values’ . . . are grounded in organizational efficacy rather than the moral good” and that these values “do not address humane treatment of the enemy and noncombatants, leaving military leaders and educators an incomplete tool box with which to deal with ‘real-world’ ethical problems.”130 The panel recommended a “review of military ethics education” and said that a “professional ethics program” is needed to equip military leaders “with a sharper moral compass for guidance in situations often riven with conflicting moral obligations.”131

Why was the Schlesinger Panel unimpressed with our Army’s basic tool for ethical decision making, the Army Values paradigm? It was probably because the seven values of this paradigm (“loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage”) are broad ideals, not definitive guidelines or a practical methodology for solving specific ethical problems. In fact, these values can actually support an interrogator’s use of “the ticking time bomb” rationale. One could argue that, during OIF I, the harshest interrogators—

● Displayed their “loyalty” to their Army, unit, and other troops by using enhanced techniques to save Soldiers’ lives.
● Did their “duty” by working hard and displaying initiative.
● Treated detainees with the “respect” they deserved (which was no respect, because they were alleged terrorists and criminals).
● Exercised “selfless service” by doing hard, dirty work for good ends.
● Demonstrated “integrity” by using only those harsh techniques they believed were approved for use.
Showcased “honor” by living up to the other Army values.

Exhibited “personal courage” by deliberately agitating dangerous detainees.

Thus, what seems patently obvious to most Americans—that, say, leaving an untried suspect naked, alone, and shivering in a brightly lit, air-conditioned cell for days at a time is behavior that is inconsistent with our nation’s core values—is not so clear when leaders apply the basic Army tool for ethical decision making.

This is not to say that this tool condones enhanced interrogation techniques. After all, we can use this same tool to argue that the harshest interrogators—

Were disloyal to the U.S. Constitution when they punished detainees without “due process of law.”

Failed in their duty to enforce the prohibition of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention against committing “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment” of captives. 132

Violated their integrity by breaking the law.

However, this argument can truly only be made in the light of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. During OIF I, the legal limits of interrogation techniques were hotly debated by America’s most senior civilian and military lawyers and were not at all clear to politicians, military leaders, or interrogators. Thus, what the Army needs is a different, sharper tool to guide ethical decision making when laws are ambiguous.

Clearly, our Army’s most important challenge before OIF I was ensuring our troops would behave ethically on today’s battlefield. As an Army, we should have placed great emphasis on developing solid ethical tools and growing ethical leaders. Unfortunately, this challenge was not fully recognized, and despite our many post-invasion tactical successes, our strategic errors were sometimes grave indeed.

Where We Are Today

The challenge of improving the quality of our leaders’ ethical tools and decision making belongs not just to the Army’s MI community but also to the entire U.S. military. As the lead service for interrogation operations, the U.S. Army has made some progress in this regard. 133 Nonetheless, our Army still has far to go. Consider the following—

Even today, some enhanced interrogation techniques are not explicitly prohibited in MI doctrine. This would be a serious oversight if it were not for the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which made it illegal for any military interrogator to use approaches or techniques other than those included in FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence
Collector Operations. Nonetheless, MI doctrine should be updated to prevent future misunderstandings here.

- Thankfully, U.S. Army doctrine published post-OIF I is far superior with regard to promoting ethical leadership and adherence to the Law of War than doctrine published before OIF I. However, some current doctrine was published before OIF I. Additionally, as noted earlier, Army doctrine has failed to sharpen or expand its basic tool kit for ethical decision making. Just as harmfully, current doctrine contains one severe over-correction that greatly handicaps interrogators. According to Appendix M of FM 2-22.3, interrogators cannot keep subjects separated from other detainees without the approval of a general officer. However, such separation is not the enhanced interrogation technique of isolation, which involves sensory deprivation, but rather it is a manner of housing detainees that is almost always a precondition for their then being successfully interrogated. Unless separated from a detention facility’s general population, subjects are prepped for their upcoming interrogations by other detainees. Also, subjects are far less inclined to cooperate with interrogators when they are afraid that other detainees will observe their having long, regular meetings with interrogators. Since potentially cooperative subjects often become firmly noncooperative during the time it takes an interrogator to obtain general officer approval to separate them, the requirement to obtain this approval needs to be rescinded while maintaining current doctrinal assurances that separated subjects are to be housed humanely without sensory deprivation.

- Our Army is standing up more interrogation units, an action which promises to reduce the risk that non-HUMINT troops with little knowledge of the Law of War will conduct interrogations. However, this process is not nearly complete. At present, few interrogation teams have assignments at the division level in Iraq. More critical still is the lack of experienced, professionally educated, senior warrant officers who can properly guide our Army’s growing body of junior interrogators.

- Ethical training in Army units today looks much as it did ten years ago. The training consists of uncertified instructors giving a nonstandard “Army Values” brief once a year. Commonly, this brief includes a review of the doctrinal definitions that pertain to each Army Value as well as examples of leaders who exemplified (or did not exemplify) these values. Seldom does such training employ practical exercises to help troops reason through complex moral problems for themselves, and seldom does someone conduct this training who has received the professional education necessary to usefully guide troops toward ethical solutions.

- The school curriculum that makes a serious attempt at improving the ethical decision making skills of Army leaders is rare. Nearly all Army officers, for example, attend Command and General Staff College, but the school provides few blocks of instruction related to improving ethical decision making skills. This lack of attention is not the fault of any one college department, for all departments have subject matter in which they can introduce ethical vignettes. Instead, it is symptomatic of a lack of emphasis that still exists across our Army.

Our Climb Ahead

Our Army has come a long way with regard to HUMINT doctrine and force structure since our tragic ethical blunders of OIF I. However, now is not the time to rest. We must upgrade our ethical toolkit, to include an ambiguous “Army Values” paradigm that may be used to justify just about any solution to a tactical problem. We must improve still more doctrine (such as Appendix M to our interrogation manual), and we must continue to increase the number and quality of our HUMINT Soldiers. Most critically, since sound doctrine and a robust force structure are ineffective without sound training, we need to turn our attention to getting ethical training and professional education right across the Army. At stake is not just our preventing future strategic defeat, which is important enough, but also our permanently solving what briefly became an existential crisis for our Army. This crisis arose when the “end justifies the means” camp grew far more influential than it should have grown during OIF I. Although this camp will always have adherents, this camp is not who American Soldiers are, and it is definitely not who they should become.

American Soldiers belong in the city upon the hill.
84. FBI Staff Judge Advocate, “Documents provided by the 4th Infantry Division USA,” American Civil Liberties Union: Torture FOIA, 12 May 2004, <www.aclu.org/files/projects/foia(search/1df/DO043552.pdf> (22 March 2009), 2. Of note here is that “isolation” is an enhanced interrogation technique.

87. Ibid.


89. 4th Infantry Division Headquarters, “AR 15-6 Investigation,” 43.

90. Ibid., 74.

91. Ibid., 73-74.

92. Ibid., 26, 73-74.

93. Ibid., 56.

94. Ibid., 46-47.

95. Ibid., 47, 62.


98. Ibid., 49.

99. Ibid., 21.

100. Ibid., 28.

101. Ibid. This practice violates Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, an article the U.S. Supreme Court has since upheld as applying even to “unlawful combatants.” For alleged use of this technique by 4ID units, see Ricks, 236, 256, 260, 283, 357.

102. Ibid.


105. Ibid., 22.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid. 1AD’s deployment was extended in Iraq for Operation Iron Saber, April to July 2003.


116. Although the TF 1AD did not employ enhanced interrogation techniques, guards and/or interrogators at a few TF 1AD facilities temporarily allowed the use of light “stress positions” as a means of controlling unruly detainees (not to coerce intelligence from detainees). At the time, MP but not MI doctrine specifically prohibited this practice. MI doctrine now clearly prohibits this practice as well.


120. Ibid., 13.


123. Ibid.


125. Department of the Navy Inspector General, “Review,” 299-302. The Church Report identifies five substantiated cases of interrogation abuse by Soldiers (not school-trained interrogators) of TF 1AD. Two of these cases occurred at the point of capture; three occurred in temporary holding facilities.


130. Ibid., Appendix H, 3-4.

131. Ibid., Appendix H, 4.


133. Army interrogation doctrine and regulations are binding for all military services.

134. Department of the Navy Inspector General, “Review,” 294-302. Of 16 substantiated cases of interrogation abuse in Iraq that had been closed as of 30 September 2004, only six cases involved trained interrogators.

135. LTC Russell Gosl, Email to Major Douglas A. Pryer: Re: Re: Interview! 19 February 2009. According to LTC Gosl, the recently redeployed Deputy G-2 for the 1AD, one HUMINT Battalion supported theater-wide HUMINT operations, thus leaving few HUMINT Collection Teams to support divisions. This is little different from the situation during OIF I.

136. Ibid. Of most concern, while the typical maneuver brigade was assigned two HUMINT warrant officers for seven-man HUMINT sections during OIF I, only one HUMINT warrant officer typically manages much larger 16-man sections within the Special Troops Battalions of such brigades today.
Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen, Jr., U.S. Army; Colonel Thomas P. Guthrie, U.S. Army; and Major Gregory L. Boylan, U.S. Army

The secret of all victory lies in the organization of the non-obvious.
—Marcus Aurelius, 121-180 CE

In the early 4th century BCE, more than five centuries before the great philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius made the observation quoted above, Gallic tribes sacked Rome. Faced with the first real threat to its existence, the young Roman state recognized the need to rethink how it organized for combat. Of the various changes adopted, the most important and extreme transformation was the abandonment of the Greek-style phalanx. This military organizational structure had been long-established as the most effective way to achieve success against opponents with a similar operational paradigm. However, the Romans understood that—unlike Greece—Italy and Gaul were not governed by city states, whose armies met on large plains deemed suitable by both sides to settle disputes. Rather, they were a collection of hill tribes adept at using the complex terrain to their advantage. Accordingly, the Romans acknowledged the need for something more flexible than the unwieldy, slow-moving phalanx to achieve their operational goals. Faced with a newly complex operating environment, the Romans took the transformative step of adopting the more flexible infantry formations of their most tenacious enemies, the Samnites.¹

Today, America is experiencing an analogous military epiphany as its military adapts to complex, adaptive, and asymmetric operating environments that defy accepted military conventions. In January 2008, in the wake of its final after action review from its 2006-2007 deployment to northern Iraq, the U.S. Army 25th Infantry Division Headquarters found itself revising longstanding organizational thinking to adapt its structure to the new demands it would face in northern Iraq later that year. The division’s new operational milieu presented an increasingly complex operating environment, an adaptive asymmetric threat, and a traditional staff organization ill-suited to deal adequately and effectively with either. The division recognized a vital requirement to rethink how to organize its staff to best meet the commander’s vision and intent (as embodied in our campaign plan). We felt this reorganization should fulfill three critical roles: inform and enhance the commander’s decision making cycle, create a logical nesting of our staff processes with the Joint architecture used by our higher headquarters, and
make our subordinate units more effective in their counterinsurgency roles across northern Iraq.

To support the needs of the command, we applied a deliberate problem-solving process. This process was rooted in “value-focused” thinking; that is, we first delineated what was important to achieve — operational success (what we valued). Then we built our organization around it. The result was a staff organization employing an “operations, targeting, and effects synchronization” (OTES) process appropriate to our goals. This process evolved in the context of Joint doctrine, as we projected the best likelihood for achieving the “enduring effects” envisioned in our campaign plan. This article sets forth—

- The methodology we applied.
- The results of the process.
- The implementation of the desired course of action.
- An assessment of how it performed in a combat environment.

Methodology

- Our staff organization methodology began in January 2008, after the 25th Infantry Division’s after action review of its recent deployment to northern Iraq from August 2006 to October 2007. Foremost among various lessons learned, we determined that a conventional Prussian general staff structure was inadequate to address the complexities of the evolving operational environment. The following factors drove this determination:
  - There was exponential growth in relevant available information.
  - Staff responsibility lines had become less clear as problem complexity grew.
  - There was a limited ability to synchronize efforts in time and space.
  - The asymmetric nature of the environment did not fit with the traditional staff architecture, requiring us to simultaneously and continuously develop multiple operational planning teams with expertise from the across the staff.
  - A “pick-up team” mentality for ad hoc planning resulted in the inability to focus on persistent problems and concerns.
  - The inability to continuously assess and modify the campaign plan persisted (because no core staff element focused on the future operations horizon to supplement planning for current operations).

Compounding these observations was the realization that, although the headquarters would return to northern Iraq in less than 11 months, the dynamic nature of the operational and information environments mandated a fresh look at what to achieve and how to organize to achieve it. Specifically, we anticipated that—

- The mission involved an exceptionally complex environment with innumerable second- and third-order effects.
- Transitioning to “Iraqis out front” would be a priority and was a significant change from the last deployment.
- There would be increasing focus on non-traditional (and nonlethal) problems in governance and economics.
- There would be increased availability and speed of information.
- There was a constant potential for disastrous consequences stemming from the somewhat overlooked and often misunderstood tensions between Kurds and Arabs in Northern Iraq.
- This environment would require trust, decentralized command and control, and empowerment downward in the chain of command to exercise initiative.

Framing the problem. The purpose of a military staff is mainly to provide accurate, timely information that most efficiently and effectively facilitates sound command decisions. Considered in this context, the results of our after action review in January 2008 yielded a simple problem statement: Determine the best alternative for organizing the division staff for combat that would allow it to prosecute the campaign plan most effectively by enhancing the commander’s decision making process and enabling the brigade combat teams’ (BCTs) abilities to execute his intent.

Recognizing the need to determine a suitable staff organization, we first sought to define what we wanted to achieve. This required that we educate ourselves about the environment, determine what we needed to do to achieve success, and then develop an approach to achieve it. Our efforts began with the development of a preliminary campaign framework that outlined our lines of effort, the short- to mid-term objectives within each, and then the longer-term enduring effects we wanted to
achieve. In short, this framework formed the core of what we “valued” and what would define success for our deployment.

We considered three courses of action (COAs) for organizing the division staff for combat:

- **COA 1**—Align with doctrinal staff architecture: use the staff as organized according to Army doctrine.
- **COA 2**—Align to focus the staff on lethal versus nonlethal effects. Organize the staff into temporary cells and work groups that would meet routinely to develop operations to achieve effects synchronized through the 28-day targeting process.
- **COA 3**—Align to focus the staff on “enduring effects” in our campaign framework. Organize the staff into four work groups, each focused on one of the four enduring effects from the campaign plan framework. These groups would be a cross-section of the staff (personnel drawn from staff sections depending on the expertise required) and then operate as permanent elements in the headquarters. A “fusion cell” would synchronize the efforts of all four groups through a 28-day operations, targeting, and effects synchronization process.

**Results**

In February 2008, the division commander directed that we pursue COA 3 for organizing the staff for combat. In this course of action, we formed four “work groups” aligned with the four enduring effects identified within the campaign’s operational framework:

- A self-sustaining secure environment.
- Self-reliant Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
- A self-sustaining economic environment.
- Legitimate, capable, and effective governance.

This course of action would flatten the staff architecture and streamline the flow of information across knowledge networks, redefining how the staff would facilitate the analytical rigor for the operations, targeting, effects, synchronization, and assessment process.

There were two key changes for the division. The first was the creation of a robust future operations
nucleus to drive the bulk of staff operations and bridge the efforts of the current operations and future plans sections. The second was making the four work groups permanent staff elements rather than ad hoc teams. They would focus daily on achieving campaign plan objectives consistent with their particular enduring effect and synchronizing those efforts across the division’s operational framework.

To build and operate the groups, the division chief of staff chaired a series of meetings with the staff primaries, facilitated by the G3 (Operations). The purpose of these meetings was to identify the skill sets each work group would require and then build the groups by putting names to spaces, identifying the right people with the right experiences, and putting them in the right job. We determined that a lieutenant colonel would lead the fusion cell and each work group. We outlined preferred skills and experience for each as dictated by the enduring effect on which they focused. We preferred—

- A Special Forces officer with a solid “foreign internal defense” background for the security work group.
- An officer with prior transition team experience (brigade or division level) or other experience in training Arab military personnel for the Iraqi Security Forces work group.
- The Division G9 (Civil-Military Affairs) for the governance work group, which focused on civic institutional capacity, essential services, and the rule of law.
- An officer with a background in economics for the economics work group.

We delineated work group composition along two lines: core and contributing members. Core members had expertise that the work group required on a daily basis (i.e., given the ISF’s considerable logistical problems at the time of our deployment, we determined the ISF work group would require a full-time logistician). Contributing members had either staff expertise that a work group routinely required or came from a small staff section that could not support core membership (i.e., the staff judge advocate or information operations sections). These last staff sections were absolutely necessary, making them a limited resource in high demand and thereby requiring further synchronization to ensure work groups received the requisite inputs.

Whether selecting core or contributing members, we sought to staff the groups with the right personnel with the right skills and experience, which required we develop a deeper understanding of the experiences and/or professional background of personnel on the division staff. For example, we identified a senior first lieutenant who, although a signal officer by trade, had spent several years working for AT&T, which made him a prime candidate to work certain essential services problems in the governance work group. We also drafted statements of work to obtain contracted bicultural and bilingual advisors—persons with an Iraqi or Kurdish background who possessed unique expertise in the four broad areas on which we intended to focus.

Once manned each of these work groups focused on their respective enduring effect to perform the following functions:

- Conduct a detailed analysis of both lethal and nonlethal functional requirements needed for attainment (i.e., targets, maneuver, resources, nonstandard lines of influence, etc.).
- Conduct detailed assessments of actions taken and results/effects achieved, as well as the efficacy of the identified functions within the enduring effect.

The staff remained the primary source for expertise in particular areas. We realigned the operational functions of the G-staff to integrate its sections into the future operations horizon.

The G2 (Intelligence) section, while a contributor to work group efforts, primarily oversaw intelligence collection and fusion. It provided a “full spectrum” common intelligence and information picture to the work groups while at the same time responding to group-specific needs for analysis, assessment, and collection.

**Work group analysis.** The detailed analysis performed by each of the four work groups went to the fusion cell. This element synthesized and synchronized these analyses across the breadth of the campaign plan and presented its conclusions and recommendations to the commander for approval and codification into an executable order. This process is a particularly important component of our organizational construct. The fusion cell provided a critical means by which we fused disparate, though not mutually exclusive, planning efforts across time and space to ensure all were integrated, synchronized, nested, and mutually supporting.
The operations, targeting, and effects synchronization process. We originally built the operations, targeting, and effects synchronization process around a 28-day cycle that aligned with our division targeting process. The process focused on synchronizing the efforts and inputs of the four work groups each week over the four-week period to ensure a cohesive output in the form of a fragmentary order to brigade combat teams. Equally important, we developed the process to—

- Streamline and synchronize the division battle rhythm.
- Create more staff involvement by tying the entire staff to the future operations horizon.
- Crush traditional stovepipes that impede vertical and lateral communication.

Since each group had its own targeting officer, they developed their targeting and operations together. Targeting efforts would be synched each week in our division targeting meeting (which included BCTs), followed by an overarching meeting the next day to synchronize operations, targeting, and effects across all four lines of effort (i.e., the enduring effects).

Because data came into the fusion cell from disparate sources (BCTs, intelligence fusion center, or higher headquarters), the targeting, effects, and assessment cell sorted the data and sent it to the four work groups. They then analyzed the data in detail to ascertain the effects achieved and to assess the efficacy of the functional requirements and sub-objectives identified for each group. All groups shared the data because some of it applied to multiple work groups. Nested within the targeting process, the assessments drove campaign assessment and refinements and course adjustments.

Staff interoperability and synchronization. As previously mentioned, one of our objectives for staff reorganization was to create a future operations nucleus where there had previously been none. This would, in effect, allow the division staff to operate across all three time horizons by plugging their operational components into each.

Work groups and the fusion cell, with OTES as the driver, interoperated with the broader division staff, our higher headquarters, and the BCTs. The three time horizons and the associated proponents were—

- Current operations, managed by the division operations center, focused on the 0-72 hour timeframe.
- Future plans, managed by the G5 and the plans operational planning team, focused at 120 days and beyond.
- Future operations core, comprised of the fusion cell and four work groups, managed by the division effects coordinator, focused on the period in the period in between 72 hours and 120 days.

The Division G3 managed the synchronization of operational efforts across all three horizons, while the chief of staff retained oversight for staff synchronization in support of the commander.

Implementation

We recognized that, like any plan or standing operating procedure, the effectiveness of our staff organization and OTES process depended on the extent to which the staff understood them and exercised them. This applied also to the brigades in our task force. Accordingly, we developed a two-pronged approach to educating and training both groups. The first focused on staff proficiency and had a phased methodology. The second focused on indoctrinating the various stakeholders affected by our staff organization. This included the subordinate headquarters we would lead in combat, as well as the division headquarters we would replace, as this would help to reduce friction. We describe each of the prongs below.

Staff proficiency. Our predeployment preparations involved a comprehensive training plan spanning four and one-half months. This approach allowed the work groups and staff to ease into the OTES process. It did so by first developing each of the four focus areas, then by increasing the tempo while focusing on specific problem sets that cut across all four work groups. It thereby enabled us to exercise basic synchronization processes and to finally put it all together in the division’s mission readiness exercise, which allowed us to identify gaps, inefficiencies, and areas requiring further attention.

We purposely avoided the typical mission readiness exercise construct focused on current operations. Doctrinally, the division headquarters functions at the operational level. Although “current operations” are a critically important feature
of division operations, they are not the nucleus. Instead, “future operations” form the nucleus, informed by current operations. To perform effectively, the division headquarters’ main effort must focus on planning to shape future events in the near- to mid-terms and to enable its subordinate units to execute effectively. Accordingly, we focused our exercise on the future operations horizon, which allowed us to refine our OTES systems, processes, and products.

Our approach yielded a number of key enhancements as we prepared to deploy. Two are particularly noteworthy. First, the replication of simultaneous operations across all three time horizons helped us to identify, further define, and assign future operations “areas of responsibility” within the work groups and the fusion cell. For example, the management and stabilization of Kurd-Arab relations became a fusion cell responsibility, because it cut across all four work groups. Similarly, we assigned the planning and synchronization of division efforts to withdraw from Iraqi cities, villages, and locales in May and June of 2009 to the fusion cell midway through our deployment. This enhancement not only more clearly defined responsibilities within the OTES process, but also allowed our G5 plans section to remain “future focused,” reinforcing our original intent.

Second, we also implemented a biweekly “fusion update” to the commander, which alternated with the traditional plans update, forcing the latter from a weekly to biweekly timetable and enabling us to inject a detailed future operations dialogue into the commander’s battle rhythm. This dialogue became a small forum in which to think about the problem, exchange the commander’s vision and concepts on the topic with the staff proponent, and provide detailed guidance to achieve the vision.

**Indoctrinating and informing stakeholders.** We used our battle command seminar with the command teams who would deploy with us, two predeployment site surveys with 1st AD, and our mission readiness exercise to inform both the BCTs in Task Force Lightning and the headquarters we
would relieve in place. The intent was to help the BCTs understand how we would operate as a staff and how and where they would plug in, as well as to inform 1st AD how we would operate so that we could develop a plan that would allow us to assume the reins with minimal disruption of operations.

**Fusion cell.** The fusion cell used OTES as the principal engine to focus and synchronize division efforts and resources in prosecuting objectives and effects. The fusion cell participated in and oversaw work group planning efforts by developing and disseminating weekly “OTES guidance,” which served to drive synchronization of planning efforts, group operational planning teams, and fusion cell-led efforts, such as stabilizing Kurd-Arab relations. Each week the staff held a synchronization meeting, chaired by the commander. The choice of the word “meeting” rather than “brief” is important, as the venue was intended to be a working environment. We openly exchanged ideas with the commander to shape future events and solicited his guidance on operational concepts in development. We also sought and gained approval for plans ready for codification and execution.

**Adaptation.** As is often the case in warfare, the realities on the ground waylay even the best-laid plans. However, we anticipated this eventuality. We established three requirements to drive a continual re-evaluation of our staff alignment and the supporting processes:

- *Adapting to the environment.* We adjusted our processes to address the environment in terms of the operational planning team, the timing and types of problem sets, and the interactions with and requirements of subordinate and higher headquarters.
- *Adapting to the commander.* We adjusted our processes to better support the commander’s “fighting horizon” and the information cycle required to impart guidance and shape actions and decisions.
- *Adapting to the command.* We adjusted processes to account for decentralized division command and control nodes in Command Post North (Mosul), Command Post South (Baqubah), and Command Post East (Kirkuk), as well as unique unit requirements for participation. The result was a modified battle rhythm based on disparate information requirements, varying desires for involvement, and unique areas of responsibility.

Over the course of our deployment, our re-evaluation process led to three key modifications that ultimately enhanced staff effectiveness and the commander’s ability to make decisions.

First, we modified our 28-day cycle to a one-week cycle based on simultaneity of efforts. While the 28-day cycle worked, it applied to each problem, which meant that we had a number of such cycles occurring simultaneously and at different stages. We needed more frequent touch points with the commander to address and seek guidance on problems we faced on the future operations horizon. Within several weeks of our transfer of authority, we modified the OTES process to facilitate more interaction between the commander and staff. We held a synchronization meeting at the end of each week. This meeting became the only forum in which the commander and his entire staff could come together to discuss operations, share concepts, generate guidance, and finalize operations by obtaining the commander’s approval.

Next, we decreased the number of meetings and consolidated some forums to give the BCTs more time and to maximize the benefits of and outputs from the meetings we retained. While these modifications were the result of the unique styles and needs of our commanding general and deputy commanding generals, they remain important for a broader audience nonetheless. The importance of the modifications, from our perspective, lay in—

- Flattening the knowledge network to facilitate information sharing, transfer, and availability.
- Enabling BCT efforts and abilities to execute.
- Facilitating a more effective integration of subordinate commanders in the planning process to better support the commander’s decision process.

Finally, we combined the security and ISF development work groups into a single entity focused on development and operations. The security agreement implemented between the U.S. and Iraq had a significant impact on our counterinsurgency operations and led to this particular adjustment. In the months preceding the security agreement, many of our operations were unilaterally developed and executed with the idea of producing effects. However, in January 2009, the security agreement required bilateral efforts, and on 30 June 2009, it mandated our withdrawal from population centers, so we found ourselves clearly in
a supporting role. Thus, the evolution of our relationship with the ISF led us to modify our organization and combine these two work groups.

**Assessment**

Ultimately, the staff alignment worked well on a number of levels. First, it allowed for continuous prosecution of our objectives and facilitated the synchronization of staff planning efforts. It helped inform the commander’s decision process, ultimately enabling him to make timely and effective decisions toward his desired end state. Equally important, it allowed the headquarters to more effectively and efficiently enable the BCTs by continuously focusing staff planning efforts on division lines of effort. This enabling drove the allocation of division resources and priorities.

In addition, we realized the following key enhancements:

- We tailored our organization to prosecute an idiosyncratic campaign plan, which focused the staff continuously on what the commander had deemed important.
- A robust future operations nucleus that allowed us to manage a very dynamic operational environment more effectively, stay in front of the BCTs, and prevent future plans from being pulled too far in (toward the current operations horizon) at the expense of maintaining a longer-term focus on campaign plan refinement and emerging branches and sequels.
- The power of permanent versus temporary groups allowed for focus on campaign objectives and planning priorities. This power cannot be overstated. Not only did it provide our subordinate units a continuously functioning means to plug into the division, it also facilitated a much simpler interface with our higher headquarters, which also operated under the Joint “boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and work groups” doctrine. Thus, the overarching effect of our permanent work groups was to streamline the knowledge networks up, down, and laterally.
- We allowed for multiple, routine touch points with the commander.
- We enabled predictability, synchronization, and staff awareness.
- We drove stability in the division main command post battle rhythm and the outpost command and control nodes.

- We avoided overwhelming staff sections by consolidating the operational components of each section. This mitigation allowed the G-staff sections to focus on their doctrinal Title X functions (e.g., G1: casualty reports and notification, awards, evaluations, etc.) while plugging them into the future operations horizon, which helped to inform those day-to-day operations.

Despite the success of our staff organization and supporting processes, there were a number of things we could have done better, and lessons future deployed units can apply.

**Indoctrination effort with BCTs and newly arriving staff.** We spent a considerable amount of time briefing persons and agencies outside the staff and task force on how OTES worked, while spending comparatively little time on those who would implement it. The unintended consequences of this misplaced effort were two-fold. First, we encountered pushback from staff primaries who misunderstood the intent and concept of operation and perceived it as a threat to their authority and staff functionality. Second, the fewer briefings to implementers led to a lack of detailed understanding among the staff, particularly staff members assigned to the work groups and the fusion cell. This slowed process development prior to our deployment.

**Work groups as the operational planning teams.** Upon arriving in theater, we reverted to standing up numerous operational planning teams to address problems, as we had done in the previous deployment. We formed these operational planning teams by pulling apart the work groups to fill them, which was precisely the situation we had designed our staff organization to prevent. Recognizing that our work groups were the planning teams was important. They were cross-functionally manned to tackle multiple problem sets within their lines of effort. The only addition required was work group-to-work group coordination and communication to ensure synthesis across lines of effort.

**Integration of the “Iraqi perspective.”** We needed to think about the Iraqi perspective earlier in our predeployment preparations and in the deployment itself. Although we worked very hard to educate ourselves on the environment and to develop appropriate and meaningful objectives, our work and, by default, our product was coalition- or U.S. forces-centric. Along the way, we learned the
The importance of integrating our efforts and objectives with those of the Iraqis, provincial reconstruction teams, and others. We did this integration aggressively through key leader engagements, integrated command and control structures, and a division-level unified common plan that linked efforts more tightly to Iraqi objectives. Ultimately, regardless of the extent of our efforts or our best intentions to develop measurable and achievable objectives for success, our focus and results would be neither complete nor correct without the infusion of Iraqi objectives to guide them. This relationship would be true in any counterinsurgency environment, particularly in the transition phase of operations.

The “de-flattening” effect of internal work group hierarchies. Our work group “leads” became work group leaders, thereby complicating the dynamic by which we intended to operate, i.e., as a flat, matrix-style organization. Simply stated, the creation (and title) of work group leaders induced corresponding work group structures (i.e., a lead’s work group became his “mini staff”) that put pressure on the system to “de-flatten.” The effect was a system of work group hierarchies that ran counter to the principle of flatness we wanted to achieve. In reality, we intended the work group leads to be analysis directors.

In the Final Analysis

Just as Roman military reforms increased their ability to adapt to new enemies and an evolving environment, operational foresight and willingness to adapt can help propel U.S. forces to military successes. Applied prudently, structural reorganization can enhance our own modern-day efforts to adapt to an evolving environment and to achieve our operational and strategic goals.

The staff organization and the OTES process we adopted and executed significantly enhanced our ability to operate as a division headquarters in Multinational Division-North. It is a tested alternative that can and should benefit other headquarters wrestling with a similar conundrum. For us, it facilitated staff communication and awareness; more effectively focused and synchronized staff and BCT efforts toward achieving campaign plan objectives and effects; enabled the commander to make timely, informed, and effective decisions; and facilitated more effective interface with our higher headquarters. The combined effect of these enhancements led to BCTs that were better enabled to execute operations and achieve the division commander’s intent.

Nevertheless, despite the successes we enjoyed, the solution we employed only reflects one way among myriad possibilities. Whichever solution a commander and staff elect to pursue, we believe that there are five keys to success:

- Education about the deployment environment.
- The development of a framework that lays out what to do and to achieve to be successful.
- The formulation of a staff organization that enables the staff to most effectively support the commander in the prosecution of that plan.
- The development of a training plan for supporting systems and processes.
- The ability to objectively assess the environment as it evolves, identify changes that will require modifying organizational constructs and processes, and then modify desired enduring effects. (For example, we learned that we had to support our Iraqi partners’ objectives).

Thereafter, it is a matter of having viable systems in place to facilitate review, refinement, and adaptation. These address those changes in the environment and how the commander “fights” once on the ground, enabling units to reframe desired end states and then modify their staff organization and processes accordingly. 

---

NOTES


A RALLYING cry for changing the U.S. military, the concept of a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) has had a good run. From the middle of the 1990s into the beginning of the 21st century, the Pentagon used it to justify rewriting doctrine, overhauling organizational structures, and spending vast amounts of money on new weapons systems. Although the concept of a revolution in military affairs owed its lineage largely to historians (the “military revolution” of the 17th century) and Soviet theoreticians (the “military-technological revolution”), civilian and uniformed leaders in the U.S. military found the idea created a powerful resonance among politicians, pundits, and academics. For a while, one could not open a military journal such as Joint Force Quarterly, Parameters, or Proceedings without encountering an analytical piece measuring the role the then-current RMA played in shaping future warfare.  

Today, the rallying cry is dead. One would have difficulty in pinpointing the exact time and place of RMA’s demise. The exciting synergy of Special Forces and B-52s blasting the Taliban in 2001 seemed to renew its vogue. However, with the beginning of a full-blown insurgency in Iraq in late 2003, the use of “RMA” as a Pentagon mantra came to an abrupt end. The exact location of the phrase’s collapse is open to speculation, but one place to look for it might be along Route Irish, between the Green Zone and the Baghdad International Airport. Near the shell of a burned out Humvee one might also find the detritus of RMA’s associated concepts such as “perfect situational awareness” and “full spectrum dominance.” Our painful experience in Iraq destroyed most of the cherished (and banal) buzzwords the U.S. military carried blithely into the new century. While historians may continue to find utility in the idea of revolutionary change in warfare, the U.S. military appears more than willing to let the RMA and its conceptual brood lie where they fell.

However, before we consign this ostensibly dead revolution to the dustbin of history and delete our PowerPoint references to the idea, we really ought
to consider what we might retrieve from the idea of a sudden, dramatic change in the way wars and warfare are conducted. After all, the RMA idea helped inspire a long-running dialogue between academia and the U.S. defense establishment over the origins of innovation and adaptation in military organizations. Iraq discredited our celebration of a unique, technology-based, “American RMA,” but the utility of the original concept endured challenges without the debunking of the core idea. The fad may have fallen out of fashion, but we should not forget its genesis as myopically as we embraced its gospel.

There are at least a dozen ways in which the RMA concept might still be useful in examining U.S. national security problems in the 21st century. The RMA idea is not likely to reappear as a catchy slogan, but the conceptual skeleton can still serve as a useful framework for analysis, especially when a historical perspective informs that analysis. Based on that belief, this discussion offers 12 assertions built on the out-of-fashion idea of a modern RMA and on historical examples. We can draw inferences from history that illuminate probable relevancy, but we cannot make prognostications. As strategist Colin Gray reminds us, “The future has not happened.”

In making these 12 assertions, I seek a level of theoretical clarity by using the definitions offered by Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox in their 2001 book, The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050. In describing the phenomenon of dramatic discontinuities in military history, Knox and Murray distinguish between a “revolution in military affairs” and a “military revolution.” They describe the latter as an “uncontrollable, unpredictable, and unforeseeable” event which “fundamentally changes the framework of war” through seismic changes in both societies and military organization. An obvious example would be the French Revolution, which transformed France from an absolutist monarchy to a democratic republic while releasing forces that made the radically new ways of war prosecuted by Napoleon possible. A “revolution in military affairs” according to Murray and Knox, is a smaller, more limited phenomenon requiring “the assembly of a complex mix of tactical, organizational, doctrinal, and technological innovations in order to implement a new conceptual approach to warfare or to a specialized sub-branch of warfare.” Murray and Knox argue that, if one compares a military revolution to an earthquake, then RMAs are the pre-shocks and aftershocks that accompany it. If, for example, World War I was the signature military revolution of the 20th century, then the birth of mechanized warfare, strategic bombing, and submarine warfare are a few of the RMAs that proceeded from the war’s powerful impact on society, technology, and military institutions. Thus, we come to my first (and most obvious) assertion about revolutions in military affairs.

1. Revolutions wait for no man (and no army, navy, or air force).

Those slow to adapt to military revolutions and revolutions in military affairs are likely to suffer painful results. When the pace of change accelerates, the militaries that anticipate and adapt are likely to gain a massive advantage over potential enemies who are less agile. During the 1990s, RMA enthusiasts made this assertion in a variety of ways and, more often than not, accompanied it with a reference to the German blitzkrieg victory over France in 1940. The Wehrmacht’s triumph over the Allied armies was useful as an illustration, especially when accompanied with illustrations of panzer (i.e., armored) formations and Stuka dive-bombers. Yet, one could just as easily have referred to Napoleon’s stunning triumph over the Prussian army in 1806. In both cases, the loser had been slow to recognize the way that warfare was changing. In the case of 1940, the French were victims of the RMA. In 1806, a military revolution had the shoe on the other foot. The proud regiments of Frederick the Great’s army became a speed bump to Napoleon’s genius and the energies released by the French Revolution.

What does this mean to us now? It should inspire us to ask if the “American RMA” of the 1990s has run its course. In its aftermath, how adaptable are we? Has the U.S. military really fostered a culture that anticipates and exploits change? The Army’s school system advertises that it develops flexible and adaptable leaders. Is this just sloganeering? Who do we resemble the most, the Germans or the French in the blitzkrieg of 1940? These questions prompt a second assertion about revolutions in military affairs.
2. Those that live by the RMA may well die by the RMA, and in time, the competition will catch up.

In 1813, when confronted with the evidence that his enemies were learning from their defeats, Napoleon said, “These animals have learned something!” The French emperor’s victories had inspired reform and innovation in the armies of Prussia and Austria and encouraged such unlikely allies as Great Britain and Russia to join in a powerful coalition determined to crush the “Corsican Ogre.” Similarly, blitzkrieg lost its magic after the Wehrmacht overextended itself in the Soviet Union. From late 1942 until the fall of Berlin, the Germans experienced the Red Army’s version of blitzkrieg in the Ukraine, in Byelorussia, and along the Vistula. Like victory, the advantages that come from exploiting a revolution in military affairs are a “wasting asset.” A decisive military inspires imitation and adaptation by the enemy.

The examples of Napoleon in defeat and the Wehrmacht battered by the Soviets should inspire us to consider the “half-life” of the RMA we celebrated in the 1990s. U.S. leaders should ask themselves how far our real and potential enemies have gone in undermining the battlefield advantages we displayed during Desert Storm and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. How much longer should we consider our advantages decisive? Springing logically from this question is my next assertion.

3. Dominance in an area of warfare will inspire others to launch their own RMA.

A competitor’s strategic inferiority inspires him to innovate. Revolutionary change is a response to competition. Consider British naval dominance up to the 20th century. In 1906, when challenged by a growing German fleet, First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher and the Royal Navy answered by launching a warship of revolutionary design: the HMS Dreadnought. When war came between Germany and Great Britain in 1914, the British held a decisive numerical advantage in this new form of battleship. The Germans made a timid challenge to this advantage in 1916 at Jutland and then let their surface fleet rust in port. Yet, by 1917, as U-boats savaged Allied merchant shipping, the British dreadnought advantage seemed almost superfluous. By using submersible vessels against Britain’s sea lines of communication, the Germans had launched their own RMA. For a period of several months, the U-boats threatened to starve Great Britain while the battleships of the Royal Navy languished at
Scapa Flow. Similarly, in the aftermath of World War I, most of the world believed that France had the most powerful and effective army in Europe. During most of the interwar period, the mobilized strength of the French army dwarfed Germany’s small, treaty-constrained Reichswehr. French (and Polish) dominance in men and materiel practically forced Germany to build a doctrine and a force structure that emphasized maneuver, low-level initiative, and combined arms cooperation. Building on these ideas, the German army of the 1920s began to assemble the components that debuted as a blitzkrieg on the Polish plains. 7

Thus, apparently weaker forces can turn the tables on their enemies. With these examples in mind, one imagines that those who resent America’s current dominance in military affairs will seek (to resurrect another former “hot” topic) an asymmetric answer to U.S. advantages on a modern battlefield. Al-Qaeda has given us a taste of this phenomenon, and one wonders what surprises the Chinese are developing. How many brigades of technicians in Beijing and Shanghai are at work countering U.S. advantages in surveillance technology, command and control systems, and precision munitions? This question leads to my next observation.

4. Even before it matures on the battlefield, an RMA may generate a “counter-RMA.”

If you advertise fabulous innovations, someone may notice. When you introduce revolutionary changes in doctrine, force structure, and technology, a wise competitor will be paying attention. Moreover, if you make a big fuss about your innovations, such a competitor will think hard about how to counteract them. Consider the case of strategic bombing prior to World War II. During World War I, German strategic bombing made a splashy but ultimately indecisive debut. Zeppelins and Gotha bombers caused a brief panic within the English population, but the technical limitations of these two bombing platforms caused them to have only a negligible effect on the war’s outcome. Nevertheless, between the wars, airpower enthusiasts Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell suggested that improved bombers would wreak havoc on helpless civilian targets. In the 1930s, as Nazi Germany began to rearm, Hitler and Goering proclaimed the ability of the newly created Luftwaffe to play such a destructive role. In truth, the Luftwaffe’s strategic capabilities were limited, but the limitations were not immediately apparent to Germany’s neighbors. In the diplomatic crises that preceded World War II, Hitler used the specter of a sky darkened by German bombers to intimidate his opponents.
Across the channel, the chief of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Fighter Command, Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, paid close attention to the growth of the Luftwaffe. Anticipating what it would take to stop German bombing raids, Dowding began to put together the pieces of an integrated air defense system. By the time Goering turned his attention to bombing England, the RAF had built a network of radar installations, fighter bases, and local and centralized control stations. In the summer of 1940, when the first Heinkels and Messerschmidts appeared over the English coastline, they were confounded by the speed of the RAF’s response. Nevertheless, the Battle of Britain was a “near-run thing,” and the eventual British victory owed much to Dowding’s vision as well as the Luftwaffe’s limitations. Dowding had anticipated what it would take to defend against strategic bombing, the nascent RMA led by the Luftwaffe. What Dowding had launched, in effect, was a “counter-RMA.”

This example from three-quarters of a century in the past should give us pause. The U.S. military procurement process ballyhoos future systems and capabilities long before they appear in the inventory. To generate momentum toward a procurement decision, military contractors will field sexy prototypes and stage gaudy performance tests well before the decision to go ahead with production, and such is the nature of things that the new technology often fails to live up to the “hype” that surrounded its development. But how skeptical can future “peer rivals” afford to be about the claims made for new U.S. fighter planes, reconnaissance satellites, and ground combat systems? If a prudent competitor waits to see if a certain piece of gear works as advertised, then it risks losing the time it could use to develop countermeasures or rival systems. With the announcement of every new American weapons program, one can imagine the Chinese beginning to assemble a “research and development team” to develop countermeasures. (How many were working to neutralize the Future Combat System [FCS] before it was cancelled?) However, if innovation inspires countermeasures, how does one know when to quit worrying about countermeasures? The answer to that question leads us to the fifth assertion:

5. The “almost” RMA from last time might be decisive next time.

One must learn from near misses. Shipping losses created anxiety in Great Britain during the spring and summer of 1917 when it appeared that the U-boat would become the decisive weapon of World War I. However, within months of instituting a convoy system, the Royal Navy had brought the U-boat menace under control. After the war, British admirals did not ignore the threat, but they believed that a convoy system and the new technological marvel, sonar, would thwart enemy submersibles. When war came in 1939, the Kriegsmarine had too few ocean-going U-boats to change such thinking. However, by 1942, Doenitz and company were able to put hundreds of U-boats into the sea, from bases in Norway and the Bay of Biscay that allowed easy access into the Atlantic shipping lanes. The Germans used new tactics that made effective use of wolf packs, aerial reconnaissance, and radio control from the mainland. A quarter-century after the crisis of 1917, the British found themselves once again pushed to the edge of defeat by a German U-boat fleet. The German boats of 1942 to 1943 were very similar to the ones deployed during World War I, yet when used in new ways, they created a renaissance of the “submarine RMA” previewed 25 years before.

World War II saw a similar revival for the tank. The tanks of 1918 played an important role in the Allied victory, but not a decisive one. Technical shortcomings limited the behemoths of 1917 and 1918 to the role of adjunct to the “poor bloody infantry” and the truly decisive weapon of the Western Front, artillery. Twenty years later, a relative handful of German panzers played a starring role in the blitzkrieg victories against Poland and the Western Allies. Combined arms doctrine, decentralized command and control, and technical improvements gave the tank a decisive role that only a few visionaries saw in the interwar years.

The cases of the U-boat and the panzer attacks suggest we can make old weapons play new tricks. This should make us wonder which weapons we have discarded that we could resurrect and put to good use on the battlefield. Can we afford to seek
the “system-after-next” before we have exhausted the potential of the hardware we have.\textsuperscript{10}

The examples of the U-boat and panzer also remind us that an RMA might result if we apply new “thoughtware” to old hardware. A handful of visionary leaders can take existing weapons and turn them into the instruments that win future wars. However, lest we believe individuals can manage the changing character of the battlefield, let us remember that, according to Murray and Knox, there are some changes so vast and fundamental as to slip the bonds of human control.\textsuperscript{11} These changes lead to my next observation.

6. We guide RMAs; we ride military revolutions.

Dramatic changes in society and the conduct of war are usually beyond control. When Louis XVI lost his head to French revolutionaries, the dynasties of Europe feared the dangerous effects of the political upheaval that had gripped France and destroyed the Bourbon monarchy. However, neither the crowned heads of the continent nor their generals could have anticipated the mobilization of French national power that the upheaval made possible or the changes in warfare that resulted. It took an ambitious (and very lucky) young Corsican officer to realize the power of the new order and to exploit that power at Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena. Yet, ironically, the same nationalism and reforming spirit that made Napoleon’s armies so formidable also inspired his enemies. By 1813, the energies the French Revolution released had turned on the man who had most benefited from them. Napoleon’s ultimate exile to St. Helena should encourage humility.

A survey of Napoleonic battlefields leads to my seventh assertion.

7. Not all military revolutions and RMAs are technology-based.

Political upheaval, social change, and economic development can change warfare dramatically. Again, Napoleon’s achievements offer a vivid example of this point. The weapons his grognards carried were essentially the same as those wielded by France’s opponents. At Auerstedt, Marshal Davout’s corps routed a Prussian force twice its size not because of its weapons but because of its revolutionary spirit, inspired leadership, and flexible tactical organization. French junior commanders were ready to exercise initiative when the situation demanded it. Skirmishers operated as thinking individuals. Moreover, the changes in the economic and political order of Europe’s early modern period led to the first, true standing armies. As historians like Geoffrey Parker and Michael Roberts have argued, drill, discipline, a reliable wage, permanent military units, and a relatively efficient tax-collecting bureaucracy gave Europe an edge against armies outside the continent. Flintlocks, caravels, and trace italienne forts played a key technological role in extending European military superiority around the world, but one can argue that it was the “software” of military innovation as much as the hardware that made the difference.

Thus, before the “revolutionary changes” of the 17th century, Ottoman Turkey was capable of periodic invasions deep into Europe; Turkish troops besieged Vienna as late as 1683. However, once the Habsburgs were able to field forces that exhibited all the advantages of drill and discipline, the retreat of the Ottomans began.

Why is this important to us? As Americans, we tend to be keenly sensitive to technological innovation among our competitors and potential rivals. Thus, during the Cold War, the Defense Intelligence Agency painted pictures of emerging, potential, and even fanciful enemy weapon systems. We have filled our threat assessments with analyses of existing enemy systems and hostile development efforts, but have not stopped to consider that such a focus could blind us to other trends in the world. Did we overlook the rise of militant jihadism because of our fascination with North Korea’s enrichment of fissionable materials? Even when we see a trend or threat clearly, does our parochialism cause us to misinterpret what we see? This line of thought leads to my next assertion.

8. One service’s RMA may marginalize another service.

What seems wonderfully “revolutionary” to one branch of the military may not look that way to another. When the first tanks crawled across no man’s land in September 1918, the prescient saw that war would never be the same: the internal combustion engine, not horseflesh, would generate shock action on the battlefield of the future. Yet few cavalrymen accepted this vision. Cavalry advocates fought a bitter delaying action against the primacy of the tank in the field of mounted warfare. Infantrymen, as well,
did their best to limit armored forces to a supporting role and keep the tank “mavericks” in their place. Similarly, when the U.S. dropped atomic weapons on Japan in August 1945, no one needed a crystal ball to see that warfare was on the verge of a sea change. Yet within the U.S. military, the changes ushered in with the nuclear era created a class of winners and losers; the newly independent U.S. Air Force and, in particular, the Strategic Air Command, justifiably saw itself as the essential component of America’s security and thought that if the other services were marginalized, so be it. The U.S. Navy could patrol the seas, and the Army could guard airbases and police up the nuclear battlefield, but the Strategic Air Command’s massive bombers would carry the load of deterrence and warfighting. Fearing marginalization, the U.S. Navy launched the “revolt of the admirals,” while the Army was inspired into ill-conceived experiments like the “Pentomic Division.” Both services were scrambling to find a role on the nuclear battlefield.

Fast forward to the end of the century. The Air Force and, to a lesser extent, the Navy, seemed well positioned to benefit from the “American RMA” of the 1990s. Prophets predicted that advances in communications, satellite imagery, and precision targeting would remove the “fog and friction” from the battlefield and foster “perfect situational awareness.” In the sterile atmospheres of the sky, space, and sea, no enemy would be able to hide from America’s wonder weapons. The Army, fearing for its future in such a battlefield, created a transformation that made similar but less credible claims for battlefield dominance in ground combat. In adapting to the new realities of 21st-century war, the visionaries of the three major services should pause over the next assertion.

9. The lasting lessons of military history were paid for in blood.

Building doctrine to exploit a revolution in military affairs cannot be divorced from experience. During World War I, the results achieved from strategic bombing were meager. Zeppelins created a brief panic among the English populace, and four-engine bombers achieved a modest civilian death toll from their somewhat random attacks. Nevertheless, shortly after the end of the war, the first prophet of airpower, Giulio Douhet, predicted that strategic bombing would be the decisive form of warfare in the future. Armies and navies would become superfluous and attempts at aerial defense would be futile. Inspired by Douhet and by their own maverick of airpower, Billy Mitchell, the U.S. Army Air Corps developed a strategic bombing doctrine that called for American heavy bombers to cripple an enemy’s war effort by striking key targets in the enemy’s homeland.

The doctrine assumed that such targets existed and could be identified. It assumed that bombers could find their way to these targets and drop their bombs accurately enough to hit the targets and that the targets would be vulnerable to destruction from the air. Most important, the doctrine assumed that an enemy would be unable to defend against such attacks. The doctrine writers at Air Corps Tactical School at Langley built their assumptions about target identification and navigation on intelligence capabilities that were uncertain and technology that was unproven. However, in assuming that U.S. bombers would not need to achieve air superiority before exploiting the promise of strategic bombing, they contradicted one of the more salient lessons that came out of World War I—that enemy air forces have to be beaten before the full capabilities of air power can be used against targets on the ground. Between 1914 and 1918, aviators had paid for this lesson in blood. The U.S. Eighth Air Force paid the blood price for the lesson yet again in the skies over Regensburg and Schweinfurt. Americans tend to be too casual in their historical analysis. The lessons learned in the skies of Nazi Germany should remind us to keep our enthusiasm over innovation in perspective. Perhaps part of the problem for the interwar Army Air Corps was the lack of a clear enemy against which to test its ideas. This observation leads to my next assertion.

10. Leadership in an RMA is difficult to sustain without a credible strategic threat.

Effective innovation needs a real threat to focus on. In his review of interwar innovation, Williamson Murray noted that the military institutions...
most successful in anticipating the problems of future battlefields were those that studied specific problems posed by specific enemies.\(^{14}\) The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps offer perhaps the clearest example of this point in the years prior to 1941. Both services anticipated that the most likely enemy of the future would be the Japanese Empire. With that in mind, they created and refined War Plan Orange as a framework for preparing for war against the Japanese. Whether it was war games at the Naval War College, or Major Pete Ellis’s prescient studies of amphibious operations, the Navy and Marine Corps focused their exercises, their weapons development, their training programs, and their experiments against that specific enemy. That focus became the basis for successful innovation in two nearly brand-new forms of combat—carrier warfare and amphibious assault against fortified islands. Focused interwar innovation laid the basis for U.S. victories at Midway and Guadalcanal.

That effective innovation requires a clear perception of the threat is a conclusion that should give us pause. The United States faces an ongoing threat in Afghanistan. Yet the Pentagon will not have the luxury of putting an exclusive emphasis on counterinsurgency. There are just too many other, different dangers on the horizon. America cannot do as Great Britain did during the 1920s, skimp on defense budget while devoting some attention to imperial policing, some attention to homeland defense, and relatively little attention to the threat of conventional war with Germany. Similarly, the U.S. Army’s recent transformation was oriented on capability rather than a concrete threat. One could argue that it was a poor target on which to focus one’s efforts. Like America during the interwar period, Japan benefited from preparing for war against a clearly defined enemy. However, for the Japanese, the skill of their carrier pilots, the bravery of their infantry, the agility of the Zero, and the lethality of the Long Lance torpedo were not enough to overcome a fundamental mistake, the mistake of making war against an enemy whose war-making potential dwarfs your own. My 11th assertion follows:

**11. Leadership during an RMA cannot overcome grievous strategic miscalculation.**

Tactical brilliance and technological wizardry will not compensate for taking on more enemy than you can handle. Imperial Japan is the conspicuous example of this point. Whatever lead it held in carrier aviation was not nearly enough to overcome American industrial might (even without the catastrophe at Midway). They consciously gambled on American resolution and lost big. Hitler is another poster child for this point. Hitler rode the blitzkrieg RMA across the Polish plains and around the Maginot Line. However, the Wehrmacht’s tactical skill and opportunistic campaigning came up short against the Soviet Union, with its vastness, its weather, and its military’s phoenix-like ability to regenerate divisions. The myth of German invincibility died, frostbitten, on the approaches to Moscow. Hitler compounded his strategic fiasco by a gratuitous declaration of war against the U.S. that same winter.

A more recent example is close at hand. Given the limited strength of our ground forces, hindsight suggests that the U.S. signed up for at least one war too many in 2003. The sprint to Baghdad in March and April of that year looked like blitzkrieg. It seemed brilliantly decisive and economic in human costs. Now, seven years later, we are hard pressed to find enough troops to fight our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. We may find ourselves robbing Peter in Ramadi to pay Paul in Kandahar.

At least part of the problem, according to some, was our inability to project a path to the political end state we desired beyond the dazzling battlefield victories. We are having to relearn the fundamentals of counterinsurgency while “making do” with forces spread thin around the world. The ghost of Clausewitz haunts us: we have been painfully reminded that war is indeed a political phenomenon. This brings me to my 12th and last assertion.

**12. The fundamental nature of war is impervious to military revolutions and RMAs.**

Weapons change; people and their motives do not. Clausewitz made the point that war is a political phenomenon almost two centuries ago. Two millennia before that, Thucydides offered similar insights about what motivates men to go to war and what sustains them. As Americans, we put more faith in engineering skills than in our historical memory. We have more confidence in our weapons than in the breadth of perspective that informs their use. At the beginning of the century, the evangelists of “American RMA” argued that we could drive
uncertainty and confusion off the battlefield the way we had chased the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait. Now, 19 years after Desert Storm, we have been offered a dose of humility that might moderate our faith in technology.

This essay began by suggesting that military professionals have largely jettisoned the concept of “the revolution in military affairs.” The Joint Force Quarterly articles that celebrated it have been shredded, and the PowerPoint briefings that proclaimed it have been recycled into the vast reservoir of electrons in the Pentagon’s servers. Like many of the products American industry used to make, the revolution in military affairs had passed its point of “planned obsolescence.”

For the most part, the analysis of revolutionary changes in warfare has been left to the historians. They can make of it what they will. Even so, there is still value in studying revolutions in military affairs, not only for the historian, but for the military professional as well. Perhaps the humility we have learned in the last several years will enable us to reach into the dustbin of history, clean up the idea of a revolution in military affairs, and find some new uses for it. **MR**

---

**NOTES**


2. There are ugly rumors that the revolution in military affairs staged its own demise in order to cover its defection to China.


7. This is probably best described in James Corum’s *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994).


9. Another example, mine warfare, so prominent in the Vietnam War, has found its renaissance in the “IED.”

10. I suspect that those who crew our B-52 fleet might argue that the idea of resurrecting old hardware can be taken to extremes.


12. In its unhappy attempts to ape the “technological utopianism” (Williamson Murray) of the Air Force and Navy, some criticized the Army for falling into the worst tendency of the other two services: reducing tactics, operations, and strategy to “targeting problems.”


Medical Operations in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Desired Effects and Unintended Consequences

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew S. Rice, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Omar J. Jones, U.S. Army

Medical operations are common in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the press reports about them frequently. Are they medically effective or are they harmful? Do they further the counterinsurgency fight, or hinder it? Other than press reports, not much published information about medical operations exists for reference when commanders and their staffs plan or execute such missions.

Brigade combat team (BCT) and battalion commanders conducting counterinsurgency warfare often use their combat health support (CHS) personnel and equipment for non-CHS purposes, namely to provide medical care to the civilians within their areas of responsibility. These operations have various doctrinal and non-doctrinal names—including medical civic action programs (MEDCAPS), combined medical engagements, or cooperative medical engagements—but they typically involve U.S. medical personnel at the battalion level, with or without the participation of indigenous medical personnel, providing care to civilians for a short period of time. For the purpose of clarity, we shall collectively refer to these missions as medical operations.

Commanders have one or more motives for conducting medical operations. These may include desires to be beneficent, to influence local civilians so that the commander can gain an advantage over the insurgents, to gather intelligence, or to generate positive content for information operations.

If the commander’s motive is humanitarian, he must be aware of the capabilities and limitations of his medical assets as they relate to the indigenous population, and he must be alert to the medical harm that may result from the attempt to provide medical care.

When gaining influence is the commander’s motive, medical care essentially serves as a commodity, which the commander hopes to trade in return for goodwill or cooperation.
When gathering intelligence is the commander’s objective, medical care draws a permissive crowd from which to elicit tactically useful information. When using the medical operation as an information operation, the commander must ensure that appropriate media are present to carry the message to targeted audiences, rather than media that simply project the message back to coalition forces.

This article examines medical operations through the lens of counterinsurgency principles and seeks to determine if BCT and battalion medical assets can be effectively used for humanitarian, influence, intelligence-gathering, or information operation missions. We will examine the unintentional medical and tactical consequences of these missions—which can undermine higher-echelon commanders’ operational and strategic counterinsurgency objectives—and suggest the most effective ways for commanders to employ their medical assets to further the counterinsurgency war.

Capabilities and Limitations of Medical Assets

Brigade combat team and battalion-level CHS assets are tailored to provide a specific range of medical services (primary care and trauma stabilization) to a specific population (healthy young Soldiers). Primary care within the BCT includes preventive medicine, the management of acute minor illnesses and injuries (e.g., colds, urinary tract infections, skin infections, sprains, lacerations, and simple fractures), and the management of chronic minor conditions (e.g. high blood pressure, lower back pain, and allergies). Family physicians, internal medicine physicians, pediatricians, physician assistants, and family nurse practitioners usually provide these services.

Successful treatment of chronic (long-term) illnesses requires ongoing care, and preferably continuity of care, which is accomplished when the same physician treats a patient over a long time, or when different physicians treating a patient have access to his medical record for reference and for generating new entries. This is important. Physicians cannot effectively treat a patient’s chronic illnesses (such as diabetes, hypertension, or emphysema) with a one-time encounter when no medical record exists for reference, and the treatment generates no medical record for future reference.

A deployed BCT may have one or more “professional filler system” physicians attached. These physicians may not be primary care physicians, but medical specialists or subspecialists, such as cardiologists, dermatologists, or endocrinologists. However, despite their specialized skills and knowledge, without the support of trained assistants, sophisticated laboratory facilities, and specialized equipment, they are not able to function much beyond the role of a primary care physician. Their potential is constrained by their environment. For example, a trauma surgeon inside an evacuation vehicle is no more useful to an injured Soldier than is a well-trained and equipped combat medic. The trauma surgeon only performs to his potential when he is in an operating suite with assistants, anesthesia support, blood products, and an intensive-care recovery room, just as an infantry BCT commander without his staff, Soldiers, or his command and control systems is, notwithstanding his education and experience, no more than a rifleman.

Medical Operations in Counterinsurgency

As with any military mission, medical operations at the battalion or BCT level should nest within the intent of the division and corps, so that they support counterinsurgency principles and imperatives. Most would agree that a foreign military cannot succeed in counterinsurgency by simply doing kind things for the population. A common term for medical operations is “random acts of kindness,” implying that they create no sustainable gain, are not laterally synchronized, and are not nested with strategic plans.

To succeed, foreign military and host nation forces must cause the population to respect and rely upon the native government. It is necessary for the people to either fear the government more than they fear the insurgents, or to trust the government to protect them from the insurgents. Our use of the word “fear” does not mean that we endorse brutality. We are simply saying that the population must fear the legitimate lethal and non-lethal martial and civil consequences of passively or actively supporting insurgents. U.S. forces may engage in efforts designed to make Iraqis or Afghans like Americans, rather than to make them stakeholders in their own government institutions. After one
BCT’s assessment of an Iraqi hospital in 2008, during which the hospital director requested 30,000 liters of fuel to run his generators (despite admitting that his fuel tanks were pilfered nightly), the BCT surgeon discussed the request with another medical officer. “Americans have been giving him fuel for years. We must stop, or he will never force his own system to work,” the surgeon said. “But if I give him fuel,” said the other officer, “then I will be his hero.” Of course, the objective is not to be the hospital director’s hero, but make the hospital director more reliant on his own government for diesel deliveries or electrical power.

This problem of fostering an unhealthy reliance on U.S. resources is not unique to medical operations. For example, a 2008 article in the Washington Post stated that—“In a Senate hearing this spring, [U.S. Senator] Levin recalled a recent trip to a base near Diyala . . . [A] senior U.S. military officer told him of a successful garbage-collection program, paid for with [U.S.] money, and the thanks he received from an Iraqi official, who added, ‘As long as you are willing to pay for the cleanup, why should we?’”

In general, we should conduct medical operations only if they are likely to cause the local population to become more reliant on and confident in their indigenous medical institutions, supporting the strategic counterinsurgency goal of legitimizing the native government.

The Humanitarian Medical Operation: Unnecessary, Futile, or Both?

Khidr, Iraq—An old woman wailed crazily as a man whose legs were blown off months ago was wheeled past the concertina wire. Hundreds of people . . . lined up amid mud and rubble for a medical clinic held by American troops in this rural village northwest of Iskandariyah . . . “I’m not going to be able to treat him,” [Dermatologist Lt. Col. Tim] Monahan said quietly, standing in the doorway of a dimly lit classroom . . . [H]is
amputations appeared to be healing well. The best thing, Monahan told him, was to wash with soap and hot water, but the man wanted medicine. After some negotiations, he left for the rubble with four tubes of ointment and a bottle of betadine [antiseptic].

This scenario is an easy trap to fall into. Appalled by the condition of local medical facilities, an American commander believes that the people have no access to healthcare or are afraid to cross sectarian boundaries to clinics or hospitals. He talks to a local sheikh or tribal leader and arranges to conduct a medical operation. Unfortunately, neither of them recognizes that transient battalion aid station medical practice is worse than consistent indigenous medical practice, when it comes to the diagnosis and treatment of chronic diseases in the local population. Major Greg Brewer, chief medical planner for Multinational Division-Baghdad, put it this way: “To me it makes more sense for us to be aiding and assisting the [Ministry of Health], rather than to be doing their job for them [with mediocrity].”

Consider the validity of some assumptions we may make when considering a medical operation. One is that the indigenous people have little or no access to healthcare. This may be true in some sparsely populated areas, but this is of little relevance to the medical assets within a BCT (for reasons that we will discuss later), and may be a false assumption. One medical officer participated in an operation in a rural area outside of Taji, Iraq, where people who reportedly had no access to medical care appeared with the recent results of sophisticated laboratory tests, ultrasound reports, tissue pathology reports, and computerized axial tomography (CAT) scan images. Colleagues have described similar experiences in rural areas of the Diyala Province. We should recognize that although we may not be familiar with the capabilities or locations of all the indigenous physicians or medical facilities in the area, the locals are. We are prone to project our unawareness onto the local population and to allow them to capitalize on our ignorance or sympathies to obtain services, which they—incorrectly—perceive as valuable.
Another assumption, at least in Iraq, is that people are too fearful to cross boundaries to obtain medical care. However, is this fear rational? According to the Los Angeles Times, 2,155 Iraqis died violently in Baghdad in May 2006, at the height of the insurgency. (This number includes insurgents killed by coalition forces.)\(^6\) If the population of Baghdad was 5.5 million at the time, then the annual violent death rate was only 0.47 percent (470 per 100,000 per year). Although ten times higher than Detroit’s annual murder rate (47 per 100,000 per year), does a daily death-risk of 0.0013 percent (1.3 per 100,000 per day) really justify avoiding the market or a hospital?\(^7\) U.S. forces should not reinforce enemy propaganda by accommodating the population’s fears. Rather, they should work to dispel those fears and to encourage normalcy as much as possible.

Before a battalion or BCT commander directs his medical assets to provide care to a civilian population, he and his medical officers must determine what common diseases exist in the community and whether CHS personnel and equipment can feasibly address those problems.

On any given day, less than two to three percent of people have an acute (brief and/or sudden) minor illness or injury that is amenable to diagnosis and treatment by a medical platoon or company. Many acute conditions resolve spontaneously and do not require treatment. The vast majority of people are either relatively well or have chronic illnesses, so the deployment of BCT or battalion medical assets to attempt the diagnosis and treatment of acute medical problems is largely unnecessary.

In the United States, the most common chronic medical conditions are diabetes, hypertension, arthritis, emphysema (from smoking), asthma, heart disease, cancers, and mental illnesses.\(^8\) These same chronic diseases are common among Iraqis. In October and November of 2007, the United Nations Refugee Agency surveyed over 700 Iraqi refugees living in Syria, and found that 17 percent of respondents had chronic diseases, the most common being hypertension, diabetes, heart problems, lung problems (emphysema and asthma), and arthritis.\(^9\)

Chronic illnesses are often preventable, largely self-inflicted by lifestyle choices, generally incurable, and progressively worsen with time. Dietary measures, exercise, tobacco cessation, and consistent life-long medication use often slow disease progression. Since chronic illnesses require ongoing care, medical platoons or companies cannot effectively treat them in the local population. Consider the medical futility of this Baghdad operation:

Consultations at the clinics are brief, often extremely so. Vital signs are rarely checked. Medics dispense a range of over-the-counter medicines and antibiotics . . . with no possibility of follow-up visits to gauge patients’ progress. Dr. (Captain) David Escobedo, a family practitioner from the 1st Infantry Division of Schweinfurt, Germany, said he questions the medical value of the four-hour operations . . . “These can’t possibly make a long-term impact, since these are a one-time deal,” he said during a . . . September clinic in the Shi’ite neighborhood of Ur. “That’s the biggest frustration. Not being able to see these people again and follow up.” . . .Another frustration, he said, is his inability to use laboratory tests to diagnose patients, or to provide more than basic help . . . Cases can be severe, as in the case of a tall, proud looking woman who carried in her 10-year-old son, a thin boy with severe deformities, club feet and atrophied limbs. She set him on an exam table and begged for help . . . “There’s nothing that we can do for him here,” Escobedo said apologetically. “We can give him some vitamins.”\(^10\)

Despite the futility and frustration illustrated above, the typical medical operation consists of battalion medical personnel setting up a temporary “sick-call” clinic in a school or other building, where a large number of people with mostly chronic illnesses and unrealistic expectations of cure quickly overwhelm them. Many people are not sick at all, but only curious.\(^11\) Severe time constraints, lack of sufficient interpreters, and absence of basic diagnostic equipment such as laboratory tests and x-ray imaging compound these frustrations.

The reader will appreciate the futility of this healthcare model if he imagines having chest pain, a cough, or bloody urine; tries to explain his symptoms to a foreign physician (who speaks no English, but only has one shared and harried interpreter); imagines the physician performing a physical exam, correctly diagnosing the problem (without any diagnostic equipment), and then imagines him formulating an effective treatment plan—all within three minutes!
It is perhaps counterintuitive, but the most effective means to improve civilian health are nonmedical. The means are ensuring security, dispelling fear caused by insurgent propaganda, and subtly assisting local authorities with clinic or hospital infrastructure repair or development. Doing so should facilitate freedom of movement of patients, physicians, and medical supplies. Physicians who feel secure will naturally want to work at their clinics or hospitals, and if they are getting paid, will probably encourage their expatriate colleagues to return home. Truck drivers who feel safe will be more likely to arrive at hospitals with supplies and medications. People who feel secure will be more likely to travel to a local clinic. Dr. Abbas al-Sahan validates this assertion by saying, “When there’s a good security situation and good economic improvement of the country, the work will grow,” describing the increasing demand for cosmetic surgery in Iraq, and the return of physicians who had left due to fear of violence.12 If the commander treats the underlying disease (insecurity and restricted movement), then the symptom (poor access to healthcare, or poor health) will improve naturally. These actions have a greater chance of sustainably improving the health of Iraqis or Afghans than do any number of operations in which U.S. forces provide transient, poor-quality medical services.

A typical humanitarian medical operation (although relatively easy to execute) is an exercise in futility. Senior commanders have prohibited U.S. physicians from providing any but emergent care (life, limb, or eyesight) to civilians, but as abundant media reports indicate, well-intentioned but misguided subordinates routinely violate the prohibitions.13

First, Do No Harm

We can apply the medical principle of “do no harm” in a military context—tactical, operational, or strategic. Just as physicians consider the potential harms of interventions and medications they prescribe, combat commanders consider the second- and third-order effects of their operations, including unintended negative consequences. Medical operations are a morass of well-intentioned mistakes, ranging from medical harms to strategic errors. Commanders and their medical advisors must deliberate carefully and mitigate the likely adverse outcomes of medical operations, if they choose to execute them at all.

The likelihood of causing medical harm during these operations is high. The combination of an overwhelming number of civilians (usually in the hundreds), a small number of physicians or physician assistants (usually one or two), the short duration of the operation (usually four to six hours), the absence of minimal diagnostic equipment, and language and cultural barriers are a recipe for disaster.

Once engaged in the operation, there is tremendous pressure—to do something—even if it is not helpful and is potentially harmful. We dispense pain medications and antibiotics without restraint. Do we ever learn of the child for whom we unnecessarily prescribed antibiotics for a viral cough, and who suffered a serious allergic reaction because we were unaware of her penicillin allergy? Do we hear about the woman we gave acetaminophen to for hip pain, who developed liver failure because we were unaware of her chronic liver disease? What about the man who complained of rectal bleeding, left the clinic with a tube of hemorrhoid cream and a false sense of reassurance, and was later diagnosed with colon cancer, by then incurably metastasized? How about the mother who gave her feverish child too much ibuprofen because of an error in calculating the weight-based dose, causing the child’s kidneys to fail? Or the man who developed severe infectious colitis after being given an unnecessary antibiotic for a cold?

These real medical errors occur in the United States, so we can assume that they occur during medical operations. However, due to the transient nature of medical operations, U.S. and allied local physicians rarely learn of the consequences of their well-intentioned efforts. In addition to the ethical questions raised by this type of medical practice, these medical harms can provide fuel for enemy propaganda, and foster mistrust of Americans, or worse, of involved indigenous physicians.

Do Expectations Create Suffering?

Other cases were more severe. In a few heart-breaking instances, parents entered the rooms cradling crippled or blind children, their eyes pleading for a magic cure . . .
Besides offering something for the pain, there was little the medics could do for patients with chronic, severe illnesses. As trained healers, it was something they all found frustrating.14

The failure to meet unrealistic expectations is a common thread of medical operations. Iraqis or Afghans may believe that they will benefit from superior medications, skills, or knowledge; or that the Americans will cure their children of incurable diseases. Consider the amputee who left with a tube of ointment; or the desperate mother who brought in her severely deformed son, only to be given a vitamin.

Dozens of headlines in unit newspapers or Stars and Stripes proclaim the “success” of one medical operation or another, in which “U.S. physicians provide medical care to 400 Iraqis” (in 3 hours). They tout quantity but do not mention quality. Commanders should read between the lines to consider the tactical consequences of people leaving the operation disillusioned, disappointed, or angry, their expectations of miracle cures, wonder drugs, or Learjet trips to the Mayo Clinic unfulfilled. Their disappointment can foment anger and incite behavior that is more malignant.

To avoid creating disappointment and potential backlash, commanders and their medical officers should set appropriate (low) expectations in advance of medical operations, outlining what their medical personnel will and (more importantly) will not do. For example, a commander could tell a community leader, “My Soldiers will distribute dental floss, toothpaste, and toothbrushes; and will provide education on the prevention of tooth decay and gum disease. They cannot and will not attempt to diagnose or treat illnesses.”

**Competition with the Indigenous Clinics and Hospitals: Reducing the Number of Stakeholders**

Military operations must not undermine the peoples’ respect for, reliance on, or trust in their government institutions, including healthcare institutions, regardless of the institutions’ state of dysfunction. Iraqis or Afghans who depend on their government institutions are less likely to support destructive efforts against those institutions. Those who are not are more likely to be ambivalent about or supportive of destructive efforts against those institutions.15

Medical operations establish parallel health care venues that compete with and delegitimize indigenous healthcare institutions and physicians, foster inappropriate dependence on American assets, and discourage development of local resources. What messages are we sending when we establish a temporary clinic 10 kilometers from the Abu Ghraib Hospital? “We have better medicine.” “We do things better than your doctors.” “You can’t trust your hospital to take care of you.” “It is not safe to drive to the hospital.” The Khidr medical operation (referenced above) illustrates the problem of competing with legitimate hospitals. The attendees at that medical operation were “within traveling distance of seven [Iraqi] hospitals.”16

**What is Right versus What is Easy**

Most deployed U.S. physicians will encounter several civilians with tragic medical problems and may attempt to evacuate them to U.S. military hospitals. Some herald treatment of sensational and tragic cases as evidence of the success of a medical operation or use it to justify an exception to the medical rules of engagement.17 But doing so actually thwarts the redevelopment of indigenous medical professionals and institutions. While transient U.S. combat surgical hospital care will (at least temporarily) benefit the patient in question, local physicians cannot develop their practices if we stunt their progress by diverting their patients into our evacuation system.

When confronted with these heartbreaking situations, we must choose the “hard right,” rather than the “convenient or emotional wrong.” If pressed to provide care for a seriously ill civilian, we should induce or coerce local physicians to provide the best available indigenous care and only evacuate the civilian into the military system if we expect to gain a compelling tactical advantage by doing so.

**Operations Scrutiny**

Brigade Combat Team and battalion medical personnel cannot effectively provide care to Iraqis or Afghans with chronic health problems, and on any given day, only a small percentage of people have acute minor illnesses or injuries requiring treatment. Attempts to provide diagnostic or curative
medical services are likely to cause medical harm. Yet, medical operations are prevalent and usually so popular with locals that they are overwhelmed with “patients.” The operations become medically meaningless in the process. They are attractive to locals because they are a novelty, and because locals incorrectly anticipate the receipt of a benefit. They are also opportunities to obtain free goods for sale in the black market according to one news article—

But . . . planners say the goodwill missions . . . also suffer from serious flaws. Among them . . . a lack of medicines and diagnostic tools that would help get patients long-term care; and locals’ tendencies to present false medical claims in order to get free medicines and goods . . . “Vitamins are huge. We may as well toss them out the door. As long as they walk out of here with something, they’re happy.” . . . That much was clear as Sadoon Karim, an Iraqi army medic, attended to patients during the mission in Ur . . . A woman walked in and, in insistent Arabic, pointed to an array of medications on the table, demanding—and receiving—eight different kinds of pills, creams and ointments . . . After she left, Karim looked at his pillaged selection of drugs and shrugged . . . “It’s a hysteria disease here,” he said in English . . . In another room . . . a healthy looking 23-year-old . . . complained of a variety of ailments . . . “A lot of times, little kids will come in and say, “We have arthritis,” . . . “They just want the pain medications. They don’t have any problems. They just want to see what we’ve got.” . . . Patients, for the most part, admit to that . . . “I don’t go to the government hospital,” Salah said, his hands full of free medications. “They don’t give me what I need.” . . . Another patient . . . who complained of diabetes, said he felt entitled to free medical care . . . “When we go to the hospital, we have to pay money,” he
said . . . Near the end of the mission, civil affairs Soldiers exasperatedly tried to stop women from carrying out entire boxes of clothing, food, and school supplies. The caretaker of the school in which the mission was held . . . complained that patients made off with school property . . . After the mission, members of the civil affairs unit gathered in their office at Forward Operating Base Loyalty and vented their frustration at the government’s lack of participation, at patients’ greediness and disorderliness, at the insufficiency of supplies and at the difficulty in winning trust in the course of a four-hour clinic . . . It was Captain Bill Billeter who pointed out the bright side . . . “I don’t know how well we showed people that the government of Iraq cares about its people,” he said. “But we showed we cared.”

This operation does not survive even a cursory course-of-action vetting process. The mission failed to improve civilian health in any significant way and probably harmed some people with inappropriate medications. The participants attempted to provide care for people with chronic illnesses, which is impossible. It created competition with the local hospitals, delegitimizing them. The woman with the deformed child certainly left disappointed: is it unreasonable to consider that such disillusionment may turn an uncommitted civilian toward the arms of insurgents? As reported, this operation’s only redeeming quality was that it felt good to one of the participants, and pictures of it made nice slides in a command briefing.

A brief look at the numbers reveals the medical absurdity of the operation: 200 patients, four hours, one U.S. physician, one Iraqi medic, and several U.S. medics. At 50 patients per hour, the physician “evaluated” one patient every 1.2 minutes. Predictably, the operation rapidly degenerated into chaos, a free-for-all dispensing of unnecessary and potentially harmful medications, and even outright thievery.

If the commander’s intent was (in part) to improve health, or to improve access to medical care in a Baghdad neighborhood, then what effective actions could his medical officer or planner have recommended? First, he should have counseled against any attempts to provide diagnostic or curative medical services. Provision of preventive services, such as vaccination against childhood illnesses, educational programs regarding tobacco cessation, or hygienic and sanitation instruction directed at infectious disease prevention are medically sound and relatively benign. Identifying nearby open clinics and hospitals and marketing their hours and capabilities may be useful. Ensuring or providing safe passage of patients from their neighborhood to the clinics or hospitals and back may be helpful.

Note the Americans’ frustration that the Iraqi government (Ministry of Health) would not participate in this Baghdad operation. One cannot really blame the Iraqis! Adding Iraqi physicians to a futile model of medical care does not improve it, and it may cause local physicians to think that American physicians are incompetents. It would be irrational for an Iraqi or Afghan physician to leave his relatively productive medical practice to spend six hours distributing vitamins and painkillers to a horde of people who may or may not have any medical problems and who he probably will never see again.

Medical operations are of dubious medical value, undermine efforts to build institutions, and explicitly violate medical rules of engagement, yet they are prevalent. This may be because they are relatively easy to execute, brief well to medically-naïve superiors, are emotionally gratifying for some restless doctors and medics, and generate positive press for self-consumption. Most likely, though, humanitarian medical operations are prevalent because commanders and their medical advisors incorrectly assume that BCT medical assets can effectively address indigenous medical problems.

While it is important for U.S. forces to engage the local population to create or maintain a deterrent presence and to develop cooperative relationships, doing so with a temporary sick call clinic is a mistake. Insecure civilians need a dedicated security presence in their communities. Providing security is a distinctive competency of a combat arms battalion commander and his Soldiers, whereas providing primary medical care to Iraqis or Afghans is not.

Using Medicine to Gain Influence

Most commanders probably do not engage in medical operations solely with humanitarian intent,
but rather use the operation as a vehicle with which to engage the local population, to gain influence (wasta), and otherwise to “win hearts and minds.” But we must acknowledge that using medical operations for these purposes is really nothing more than exchanging a commodity, the illusion of medical care, for cooperation or influence, because meaningful medical care is not usually provided. Unlike Hamas, which can successfully garner popular support by providing social services (including healthcare), U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, alien and without the intent or desire to remain indefinitely, cannot effectively do so.

The Ur operation described previously sought to generate goodwill in Baghdad by exchanging the illusion of healthcare for cooperation and cessation of violent behavior. This construct may be naïve. A committed religious fanatic or tribal or sectarian insurgent is not likely to change his behavior because an American doctor and Iraqi collaborator gave him a tube of ointment, or his mother a bottle of ibuprofen. An ambivalent civilian who receives a one-month supply of diabetes medication is not likely to flip to the government side as he feels the insurgent’s eye on him and continues to receive night-letters reminding him of the consequences to his family should he cooperate with the infidels. “Random acts of kindness,” if they are effective at all in modifying behavior (which is doubtful), are certainly not effective in the absence of security.

Counterinsurgents can purchase influence over ambivalent civilians with money. After all, we paid the Sons of Iraq with cash, not with medications. The price of cooperation is relative to the level of risk the civilian is willing to accept for associating with Americans or the host-nation government. The higher the risk, the higher the price. Considering the medical and operational harms inherent to medical operations, would it perhaps be better to exchange a more benign commodity for influence? Anything of perceived value would likely do: cash, livestock, food, fuel, or potable water.

The Use of Medicine to Gather Intelligence

Commanders may conduct medical operations, in part to draw a crowd of permissive or friendly civilians from which to elicit tactically actionable information or to determine general attitudes, such as opinions about the legitimate government, the perception of security, or feelings about coalition forces. In this situation, the illusion of medical care is bait. Considering the pitfalls of medical operations, using an alternative commodity to entice civilians would be preferable and equally as effective.

Using Medicine for Information Operations

When commanders use medical operations to generate positive content for information operations, they must overcome several obstacles. One is the mitigation of unintended consequences, both medical and tactical. The commander must determine how to conduct the operation without causing undue medical harm, without causing disappointment, without undermining the local health care system, and without otherwise countermanding counterinsurgency efforts.

Second, for the information operation to be effective, the commander must have the media present at the operation to project the message to the targeted local, national, or regional Islamic audience (e.g., Al Jazeera, Iraq Daily, Kabul Weekly, Bakhtar News Agency). Stars and Stripes, Combat Camera, and writers for Division or Corps news bulletins do not reach the target audience (unless we are performing for ourselves).

Conclusion and Recommendations

In general, battalion and BCT medical forces should not attempt to provide diagnostic and curative medical care to civilians, except in emergencies or in situations in which U.S. forces inadvertently caused the injury. Regardless of the commander’s motives, using the illusion of healthcare to engage the local population risks causing medical harm to those he intends to help, and perhaps more significantly, risks making tactical errors that are likely to undermine counterinsurgency strategy.

A commander can most effectively improve the health of civilians in his area of responsibility by treating the disease of insecurity rather than attempting to treat its symptoms. He can do so by improving real and perceived
safety, dispelling fears caused by insurgent propaganda, and increasing freedom of movement.

If a commander does employ his forces to provide medical care to civilians, the least medically harmful means is preventive medicine. If he does choose to use his medical personnel to attempt diagnostic and curative medicine, he should have feasible and acceptable (for the indigenous people) contingencies available to address those (the majority) who will present with chronic diseases or serious conditions.

Commanders and their medical advisors should not attempt to improve medical operations by adding indigenous physicians or medics to this unsustainable model of medical care. Doing so makes U.S. medical personnel appear incompetent and unsustainable model of medical care. Doing so makes U.S. medical personnel appear incompetent and valuable native medical resources away from productive use into a sinkhole of futility.

Commanders and their medical officers should avoid the temptation to divert tragic humanitarian cases into the U.S. evacuation system in an attempt to obtain temporary U.S.-standard medical care for them. Rather, when asked to intervene, they should work with officials in the indigenous medical system to get the person the best available indigenous care, although the outcome may not be ideal from an American perspective.

What are some roles (other than providing combat health support) in which medical staff can be useful to their commanders? Medical officers can act as effective subject matter experts to their civil affairs colleagues who are responsible for the reconstruction of healthcare facilities and for planning public health campaigns. Medical officers and planners can benefit their local counterparts by offering training, establishing collegial relationships with them, and advising them on such issues as medical systems, staffing, and logistics. Medical officers should establish relationships with local clinic and hospital directors and facilitate meetings with their counterparts at the ministry level, with the aim of facilitating institutional development. Attending these meetings to help negotiate conflicts or find solutions to problems can be useful as a way to keep a finger on the pulse of the indigenous medical system. MR

NOTES


2. Ibid.


13. Corps and division commanders typically formalize this prohibition in the medical rules of engagement.


18. Powell.

19. Petraeus.

20. Ad-hoc groups of Iraqi fighters, paid by the United States to provide local security. Weaning the Sons of Iraq off our payrolls may prove to be problematic, but a thorough discussion of that topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
AS A COMPANY commander in Afghanistan, I operated from Asadabad, the provincial seat of Kunar Province. My company worked extensively with our partnered provincial reconstruction team, the provincial governor, the provincial chief of police, and local Afghan media during information operations (IO).

Task Force (TF) Rock, my battalion task force, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William Ostlund, operated in an extremely violent area of Afghanistan that included Wanat, the Korengal Valley, the Pech Valley, and a shared border with Pakistan’s Bajuar Agency. In this area of operations, our TF quickly learned that while we could win any kinetic engagement, we were initially unprepared to execute information operations with equal ability. In our second full month of the deployment, our Alpha company air assaulted into the Watapor Valley and precipitated a fierce engagement that left dozens of insurgents dead and killed two paratroopers. At the end of the day though, we had won the engagement, but we quickly lost the information operations battle. During the battle, insurgents had used a single satellite phone to tell local media that we had indiscriminately killed dozens of civilians. Instead of exploiting a tactical victory, we were instantly on our heels, explaining to the population and our own headquarters that it was all untrue.

From that initial failure, our task force set out to ensure that we would not have another defeat snatched from the jaws of victory due to a lack of aggressive information operations. For the next year, our information operations became tactical-unit battle drills that we executed with vigor as we sought to connect every event to the larger narrative of our counterinsurgency campaign. The result was a more coherent and effective counterinsurgency effort. That focused information operations on the decisive point: the Afghan population.

Having had time to reflect on that deployment, I now see how our initial unpreparedness was symptomatic of a larger doctrinal and structural issue, and that the solutions we developed could be useful in solving what I believe is likely a wider Army information operations problem. Current struggles with how to deal with noncombatant deaths due to air strikes highlight the difficulties that units at every echelon have in harnessing information operations to support counterinsurgency efforts. This article is the product of that reflection.
Enhancing the understanding and execution of effective counterinsurgency demands that commanders overcome a doctrinal gap and top-heavy structure of the Army’s existing information operations system. Operational commanders must provide their tactical formations—squads, platoons, companies, and battalions—with the commander’s intent, delegated decision authority, training, and responsive resourcing to wage persistent, precision information operations with audacity and vigor at the decisive point: the population. Tactical leaders must recognize that tactical IO are a decisive warrior task. Success of the counterinsurgency mission requires their aggressive cultivation of the ethos, principles, and techniques of tactical information operations. The principles and techniques they develop may become the foundation for a more effective and appropriate IO doctrine.

The Doctrinal Gap

No doctrine exists for the employment of IO at the battalion level and below. Information operations in counterinsurgency suffer from a disparity in the definitions of the term as it is understood by the strategic and operational entities that resource and enable IO and the tactical units that can most effectively employ them. As a result, a doctrinal gap has opened between those best positioned to execute IO in counterinsurgency and those best resourced and trained to execute information operations in counterinsurgency. That doctrinal gap manifests itself in diminished understanding and effectiveness of a decisive line of operation.

For tactical maneuver units executing counterinsurgency, the term information operations has a vernacular definition roughly equivalent to public affairs or public relations: “Ensure that we IO this operation and highlight that local security forces are in the lead.” This definition of the term is far narrower than that in Joint and Army doctrine. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, lists the Joint and Army definitions of information operations as—

Joint: The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. (Joint Publication 1-02)

Army: The employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect and defend information and information systems and to influence decision making. (FM 3-13)

These disparate understandings of what IO means capture the nature of the doctrinal gap. The Army built its information operations system to meet the needs of the Army’s definition, but it fails to meet the needs of the event-driven definition developed by the tactical formations that execute counterinsurgency at the decisive point. Put more bluntly, the Army is ineffective at information operations in counterinsurgency because the Army did not build its IO system with counterinsurgency in mind.

An effective definition of information operations must also include public affairs, public relations and host nation, military, and domestic media integration. Public affairs and public relations include the use of traditional and nontraditional media and social organizations to distribute information and deliver messages to the population, including the most basic form of IO, getting out and talking to the people, face to face.

Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, states that the FM is most applicable to corps and divisions:

The primary users of this manual are ASCC [army service component command], corps, division, and brigade commanders and staff officers—specifically the G-2, G-3, G-7, and staff representatives for military deception, electronic warfare, operations security, fire support, psychological operations, civil affairs, and public affairs. Battalions normally execute higher headquarters IO. In stability operations and support operations, they may be given IO assets. Thus, they need to know their role in brigade and division IO.

No supplementary FM or other doctrine is targeted to inform commanders and leaders at battalion level and below on the effective integration of IO at the tactical level.
Field Manual 3-24 states that “IO may often be the decisive logical line of operation,” but that even when they are not, they make significant contributions to setting the conditions for success of all other [logical lines of operation].” Field Manual 3-24 and the military’s combat experience over the last seven years also make it plain that the decisive point of a counterinsurgency is the host nation population. Squads, platoons, and companies that live (and die) amongst the population win or lose at counterinsurgency. Given the combat-earned understanding that information operations are at least key to a successful counterinsurgency, it is conspicuous that neither the Joint nor the Army definition of IO is useful to the company commander or fire-team, squad, or platoon leaders who execute counterinsurgency at the decisive point.

The Structural Problem

The existing information operations system concentrates experts, resources, and decision makers at the division and brigade levels, but counterinsurgency demands persistent, responsive IO effects at the company and platoon levels.

Information operations are key to a successful counterinsurgency, and at the tactical level, effective counterinsurgency requires persistent partnership and collocation with the host nation population by units at the battalion level and below. No doctrine exists for the implementation of integrated IO at these echelons, the very echelons where we most need them. Further aggravating the lack of IO doctrine at the battalion, company, platoon, squad, and team levels is a corresponding lack of resourcing, staffing, equipping, and training at these echelons. Instead, information operations enablers and decision makers often reside at the brigade or division levels because that is where the preponderance of manning, equipping, funding, and training is. While brigades and divisions could doctrinally be tactical formations, the contemporary operating environment, shaped by the necessity of maximum tactical exposure to the population, means that brigades and divisions are often functionally operational or strategic. As a result, the locus of the IO delivery system resides at the operational or strategic level while that system’s highest pay-off targets exist at the tactical level.

Some of this top-heaviness may be attributable to the nature of some information operations component capabilities. Certainly, capabilities like electronic warfare and network operations should not fall into the scope of responsibility of infantrymen in the close fight. Yet other component capabilities, like public affairs, military deception, and psychological operations, can only be effectively controlled at the tactical, on-scene level. On-scene control of IO is urgently needed in a conflict where increasing the population’s confidence in the host nation government is more important than the maneuver of formations. Local understanding, relationships, and IO are essential to the local successes that effective counterinsurgency requires. In the dispersed and distributed counterinsurgency environment, divisions and brigades do not have the local, tactical exposure necessary to achieve these local effects. The Army has yet to adjust its IO system to complement the adaptations its fighting formations have employed to increase success: maximum tactical exposure to the host nation population.

Recommendations

From May 2007 to August 2008, Task Force Rock’s counterinsurgency operations in the Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan yielded ten principles of information operations that helped overcome the doctrinal gap and structural shortcomings that resulted in an initial lack of readiness to employ aggressive, fully integrated information operations in concert with security, development, and governance efforts.
1. **Credibility is the currency of counterinsurgency:** “The truth is an asset, not a liability.” The assertion that insurgents have an insurmountable advantage in information operations because they are not burdened with honesty is as wrong as it is pervasive. Dishonesty can only be effective in information operations when it goes unchallenged. A durable and effective counterinsurgent IO campaign demands aggressive honesty, both in communicating messages to the population and in addressing insurgent information operations. Tactical units must exploit every opportunity to publicly demonstrate when insurgent information operations are dishonest. Similarly, counterinsurgents must be equally aggressive when admitting their mistakes. If not, the insurgents will gladly take that opportunity to discredit the counterinsurgents and the host nation government every time. Honesty, responsiveness, and effectiveness enable credibility, and credibility with the population is the currency of counterinsurgency.

2. **Establish an overarching narrative:** “Stay on message.” No event in counterinsurgency is discrete. Every event occurs in the context of the larger counterinsurgency effort, and effective information operations are essential to enable the host nation population to understand how this is true. Effective IO explains how every event is part of a larger narrative designed to convince the host nation population to view the government as a preferable alternative to the insurgency. In designing this narrative, counterinsurgents must identify a few simple, resounding themes and then aggressively integrate them into how every event is reported to the population. The insurgents must be “they,” while the counterinsurgents and the population are “we.”

We must not dismiss these seemingly subtle differences in tone as semantics. We can report an improvised explosive device as “destroying a coalition vehicle and killing two Soldiers,” or as “killing two soldiers and disrupting the host nation patrol guarding a road construction crew as they worked to connect a remote town and its farmers to the nation’s network of roads and markets.” We must explain every event in the context of the narrative—doing so implicitly links the population’s future with the efforts of the counterinsurgents, leaving the insurgents to act against that union. Failing to explain how *every* event relates to the narrative cedes control of that event’s impact to the insurgents. It is not enough simply to tell the population that something happened. We must tell the population how it affects them and why they should care.

3. **Maintain continuous contact:** “*Every SIGACT [significant activity] is pregnant with IO possibility.*”

Every significant activity that benefits or hurts the counterinsurgent force contains potential energy that either the counterinsurgents or the insurgents will harness or dissipate. Effective IO requires aggressive counterinsurgent action to maximize the realization of potential energy while minimizing the insurgents’ ability to realize their energy.

Too often, counterinsurgent IO only reactively mitigate insurgent information operations. Opportunities to conduct IO are always present, but realizing this requires leaders who understand how to tie every event (or the lack of events) into the larger narrative of the counterinsurgency campaign, and then to reinforce that narrative at every opportunity by every means available. By realizing and capitalizing on the potential energy every significant activity can release, a tactical unit can maintain continuous contact with the population and force the insurgents to react defensively (and therefore be less credible). Counterinsurgents must act aggressively to “turn every setback into a victory, and every victory into a resounding triumph.”

In addition, if executed in partnership with local government, media, and power brokers, the persistent presence of information operations can build a habit of information consumption. The host nation population’s willingness to side with the insurgents may be less because of religious, tribal, or cultural sympathy than the lack of a reliable and persistent source of information. When a persistent, alternative narrative piques the population’s demand for information, the host nation population can make better-informed decisions on the merits of the government and the insurgency. The emergence of
a persistent, alternative narrative can help incentivize more host nation media to meet the demand. Multiple information sources can be a sign of a functioning government.

4. Gain the initiative: “You don’t have to be right; you have to be first and not wrong.” The counterinsurgent force must “break” the story to the population before the insurgents do. Our IO culture often values accuracy over responsiveness, but that is a false choice. Accuracy and responsiveness are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Honesty does not imply inertia. Being “not wrong” is different from being “right.” The space between those two standards has more to do with completeness than accuracy. Credibility does not require immediate completeness, but it does demand accuracy, responsiveness, and eventual completeness. It is neither acceptable nor effective to mislead, lie, or withhold information (except for the purposes of operational security or military deception), but that does not mean that it is acceptable to wait until everything is known to do something. Leaders must be able to operate in the space between rushing to failure with insufficient information and waiting until failure for perfect information. That same balance is required every time a tactical unit reacts to kinetic contact, so the precedent for junior leaders thriving in that space exists. A partial explanation (it does not have to be complete, it just can’t be wrong) and a plan to move forward delivered within minutes translates into more crediblility with the population than does the 100 percent solution delivered two weeks later.

5. Mass effects at the decisive point: “Employ population-centric IO.” In counterinsurgency, the decisive operation’s purpose should always be population-centric. For a force trained primarily in the kinetics of combat, the habit is to employ IO only to counter the insurgents’ IO because the

Being “not wrong” is different from being “right.” The space between those two standards has more to do with completeness than accuracy.
decisive point in kinetic operations is normally enemy-centric. Units often target their information operations on the insurgents rather than the population because they are used to massing effects on the enemy. The decisive point in counterinsurgency is the population, not the enemy. It may be the case that a shaping effort targets the insurgents, but just as in kinetic operations, the shaping purpose must nest within the purpose of the decisive operation.

6. Create unity of IO effect, despite disunity of command. Provincial reconstruction teams, the Department of State, government contractors, and civilian subject matter experts are just some organizations and enablers in the counterinsurgency battlespace. While such a multitude of organizations and funding sources often frustrate a military organization’s propensity for “clean lines of command,” the host nation population’s perception is that all these entities are simply dysfunctional arms of the same force, the United States (or the coalition). Commanders must understand that creating unity of effect (as opposed to seeking unity of effort), even in the absence of unity of command, is essential because every organization’s credibility depends on it.

Delegating IO resourcing and decision authority is critical because effective, local counterinsurgency solutions (and their IO components) look different to different localities. A company commander must have the authority to tailor IO messages, products, and staffs to complement the efforts of local, host nation, joint, and interagency partners with whom he must present a unified IO campaign in order to maintain credibility. Presenting the population with a unified national effect in counterinsurgency may paradoxically require delegating IO decision authority to as low a level as possible.

7. Ensure 24/7 staffing. Twenty-four hour IO staff coverage is necessary at every relevant echelon. We unintentionally build most IO cells to fail because most work 12-hour staff shifts without meaningful replacement for the remaining 50 percent of the fighting day. In the contemporary operating environment, insurgents and media “break” stories to the population within hours, yet counterinsurgent IO cycles often take days. Twelve-hour staff shifts and the consolidation of decision authority drive this tempo. Even when tactical leaders have the authority to conduct IO, staffs still have the responsibility to continually forecast, synchronize, and deliver assets to support tactical formations. Unless commanders resource and direct IO staffs to wage aggressive 24-hour operations with persistent coverage, within-minutes responsiveness, and IPB (intelligence preparation of the battlefield)-enabled precision in support of on-scene leaders who have employment authority, then the counterinsurgent delivery system is built to be unresponsive and irrelevant.

Models exist for the effective and responsible tactical employment of enablers—artillery, close air support, close combat air, medical evacuation. The employment of these functions is often dependent entirely on the judgment of tactical formations and leaders. The model is based on the need to provide tactical units with immediate lethal means to accomplish their missions because of the dire consequences for the tactical unit if we fail to do so. Recent counterinsurgency experience bears out that we must provide—with the same urgency with which we provide lethal enablers—instruments of nonlethal power like information operations, food aid, development expertise, and the Commander’s Emergency Relief Program to tactical units in contact with the population and insurgents.

8. Plan and resource information operations into every phase of every operation. Every phase of the operation should incorporate IO, including possible branches or sequels.

Information operations’ purposes and effects are roughly analogous to those of planning fires. They can—

- Enable the population’s support of a patrol tasked to secure a road construction crew.
- Demonstrate the government’s relevance and reach beyond its purely kinetic capabilities. For example, a planned press conference by the provincial governor next to a cache found by the host nation security forces during a deliberate operation, complete with a plan to insert and extract the governor and several members of the host nation media by air.
- Reinforce assertions of host nation partnership and relevance. (Enable the local police chief to announce the task and purpose of a nighttime air assault within five minutes of the operation beginning, even if the police chief himself only learned of the operation’s details five minutes before that.)
• Publicize a project’s completion and each milestone in its progress. All school, road, and clinic openings should be reason for a press conference or social event sponsored by the host nation government (even if it is funded or enabled by the counterinsurgent coalition). In fact, an aggressive IO cell may hold a contractor-hosted luncheon to mark the approval of funding, a local power-broker-hosted press conference to mark a ground breaking, a “surprise” inspection by a government official (complete with media coverage), a provincial governor-led press conference and town-hall meeting upon the project’s completion, and then ceremonies to mark as many anniversaries of the project’s completions as are useful.  

An information operations battle drill should be in place in the event noncombatants are killed or property is damaged.

Planning for responsive, local IO—even when that operations’ purpose is to mitigate the effects of a mistake—is essential to gaining and maintaining credibility. Deliberate operations planning includes a fires rehearsal, and it should include an IO rehearsal as well.

9. **Build capacity and leverage local expertise.** As with the pursuit of any goal in counterinsurgency, a coalition success without host nation partnership is failure. As counterinsurgents gain and maintain tactical IO dominance, they must train their host nation counterparts to do the same. The IO fight will last beyond the point that coalition counterinsurgent forces hand off exclusive responsibility to the host nation security force. Information operations’ decisive role will not diminish with the transfer of responsibility, and the host nation force will require competent and aggressive IO warriors as much as it will need helicopter pilots, logisticians, and police.

Building host nation IO capacity also capitalizes on one of the host nation’s strengths: host nation IO practitioners know the language, culture, and local themes and history that will enable IO to most effectively resonate with the population. Local information operations are most effective.

10. **Seek feedback.** Information operations are not fire and forget. Information operations are the successful communication of information or a message to a specific target audience. The broadcast of the information or a message is only the beginning of IO. The use of traditional and nontraditional media, face-to-face contact, interpreters, complaint procedures, hotlines, and provincial coordination centers to ensure that a message is received or to improve its dissemination is as important as executing the initial broadcast.

### Dominating Information Operations

Despite the existing doctrinal gap and structural shortcomings, commanders at all levels must understand that dominating information operations is as necessary to success in counterinsurgency as dominating any other line of operation. If the counterinsurgent force does not dominate IO, then it cedes this potentially decisive tool to the insurgents. Because counterinsurgency’s decisive point is the population, an IO system designed to enable responsive tactical effects to support tactical formations is essential. This effort will yield an enhanced ability to influence the population’s perception of the host nation government as a preferable alternative to the insurgency.

Operational and strategic headquarters must actively facilitate their subordinate units’ tactical capabilities to operate decisively along the IO line of operations by providing and resourcing constant staff support and a clear commander’s intent in which subordinate units can exercise vigorous and disciplined initiative to achieve that intent. The lack of such clarity of purpose or priority of resources must not prevent tactical units from aggressively gaining and maintaining information operations superiority.

Tactical information operations are warrior tasks that fire teams, squads, platoons, companies, and battalions must execute with audacity to gain and maintain the IO initiative and wage relentless counterinsurgency operations. **MR**

### NOTES

1. Those that observe that public affairs and public relations are intentionally not part of information operations (IO) because they are independent disciplines miss the point: that they are separate disciplines is part of the problem. We must stop trying to make the tactical necessity fit the doctrinal definition and begin making the doctrine solve the actual problem.
3. Ibid.
IN THE ONGOING wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, small teams of advisors (e.g., military transition teams, national police transition teams, police transition teams, border transition teams, and embedded training teams) advise, coach, teach, and mentor host nation security forces. They also provide situational awareness for host nation units, helping to shape the operational environment through their counterparts. As coalition combat forces begin to draw down in Iraq, advisory assistance brigades are replacing them. Our Nation’s future conflicts will require adept professionals for this crucial advisory mission. Therefore, the U.S. military needs to examine the scope of the advisory mission and determine the methods of effective advising required for mission success.

The nascent democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan need strong, professional militaries and self-policing and self-learning internal security forces. At the national policy level, these forces must support the host nation constitution and the duly elected members of the national, provincial, and local governments. Said another way, they need military leaders who will not instigate a coup at the first sign of trouble. At the unit level, these nations need soldiers who can defeat their enemies, while learning from setbacks and successes. This article strives to define the advisory mission, show a snapshot of advisor reality, set forth some tenets of combat advising, and identify measures of effectiveness to shape the training of future advisors and the expectations of coalition force commanders.

Prerequisites: Having the Right Stuff

From 2006 through 2009, these advisor teams trained at Camp Funston at Fort Riley, Kansas, and deployed to the theaters of war as needed. Soldiers, from the rank of staff sergeant to colonel and from a wide variety of military occupational specialties, served as combat advisor, for approximately 15 months, including their training. However, the training at Camp Funston, seemingly excellent at training advisor survival skills, misses the mark on teaching the fine art of actual combat advising. As one advisor put it, “Camp Funston taught us to survive. The Mada’in (a rural district in Baghdad Province) taught us to advise.”

PHOTO: Advisors with 35th brigade commander BG Abdullah at Al Ani farms in vicinity of Salman Pak, Iraq. (Photo, MAJ [P] Mike Solis)
Training at Camp Funston is a mix of Soldier common tasks, collective combat skills training, counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, language and culture training, and team building. The schoolhouse hones combat lifesaver, individual and crew-served weapon, communications equipment, and operator HMMWV maintenance skills. Counterinsurgency is taught as a combination of lectures and readings from counterinsurgency classics such as David Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, John A. Nagl’s *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, and U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. Language and cultural training involve classroom instruction, presented through a variety of media and concentrating on the specific language and area where the team will be employed. “Leader Meets” training exercises are staged scenarios with role players from the targeted language and culture-simulating situations that U.S. military advisors may encounter on the battlefield. The course ensures that all deploying advisory team members have the requisite skills to survive in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Oddly, though, teaching future advisors the art of how to advise takes up very little training time, lending credence to the idea of learning to advise while on the job. Many advisors literally learn the craft through trial and error while doing it. As the reader can imagine, this leads to a wide variety of results. Many advisors have returned from deployment completely frustrated by the experience and demoralized about the mission’s overall chance of success. Yet, others return with a tremendous sense of accomplishment. What, we might ask, causes some advisors to return fulfilled, and others disenchanted?

**Partner Units**

In Iraq, advisor teams advise host nation security forces in order to help build a sustainable, professional military or policing capability that can provide security for the Iraqi people, defeat the insurgency, and secure the nascent democracy. Coalition force combat units are “partnered” with Iraqi units towards the same ends. All three are engaged in the day-to-day struggle of counterinsurgency. Depending on the location in Iraq, this can mean—

- Operating static checkpoints.
- Conducting cordon and searches.
- Governing humanitarian aid missions.
- Performing command and control.
- Sustaining units.

When time allows, initial and sustainment training of all military occupational specialties and the vital staff functions for these combat units is necessary. In this environment with the perceived overlapping tasks of advising and partnering, who is responsible for the maturation and professionalization of the host nation forces? Who does what to whom, and how and when? Without question, coalition advisors and partner coalition-force units are involved with the continued professionalization of the Iraqi Security Forces. Understanding the difference between advising and partnering is critical to the success of both missions: despite how we use the terms advise and partner with, the two are not the same.

**Advising versus Partnering**

For most of us, the most common partnership experience is marriage. Two people involved in a marriage have, or should have, the same or combined goals, whether the goal is putting food on the table, putting a roof over their heads, or raising a family. In a perfect world, this is a partnership of equals, who share the burdens and rewards, examine and discuss challenges, and reach decisions together. In the context of unit-to-unit partnerships in Iraq, partnership translates into combined planning, combined training, and combined decision making, followed by combined execution. Although the coalition force partner unit shares in the goal of professionalizing the host nation security force unit, its first mission is to defeat the insurgent and secure the Iraqi people.

Just like in a marriage, success or failure in counterinsurgency often hinges on the quality and quantity of communication. An advisor, however, is not a partner in a marriage. An advisor provides advice, often requested, sometimes not. In this sense, he is more like a sibling, close friend, or even...
a marriage counselor. Siblings and friends want to see the success of their loved ones, but they often do so as onlookers, without the shared goals and associated burdens and rewards of partners. They may provide advice along the way, but ultimately the success of the relationship is the responsibility of the two parties involved. In advising, what separates the advisor’s role from that of the partnered coalition force unit is his relationship to the host nation unit. The advisor is not an “owner” of ground. He does not “fight” counterinsurgency in an assigned sector. He is concerned with his host nation unit’s performance in the counterinsurgency fight and he is concerned about the health of the partnership, but the advisor’s primary mission is the professionalization of the host nation unit.

The Tenets of Combat Advising

Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present, is a book given to prospective advisors headed for Iraq and Afghanistan that provides insight into the challenges of combat advising. Two consistent truths about combat advising jump off the book’s pages—time and patience.

Being there all the time. Time is so critical to advising that without the proper investment of it, the mission is surely to fail. A resolute investment of time is necessary to:

- Assess the unit and its personnel.
- Build trust and a personal relationship producing opportunities for honest and open discussion.
- Understand problems faced in the partnership or host nation unit and by key leaders and soldiers.
- Ask many questions, and patiently and attentively listen to the answers.

An advisor must maximize the amount of time he spends with his counterpart. The best way to do this is through constant physical proximity. My personal experiences demonstrate the power of this method.

Upon arrival in Iraq, our team was assigned to advise the 35th Mechanized Brigade, part of the 9th
Mechanized Division. The brigade headquarters was in an abandoned hotel in Salman Pak, Iraq. Our predecessors lived at Combat Outpost Cahill on the other side of town and commuted to work. Our team also took up residence at Cahill. Despite recognizing the need to live with the 35th Brigade in its headquarters, and invitations to do so by the brigade commander, for a variety of good and bad reasons, the team was never able to move into the hotel. The immensity of this mistake became clear five months later when the team was reassigned to advise the 9th Division at its headquarters on Al Rasheed. In this case, the team did live on the Iraqi base, and the benefits of doing so were immediately apparent. To be certain, there are many other factors involved, but without question, physical proximity with the host nation unit and its leaders and especially shared living quarters make a huge difference in mission success or failure.

The advisor must share a joint domicile with the host nation unit he is advising. By physically being present there, the advisor is—

- Able to learn the daily patterns of his counterpart and recognize anomalies.
- Exposed to the good, the bad, and the ugly of the host nation unit.
- On call when his counterpart asks for him.
- Able to fit in as a “member of the team” and adopt the battle rhythm of the host nation unit instead of attempting to force battle rhythm change for the sake of convenience.

A phone call just will not do. Effective advising requires the individuals to look each other in the eye, observe body language, share light moments as well as business moments, and in so doing, establish trust. An advisor must share the risks in combat by accompanying his counterpart at every opportunity. An advisor who is not willing to share dangers in combat with his host nation unit may as well go home. Without getting to know the individual in this environment, the advisor will never be able to recognize those rare and elusive opportunities when real advising can take place.

The advisor must measure and mitigate risks as he lives with his counterpart. One such risk is the challenge of physical security for the advisory team. Other risks range from sanitation to the potential that a host nation soldier may turn his weapon upon the advisors. Advisors can mitigate these risks through due diligence, establishing an advisor compound within the host nation base, a solid base-defense and internal-communications plan, basic buddy team rules, and, perhaps most important, making friends and building trust at all levels. Our team adopted the philosophy of force protection with a smile. Making friends and establishing sound, military working relationships with your counterpart, his subordinates, and the common soldiers of the host nation unit goes a long way toward advisory team security. Your friends are far less likely to kill you than your enemies, and very likely to warn you in advance of trouble that is brewing. Although it seems paradoxical, risk actually decreases the longer the advisor team lives among the host nation unit.

Another risk is that of advisory team members “going native.” This does not refer to the often-heard complaint about advisors allegedly lowering standards. Wearing your counterpart’s unit patch, adopting his daily work and rest cycle, and growing a mustache (or a beard in Afghanistan) are all useful steps to build relationships, so there is no easy way to guard against “going native.” Be aware of its possibility and watch for warning signals.

A sure sign that an advisor has gone native is when his counterpart’s success begins to matter more to him than the success of his own mission, professionalizing the host nation unit. The best way to guard against going native is for the advisor to let the host nation unit fail, provided it is not catastrophic failure. (The host nation unit leaders can learn a great deal from some setbacks.)

Despite the numerous risks associated with the advisor mission, the real risk to mission success is in failing to invest the resources required to allow the advisor to maximize his time by living with his counterpart. Time is the main ingredient in the establishment of any relationship; it takes ample, quality time for the advisor to build the trust with his counterpart that permits accomplished advising to occur. Thus, time is a tenet of combat advising. Patience is another.
Patience: Getting to the Point

Patience is hard to have when the situation appears dire. Yet patience is one quality the advisor needs in abundance. Imagine the advisor has a crucial need to reinforce checkpoint security near a polling site just prior to an important election. Every leader in his chain of command is telling him to “make it happen.” The advisor can demand or manipulate his counterpart into reinforcing the checkpoint. Everything from “bribery” through “gifts” of various classes of supply to threats of cutting off supplies already provided, can “force” compliance with coalition-force desires. If the advisor has already invested the time to develop rapport and trust, he can make such demands at crucial times without upsetting the relationship, but if he has not, then making demands will almost certainly damage the relationship, often beyond repair. Coalition force commanders must keep this in mind as they ask advisory teams to force compliance. The coalition force commander may get what he wants in the short term, but it may come at the cost of permanently damaging the advisory mission. It is far better to exercise patience and find a way for host nation unit leaders to understand the “why” and the “how” of a mission in order to have a lasting and meaningful impact.

Patience also means not pointing out every single weakness the host nation unit has all at once. After all, military officers of all nations have pride. An overly critical advisor may so damage the relationship he has with his counterpart that the counterpart comes to loathe having the advisor present. The advisor that passes quick judgment is very likely to set conditions for his own long-term failure.

A recent study of combat advising noted that most advisors and their Iraqi counterparts felt that it took one to three months to build an “effective working relationship.” Even after trust and rapport are established, the exercise of patience, to wait for opportunities, is still a critical aspect of advising. One thing that helps is to find commonality of interest between the advisor and his counterpart. Whether it is history or ping-pong, the advisor can find something that he has in common with his counterpart that can start conversations. Several hours of “small talk” may eventually lead to 20 minutes of Army talk. When opportunity strikes, the good advisor makes that 20 minutes the most productive 20 minutes of the day. Patience is indeed a tenet of combat advising.

Advising Methods: Making It Their Idea

Combat advising is as varied as the individuals and units involved. Attacking the problem of getting a host nation military leader to do what you require, while making him think that it is his idea, is far easier to say than to do. Some advisors try to convince their counterpart in a debate of ideas. This is often a losing proposition because the counterpart has more actual or perceived experience and usually outranks the advisor by one or two grades. Most military professionals, regardless of the country they serve, are “type A” personalities. They do not rise to the position of command without being that way. So how does an advisor get that type of person to do something and make him think it was his idea to do it?

Asking Questions: Providing Advice without Giving It

One of the best ways to shape the advising environment is to ask many questions. Asking questions about the unit is natural in the assessment phase. The advisor must ask questions to fill in his gaps of knowledge about the host nation unit and its leaders. Questions also aid the combat advisor in discovering how his counterpart thinks, processes information, and turns discovery into action. Asking questions is also a means to allow the host nation counterpart to learn on his own. Shaping a conversation using planned and artful questions can set the stage for opportunities to provide advice.

For example, if munitions smuggling is a problem in the host nation unit’s operational environment but the host nation commander has not taken steps to deter or prevent it, it may be because he does not know that it is occurring or he feels powerless to stop it. He will likely not admit that he is powerless to prevent it, which would be admitting failure.

One of the best ways to shape the advising environment is to ask many questions.
The advisor may already have some suggestions, but advice given directly may cause the host nation commander to lose face or crush his confidence. Even worse, he may take the advice just to placate his advisor but without learning the “why” of the situation. The advisor may get what he wants but without the long-term benefit of increased professionalism. Better to ask a series of questions that allow the counterpart to internalize the situation. Asking “How are the insurgents getting munitions into this area?” can be followed up with a question such as “What do you think can be done about that?” Asking the right series of questions can aid in the learning process, shaping the conversation so the host nation commander teaches himself, and subsequently takes ownership of the problem and the solution.

Asking questions also helps the advisor avoid one of the worst things a combat advisor can do, make a comparison between his Army and the one he is advising. There are many differences between the U.S. Army and those we advise. Our technology is greater, weapons are better, soldier education is far more advanced, and the supply chain has a much greater capacity. Pointing these out, however, will not endear the advisor to his counterpart.

Asking questions also helps avoid assigning blame. The strengths and weaknesses of officers in any Army stand out, particularly the longer one is around them. Making off-hand remarks about a given officer or noncommissioned officer in the host nation unit is not going to solve the problem. For starters, the advisor may not realize the true strengths and weaknesses of a leader. He may also be unaware of long-standing personal relationships between host nation officers or with tribal or familial relations. Making disparaging remarks may erode the relationship that the advisor is establishing.

Ultimately, asking questions, many questions, can lead the advisor and his counterpart to work in tandem toward lasting solutions to tactical and organizational challenges. Asking questions, whether to avoid pitfalls or to shape a conversation, often leads to individual learning, host nation leader ownership of their problems, creative and lasting solutions, and a professional host nation unit.

**The Approach: Direct, Indirect, and Mixed**

The direct approach and the indirect approach are two methods of combat advising. As the titles imply, one is straight to the target and the other is by varied paths. Both are effective, and perhaps most effective when applied together. However, deciding which approach to use depends on the relationship between advisor and counterpart, the maturity of the individual host nation leaders, and the maturity of the unit.

**The direct approach.** The advisor, using questions to shape the conversation, is advising his counterpart man-to-man. If the counterpart is new to the job and has yet to establish trust in his subordinates or his staff, this may be the best and only approach available to the advisor. However, the advisor should not anticipate immediate results, for if the counterpart is indeed new to his command, his relationship with his advisor is also likely immature.

**The indirect approach.** In this approach, the advisor plants seeds in the mind of his counterpart by means of the advice of the counterpart’s subordinates or staff officers. This presupposes that the advisor or advisory team has established functional, trusting relationships with the subordinates. It also presupposes that the commander is willing to listen to them. It helps if the advisor knows which subordinates his counterpart trusts and with whom he has an existing solid professional relationship.

**Direct and indirect approaches.** The best approach to combat advising is a blend of both the direct and indirect approaches. For example, assuming the advisory team has the rapport it needs to plant ideas within the host nation staff, the advisors
can, over time and with experience, begin to predict when the staff will present those ideas to the host nation unit commander. The senior advisor can then make sure he is in the room when the subordinate presents the idea, so he can reinforce concepts, provide “color commentary” if required, and ensure that the ideas are presented to the commander. He must remember the tenets of time and patience. The advisor must make the time to “be there” and he must exercise patience to allow the host nation staff the time to present their ideas.

The advisory team must exercise patience in letting the “seeds” germinate. Our team discovered that two weeks is often required for a seed of an idea planted with the staff to reach the commander, and another two weeks for the commander to act upon that idea. That may appear terribly inefficient and too slow for combat operations, and in many cases, it is. However, the patient application of a mixture of direct and indirect approaches will likely yield lasting results that empower the host nation unit. The more often this approach is used, the more likely the lag time will shrink from planting to sprouting to sustained growth.

**Advising through Observation**

In a language-hindered environment, host nation soldiers and leaders observe their coalition force partners closely. Observation is an often-overlooked method of advising and a powerful tool to promote learning.

For example, coalition force soldiers in Iraq wear kneepads to protect their knees from the sustained impact of “taking a knee” on patrol or the sudden whacks experienced inside tactical vehicles. In non-tactical situations, soldiers often slide the kneepads down around their ankles for comfort. Therefore, while on patrol with an Iraqi unit we observed an Iraqi soldier wearing three kneepads. One kneepad was applied correctly to the knee that he was using to take a knee during temporary halts. The other two were worn around his ankles. There is no way he could have learned this through communication. He learned it through observation. He had seen so many coalition force soldiers wear their kneepads in this fashion that he assumed it was what right looked like.

This lesson applied to combat advising often leads to excellent results, but requires coalition force partner involvement. One such example is the quarterly training brief. Our team felt that its counterpart commander could benefit from a similar tool. Opportunity knocked when the coalition force partner unit was conducting its normal quarterly briefing. “Arranging” an impromptu visit to that unit provided a “chance” opportunity for observation learning. The host nation unit commander sat alongside his coalition force partner commander while he was receiving a quarterly training briefing. During the course of the briefing, discussion ensued between the commanders regarding why the event was important to the readiness and health of the organization. The host nation commander participated by asking questions. The advisors never said a word. Within a few weeks, the advisors walked in on an Iraqi quarterly training brief in progress. This eventually became a regular practice in the unit. The host nation commander had his subordinate battalion commanders present “status briefs” so that he could better understand the health and challenges of his subordinate units. Observation is a powerful tool for the advisor to wield. The advisory team and the coalition force partner unit should always make sure that they present the appearance and behavior of professional military officers and noncommissioned officers.

**Measures of Effectiveness**

How does an advisory team or coalition force partner unit know when and if it is being effective in professionalizing a host nation unit? Metrics are useful, of course; items that can be measured provide the most useful data. However, they do not tell the whole story and can be misleading.

The metrics most often used by professional militaries worldwide are status reports on personnel, vehicle and equipment availability and readiness, maintenance days required for repairs, and personnel trained and qualified for certain skills. This data is a snapshot of health in an organization. What these metrics do not tell the advisor is cause. Discovering causes for increases or decreases in efficiency is the art that goes with the science. For the combat advisor this is often made harder by the “fudging” of host nation unit reporting systems, outright lying, perceived or real corruption, and errors in language translation. There are also some areas of professional growth and maturity in a host nation unit that simply cannot be measured.
Early on, our team set a goal of professionalizing the noncommissioned officers in our host nation unit. After many months of assessing the problem, we determined that the problem was a matter of empowerment and confidence. The senior noncommissioned officers of this organization knew what they personally needed to be successful as individuals and as a group. Many of the junior noncommissioned officers, however, did not know what right looked like. The senior noncommissioned officers were routinely frustrated in any attempts to fix this problem independently. The most-often stated reason for this was that their commissioned officers did not let them tackle the challenge. However, when we asked the commissioned officers why they did not utilize the noncommissioned men more effectively, the answer was often that they lacked confidence in them.

A problem of this magnitude, and with so many entry points, required the entire advisory team’s participation. Slowly, over a period of months, little signs became apparent that the message was soaking in. Then, one day at a command and staff meeting, the advisory team noticed the host nation unit command sergeant major sitting at the table with his boss. He did not have a speaking role, but the visual signal was enough, and it sent a powerful message to the subordinate commanders and staff at the table. The boss was signaling his confidence; he had empowered his senior noncommissioned officer with a “seat at the table.” Immediately following this event, other signs of success started to emerge. The unit established a noncommissioned officer-led leaders course to impart knowledge from senior noncommissioned officers to junior noncommissioned officers. Noncommissioned officer development programs in subordinate units started to appear. Noncommissioned officers began leading training. The tipping point was the “seat at the table.”

Metric evidence provides concrete measures of readiness. However, these metrics can be dangerous as the sole measure for success or failure. Advisory teams and coalition force partner units must invest time, exercise patience, use the power of questioning and observation, identify and use the appropriate approaches, and look for signals that indicate whether the advisory effort is working.

Emerging Specialties

The U.S. Army devotes considerable time and resources to the development of combat advisors. As advisory assistance brigades take the lead in Iraq, training U.S. Soldiers how to be successful advisors becomes even more critical. The current effort, although preparing advisors to survive, falls short at developing competent and confident combat advisors. Similarly, commanders of coalition units receive little to no introduction to combat advising and therefore possess poorly conceived expectations of what advisors can do for them in the context of partnership.

On-the-job training costs valuable time. Expanding combat advisor education to include interpersonal skills training, the art of asking questions, and observation and listening skills will aid in their development. Learning how to master patient behavior through education and practical exercise must be part of the curriculum. By synchronizing effort and using a targeting cycle, with the host nation unit as the target, the coalition force unit commander’s expectations will be better managed. Enabling advisors to live with their host nation unit will maximize the time advisors have to put these skills into practice.

Combat advising and partnering are related specialties emerging in our military profession. Specialties are characterized by a foundation in doctrine, continuing education from a certified practitioner, and an investment of time and resources. Just as we educate teachers, counselors, and consultants, we can educate advisors and partner unit leaders in the skills required to execute this mission successfully.

NOTES


May-June 2010 • MILITARY REVIEW
Combat exacts a moral cohesion, a solidarity more compact than ever before… The more men [and women] think themselves isolated, the more need they have of high morale. We are brought by dispersion to the need of cohesion greater than ever before.  

WITH THE ADVENT of the Obama administration, the U.S. Army embarked upon a significant shift in military effort. The primary U.S. strategic focus no longer remains rebuilding the state of Iraq. It has moved toward countering the Taliban insurgency in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan. Every environment is different from a military operations perspective, and Afghanistan certainly does not closely resemble its Iraq counterpart. Strategically, the numerous differences between Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that Afghanistan will be a greater challenge. Its terrain, climate, populace, natural resources, culture, and infrastructure all make operations in Afghanistan more difficult. Moreover, Afghan tribal warriors have historically displayed tenacity in insurgency. To compound these difficulties for our forces, critics argue that the U.S. military and its supporters must move to the rural segments of Afghanistan if the coalition is to be successful over the long term. Counterinsurgencies are seldom won from the confines of centralized base camps.

In all of this, the trends indicate the need for decentralized positions, distributed operations, effective small-unit leaders, and well-trained small units that must bear the brunt of close combat. The more decentralized operations are, the greater the reliance on effective leadership and small-unit performance. Recent research has revealed that we can best counter a decentralized, network-enabled enemy if our forces too are decentralized and network-enabled. Moreover, the tactics of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to target civilians, schools, and crowded markets have placed a premium on discernment, perspective, and excellence in decision making at the small-unit level. The responsibility required of leaders and units at lower levels of command is clearly increasing, as is the potential that small units will continue to bear the brunt of close combat in the years to come. Units will fight separately and operate more independently with a greater need to be
self-sustaining. Has the U.S. military done all that it can to improve small-unit performance and to develop small-unit excellence?

In the future, beyond Afghanistan, the range of challenges that we could potentially confront will become even greater. Our adversaries will certainly strive to decentralize, network, and operate among the people to blunt U.S. technological advantages. Thus, our continued success requires greater decentralization of capability, excellence in decision making, and the authority to overcome increasingly networked, decentralized threats. Simply stated, this requires us to increase our commitment to small-unit performance and leader development. One initiative, the Army Leader Development Strategy for an Expeditionary Army, underscores our increased commitment to develop leaders who are comfortable operating amidst this complexity.

This article sheds light on the characteristics of high-performing small units, expands on key Army Leader Development Strategy ideas, and considers ways to enhance small-unit performance. In the end, we will only achieve success through increased dialogue, a willingness to challenge the status quo, a sense of shared responsibility, and our persistent commitment across the Army.

Characteristics of High-Performing Small Units

Seeking improvement in small-unit performance is as old as warfare itself. Polybius detailed the small-unit performance of the Roman army in *The Histories, Book X*, circa 146 BCE. In this particular treatise, he highlighted the specific techniques used by Roman soldiers to plan and execute the destruction of the defenders of the walled city of Carthage. In 450 CE, Flavius Vegetius Renatus wrote *De Re Militare*, a prominent guide to improve small-unit performance for the Roman army, in an attempt to restore basic discipline to frontline units. Nonetheless, merely stating that this has always been a goal does not preclude our need to continue to study how to maximize our capacity for attaining small-unit excellence today.

The traditional definition of a small unit tends to refer to the company level or below; however, the actual size of this unit may vary, depending on the scope, scale, and complexity of the mission.

Effective leadership. Effective leadership is not a journey in pursuit of perfection, but a continuous development process. The U.S. Army has been developing small-unit leaders since its inception and has published Army leadership manuals for decades. The current Field Manual 6-22, *Leadership*, defines those who lead. It states, “Leaders motivate, inspire, and influence others to take initiative, work toward a common purpose, accomplish critical tasks, and achieve organizational objectives. Influence is focused on compelling others to go beyond their individual interests and work for the common good.” Leadership deals with a broad range of skills. While not all-inclusive, leadership involves everything from demonstrating tactical and technical proficiency to motivating and building trust—from exemplifying the Warrior Ethos to fostering teamwork and cohesion. “Be, Know, Do” is a more simplified version of an extremely complex set of characteristics.

We may have to incorporate initiatives earlier in the recruitment process. Efforts to bring early leadership opportunities to high school campuses may prove valuable over the long term. In addition, early screening of potential candidates, using human dimension tools, may help identify high quality candidates more effectively than the traditional screening provided by a high school diploma.

There is also work underway in the area of “trust” between leaders and subordinates. The Army Research Institute has initiated several projects to explore development of trust, including its swift development in ad hoc teams, scenario training for adaptive teams, and the Tactical Human Integration with Networked Knowledge efforts. Meanwhile, the Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group is researching new techniques and methodologies in Outcome Based Training and Education. These initiatives may inform our understanding of leadership development and guide our efforts. Certainly, leadership is essential to any endeavor to improve small-unit performance.
Effective use of information. Exceptional small units actively seek and acquire information and use it effectively, an imperative in complex environments today. The rigorous demands of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations require that small units have access to national level databases, especially human intelligence databases. These databases expand the venues for leaders to learn from the edge, since many receive direct feeds from liaison elements on the tactical front. The Distributed Common Ground System-Army is available, but we need to train our Soldiers to leverage these assets. The notion that leveraging is limited to higher-level headquarters units is no longer valid.

Moreover, the RAND study *Characteristics of High-Performance Units* found that “high-performance units do exist and one common characteristic is the effective use of information.” These high-performance units “value information and use it by integrating information (either what is available or planning to get what they need) into operational plans.” Information in these organizations was not stovepiped, but dynamically integrated into unit operations to assist Soldiers with understanding the environment, making decisions, disseminating new information, and providing information to subordinates.

In addition to a common understanding, the high performance units possessed a common vision of how the operation would unfold. Information and vision improved cohesion and teamwork to achieve mission success. Units that do not value information do so at their own peril. Subsequently, the Army must strive to decrease Soldiers’ loads while connecting them to networks with applications that have been developed faster and increasingly leverage commercial infrastructures, such as the RITE capability (Relevant ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] to the Edge). RITE uses satellite communications, an airborne layer, and third and fourth generation network extensions to provide network access to remote users.

Competent decision making. Small units demonstrate competence in the art and science of decision making. However, all small units do not necessarily excel in making effective decisions. Certainly core skill sets for decision making involve understanding, visualizing, and assessing the environment and situation. Effective decision makers, however, are also flexible, quick, resilient, adaptive, risk-taking, and accurate. These skill sets require higher-order training in critical thinking, and we must inculcate them into our training. The first core skill set is understanding—it is vital to decision making. Understanding needs to be measured and is related to the small-unit leader’s education, intellect, experience, perception, and the information he receives. To assist in understanding and enable decision makers to adapt in stride, the Army is exploring new training patterns like those developed by the Asymmetric Warfare Group and Army Research Institute. Intelligence, reconnaissance, and security are indispensable to understanding and can be supplemented by actively listening to and observing the population, leveraging technology, and listening to subordinates. Relevant information, augmented by training and the network, can enhance understanding and foster initiative. We must continue to raise the standard of understanding across several areas and recognize that new norms are essential in the 21st century. Digital literacy, expanded use of space, and the understanding of cultures and foreign languages will enhance our knowledge base.

The second core skill, visualizing, improves decision making. We must train leaders at the small-unit level to establish mental frameworks of possible scenarios to enable them to detect, understand, and interpret relevant cues, patterns, and anomalies in the environment. Operations are fluid, dynamic, and changing, and appropriate visualization is essential.
The U.S. Army Study of the Human Dimension in the future 2015-2024

<www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-3-7-01.pdf>

to deal with a changing and complex environment. Anticipating and visualizing the end state requires small-unit leaders to understand the operational environment and to assess it continually against their cognitive baseline in terms of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops available, time, and civil considerations.12

The third core skill, assessing, involves monitoring and studying the current situation. It encompasses the enemy’s reactions, vulnerabilities, and the changing environment and evaluates the progress of the operation using measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. Assessing involves comparing the anticipated end state with actual events on the ground and adjusting one’s situational awareness accordingly. In addition, the Army has developed the human dimension concept to provide a broad, holistic approach to assess the Soldier’s cognitive, physical, and social aspects. This assessment, in fact, goes beyond decision making, and looks at comprehensive Soldier fitness before, during, and after deployments. Accessing relevant information and leveraging the human dimension can improve Soldier resilience, intuition, and decision making under stressful conditions.13

Foster innovation. The relationships between agility, adaptability, and small-unit effectiveness are also as old as warfare itself. Since the advent of the pike, the longbow, the stirrup, and gunpowder, warriors have been agile enough to adapt to newer methods of warfighting for basic survival. Unquestionably, this basic characteristic remains applicable today. Innovation is best achieved when opportunity meets demand with immediate feedback. We need to deliver the right technologies to Soldiers who have to adapt while in contact with adaptive enemies. Some authors have recently argued that the Army needs to create a more adaptive culture by making small units the basic building block of Army operations.14 We can improve agility and adaptability through training. We can encourage innovation by immersing Soldiers in challenging environments and exposing them to events that can accelerate their ability to learn under pressure. In addition, we can use the network to our advantage. Tactical Ground Reporting, coupled with mobile Internet devices and RITE, are good examples. By using them, we can begin to test a process of adaptability that leverages the network’s new information technologies to enhance Soldier situational awareness, improve synchronization, and convey a leader’s vision and intent as another means of bringing all elements of change together for small-unit effectiveness.

Superior execution. Small units use a basic set of procedures to execute assigned missions. Today, the preferred method is to use troop-leading procedures, a commonly understood process to successfully carry out assigned small-unit tasks in a time-compressed fashion. Troop-leading procedures give small-unit leaders a competent framework for planning, preparing, and executing operations, and they help with the development of plans and orders. While not rigid, troop-leading procedures follow eight practical steps: receive the mission, issue a warning order, make a tentative plan, initiate movement, conduct reconnaissance, complete the plan, issue the order, and supervise and refine. Leaders normally modify these steps to accommodate the specific mission at hand. The military decision making process is a parallel process used at battalion level and above. Interestingly, many of the steps undertaken in the military decision making process can be of value to smaller units. Future efforts to improve small-unit execution need to ensure the dissemination of the military decision making process to lower units or consider a modification of troop-leading procedures to incorporate insights derived from the decision-making process. For example, under the step of “make a tentative plan,” small-units may consider developing and analyzing multiple courses of action before selecting the course of action. Outside the
decision making process, and time permitting, they can conduct a “post-mortem” analysis session scrutinizing courses of action, on the assumption that they will fail, and then attempt to discover how failure occurred. This technique opens the thinking process to more readily identify potential weaknesses in the plan.

To deal with complex environments, the Army has recently developed “design” and is teaching and making this approach available to small units. Rather than a top-down approach to “framing a problem,” the new design approach provides an opportunity for subordinate leaders to help frame the problem for superiors. Emphasis should be placed on “co-creating of context.” The approach should rely on top-down and bottom-up inputs from all levels, particularly from Soldiers’ interaction with the population and their ability to leverage social networking.

The bottom line is that mission success hinges on enabling small-unit excellence in decision making and consistent superior execution. Can we improve our troop-leading procedures and the military decision making process? By using best practices and innovative training methods like Outcome Based Training and Education and cognitive-based training, we can develop hybrid sets of innovative training procedures that can lead to high performing and adaptive teams.

Thorough preparation and pre-combat inspections. How do we better leverage the new forms of electronic media for mission preparation? Today, small-unit preparations are much more advanced in form and substance. These activities include, but are not limited to, plan refinement, reconnaissance, coordination, pre-combat inspections, movement, and rehearsals. During plan refinement, leaders adjust the plan based on new information, enemy actions, unit dispositions, and results of reconnaissance. Additional overhead reconnaissance improves execution by monitoring threat activities up to the actual event. Rehearsals come in several forms and aim to improve small-unit performance during execution. Rehearsal techniques include full-dress rehearsal, reduced-force rehearsal, terrain-model rehearsal, sketch-map rehearsal, map rehearsal, network rehearsal, combined arms rehearsal, support rehearsal, and battle-drill rehearsal.
With the advent of network connectivity, small units can now exploit new software programs to rehearse with joint, multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental partners. Today, computerized mission rehearsal imagery and maps allow units to virtually see their objectives and routes to objectives through embedded training. This includes ground-level color photos or video footage of the area of operations. Virtual training has also expanded to the online Army Training Network and the Joint Training Counter IED (improvised explosive device) Integration Center, where devices like the Apple iPod Touch, iPhone, and other devices allow Soldiers to download the latest vignette to hone skills such as collateral damage avoidance.

Through mobile Internet devices, any Soldier will be able to carry his or her lesson to the squad tent or to the dining facility, or use it for hip-pocket training. New immersive simulation environments can also enhance unit capabilities in stressful situations. Electronic video war games, such as Virtual Battle Space 2 (VBS2), provide realistic scenarios that stress leaders’ reaction capabilities; VBS2-based video vignettes of actual operations enhance teaching. Even beyond this, immersive environments for the entire unit could lead to greater resilience and complex adaptive behaviors. The end result of incorporating more varied, authentic, demanding, and relevant mission rehearsals is a cognitively prepared, more effective, and adaptive combat unit.

The Army is shifting to immersive training. This is training that emphasizes Soldiers learning by teaching themselves as opposed to emphasizing the role of teachers in the learning process. It places Soldiers in a most realistic, relevant set of conditions while in a virtual or live battlespace. Should we do even more to improve rehearsals and immersive environments and leverage live, virtual, and constructive integrated training environments?

**Thorough assessment of performance.** U.S. Army small units frequently use the after action review to enhance the learning process. After action reviews allow all Soldiers within a unit to discuss an actual event and help ensure that all participants discover for themselves what happened, comprehend why certain actions occurred, and discuss how they can improve performance. They provide a nonthreatening environment, encourage Soldiers and leaders to be more candid, and foster self-discovery in areas in which Soldiers and leaders need to improve. After action reviews provide the essential feedback to correct and improve training deficiencies. Successful small units habitually use after action reviews to provide a candid assessment of strengths, weaknesses, and areas for improvement. The best units are open to embracing change, have open discussions on how to improve, and support active learning in all ranks.

Over time, the technique of “red teaming” has proven to be highly effective at improving practices in higher headquarters. Similar techniques may prove beneficial at lower echelons with minimal force structure additions.

**Executing full spectrum operations.** Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, exposes Army units to a different set of tasks in its newest edition. Many of these tasks are not the traditional force-on-force tasks that involve kinetic actions. Thus, high-performing small units must be capable of understanding, training for, and executing a diverse set of military tasks, even though the timelines for preparation are more compressed than in the past. Army forces traditionally used offensive and defensive operations to defeat the threat on land. They must now simultaneously execute stability or civil support operations along with offensive and defensive operations anywhere along the spectrum of conflict and in any operational environment. Stability operations tend to cover offensive and defensive operations in peace operations, peacetime military engagements, and limited interventions. These new norms raise the bar for Soldier basic tasks. These new tasks include foreign cultural and language awareness, digital literacy, use of space assets like

...new tasks include foreign cultural and language awareness, digital literacy, use of space assets like Global Positioning Systems, and an understanding of enemy-site exploitation and forensics.
Global Positioning Systems, and an understanding of enemy-site exploitation and forensics. Civil support tasks apply to operations within the United States and its territories. Today, operations require versatile, well-trained units and tough, adaptive leaders that can deal with complex environments.

**Possess a dynamic process of change.** Captain Timothy Lupfer, in his Leavenworth Paper, *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War*, sheds light on a proven approach to improving small-unit performance. He examines the process of institutional change that led to remarkable tactical successes for German units on the Western Front. This approach was not rigidly sequential, but involved a dynamic process that required great intellectual capacity and firm character to drive the successful changes down to small units during a time of war. The ten-step process included perceiving the need for change, soliciting ideas from frontline units, and defining, disseminating, and enforcing the change, as well as modifying equipment and organizations and training, testing, evaluating, and refining the change. Using these steps, General Eric von Ludendorff implemented rapid changes to his tactical units that led to two major breakthroughs. First, the use of the elastic defense in depth, developed by Ludendorff in 1916, halted Allied infantry offenses with a minimum number of German defense units. Second, the use of newly developed tactical doctrine led to a series of successful German offensive advances in 1918. As General Wilhelm Balck once noted, “Bullets quickly write new tactics.” In both cases, the solutions were tested before fielding. During World War I, desperately needed change resulted in rapid developments to improve the effectiveness of small German units on the Western Front. Our Army has a similar process of change today. Can we learn from these early experiences?

**Peer-to-peer integration and development.** The emergent qualities of high-performing small units have a number of notable attributes—the synergistic capacity to work together; the ability to develop superior leaders (beyond the appointed leadership); the capacity to adapt; the flexibility to handle fast changing situations; and the resilience to maintain these characteristics in the face of adversity, including the death of team members. Recent work in the field of neurological sciences is making great strides in building resilience, stress tolerance, and leadership *in extremis*. Increased awareness of the importance for Soldiers to be physically, emotionally, socially, and spiritually fit highlights another dimension to the challenges of achieving small-unit excellence.

There is a shared cognition or common understanding that evolves in training together that is closely coupled with trust and interdependence. These attributes are forged and shaped through the development of teamwork and the emotional fulfillment of being a part of a team or a greater whole. The success of the team reflects back on individual success and a sense of belonging, accomplishment, and achievement. The bond created when team members train together and build unit cohesion is valuable, and something we may not replicate otherwise. Small units achieve greatness through this when competence breeds the confidence that cements cohesion. Distributed operations and decentralized command may force small units to excel while being isolated, but it also requires a special strength to avoid creating their own rules in the absence of higher headquarters supervision.
Decentralized operations will certainly lead to a greater reliance on the need to develop teamwork, cohesion, and trust.18 Today, the U.S. Army is increasing its emphasis and focus on improving small-unit effectiveness by connecting the Soldier to the network—in both the garrison and the operating environment. There are several ongoing approaches to achieve connectivity. One approach is the development of the Ground Soldier System. We are providing battle command and situational awareness capabilities to dismounted small-unit leaders by connecting them to the network in the operational environment to enable appropriate and timely tactical actions, focus organic fires, and facilitate requests for joint supporting fires while minimizing the potential for fratricide. This system provides the tools that give small-unit leaders the flexibility to handle rapidly changing situations and conduct distributed operations. Development of the Ground Soldier System should converge with other systems, such as handheld devices, Rifleman’s Radio, and Joint Battle Command.

Our Army is also leveraging the development of simulations and tools that bring the battlefield to the Soldier in an immersive environment. We are continuing to experiment and capture lessons learned at Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment and Army Evaluation Task Force, as well as other experimental and operational venues. We are also connecting through new efforts in the implementation of the Human Dimension Strategy and the Army Campaign Plan.

We are improving small-unit performance by improving individual Soldier performance. The Lighten the Load initiative is streamlining the basic equipment our Soldiers use and reducing its weight—from the over 100 pounds today to around 73 pounds by 2017. We are fielding new composite materials to reduce the weight of protective vests, improve helmet ballistic protection, and increase Soldier mobility. We are improving combat identification with dual-purpose flashlights that provide basic illumination and reflect a Soldier’s identity in terms of friend or foe.

However, improvement is a continuous process. We still need to do much more work. In the area of live, virtual, and constructive environments, our goal should be to ensure that all Soldiers have access to immersive training. In the area of handheld devices, we need to give every Soldier a personal digital assistant with sufficient power, applications, speed, and memory to handle current and projected requirements. Small-unit leaders are the centerpiece of current combat operations. The Army must develop flexible and adaptive leaders and provide appropriate network-connected tools to facilitate superior execution in decentralized operating environments. In the human dimension, we must improve morale and unit cohesiveness and provide the tools to understand the cognitive, physical, and social aspects of comprehensive Soldier fitness. We should give every small-unit leader and individual Soldier the capacity to access information regarding his or her comprehensive Soldier fitness.

Conclusion

Several common threads are apparent in the high performance of small units.

First, the use of information makes a significant difference in building units able to exploit advances in improved small-unit leadership, understanding, subordinate actions, and adaptability across the spectrum of operations.

Second, while the basics have not changed, we can leverage advances in human-dimension concepts and new decision making tools to create a significant leap in small-unit performance.

Third, a dynamic process of change is necessary to document notable advances and to share these techniques with the rest of the Army so that we can have a wide impact on the operational force.

Fourth, testing is necessary to get the right solutions to the right problems.

Small-unit excellence is possible. With a purposeful approach to change, the U.S. Army can develop dynamic solutions for the operational force and better prepare our small units to achieve excellence in the 21st Century. MR

NOTES

3. Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider (New York: The Penguin Group, 2000), 15-21. The authors highlight the trend in which information technology has led to greater decentralization and a new set of rules.


9. Ibid., 11.

10. Brafman and Beckstrom, 201-207. MG Michael T. Flynn, CPT Matt Pottinger, and Paul Batchelor, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” Center for New American Security (January 2010), 13-15. MG Flynn’s article provides concrete examples on how high performing teams are not only re-focusing the type of intelligence collected (i.e. population grievances versus enemy), but also skilfully using that knowledge to wage a well-informed political/social campaign (versus purely kinetic) to drive a wedge between the population and Taliban.


WHILE MOST U.S. efforts in overseas contingency operations focus on the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa, other efforts center in Southeast Asia on the tri-border region of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia around the Sulawesi Sea. This area, more commonly known as the “T3”—the Terrorist Transit Triangle—remains the U.S. Pacific Command’s primary area of interest for counterterrorism in the Pacific and its primary focus of bilateral military engagement within Southeast Asia. This article discusses the various threats in the T3 region and the reactions of the three nations that surround it.

Looking for a Needle in a Stack of Needles

The expanse known as T3 centers on the Sulawesi Sea, which separates the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The area is much larger and more remote than most Americans appreciate. Just the water area of the Sulawesi Sea is larger than the combined areas of the states of Texas and Louisiana. Even defining the water area is complicated because the Sulawesi Sea separates two archipelagic nations—Indonesia and the Philippines—and adjoins eastern Malaysia. To the southwest, the Sulawesi intersects one of the most important waterways for energy security in the Pacific, the Makassar Straights, which contain the world’s second largest operational liquid natural gas field.1

Several island chains bisect the T3, providing natural corridors for transit. They provided trading routes during the precolonial era in Southeast Asia. Today, along with legitimate trade, they provide relatively safe transit routes for criminal and terrorist elements and for the movement of weapons and personnel to the region’s two infamous terrorist groups, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Southeast Asia, and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines.

Four main island chains transit the T3 area. These chains have many unofficial names—“rat lines,” “infiltration routes,” “terrorist corridors”—and are referred to differently by Department of Defense, Department of State, various intelligence agencies, and Department of Justice officials. From west to east, the first route (Route 1) originates and terminates in northern Mindanao or the central Philippines, and it extends west to the Philippine

PHOTO: Two rigid-hull inflatable boats operated by members of U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) approach a Philippine Navy patrol boat carrying survivors from a ferry that sank in the waters off Zamboanga del Norte 6 September 2009. (U.S. Navy, Petty Officer 1st Class Robin Ressler)
island of Palawan. Palawan is, in turn, a waypoint for transit into the eastern Malaysian city of Sandakan, another port in the state of Sabah.

The second route (Route 2), a direct line along the Sulu archipelago island chain, is the most obvious and the most infamous of these routes. This line originates and terminates in the southwestern Mindanao city of Zamboanga, and it extends southwest down a chain of islands from Basilan to Jolo, the tiny island of Tapul, Tawi-Tawi, and Sibutu. The route then splits toward either the island of Timbunmata and the Malaysian port town of Tawao or toward the island of Ligitan and the Malaysian port of Lahaddatu. Alternatively, it splits toward the Indonesian port of Nunukan or turns back northwesterly towards Sandakan at the terminus of Route 1.

The third route (Route 3) originates and terminates in southern Mindanao near General Santos City, and it crosses the T3 via a group of small islands that lead to Tahuna Island, which is off the extreme northeast tip of the island of Sulawesi. From Tahuna, the route follows a southerly path directly to the Indonesian port cities of Manado and Bitung.

The fourth and final route (Route 3A) is a branch of the General Santos City-Manado route. It only recently came to light in the wake of sectarian violence in Poso on central Sulawesi in February and March 2007. Weapons and trained cadre intended for Indonesian fundamentalist organizations moved out of the Philippines via this route to support the violence in Poso. The route originates and terminates near General Santos City, and it veers southeast to Karkarekelong Island just inside Indonesian territory, then proceeds on a southerly course to the Indonesian port city of Ternate, on the island of Halmahera. From Ternate, the route moves in a southwesterly direction to central Sulawesi, avoiding the more guarded ports of Manado and Bitung.

The “Realpolitik” of the Sulawesi Sea

Compounding the geospatial challenges of the T3 region, all three countries in the region are (to put it politely) undergoverned. The region lacks the necessary resources to make it governable. The most tangible evidence of this state of affairs is the paucity of border controls exercised by the three nations in the region. It is not uncommon for a person to travel freely between any of the three nations without ever encountering a border control agent. Consequently, terrorists and their support elements can move between training areas in Mindanao while returning to or transiting from Indonesia and Malaysia en route to other destinations. This freedom of movement enables them to blend with the general population or form networks with other illegal elements to facilitate the flow of persons, weapons, and communication across the T3.

Currently, no formal mechanism facilitates either tri-nation cooperation in the T3 or a U.S.-led multilateral effort—only an unofficial network of individual military and law enforcement officials from each nation exists. The lack of effort to legitimize the borders within the T3 seems to validate the old adage about the Association of Southeast Asian Nations: it is primarily an economic grouping that is capable of cooperating, but not coordinating.

There are four main reasons for the lack of cooperation that obstruct effective multilateral coordination across the T3:

● Distrust amongst the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
● Lack of resources.
Interservice rivalry and ineffectual coordination among government agencies.

Corruption.

Distrust. The Philippines has fair relations with Indonesia mainly because of the distance between the two nations. However, this is not the case with Malaysia. The end of the Sulu Archipelago is within eyesight of the Malaysian state of Sabah, and many ethnic Filipinos cross into Malaysia in search of plantation work, creating a tense atmosphere whenever Filipinos and Malaysians meet to discuss bilateral issues.

The Malaysian-Philippines relationship seems congenial compared to Malaysia’s relations with Indonesia, except for a territorial dispute over the Ambalat block, an undersea parcel of land with a direct impact on bilateral cooperation in the T3. Contested by Indonesia and Malaysia, the Ambalat block in the Sulawesi Sea is located off the coast of the Indonesian province of East Kalimantan and southeast of the Malaysian state of Sabah. Malaysia refers to part of it as “Block ND 6” while part of the East Ambalat block is “Block ND 7.” The sea blocks are rich in crude oil.

The dispute over the Ambalat stretch of the Sulawesi Sea began with the publication of a map by Malaysia in 1979 depicting its territorial waters and continental shelf. The map drew Malaysia’s maritime boundary in a southeast direction in the Sulawesi Sea from the eastern-most point of the Indonesia-Malaysia land border on the eastern shore of Sebatik Island, including the Ambalat block, or at least a large portion of it, within Malaysian territorial waters. Indonesia and other neighbors of Malaysia objected to the map. Indonesia has never officially announced its maritime territorial limits, but in June 2002 it declared the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan for its own. Both Indonesia and Malaysia once claimed these islands—which Malaysia included as part of its territory in its 1979 map—to be its archipelagic base points. This effectively put the entire Ambalat area within its internal waters.

Lack of resources. The government of the Philippines has long neglected Mindanao and particularly the portions that fall into the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. This neglect extends across the full spectrum of governance—political, social, economic, and military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have traditionally been underfunded, but became even more so after 1992, when the United States removed its bases in the Philippines and ended United States grant aid, leading to underfunding of units and bases in Mindanao throughout the 1990s. The U.S discovered the extent of the underfunding after the deployment of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines to Zamboanga in February 2002. The task force was shocked and dismayed to discover how little its assigned AFP partner actually controlled the units assigned to it.

Indonesian security forces are as short of funds as those of the Philippines. Another common trait with the Philippines is the economic activities that the Indonesian Armed Forces and National Police employ to make ends meet or to produce profit for their commanders. There is a direct correlation between the distance from Jakarta and the autonomy of security forces.

Malaysia is the exception to the rule in terms of resources available to support counterterrorism efforts. The Malaysian Armed Forces and Coast Guard are better equipped and trained than those of Indonesia and the Philippines. For Malaysia, the problem seems to be more a question of will and a reluctance to cooperate too closely with its neighbors or the United States. The Malaysian security forces are Malaccan Straits-centric with only a grudging interest in T3 problems beyond defending Ambalat from Indonesian incursions.

Rivalry and ineffectual coordination among government agencies. In the wake of Ferdinand Marcos’ 1986 expulsion from the Philippines, the AFP underwent a massive restructuring. As part of this restructuring, a small coastal protection force, the Philippine Coast Guard, divorced itself from the Philippine Navy. Unfortunately, the divorce was not amicable, and both the Navy and the newly formed Coast Guard were unhappy with the division of bases, vessels, and personnel. The ensuing 22 years have done little to heal this rift.
Conflicting missions and muddled lines of responsibility have only made matters worse. To the horror of the Philippine Navy, the Philippine Coast Guard is a better funded, albeit a smaller organization. Its presence in the T3 is small, and its communications and coordination with the Navy and the AFP nonexistent. Professional jealousy exists between the Navy and Coast Guard in Malaysia, too, although the Malaysian rivalry is less than three years old.

The Royal Malaysian Police have the lead in counterterrorism, while the Malaysian Armed Forces play only a supporting role. The Royal Malaysian Police view the problems in the T3 as transnational crime issues, while the Malaysian Armed Forces view them as national sovereignty issues, leaving little room for multilateral cooperation.

Interagency cooperation in Indonesia is practically unknown. In an attempt to remedy the situation, the government of the Indonesia placed one of its planning agencies, Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board, in control of maritime security and made it the lead agency in the creation of an Indonesian Coast Guard. The Indonesian aversion to sharing information is an important factor as well.4

Corruption. Corruption in the AFP reflects corruption in the government and society in the Philippines. In Mindanao, corruption is present in almost all aspects of the AFP’s daily existence. The AFP’s policy of recruiting locally for enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers compounds already endemic problems, entrenching AFP units geographically and hindering their mobility. To the dismay of the U.S. forces, operational security is next to impossible when planning AFP operations.

Corruption is still an unpleasant fact of life in Malaysia, too, but less prevalent than in Indonesia or the Philippines. Scrutiny from distant Kuala Lumpur is much more lax in far eastern Malaysia. Indonesian fishermen frequently must pay bribes, surrender their catch, or both in order to avoid confinement in a Sabah detention facility. If Indonesian fishermen pay bribes to avoid entanglements with the Malaysian Coast Guard or Police, obviously
other better-financed organizations can as well. Corruption in Indonesia and its security forces is legendary. The reasons are many, but are usually associated with the security forces’ lack of resources for operations.

National Outlooks, U.S. Security Assistance, and Multinational Cooperation

The need for multilateral cooperation in counterterrorism in the T3 seems like a “no brainer” to the United States. On the surface, it would seem that multilateral counterterrorist cooperation is in the obvious self-interest of the states involved. In many ways, the Filipino point of view on terrorism and multilateral cooperation is more congruent with that of the United States than with that of the other littorals, as are its motives in cooperation. The threat posed by Mindanao separatists and terrorists trained and supported in Indonesia and Malaysia, and the Philippines’ history as a former U.S. colony and current defense treaty partner, foster cooperation with the United States. On the other hand, cooperation with the United States seems counterintuitive to Malaysia and Indonesia.

Indonesia was slow to awaken to the transnational threat posed by Jemaah Islamiyah. Indonesia considered the JI as an internal and regional threat when its violent activities came to light in Maluku and Poso, far from the capital in Jakarta. Most Indonesians believe that the JI bombing in Bali on 12 October 2002, the bombing of the Marriott in Jakarta in 2003, the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004, and the October 2005 bombing in Bali indicated the JI was focusing on U.S. and Western targets in response to the U.S.-led War on Terrorism.

Most Indonesians worry about foreign-funded extremists infiltrating mainstream Muslim organizations and regard illegal fishing, wildlife smuggling, logging, and trafficking as the only serious threats emanating from the Sulawesi. The government of Indonesia points out that its economic losses due to these illegal activities total nearly $8 billion a year.

Like Indonesia, Malaysia views maritime security in the Sulawesi as a law enforcement and sovereignty problem, not a counterterrorism problem. In multilateral maritime security meetings, Malaysian representatives tend to disengage from counterterrorist discussions by asserting that terrorism in the region is a problem for Indonesia and the Philippines. No active extremist groups operate within Malaysia’s borders.

Since 2002, all three nations have upgraded their counterterrorism capabilities. However, progress has been uneven, much of it depending on each nation’s relationship with the United States and its eligibility for U.S. foreign assistance, in particular Department of Defense “1206” dollars designed to create counterterrorism capabilities. The progress has been most rapid in the Philippines. On the other hand, Malaysia, which possesses the most capable counterterrorism forces in the region, has shown itself the least likely to cooperate with its neighbors or with the United States. Indonesia, for its part, possesses a counterterrorist capability, but cannot bring itself to do the necessary internal governmental coordination or provide the necessary resources to sustain it.

Connecting the Dots

The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) has faced a steep learning curve, and its initial efforts to facilitate a spirit of cooperation amongst the littorals were anything but smooth. To their credit, Pacific Command, DOD, and the State Department have learned their lessons about sovereignty concerns in the region. They started low-profile regional capacity-building programs and sponsored multilateral conferences to help build domain awareness, first in the Straits of Malacca and later in the Sulawesi Sea, to help states better enforce their laws. The Joint Interagency Coordinating Group, organized under the PACOM J-5, Plans and Policy, led the way in terms of U.S. efforts to kindle the fires of regional cooperation in maritime security and counterterrorism. With substantial encouragement from diplomats and U.S. military officials assigned to the region, the three nations slowly and deliberately encouraged the littorals’ reengagement on cooperation.

The Philippines led the region in building a comprehensive network of interagency cooperation that balanced surveillance, communication, and interdiction across the Philippine portion of the T3. The Philippines inaugurated Coast Watch South, the country’s version of the famed Australian Coast...
Watchers of World War II. Coast Watch South has Pacific Command’s enthusiastic support and receives U.S. military and law enforcement grant assistance. The Joint Interagency Task Force West brought together military and law enforcement capabilities to combat transnational drug-related crime in the region.

The U.S. Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program is spearheading a separate but congruent initiative in Indonesia. Indonesian maritime security stakeholders seem to realize that their bureaucratic infighting has done little to detangle conflicting and overlapping authorities and see the need for a fresh approach. Begun in early 2009 and collectively known as the Tarakan Initiative, these program-developed actions represent a significant cultural shift in sharing basic goals and objectives within the government of Indonesia.

The Tarakan Initiative also brought together the Indonesian National Police, the Department of Sea Transportation (which controls the Ports Authority and an independent search and rescue arm), the Department of Customs, Department of Immigration, the Ministry of Fisheries, prosecutors, quarantine officials, and representatives of the Indonesian Navy to identify—

- Problems within the Sulawesi from their individual perspectives.
- Tasks and roles.
- Solution sets.
- Contributions each agency could make to the solution in terms of experience and assets.

The Tarakan Initiative group validated that illegal fishing, logging, smuggling, and various forms of trafficking are more serious threats to Indonesia’s sovereignty than terrorism.

Conclusion

The geospatial and political challenges to effective counterterrorism cooperation in the T3 are daunting, but not insurmountable. Through its grant aid programs, the United States is slowly leading nations in the region toward a more practical and constructive relationship that will lead to effective cooperation. With practically all of the “1206” imagery and communications equipment from a common supplier, the technical cornerstones are in place for a regional common operating picture. The political will to switch on that capability in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia does not yet exist, but the prospects for future cooperation are much brighter than only a few years ago.

Pacific Command’s indirect approach to multilateral maritime security cooperation will inevitably lead to counterterrorist cooperation in the Sulawesi, and it is beginning to make a real change in perceptions about the viability and practicality of cooperation in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Ultimately, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines will not come fully on board until they realize it is in their best interest. However, success is achievable if the United States has the political savvy to remain an indirect leader or facilitator in the process and remember the keys to success in the region—presence, persistence, and patience. MR
United States military history is replete with examples of preparing for the next war by studying the last (or current) one. Consequently, we often engage in warfare with doctrine and processes that lag behind current reality. The result can be a prolonged war effort at great cost to national treasure, both fiscal and human. The harried development and implementation of counterinsurgency doctrine, resulting in the so-called “surge” in the midst of the campaign in Iraq, is but one example.1

The Army’s introspective consideration of future warfare in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, is an exception. Using the 1973 Arab-Israeli War as a harbinger of warfare where precision weaponry and technological advances showed the importance of maneuver, the Army shifted from a doctrine of “Active Defense” to “Airland Battle.” However, this was not universally accepted. In a 2006 Landpower essay, Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege reminisced:

In what developed into a healthy exchange, [young officers] saw defensive tactics as a “fall-back by ranks” approach that confused delay and defense, and would lead commanders to avoid decisive engagement . . . They saw it as reactive, surrendering the initiative and resulting in a risky method of defense.2

The official history of the 1991 Gulf War describes the shift to Airland Battle doctrine as a prescient decision that was the basis of that dramatic victory for the U.S. military.3

So what will the next war look like? No one has a flawless crystal ball to predict the future, but even a cursory consideration of potential future
adversaries reveals the importance placed on information as a strategic asymmetric means to conduct warfare. The Chinese military has reportedly hacked into Pentagon military networks. The Russian government allegedly conducted a major cyber attack on Estonian infrastructure. Yet even while attacks on information systems are proving to be a threat, reliance on the Internet to fight the “war of ideas” is increasing. Consider the so-called “2nd Lebanon War” between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006. Hezbollah used information to affect perceptions as a means to achieve strategic victory, even going so far as to place billboards on the rubble of buildings in southern Lebanon that said “Made in the USA” (in English).

The U.S. military certainly recognizes this threat, as the move to establish a U.S. Cyber Command demonstrates. However, until recently, doctrine was lagging. Past policies favored “active defense” over “maneuver” in cyberspace. And while a recent policy change points to a potentially significant shift in that equation, the question arises whether the military will embrace the organizational change necessary to balance the need to protect networks while going on the ideological offensive its adversaries have embraced.

In the end, leaders must weigh the risks involved to achieve a balance to compete in the information battlespace. Will they develop an “Airland Battle” equivalent for cyberspace, or will they wait until the next war to strike the balance at potentially great cost to our Nation?

**Defining the Problem**

Keeping up with the definition of cyberspace can be a full-time job. Since 2004, the U.S. government has presented four different “official”
definitions. The Department of Defense (DOD) currently defines cyberspace as—

a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.7

Perhaps more important, cyberpower is “the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence events in all the operational environments and across the instruments of power.”8 Thus, much like land, sea, and airpower, cyberpower is a weapon of war.

The DOD definition of cyberspace rightly recognizes the importance of the Internet as an enabler of that domain in today’s information environment. The World Wide Web, as a subset of the Internet, is essentially ungoverned, providing obvious freedoms and cautions. The web gives the individual a voice—often an anonymous voice—and a potentially vast audience. One can easily establish, dismantle, and reestablish a website. This attribute makes them valuable to extremist movements. On the other hand, the same capability the web gives our adversaries is available to us, if we choose to embrace it.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism notes that the Internet provides terrorists cyber safe havens to “communicate, recruit, train, rally support, proselytize, and spread their propaganda without risking personal contact.” It also points out the opportunity the Internet offers to discredit that same propaganda.9

The impact of Internet technologies on national security and warfighting will not only increase in the future, but do so exponentially.10 Consider the Internet as a significant means to conduct the “war of ideas.” Web logs (blogs), YouTube, Google Earth, and Second Life are all “new media”—enabling technologies our adversaries use to gain asymmetric advantage by affecting perceptions, attitudes, behaviors, and ultimately beliefs. Social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter have exploded recently and are used for purposes well beyond the social interaction that this medium implies. The iPhone may look like a phone, but it has all the capabilities of a desktop computer (and more in many cases) in a device the size of your palm.

There is no doubt that technology will continue to be faster, cheaper, and more capable. New media in this context quickly become “old” media. And so a more timeless definition sees new media as any capabilities that empower a broad range of actors (individuals through nation-states) to create and disseminate real-time or nearly real-time information that can affect a broad (regional or worldwide) audience. Although it was previously the exclusive purview of nation-states and large multi-national corporations, individuals can now wield information as a strategic means, a development of importance to policymakers and warfighters.

Future warfighting challenges must consider the almost certain use of the Internet by any potential adversary. Analysts should not gain a false sense of security based on limited Internet penetration in some of the most contentious parts of the world. While Africa has only a 6.8 percent Internet penetration based on population, the use of the Internet there grew 1,392 percent from 2000 to 2009. Dramatic growth rates are similarly occurring in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.11

Warfighters recognize the requirement to compete in cyberspace. Increasingly, senior leaders and units sponsor Facebook pages and “tweet” routinely. The U.S. Central Command engages dissident voices by participating in blogs that are critical of the war on terror, noting “with the proliferation of information today, if you’re not speaking to this forum, you’re not being heard by it.”12 The United States military also recognizes the importance of competing in the video medium, using YouTube to show ongoing images of U.S. operations in the current theaters of war.13

On the other hand, the U.S. military’s significant dependence on the Internet for routine daily business and communication creates a vulnerability to cyber attack. There are plenty of people and organizations out there probing U.S. networks. While the U.S. repels most of those attacks, the failures provide a glimpse into their impact. China’s People’s
Liberation Army attacked Pentagon computers in June 2007 apparently following numerous probes and caused the network to be taken down for more than a week.14 The Chinese are transforming from a mechanized to an “informationized” force and have stated they intend to use information warfare “as a tool of war [or] as a way to achieve victory without war.”15 Retired General Barry McCaffrey indicates this is not an anomaly, but in fact may be the norm. He notes that all of our potential adversaries, as well as criminal elements, conduct daily reconnaissance of our electronic spectrum in areas critical to U.S. national security.16 In fact, on average, U.S. government computer systems come under attack every eight seconds.17

The case of Estonia may be a precursor of what the United States could expect as it increases its reliance on the Internet for government and military business. Estonia uses some of the most advanced “e-government” processes in the world. Estonians bank, vote, and pay taxes online, and Estonia has embedded its national identification cards with electronic chips, making them very efficient and, as it turns out, very vulnerable. So it mattered when Russian hackers attacked in the spring of 2007.18 In fact, some observers equated that cyber attack to an act of war in the Clausewitzian sense, with the intent to create mass social panic.19

It should not be surprising, then, that protecting the net has taken on great importance in the Department of Defense and that using that same net to get proactive, positive U.S. messages out is increasingly significant. A recent Department of Defense policy change has opened the aperture to enable opportunities to use the Internet to counter misinformation and tell the story of the American military. However, it remains to be seen whether organizational culture will embrace such an approach.

Defend: Protecting the Network

Great effort and resources go into protecting the Internet-capable systems of the Department of Defense and other governmental organizations. The Department of Homeland Security established a National Cybersecurity Center whose mission is to “coordinate and integrate information necessary to help secure U.S. cyber networks and systems and help foster collaboration among federal cyber groups.”20 The Department of Defense has codified the process to protect their networks in a concept called information assurance. Information assurance includes measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection and reaction capabilities . . . IA [information assurance] requires a defense-in-depth approach [emphasis added].21

The Department of Defense conducts unclassified computer operations within a subset of the Internet known as the “NIPRnet” (originally the nonclassified Internet protocol router network). The NIPRnet isolates access to the greater Internet by using a limited number of portals or gateways. This methodology makes the required “defense in depth” manageable from a resource perspective in that it reduces the number of pathways to monitor for attacks. It allows access to the Internet to facilitate efficient business and command and control.22 But firewalls and content filters that block entrance to specific external sites often limit access to the World Wide Web in order to promote work productivity, support bandwidth requirements, protect operations security, and prevent intrusion and compromise. In the recent past it appeared that this external access would become even more restrictive. Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England asked Congress for funds to build, for lack of a better term, a “DODnet” in July 2008. “Recent attacks from China on Department of Defense networks and systems increase the urgency to construct cyber systems that can’t be penetrated.”23 The trend was toward increased security by locking down the system, an approach that was at odds with winning the war of ideas.

Attack: Getting the Message Out

Senior military leaders increasingly emphasize the importance of “strategic communication” to compete in the information environment. According to the Department of Defense, strategic communication is focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or
preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.\textsuperscript{24}

Thus, strategic communication is the integration of actions, images, and words to send a message to affect perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors.\textsuperscript{25} Actions send the loudest messages, but images and words provide context and often have significant effects on their own. While strategic communication focuses on the cognitive dimension of the information environment, it relies on the physical environment to send its messages. Often that requires ready and rapid access to the Internet.

Leaders increasingly point to the importance of using new media means and the Internet to proactively fight in cyberspace. However, past anecdotal evidence reveals a struggle between defending the networks and using them to actively get out the message. U.S. operations in Iraq shown on YouTube were among the top 10 viewed for weeks after their posting, but the Army posted them only after senior generals overcame significant bureaucratic stonewalling.\textsuperscript{26}

Bandwidth considerations may have been an issue. Blogs are fast becoming the medium of choice not only for recreational, but for more serious military and political pursuits. Blogs provide a forum to tell the military’s story, often by the most credible sources—the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines themselves—but risk-aversion often stymies the effort. Past military policies in Iraq have been restrictive and often discouraged blogging rather than encouraging it.\textsuperscript{27} In May 2008, Army Lieutenant Matthew Gallagher’s blog “Kaboom” was taken down by his leadership after he recounted an anonymous exchange between himself and his commander without seeking approval prior to posting it. Before its demise, the site received tens of thousands of page views about the day-to-day life of an Army platoon in the war zone.\textsuperscript{28} MySpace and Facebook receive plenty of press about their transparency and the adverse effect of personal disclosure in the wrong hands. On the other hand, from a military perspective these social networking sites provide an opportunity to tell a credible and contextual story of military life. Both blogs and social networks, however, present operations...
security issues for commanders, rightly concerned about maintaining the secrecy of military operations, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

Many senior military leaders acknowledge the importance of these new media tools as contemporary military capabilities and encourage participation in the dialogue that they facilitate. Examples from the recent past point to a risk averse climate at high levels that in turn works against capitalizing on the network’s potential. For example, in March 2008, the Army’s Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, submitted a memorandum requesting an “exception to policy” to allow their officers to engage in blogging in the public domain. CAC is commanded by a three-star general who had to go to his four-star command for that authority. What’s more, CAC is responsible for training and educating Army leaders in the use of these capabilities.

The Department of Defense also restricted the authority to conduct interactive Internet activities to the four-star level and only allowed public affairs officers to engage in interactive Internet activities with journalists. These policies not only applied to the NIPRnet but also restricted home use of the Internet.

What appears to be a significant breakthrough, however, occurred in February 2010 with the publication of a DOD memorandum entitled “Responsible and Effective Use of Internet-based Capabilities.” This broad policy significantly softens the previous restrictions by explicitly directing NIPRnet access to a wide variety of publicly available collaborative tools and discussion forums. (The policy specifically cites YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter among others). On the other hand, commanders at all levels are directed to continue to defend against malicious activities and take action to safeguard missions.

This recent policy seemingly makes sense from a perspective of balance. But it also presents military leaders with a dilemma. They are responsible for fighting the war of ideas in an age where they must quickly come up with proactive messages and reactive responses. This demand calls for a decentralized approach to strategic communication and information engagement. The means to achieve that speed, the Internet, is indispensable to the conduct of daily business, yet it is under continuous surveillance and attack, causing some leaders to place it under centralized control. This issue tips toward either point based on the level of risk a commander is willing to take in the information environment, and the organizational culture of the military regarding the value of competing in that environment.

Addressing the Dilemma: Managing Risk, Achieving Balance

A command approach focusing on a “defense in depth” to secure the NIPRnet and controlling outside access to and use of the Internet, while understandable from a threat analysis approach, flies in the face of the tenets of good strategy and military planning: Strategic thinking [is] a sophisticated intellectual process seeking to create a synthesis of consensus, efforts, and circumstances to influence the overall environment favorably while managing the risks involved in pursuing opportunities or reacting to threats.

Therefore, a strategy regarding use of the Internet to influence the information environment requires managing the risk of attack while pursuing the opportunities to compete. The previously cited definition of cyberpower as the “ability to create advantages and influence events” in cyberspace appears to provide a proactive, offensive-minded focus on cyber-related activities. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism notes the opportunity the Internet offers to discredit adversary propaganda. The June 2008 National Defense Strategy discusses the requirement to mitigate risk—but in terms of the ability to exploit opportunity. Still, it remains to be seen whether commanders will take a risk-averse approach to the new DOD policy by establishing centralized control emphasizing defense of the network.

Military operations rely on centralized planning and decentralized execution with a synchronized overarching plan that subordinate organizations adhere to in their subordinate plans to achieve desired ends. Decentralized execution fosters agility, speed, and responsiveness in a fluid and constantly changing environment. Therefore, if information is a key component of current and future military operating environments, it follows that a centralized plan with decentralized execution would hold in cyberspace.
Again, however, some commands’ emphasis regarding the Internet may restrict decentralized execution, hampering the ability to be proactive, agile, and responsive in prosecuting the war of ideas.

The question is how to exploit emerging cyber capabilities to influence perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors while managing the risk of surveillance and attack of the Internet. It is important to consider the various reasons given to limit access to new media means since they inform the logic of those commands prone to restricting access: to promote work productivity, support bandwidth requirements, maintain operations security, and prevent intrusion and compromise. These examples are clearly covered in new DOD policy. Still, this expansion is necessary to provide a reasoned argument in favor of the balanced approach that policy directs.

**Productivity.** One argument for using NIPRnet content filters to preclude access to video upload sites (e.g. YouTube), blogs, and social networking sites is the assumption that Soldiers will access them for personal use during duty hours, thus adversely affecting work productivity. Certainly, that potential exists. However, the responsibility to manage this issue is leader business, pure and simple, and should be handled on a by-exception basis. Content filters established at any level of command usurp the responsibilities of leaders in subordinate organizations.

**Bandwidth requirements.** Another argument for restricting access to video uplink sites is the requirement to manage bandwidth requirements. Bandwidth is the “capacity to move information.” It is a low-density, high-demand item in providing command and control computer capabilities to the military. However, again, leaders decide how to distribute any valuable, limited resource to support mission requirements and accomplish the military mission.

**Operations security.** Operations security “selects and executes measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.” Some leaders worry that participation by military members in blogging, social networking, and uploading to video sites can potentially reveal military vulnerabilities. This risk applies to both the NIPRnet and the Internet where military members may conduct new media engagement from home. It is certainly a risk borne out by several significant violations in recent years. However, OPSEC is, and always has been, a commander’s program. Commanders control the OPSEC environment through training, education, and punitive measures for deliberate violations. Content filters and command policies established at high levels to prevent OPSEC violations are restrictions that detract from the subordinate commander’s ability to lead and achieve military objectives by exploiting the capabilities of the network.

Intrusions and the threat of compromise of the network itself are, on the other hand, valid and important concerns. DOD systems, as previously noted, are under continuous attack by nation-states, nonstate actors, criminals, and hackers. Consequently, the department was right to establish a system that reduces gateways to the Internet and allows judicious and continuous monitoring, to prevent the downloading of software that might harbor malicious code with devastating consequences to the network, and to continue to evaluate ways to mitigate such risk. Adversaries and criminals alike continuously adapt to updates and other defensive measures.

Managing risk while providing the opportunity to engage effectively and exploit the opportunities the Internet provides requires a rebalancing of command philosophy. Leaders and commanders have the authority and resources to conduct rapidly proactive and responsive strategic communication. Productivity, bandwidth, and OPSEC issues are clearly leader business, and leaders should monitor subordinates and hold them accountable for violations of their guidance. This decentralized approach assumes risk. Commanders and leaders must take steps to mitigate this risk but in a balanced fashion.

Lieutenant General William Caldwell says (interestingly using a blog as his medium of choice) we should encourage Soldiers to tell their stories, empower them by underwriting honest mistakes, educate them on potential strategic implications...
of engagement, and equip them to engage the new media. While Caldwell specifically refers to physical equipment, one could reasonably argue that equally, if not more importantly, is equipping Soldiers with the appropriate command guidance that freely allows engagement by new media means while prescribing the limits of that interaction. The new DOD policy, as it trickles down to subordinate commands, should allow free engagement provided commanders are open to the opportunities and aware of the threats.

Conclusion

In August 2008, Russia apparently again conducted cyber attacks, but this time in a coordinated and synchronized kinetic and nonkinetic campaign against Georgia. It is entirely probable that this may become the norm in future warfare between and among nation-states that can conduct such complex excursions. The case of Hezbollah in the 2006 conflict with Israel also suggests the future strategic use of the Internet and new media to strike at domestic and international audiences.

The information environment has three dimensions: the physical dimension, the “means” by which one sends a message; the informational dimension, or the impact of the message on the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of target audiences. It’s safe to say that future war will increasingly include conflict in cyberspace in all three dimensions.

Exploiting opportunity while managing risk is the strategic imperative. A good military plan, whether on land, sea, or air, will “protect the force” while attacking the enemy. Civilian leaders and military commanders weigh risk, emplace policies, and act to mitigate risk, but they also focus on achieving policy and military objectives. In cyberspace, this means both protecting the Internet and using it to engage.

Considering second- and third-order effects when making decisions is also important. Given the constant threat of a successful cyber attack against U.S. government systems, leaders might default to the no risk or low risk option of strengthening the virtual walls around the NIPRnet to impervious levels. Moreover, to prevent the potential violation of operations security, they may establish restrictive policies on the use of the Internet. However, the second-order effect of doing all this is to significantly reduce the ability of leaders and commanders to engage in the information environment using new media.

Currently, U.S. government and military strategies “talk the talk” in this regard with encouraging evidence toward “walking the walk.” Senior leader guidance to engage audiences using new media trumpets the beginnings of overcoming a long-standing cultural bias against using the Internet for important information engagements. New DOD policy offers the opportunity to achieve the balance necessary to both exploit and protect the Internet. Leaders and commanders are responsible for fighting wars. A more restrictive NIPRnet will not resolve this dilemma and, in fact, can have significant adverse second-order effects. It’s time to break down some of the risk-averse culture to allow “maneuver” to occur so that leaders at all levels can do their job. 

NOTES


22. The author attended a conference on cyberpower sponsored by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. in April 2008. The referenced comments reflect panelists' presentations. The conference was held under Chatham House rules allowing free and open dialog while ensuring the anonymity of speakers.


25. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication (DASD(JC)), presentation, June 2008. DASD(JC) is responsible for the Quadrennial Defense Review Strategic Communication Roadmap and Strategic Communication education and training within the Department of Defense.


29. The author has been present at numerous presentations at the U.S. Army War College where senior leaders (general officers and senior Army civilians) have advocated aggressive use of new media means to get out the positive messages about service members. An April 2008 memo co-signed by the Chief of Staff of the Army and Secretary of the Army urged a significant effort to tell the story of support of Army families using “new media such as blogs as effective means for communicating” the message.


33. The Army Field Manual on operations (February 2008), devotes a chapter to the topic of information as a warfighting capability. It stresses the need for "information engagement" at the individual Soldier level. It further discusses the requirement to overcome a risk-averse culture in order to effectively engage. See chap. 7.


36. Caldwell, “Changing the Organizational Culture.”


We must hold our minds alert and receptive to the application of unglimped methods and weapons.

—General Douglas A. MacArthur

INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) provide the commander with non-lethal, flexible deterrent options. Applying IO this way is viable for both state and nonstate adversaries. The greatest impact will vary depending on the particular core capability the adversary has. Information operations core capabilities have the most significant strategic effect as a deterrent to conflict when applied during phase I of Joint operations. Indeed, the central strategic aim of IO is to deter threats of potential adversaries.\(^1\) Information operations-induced deterrence compels an adversary to adopt a policy or take an action that obtains or sustains the national security of U.S. interests. Applications of IO at the strategic level have essentially consisted of only one or two core capabilities as tactical enablers rather than synergistic combinations for a strategic effect.

Information operations planned, integrated, and executed as part of a combatant command’s campaign plan during phase I provide the commander with nonkinetic, nonlethal options to achieve strategic objectives. The probability of effectiveness in phase I rises when commanders integrate IO into deliberate and crisis action planning cycles. Such integration should occur from inception and be included in rigorous Joint targeting processes. Measures of effectiveness must be developed to inform any decisions to re-engage or terminate IO actions.

Applying concentrated, integrated, and synchronized IO to deter an adversary from a course of action and preclude an outbreak of armed conflict does not constitute an act of war.\(^2\) However, though not an act of war, it does involve targeting. If the application of IO is to achieve the desired deterrent effect, three enabling components must align—the capabilities to engage a target, access to the target, and the authority to engage the target.
Foundations for Information Operations

Information operations core military capabilities include electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security. When properly coordinated and closely focused, these capabilities can deter armed conflict. Information operations’ primary goal at the strategic level is to coerce a key leader or group of leaders to forgo a particular action or, alternatively, take an action consistent with U.S. interests.³

Information operations are not the application of any of the core capabilities singularly. The synchronized and coordinated integration of combinations of the core capabilities characterizes information operations, and this generates the offensive nonkinetic force component that can deter armed conflict.

Electronic warfare. This core capability is comprised of the three subdivisions—electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic support. These all represent military action during which electromagnetic or directed energy weapons control the electromagnetic spectrum or attack an enemy.⁴ Because the focus is on deterrence, electronic attack has the most direct relevance.

Electronic attack targets enemy facilities, equipment, or personnel to degrade, neutralize, and, if necessary, destroy an enemy’s electronic support systems.⁵ As an example, electronic attack airborne assets could conduct standoff communications jamming against an enemy’s integrated air defense system communications network so that the enemy suffers a degradation of its system’s command and control capability.

Computer network operations. The latest IO core capability integrated into Joint Publication 3-13, Computer Network Operations, has three subcomponents—computer network attack, computer network defense, and computer network exploitation.⁶ Again, since the focus is on causing a deterrent effect, the offensive computer network attack represents the most viable “effects generating” subcomponent.

Computer network attack involves using computer networks to deny, disrupt, or degrade computers, computer networks, or the information resident in any of those. Today, potential adversary groups rely more and more on computers and computer networks to facilitate command and control, support enabling transactions, and coordinate actions.⁷

Computer network attack has the potential to be a weapon of mass disruption against both military and civilian infrastructure targets.⁸ As an example, an Internet denial-of-service attack consisting of the injection of a large stream of data against an adversary computer network has the potential to consume all available bandwidth on that network and significantly degrade or deny its use.

Psychological operations. This core capability involves delivering information that influences or dissuades key adversary leadership and their support structures so that follow-on adverse actions by the adversary are deterred. Psychological operations are most effectively employed as an integrated IO capability in support of phase I operations.⁹ Psychological operations influence foreign populations and counter adversary messages.¹⁰ Messages broadcast via shortwave radio, warning the general population that the actions of their leaders may result in military action, are an example. Within the Department of Defense, only psychological operations forces have the authority to influence foreign target audiences using an array of radio, print, and other associated media delivery mechanisms.¹¹

Military deception. This core capability deliberately targets key adversary decision makers to mislead them into making a decision favorable to friendly objectives. As a weapon for deterrence, it causes doubt, confusion, and possibly fear among key adversary leadership targets by disrupting or degrading their normal command and control decision cycle as it wrestles to evaluate the deception.¹² A message targeted to exploit a fissure between a key member of the adversary’s leadership who has a contentious relationship with another key decision maker is an example. That message could cause internal strife resulting in the adversary foregoing an intended course of action and adopting a position more favorable to our interests.

Operations security. In phase I, operations security denies the adversary critical information that would facilitate an accurate assessment of our intent and capabilities. In addition, effective operations security causes the adversary either to make erroneous decisions or to delay decisions due a lack of credible information.¹³
Denying the adversary decision maker critical information about our intent and capabilities contributes to his uncertainty, disrupts his decision cycle, and escalates his mounting sense of doubt, fear and confusion, which makes deterrence a real possibility.  

Five additional capabilities support IO—counterintelligence, physical security, information assurance, combat camera, and physical attack. Except for physical attack, these measures act to defend friendly infrastructure or visual information documentation and are not as germane to achieving deterrence. Physical attack involves the use of kinetic fires against an information operations target to influence a specific target audience.

While doctrine states that the three IO-related capabilities of public affairs, civil-military operations, and defense support to public diplomacy contribute to the overall information environment and must be coordinated with IO, arguably their application as related to defensive information operations to achieve deterrence is indirect at best. Military IO targets the adversary and the adversary’s support structures. Public affairs operations convey messages to domestic and foreign audiences. Civil military operations are most effective in phase IV (stabilize) and V (enable civil authority) operations. Defense support to public diplomacy equates to psychological operations-trained Soldiers supporting dissemination of messages and themes under the authority of an ambassador. These related capabilities are not as effective as IO capabilities in terms of achieving deterrence in phase I.

**Information Operations in Phase I: A Compelling Position**

Undergirded by committed political will, IO offers combatant commanders a nonlethal option that, when applied within the context of an overall set of strategic objectives, can deter conflict. Indeed, the primary strategic emphasis of IO should be deterrence and the employment of core capabilities toward that end. For IO to be effective in deterring a potential adversary, we must apply them with the same force and rigor that characterize our application of lethal force. We must leave our adversary with an overwhelming sense that pursuing a course of action that the United States deems as threatening to U.S. national interests is fruitless, and that the continued pursuit of that course of action brings dire consequences. Information operations applied effectively in support of deterrence leave the adversary with a sense of doubt, fear, and confusion and influences him to abandon a course of action. With IO orchestrated to influence the adversary’s observe-orient-decide-act (“OODA”) loop, his operations and perception of the possibility of success diminish. This creates the real possibility that the adversary may abandon or alter the policy challenged by the United States.

The value of applying IO to deter conflict has widely recognized appeal. In the *National Security Strategy of the United States*, deterring a potential adversary is one of the top priorities for securing U.S. national interests. The document speaks directly to the need to engage a potential adversary with the capabilities of IO before the onset of armed conflict.

Interestingly, the *National Security Strategy* also points to “dissuading” as a top priority for securing U.S. interests. Dissuading involves those activities associated with phase 0 (shaping operations). In phase 0, military IO should play a minor role only. Other elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—should dominate U.S. efforts to dissuade an adversary from pursuing a policy that threatens U.S. security interests.

The distinction between dissuading and deterring a potential adversary resides with the focus of force. With dissuading efforts, the focus often takes a less direct approach to the adversary. In contrast, deterrence requires directed pressure against a potential adversary. The targets for the application of deterrent IO must correspond directly to the critical human, infrastructural, and content components that sustain the potential adversary and the policy or course of action he is pursuing.

...the *National Security Strategy* also points to “dissuading” as a top priority...
Department of Defense Directive 3600.1 addresses IO and endorses the need to leverage IO capabilities to achieve deterrence. The directive states that IO should aim to deter conflict and that the potential to defuse a crisis is its greatest promise. Phase 0 constitutes the shaping phase of Joint operations and phase II, the “seize the initiative” phase, represents the onset of armed conflict. Information operations quickly devolve to tactical application as they are applied offensively in phase II. In phase I, IO fills the strategic deterrence gap between dissuading in phase 0 and the onset of lethal force in phase II. The more aggressive the use of IO in phase I, the more likely the adversary will perceive our willingness to use force. Information operations in support of strategic deterrence can thereby minimize the requirement for forward deployed and stationed forces. Information operations will influence the decision making and perceptions of a potential adversary while increasing the deterrent impact of power-projection options.

Figure 1 portrays the deterrent effectiveness of information operations across the phases of Joint operations. Analysis of this diagram will further clarify the compelling argument for offensive IO engagement as phase I approaches culmination and phase II is about to begin.

The line to the left represents IO applied to achieve deterrence. The diagram shows that IO effectiveness is minimal in phase 0, but rapidly accelerates with the onset of phase I and increases across phase I in an accumulating manner. This increasing effectiveness reflects that the potential adversary is reacting to the synchronized application of the core military information operations capabilities. In phase I, IO should aim to affect an adversary’s leadership and its supporting structures, to include populations, to such an extent that the U.S. achieves its goal to deter conflict by compelling the favorable change of an adversary policy. As the onset of phase II approaches, the diagram illustrates that a concentrated IO engagement needs to occur that ensures, first, successful deterrence and, failing deterrence, friendly forces information superiority in preparation for the onset of armed conflict in phase II. The central characteristic of the concentrated IO engagement is a redoubling of effort and a massing of IO “fires.” Should deterrence fail, the concentrated IO engagement in phase I should begin within 48 to 72 hours of the anticipated commencement of...
phase II. Figure 2 depicts the timeline for initiating and executing the concentrated IO engagement in phase I.

As phase II commences, the strategic impact of IO as an option to achieve deterrence quickly becomes subservient to the application of IO in support of operational and tactical demands.

The same assets used in phase I for IO also support the operational and tactical fight, and their application increases from the onset of phase II through the culmination of phase III, main combat operations. At the onset of phase VI, stability operations, operational and tactical IO decline in effectiveness.

An aggressive, synchronized, and coordinated application of the five core capabilities to deter the actions of a potential state adversary may be as follows:

● Electronic warfare may target the adversary’s ballistic missile command and control network and the associated radars to degrade delivery capability. It may jam state-owned radio and television stations to isolate the population from further state propaganda.

● A computer network attack against the state-controlled telecommunications network can deny, degrade, or disrupt its use for command and control of military forces and for use by key leadership to direct a national response. Such an attack, in conjunction with psychological operations, can deliver discreet messages to key leaders of factional groups to create friction and increase internal pressure on the adversary state leadership to abandon its contentious policies.

● Psychological operations can deliver broadcast messages to the population in order to create separation from the adversary state leadership and add additional internal pressure.

● Military deception operations can cause the key military leadership doubt, fear, and confusion as to legitimate U.S. military intentions. These operations will compel the adversary state military leaders to confront the political leadership with the futility of resistance.

● Operational security can surround the operations of friendly forces with a blanket of security and thwart the detection of U.S. intentions.

The combatant commander seeks to isolate the leaders of a potential adversary from the physical and psychological support they enjoy, especially from their military forces and supporting infrastructure. If the actor is a nation-state, dependence on a more formalized bureaucracy and embedded technology, such as telecommunications networks and radar networks, will probably be greater than that of a nonstate actor. Therefore, electronic warfare and computer network attacks may have a greater effect against a state actor than a nonstate actor may.
In either case, the application of offensive IO can diffuse a crisis and preclude the need to move into the armed conflict stage that begins with phase II.27

The lack of technological sophistication and less formalized command and control of typical potential nonstate adversaries, as compared to state adversaries, may well limit the direct effectiveness of electronic warfare and computer network attack. However, since nonstate adversaries may use the telecommunications infrastructure of the host country in which they operate, computer network attack has the potential to work as an enabling capability for the delivery of direct psychological operations messages. Likewise, computer network attacks can enable psychological operations messages to key leaders of the host country, encouraging bolder action against the adversary.

Influence operations using psychological operations and military deception will have the greatest impact on an adversary that lacks technological sophistication for command and control. Military deception can cause the leadership of the nonstate adversary to become suspicious of the host nation’s further tolerance of its activities and create fear as to pending military operations against them by U.S. lead coalition forces. Psychological operations against the local population can erode support for the adversary. For example, offering a reward for information entices the local population to report the activities of the adversary group.

Both scenarios demonstrate that successful application of military information operations against any potential adversary requires the following:

- Analysis of the environment to ensure the proper synchronization of core capabilities.
- Assessment of the vital interests of the potential adversary to ensure that the planning for information operations is on target.
- Assessment of a potential adversary’s critical pressure points to ensure that the force applied by information operations achieves maximum effectiveness.

- Use of the appropriate information operations capability, or capabilities, in the degree and range of force necessary to achieve the desired deterrent effect.28

Planning, Targeting, and Effectiveness

Information operations should integrate fully into planning and targeting, and measures of effectiveness should provide the feedback to insure its effectiveness. Key to effectiveness is the use of all synchronized and integrated core capabilities.29 Effectiveness in phase I operations is doubtful unless IO is integrated into planning and targeting. Information operations planners must participate as active members in established operations planning teams and stand ready to defend the value of IO products as both a unique set of capabilities and as a force multiplier across all phases of Joint operations.30

Using traditional targeting procedures is necessary and appropriate because information operations provide effects-producing options, just as lethal options do. A targeting synchronization matrix depicting integration of targets is as applicable for information operations as it is for lethal capabilities.31 There should be only one target synchronization matrix that integrates lethal and nonlethal targets. Measures of effectiveness should be logically linked to a desired end state. However, one must recognize that measures of effectiveness are a tremendous challenge. The cumulative effect of information operations that is necessary to achieve deterrence makes the impact of each individual capability difficult to assess.32

Arguably, a measure of effectiveness for each core capability is irrelevant when the synchronization of two or more capabilities is needed to achieve a desired effect. Without a measure of effectiveness based on deductive analysis for first-order effects and reasonable inductive analysis for second- and third-order effects, the acceptability of information operations as a set of predictable nonlethal options for the commander is specious.

Legal and Moral Justification

Armed conflict is governed by international law.33 Information operations fall outside this legal framework. International law does not mention use
of information operations as an aspect of armed conflict, so use of IO as a deterrent to war does not constitute an act of war.\textsuperscript{34} 

Article 41 of the UN Charter is one example of current governing bodies of law that do not categorize the use of information operations as an act of war. It states that acts to interrupt the communications of an adversary do not involve the use of armed force.\textsuperscript{35} Therefore, the use of information operations in deterrence operations, such as electronic warfare and computer network attack, do not constitute an act of war.

Within the context of the Laws of Armed Conflict, the conditions of \textit{jus in bello}, how a force is used in war, involves principles of necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and humanity. The Geneva and Hague conventions codify the conditions for \textit{jus in bello}. These conventions do not contain any specific control agreements that limit the use of information operations.\textsuperscript{36} In fact, information operations accommodate efforts to adhere to traditional moral and legal restrictions meant to encourage restraint and minimize the use of force.\textsuperscript{37} For instance, the principle of proportionality requires that the value of a military objective balance against the loss of life and damage caused by a military action.\textsuperscript{38} Information operations help meet the demands to satisfy this principle. The principle of discrimination likewise requires that targets attacked have a military value and not be solely civilian in nature.\textsuperscript{39} Since the capabilities of information operations do not directly cause loss of life or infrastructure damage, and arguably neither do possible second- and third-order effects, the mandate of this principle is met. Likewise “humanity” as a principle of \textit{jus in bello} requires the mitigation of human suffering in war.\textsuperscript{40} Here again, information operations can lead to more moral outcomes.

\section*{Conclusion}

The core military information operations capabilities can deter armed conflict with both state and nonstate potential adversaries. The results of actions the U.S. takes to deter a potential adversary from an undesirable course of action or policy, and not the weapons used, will constitute how the international community and domestic audience judge the United States.\textsuperscript{41} The ability to justify the use of offensive IO as morally prudent will significantly contribute to the acceptance by the international community that the use of IO does not constitute the use of force in the classic sense.\textsuperscript{42} 

Today, U.S. policy and military leaders tend to adhere to an operational constraint that seeks to minimize casualties, especially for U.S. forces and the affected civilian population base.\textsuperscript{43} Clearly, IO with nonlethal, nonkinetic characteristics meet this operational constraint and offer justification for offensive information operations. The more the use of IO for deterrent purposes is understood, the more U.S. political and military leaders are likely to agree that military information operations offensively applied in phase I will achieve deterrence with minimal casualties and loss of infrastructure. Then, and only then, will the Nation embrace IO enough to allow its full contribution to national security as a deterrent.\textsuperscript{44} 

The application of information operations as a deterrent to armed conflict holds considerable promise for military and political leaders alike. However, the country currently lacks the political will and some enabling factors to permit offensive information operations as a phase I force option when seeking to achieve a strategic objective.

The following five enabling factors would support successful offensive IO in phase I. Accepted and implemented together, they provide real hope for progress.

- Expand doctrine in Joint Publications 3-0 and 3-13 to specify that the use of offensive information operations in phase I of Joint operations constitutes what amounts to a first option for the combatant commander. The doctrine could specify a concentrated information operations engagement as a culminating application in phase I, a last concerted effort to force a potential adversary to acquiesce to U.S. deterrent pressure or as a precursor for favorable phase II operations.
• Establish IO as a core capability in all combatant commands.45 To do so requires additional new, technically superior IO weapons along with an adequate force structure to implement them. Too few assets, both in weapons and forces available, exist to support all combatant commands on anything approaching simultaneous engagements or to adequately mass IO “fires” in the quantity necessary to achieve effectiveness. Establishing a joint development and acquisition office chartered to explore, develop, and field technically superior IO weapon systems in sufficient quantities for application in air, land, and sea environments is necessary. A joint force structure that provides each geographic combatant command, Special Operations Command, and U.S. Strategic Command with a direct support organization is also necessary. Each of these organizations could plan and execute information operations with organic capabilities assigned or attached.

• Address basic issues related to preparation of the battlespace to support offensive information operations in directives, policy, and doctrine.46 A presidential directive to the intelligence community that directs proactive, aggressive intelligence preparation of the battlespace against all potential adversaries for the purpose of gaining access to that adversary’s critical information nodes to support offensive IO is critically needed. The process for gaining access to a sensitive adversary IO target is too slow, too cumbersome, highly politicized, and favors intelligence process over operational necessity.

• Provide authority for combatant commanders to execute offensive information operations critical to ensuring that they are a force option for deterrence. A comprehensive policy should be established that directs that all existing information operations capabilities and supporting force structures be authorized for employment by a combatant commander in support of deterrent operations. Specific tests should establish the criteria that set the acceptable conditions for the use of information operations in phase I.

• Call for the U.S. government to use information operations to achieve strategic national objectives and protect national interests. Unless there is the political will to use IO in phase I to deter a potential adversary, armed conflict is probable, with its attendant casualties and expenditure of resources. MR

NOTES

5. Ibid., 1-2.
7. Ibid.
10. Ibid., x.
11. Ibid., xii.
15. JCS, Information Operations, II-7–II-10.
20. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 98.
34. Miller, 14.
35. Ibid., 29.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Miller, 11.
42. Barnett, 7.
43. Ibid., 5.
44. Ibid., 1.
The main objective of this exercise is to adopt new tactics and use new equipment able to cope with possible threats. . . . [Iran has] been vigilant to what has happened in the world . . . and we have invested in both modern tactics and equipment.

—Brigadier General Kiyumars Heidari, Islamic Republic of Iran, a spokesman for the Zolfaqar’s Blow military maneuvers, August 2006.¹

The Islamic Republic of Iran is no stranger to asymmetric warfare. Ever since the regime faced a technologically superior adversary during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Iran has attempted to leverage its human assets to overcome its weaknesses in a conventional military conflict. In the Iran-Iraq War, Iran threw waves of human bodies at better armored and better equipped Iraqi forces. The losses were staggering: by some reports upwards of 1,000,000 Iranian casualties, compared to an estimated 375,000 Iraqi casualties.² In the wake of that conflict, Iran has consistently sought more efficient ways of employing its significant manpower in military operations. Its exportation of Iranian military training to other countries in the Middle East has given the country a window into the successful refinement of its tactical doctrine. In effect, the 2006 Lebanon War offered an opportunity for Hezbollah to experiment with the asymmetric ground tactics that Iran had developed. As their own professional journals and war games make clear, Iranian military leaders have paid close attention to the lessons learned in this conflict.³ In the absence of recent, overt military action on the part of Iran, it is useful to hold up a mirror to the 2006 Lebanon War so that we may discern the reflection of Iranian training and tactics.⁴ The United States must remain cognizant of developments in Iranian tactical doctrine, even as Iran makes strides toward the development of nuclear weaponry. To facilitate a diplomatic solution to this threat, the U.S. military should work to ensure that there is a feasible military alternative in place: who desires peace, let him prepare for war.⁵
Iran in Lebanon

The Shi‘ite paramilitary organization known as Hezbollah first emerged as a militia in opposition to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Although Iran was engaged in the Iran-Iraq War at the time of the Israeli occupation, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) took the lead in organizing, training, and equipping Hezbollah.6 To this end, Syria allowed 2,500 members of the IRGC to enter Lebanon and set up training camps among the Shi‘ite population in the Beqa’a Valley, an important farming region in eastern Lebanon. Training at the IRGC camps became a prerequisite for membership in Hezbollah.7 In 1985, Hezbollah publicly acknowledged its reliance on Iran: “We view the Iranian regime as the vanguard and new nucleus of the leading Islamic State in the world. We abide by the orders of one single wise and just leadership, represented by ‘Wali Faqih’ [rule of the jurisprudent] and personified by Khomeini.”8

Given the group’s equipment and logistical constraints, Hezbollah—with the guidance of Iranian advisors—adopted a doctrine of guerrilla warfare against the Israeli occupation. This doctrine, a useful if primitive template for future asymmetric operations in the region, revolved around 13 principles:

1. Avoid the strong, attack the weak—attack and withdraw.
2. Protecting our fighters is more important than causing enemy casualties.
3. Strike only when success is assured.
4. Surprise is essential to success. If you are spotted, you have failed.
5. Don’t get into a set-piece battle. Slip away like smoke, before the enemy can drive home his advantage.
6. Attaining the goal demands patience in order to discover the enemy’s weak points.
7. Keep moving; avoid formation of a front line.
8. Keep the enemy on constant alert, at the front and in the rear.
9. The road to the great victory passes through thousands of small victories.
10. Keep up the morale of the fighters; avoid notions of the enemy’s superiority.
11. The media has innumerable guns whose hits are like bullets. Use them in the battle.
12. The population is a treasure—nurture it.
13. Hurt the enemy and then stop before he abandons restraint.9

Even as Iran was suffering massive casualties against conventional Iraqi forces, Hezbollah was enjoying limited success in weakening the resolve of the occupying Israeli forces. It would take 18 years before Israel ultimately withdrew from Lebanon, giving Hezbollah ample time to test and revise the asymmetric tactics, techniques, and procedures that Iranian military trainers had bequeathed to the organization.10

Over the course of the Israeli occupation, Hezbollah faced and adapted to Israeli military efforts. On the ground, Hezbollah tactics against the occupying Israeli force included suicide bombings, rocket attacks, and abductions of Israeli Defense Force soldiers. Twice, in its 1993 Operation Accountability and 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath, Israel conducted massive artillery and aerial bombardments of Lebanese territory. These Israeli campaigns may have temporarily deterred Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israel, but they did not have any lasting effect. Throughout the Israeli occupation, Iran provided arms to Hezbollah fighters through Syria and ran training camps within Lebanon itself.

After Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah became a major political party, its legitimacy deriving in part from its role in causing the departure of Israeli forces. Between 2000 and 2006, the organization’s military arm continued to receive training and equipment from Iran, including the AT-3 Sagger antitank missiles, long-range rockets, and Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that appeared in the 2006 Lebanon War.11 Iran’s IRGC tasked the elite Quds (“Jerusalem”) Force with overseeing the outreach to Hezbollah, training Hezbollah fighters both in Iran and Lebanon on the use of AT-3 Sagers, TOWs, and UAVs.12 General Hussein Firuzabadi, deputy chief of staff for the Iranian armed forces, reportedly supervised the delivery of Iranian missile systems to Hezbollah by stationing around 100 Iranian officers in Syria and in Lebanon’s Beqa’a Valley.13 All told, Anthony Cordesman of
the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that Iran has been providing Hezbollah with financial aid, goods, and military services worth approximately $25 to $50 million each year, and notes that “[i]t is clear . . . that IRGC and Syrian intelligence and military officers and personnel meet regularly with the Hezbollah forces and cadres of IRGC personnel seem to have stayed in low profile roles with its full time fighters. The Hezbollah also seems to send some cadres for expert training in Iran and possibl[y] Syria.”

Despite the withdrawal of Israeli troops in 2000, Hezbollah continued operations against Israel. Soon after Israeli occupation ended, Hezbollah abducted three Israeli soldiers who were patrolling the Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah exchanged the bodies of these soldiers in 2004 for the release of Lebanese prisoners. Another such abduction sparked the 2006 Lebanon War.

**Hezbollah Tactics in 2006**

Many military analysts have regarded the 2006 Lebanon War as a defeat for Israel. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), accustomed to years of guarding checkpoints and other low-intensity missions familiar to U.S. troops in Iraq, suddenly had to conduct a ground war in Lebanon. Although the mission shift may have come as a shock to Israeli soldiers, Hezbollah had spent the years since the 2000 Israeli withdrawal getting ready for such a scenario. From 2000 to 2006, Hezbollah prepared the battlefield in anticipation of another Israeli conflict. The organization built a complex bunker system in the countryside and staged small arms, rockets, and other supply caches in and around rural villages. All told, there were reportedly about 600 ammunition and weapons bunkers in the region south of the Litani River. Each Hezbollah militia element was assigned to three bunkers—one primary munitions and two reserve—and no single commander knew the location of bunkers outside his assigned area of operations. Hezbollah constructed the bunker system with backing from an IRGC general, Mir Faysal Baqer Zadah. Furthermore, Hezbollah seeded high-speed avenues of approach with mines to slow down the movement of Israeli armored forces. Although evidence suggests that the group’s Iranian sponsors trained Hezbollah fighters on the operation.
of Iranian rocket and missile systems, Hezbollah itself also possessed an institutional memory for the type of asymmetric operations that led to the eventual departure of Israeli forces in 2000. A 2008 Strategic Studies Institute monograph, based on 36 interviews with Israeli participants in the conflict, emphasized that the most notable thing about Hezbollah’s performance in the 2006 Lebanon War was its blend of conventional and irregular warfare.\(^{18}\) Iran’s role in training Hezbollah—the state sponsorship of a nonstate actor—resulted in the employment of asymmetric tactics within a surprisingly conventional framework.

Tactically, the 2006 Lebanon War witnessed the success of decentralized Hezbollah fighting teams. Hezbollah primarily relied upon squad-sized elements during the conflict. Notably, Hezbollah allowed these largely autonomous groups (task-organized as antitank teams, village fighters, and rocket teams) to seize the initiative and make tactical decisions without consulting higher command. When necessary, these elements coordinated their actions between villages and isolated fighting positions using a closed cellular phone system and two-way radios.\(^{19}\)

Although the teams generally acted independently, Hezbollah leaders—who were able to intercept ground communications between Israeli military commanders—could provide warning of impending IDF maneuvers, which came along predictable avenues of approach dictated by terrain.\(^{20}\) The Intelligence and Terrorism Center at the Center for Special Studies has concluded that “[i]n effect, the Hezbollah formation in south Lebanon was the direct product of Iranian doctrine and technology supplied by Iran and Syria,” resembling an “Iranian division” with territorial brigades and specialized subunits, such as antitank and rocket teams.\(^{21}\) The teams themselves may have been located within the loose context of an Iranian-style division, but they operated without excessive deference to military hierarchy.

The typical Hezbollah antitank team was composed of two men with advanced Iranian weapons system training, and two or three men who served to help transport the team’s equipment. These antitank teams employed antitank missiles against Israeli tanks, personnel, and other vehicles, sometimes fixing the location of enemy vehicles with improvised explosive devices.\(^{22}\) The AT-3 Sagger, which Iranian engineering had modified to carry tandem warheads, was Hezbollah’s most common antitank system.\(^{23}\) However, Hezbollah also used others to great effect upon Israeli tanks, even those with reactive armor.\(^{24}\) Of particular interest was Hezbollah’s deployment of the AT-14 Kornet-E, which has thermal sights for night warfare, and of the RPG-29 Vampire, some versions of which feature night sights.\(^{25}\) Taking advantage of canalizing terrain, antitank teams occupied fortified positions in hillsides and awaited Israeli advances, using “swarm” techniques to fire multiple rounds simultaneously at one target.\(^{26}\) On 12 August 2006 alone, antitank missiles hit 11 IDF tanks as they attempted to move north through the valley of Wadi Salouqi in Southern Lebanon; of the 400 IDF tanks involved in the fighting in southern Lebanon, 48 were hit, 40 were damaged, and 20 were penetrated.\(^{27}\)

Armed largely with AK-47s, Hezbollah village fighters drew the IDF into streets where Israeli tanks could not maneuver effectively. As the village fighters in southern Lebanon moved from room to room and house to house, the IDF had to rely upon its infantry, supported by artillery, armor, and air power. Andrew Exum, a former Soref Fellow for The Washington Institute’s Military and Security Studies Program, has suggested that the village fighters were not primarily trained by Iran, instead deriving their expertise from previous Hezbollah-Israeli conflicts, bringing to mind the Spartan rebuke of King Agesilaus for teaching his enemies how to fight as a result of his frequent campaigning.\(^{28}\) Hezbollah’s willingness to defend ground and extend direct-fire confrontations, however, indicated an important shift toward the more conventional side of the warfighting spectrum, away from the guerrilla tactics of groups such as the Viet Cong.\(^{29}\)

Drawing heavily upon Iranian munitions and training, Hezbollah kept up a steady barrage of indirect fire against Israel. Early in the 2006
conflict, there was evidence of a large shipment of Iranian missiles and rockets as well as the presence of Iranian trainers on these weapons systems. Israeli intelligence has indicated that approximately 100 Iranian advisors were present in Lebanon, assisting, for example, in firing the complex, radar-guided C-802 missile system. Iran further obliged Hezbollah by setting up rocket and missile targeting and control centers, and Hezbollah and Iran set up a joint intelligence center in Damascus during the conflict. Iranian-trained teams rained rockets into northern Israel, demonstrating that the Israeli invasion was ineffective in staunching the attacks on the IDF’s homeland.

A rocket team’s tactics involved the coordination of several small squads of Hezbollah fighters: after lookouts determined that no Israeli aircraft were in the area, the first group would set up a launcher, the second would transport the rocket to the launch location, and the third would prepare the rocket for firing, often setting up remote control devices or timers. Each group would converge on the launch area, sometimes by bicycle, and swiftly depart from the area after completing its part in the process, which could take less than 28 seconds from beginning to end. To reduce rocket launchers’ heat signatures, Hezbollah teams would sometimes lower the launchers into the ground or cover them with a fire-retardant blanket after firing. Israeli video showed how Hezbollah rocket teams took advantage of Israel’s reluctance to cause collateral damage; repeatedly, Hezbollah fighters would duck into a home, set up a rocket system, and fire or leave in less than a minute. These low-signature weapons were difficult for Israel to detect before they were fired. More so than the antitank teams and village fighters, the rocket teams were sometimes subject to the centralized control of Hezbollah and its Iranian advisers. A barrage of 250 rockets the day before the United Nations ceasefire on 14 August 2006 indicated Hezbollah’s capacity for higher-level coordination of the rocket teams’ activities. As of the ceasefire, Hezbollah had launched approximately 4,228 rockets into Israeli territory.

Although decentralized organization forced Hezbollah to fight a more or less static defense, its preparation of the battlefield enabled it to wage a five-week war without significant logistical failure. Storing caches of supplies and weapons in what would become forward and stay-behind positions, Hezbollah minimized the exposure of its fighters to the risks of resupply. Also, as the conflict progressed, Hezbollah took advantage of unexpected ways of fighting and conducting reconnaissance. To the surprise of the IDF, Hezbollah displayed a willingness to fight at night, despite its possession of limited night-vision equipment. Iran also supplied Hezbollah with UAVs to provide tactical reconnaissance of northern Israel. There is some evidence that Iran also assisted in the equipping of a UAV, identified as either the Iranian Mirsad-1 or Ababil-3 Swallow, with small explosive charges. In fact, during the Iran-Iraq War, Iran was the first country to use UAVs in such a fashion.

Despite the influx of Iranian arms and training, it would be a mistake to conclude that Iran controlled all of Hezbollah’s military activities against Israel. As Cordesman notes, such a conclusion amounts to a “conspiracy theory”; in terms of tactics, Hezbollah used Iran as much as Iran uses Hezbollah. As will be seen, Iran has used Hezbollah’s operations as a template for its own evolving tactical doctrine.

Iranian Warfighting Doctrine

The Islamic Republic of Iran was in its infancy when Iraq invaded it in 1980. Following the Shah’s deposition in 1979, Iran had purged its military leadership of those with suspected sympathies for the Shah. At the time, Iran’s warfighting doctrine was largely U.S.-inspired, a result of U.S. military aid and advisors during the Shah’s administration. The Iran-Iraq War spurred the Iranian government to release formerly disgraced military officers from prison in hope of bolstering its war effort. When Iran met with the occasional victory, however, the administration again incarcerated these leaders. As a result, formulation and implementation of an Iranian warfighting doctrine suffered during the Iran-Iraq War.
As a counterweight to the suspect loyalties of the regular armed forces, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini formed the IRGC, a military organization that reported directly to Iranian religious leaders. In turn, the IRGC oversaw the creation of a volunteer militia, the Basij (Mobilization) Resistance Force, in 1980. The group now numbers over 1,000,000, though it consists mainly of elderly men, youths, and volunteers who have completed military service. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Basij, which has a regional and decentralized command structure, gained a reputation for “martyr”-style suicide attacks. As mentioned above, within the IRGC is the Al Quds Force, which works outside the country with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shi’ite militias in Iraq. In recent years, the IRGC has maintained a force of approximately 125,000, compared to the regular armed forces’ 350,000. Approximately 5,000 IRGC members are specialized in unconventional warfare.

Although asymmetric warfare had been part of Iran’s warfighting doctrine prior to the War on Terrorism, this theme quickly came to the forefront of military discourse and training exercises. The basic principles of Iranian asymmetric warfighting appeared in the April 2004 edition of Saff. The military journal quoted Brigadier General Amir Bakhtiari, an Iran-Iraq War veteran and a professor at the IRGC’s Command and Staff University, as saying that it is “important and essential to change and replace military training and planning and to use unknown operational tactics and methods such as irregular and guerrilla warfare and rapid response and deterrent operations.” A year later, Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Ja’fari, once the head of IRGC Ground Forces, stated that the IRGC had been implementing asymmetric warfare ideas since 2003: “According to the IRGC asymmetric doctrine, and in order to realize its defense capacity in scope and depth, the IRGC ground force has been organizing and equipping its units, on the basis of a battalion-based plan, for the past two years. The main characteristic of this strengthening measure has been to pay particular attention to the volume of the battalion’s fire power—with special stress on its antiarmor and anti-helicopter capacity—as well as self-reliance and great mobility of the combat battalion.” IRGC strategists, including Brigadier General Hossein Salami, director of operations for the IRGC Joint Chiefs of Staff, were key players in the promotion of this shift.

In a preview of Hezbollah elements’ tactical autonomy in the 2006 Lebanon War, the IRGC announced in 2005 that it was incorporating defense in depth, also known as “mosaic defense,” into its doctrine. By so doing, the IRGC hoped to take advantage of Iran’s mountainous border terrain and widely spaced population centers to attenuate an invading force’s supply lines; stay-behind forces would then capitalize on the effects of Iran’s geography to harry and destroy an advancing enemy’s rear elements. Michael Connell of the Center for Naval Analysis notes that a key element of the mosaic defense plan is to “delegate decision-making authority down to the tactical level, thereby rendering it difficult for U.S. forces to degrade Iranian command and control nodes. Basij forces and other irregular units would accordingly be granted considerable decision-making autonomy to defend their
own towns and villages against invading enemy units.” IRGC commander in chief Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi has stated as much: “Our battalions can fight the enemy in a self-sufficient manner. . . . [A]nywhere there are Basij forces, the people are able to defend their own villages and cities.” The IRGC has indicated that it has trained between 1,800 and 3,000 teams of three to four soldiers to conduct guerrilla operations behind enemy lines.

In the year prior to the 2006 Lebanon War, the IRGC unveiled a wartime mobilization blueprint for Iran called the “Mo’in Plan,” in which Basij elements would be integrated into IRGC units as part of a regional defense structure. In an invasion, the Basij would perform like the Hezbollah village fighters, using cities and other built-up areas as defensive bases to draw technologically superior attackers into the time-consuming and politically dangerous business of neighborhood clearance. “In view of the disparity which exists between us and some of our enemies as far as military equipment and weapons are concerned, our efforts are aimed at redressing this by forming small resistance groups capable of carrying out highly destructive maneuvers,” said Seyyed Morteza Musavi, the commander of the 2d Brigade of the IRGC’s 41st Sarallah Division.

Iran’s war games have also reflected a renewed emphasis on asymmetric warfare in the post-9/11 world. Nearly a year after the United States began Operation Enduring Freedom, the IRGC-led Ashura-4 field exercise in September 2002 featured asymmetric warfare techniques and the use of passive air defenses to reduce the vulnerability of troop movements. In the April 2004 Thunder exercise, IRGC troops used man-portable surface-to-air missiles against simulated U.S. AH-64 (“Apache”) attack helicopter targets. Iranian military forces also practiced emplacing mines and other road obstacles to influence the advance of enemy armored columns. In September 2004, the IRGC—specifically referencing the U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq—tailored its exercises to include asymmetric warfare operations.

Iranian war games became more frequent with the 2005 election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, a member of the IRGC, and a reported instructor of Basij forces). IRGC Brigadier General Mohammad-Ali Jaafari stated in August 2005, “As the likely enemy is far more advanced technologically than we are, we have been using what is called asymmetric warfare methods. . . . [O]ur forces are now well prepared for it.” To this end, the IRGC began equipping itself with more antiarmor and antihelicopter weaponry. In October 2005, Iran held military exercises involving the defense of 16 resistance areas and 400 civic resistance bases, with a reported emphasis on asymmetric warfare. December 2005 war games involved more than 15,000 members of the regular armed forces and focused on irregular warfare by highly mobile units.

In August 2006, the month of the final ceasefire of the 2006 Lebanon War, Iran’s military leaders began five weeks of war games under the name “Zolfaqar’s Blow,” citing lessons learned in the recent conflict in Lebanon. As Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani, deputy commander in chief of Iran’s regular armed forces, noted, “Human forces can decide the fate of war. We saw it in Lebanon.” Iran heralded these particular maneuvers as the introduction of a “new defensive doctrine.” The exercises involved commando training, mobile shoulder-firing weaponry, electronic warfare teams,
rapid reaction forces, and drone operations. The electronic warfare segments of training reportedly included the jamming of enemy tactical communications and the establishment of communications networks to coordinate Iranian military activity.70

In the past three and a half years, training in guerrilla tactics has been a mainstay of large-scale Iranian military exercises, including Great Prophet II in November 2006 and Eqtedar-85 in February 2007. Although the Great Prophet I exercises of April 2006 focused mainly on naval and littoral operations, Great Prophet II involved about 20,000 Basij forces as well as conventional forces that practiced night operations and maneuver through restrictive terrain.71 As in the Zolfagar’s Blow exercises, Iranian military leaders pointed to Hezbollah’s experience in Lebanon as a guiding factor in the Great Prophet II exercises. In a nod toward Hezbollah’s use of autonomous squad-sized elements, Great Prophet II reportedly involved the training of 1,800 self-sufficient Iranian military teams.72

In the February 2007 Eqtedar-85 urban warfare maneuvers, 3,000 such teams were involved, with an emphasis on antiair and antitank weaponry.73 Also as part of the Eqtedar-85 training, 2,500 members of the Basij staged an exercise in the western suburbs of Tehran, focusing on countering enemy forces transported to the capital by helicopter.74 In recent training, IRGC and Basij members have practiced camouflage and deception techniques intended to minimize detection by enemy reconnaissance.75 In addition, the Iranians have been working to improve and encrypt communications between units.76 The IRGC’s research staff at Imam Hossein and Sharif Universities has been working on developing a tactical telecommunications network; the IRGC purportedly fielded this system during the February 2007 Eqtedar-85 exercises.77 As Minister of Defense and Logistics Major General Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar noted, Iran pays special attention to “the production of equipment related to asymmetric warfare.”78

Iran’s pursuit of improved command-and-control technology, however, has coincided with the military’s attempt to develop decentralized capabilities, enabling small teams to work against the enemy in the absence of communication from higher headquarters. And in yet another allusion to the 2006 Lebanon War, Iran announced that it was conducting drills involving “missile squads” as part of its July 2008 exercise, Great Prophet III.79 A December 2008 war game, Ittihad-87, concentrated on naval operations in the Strait of Hormuz, in keeping with Iran’s parallel focus on asymmetric naval operations.80 In its November 2009 maneuvers, Iran continued to emphasize training on antiair and surface-to-surface missile attacks.81

The military’s sense of Iranian exceptionalism is a cornerstone of the country’s asymmetric warfighting doctrine, particularly when it comes to suicide operations. Major General Safavi has remarked: “Those forces that have been trained in the ‘culture’ of martyrdom-seeking are among the unique features of the Islamic republic’s armed forces.”82 Over the past six years, the Iranian military has conducted an intensive review of its “martyrdom” operations during the Iran-Iraq War in order to prepare prospective martyr-soldiers for a more modern battlefield.83 Even prior to his election as president, Ahmadinejad helped initiate a recruitment campaign for suicide operations in the IRGC and Basij forces. With Iranian children’s cartoons celebrating the prospect of martyrdom against an invading enemy, “martyr” recruitment has accelerated since Ahmadinejad’s election, and the administration has even taken online applications through a designated website.84

Rather than clearing minefields by ordering ill-trained militia members to walk through them, as the Iranian military did during the Iran-Iraq War, Iran is trying to utilize its personnel in a more efficient and cost-effective manner. In 1988, an Iranian naval mine estimated to cost $1,500 caused about $90 million in damages to the Samuel B. Roberts, a U.S. frigate, as it moved through the Persian Gulf. Likewise, Iran—through its professional journals and war games—has been attempting to use asymmetric ground warfare to overcome its limitations against a technologically superior enemy. The 2006 Lebanon War provided a test of the ground tactics that Iranian advisors had taught Hezbollah since that organization’s creation. Since the 2006 Lebanon War, Iran has been quick to take lessons from it and train its own military accordingly.

**Going Forward**

In a conflict with Iran today, an invading force would be fighting against a state that, from the
onset, has prepared to engage in asymmetric warfare, not as an afterthought to occupation, but as a primary feature of its defensive strategy. In so doing, it is important to recall the lessons of the 2006 Lebanon War and avoid repeating the IDF’s mistakes. If contemplating a ground conflict with Iran, the United States should adapt its own training and tactics accordingly. Also, while Iran may have been a source for the asymmetric tactical doctrine that worked against the IDF, Iran is not Lebanon, and potential adversaries must prepare for differences in geography and military organization.

The IDF’s recent emphasis on stability operations, rather than maneuver, undermined its ability to wage ground warfare. Maneuver units’ crew drills and proficiency in combined arms operations withered through disuse. As Matt M. Matthews of the Combat Studies Institute noted in his incisive critique of the 2006 Lebanon War, the United States faces a similar challenge: “While the U.S. Army must be proficient in conducting major combat operations around the world, it is possible that years of irregular operations have chipped away at this capability, not unlike the world, it is possible that years of irregular operations have chipped away at this capability, not unlike the situation encountered by the IDF.”

In addition, the IDF was hobbled by a poorly understood revamping of its military doctrine. Senior officers’ reliance upon the unfamiliar jargon of a new effects-based operational theory threw field officers into confusion, detracting from a traditional emphasis on taking and holding ground. In its own professional journals, the U.S. military is starting to qualify its reliance upon effects-based operations.

Despite Hezbollah’s and Iran’s commitment to an asymmetric tactical doctrine, Iran also differs from Lebanon in that it possesses a relatively large conventional military, in addition to the personnel that would be tasked with irregular warfare. A successful invasion would have to address both the conventional threat and the asymmetric threat. Decisive land maneuver action would be necessary, both to destroy conventional Iranian military units and to isolate and identify the asymmetric warfighting elements. Failure to maneuver decisively could beget a war of attrition. The Israeli government’s Winograd Commission Report, an analysis of political and military failures during the 2006 Lebanon War, took special notice of the period of “equivocation” that sapped the IDF’s operations of their timeliness.

The intensity of Israel’s 2008-2009 operations in Gaza has demonstrated that the IDF has learned at least one lesson from its experience in 2006.

Pursuant to a ground offensive, an invading force in Iran would quickly have to detect and destroy primary and secondary bunker systems to remove potential power centers for stay-behind elements. In 2006, Israeli airstrikes enjoyed some success in destroying known Hezbollah bunker locations closest to the border. Still, limitations of intelligence blunted the effect of these strikes; as the IDF attempted to penetrate beyond the border areas, it encountered areas sown with previously unknown bunker systems. Air strikes in preparation for a ground offensive are useful if timely, but ground units must pass along evidence of additional bunkers to higher echelons to enable the destruction of these strong points.

Underestimation of the enemy hamstrung the IDF’s efforts in Lebanon. As one Israeli special forces soldier commented about a Hezbollah bunker: “We expected a tent and three Kalashnikovs—that was the intelligence we were given. Instead, we found a hydraulic steel door leading to a well-equipped network of tunnels.” Since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has had 20 years to prepare the battlefield, honeycombing it with bunkers and weapon stockpiles. Iranian forces have trained to use mines to canalize invading forces down predictable avenues of approach. As in 2006, Hezbollah bunker: “We expected a tent and three Kalashnikovs—that was the intelligence we were given. Instead, we found a hydraulic steel door leading to a well-equipped network of tunnels.”

Since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has had 20 years to prepare the battlefield, honeycombing it with bunkers and weapon stockpiles. Iranian forces have trained to use mines to canalize invading forces down predictable avenues of approach. In addition, recent war games have involved antihelicopter attacks to limit an invader’s flexibility in moving troops. To keep control of an advance’s momentum, an invading force in Iran must exchange high-speed avenues of approach for less-expected and more time-consuming routes.

An invader facing Iran’s mosaic defense must identify and isolate the individual “tiles” of this mosaic—weapon stockpiles, bunkers, rocket teams, antitank teams, and village-based centers of resistance. Although bypassing strong points might be necessary during initial maneuvers, a sustained military effort against Iran would have to deal with these “tiles.” Area commanders would have to limit and monitor personnel traffic in the expanses between populated areas to detect the existence of bunkers and stockpiles. Human intelligence would also be pivotal. Two decades of battlefield preparation without the relative “tonic” of military conflict may have resulted in Iran’s over-reliance
An invader facing Iran’s mosaic defense must identify and isolate the individual “tiles”...

upon established bunkers and stockpiles that have, over time, become known to civilians and extraneous military personnel. The information regarding bunker locations may therefore be easier to come by than it was during the 2006 Lebanon War. Iran might not be able to achieve as strict a compartmentalization of bunker assignments as Hezbollah did. An invading force should target command-and-control nodes, such as those that played a part in the coordination of Hezbollah rocket attacks, and it should interrupt enemy radio and cell-phone traffic to limit the coordination of far-flung autonomous elements.

The weapons systems that marked the 2006 Lebanon War would likely play a role in a conflict with Iran. The rocket teams in Lebanon focused on firing upon static targets in Israel, although there is some evidence that they were successful attacking the invading IDF. Iran might well devote its rocket teams to attacking the more static elements of an invading force. In this situation, dynamic maneuver at the front and varying rearguard routines would be useful to counter the enemy’s indirect fire. At least one commentator has dubbed the 2006 Lebanon War the “war of the antitank missile,” in reference to Hezbollah’s successful reliance upon antitank weaponry and swarming tactics.\(^9\) Iran’s antitank systems are more numerous and more sophisticated than Hezbollah’s, and an invading, armored force must prepare for the ambushes and swarm attacks that marked the 2006 conflict. Merely increasing the thickness of armor plate is not the solution; in Lebanon, even reactive armor was no match for Iranian-developed weaponry. Armored units must be proficient in battle drills and maneuver in order to minimize the risks of an antitank-missile attack and to react accordingly when they detect such a threat.

While the front-line troops of an invading force must engage in decisive maneuver, rearguard elements should seal off populated centers of resistance and attempt to locate stockpiled munitions. Admittedly, this work would be grueling; an invader would have to weather attacks from these areas until it unearthed the stockpiles, the store of munitions dwindled through use, or the villagers lost the will to fight. In the 2006 Lebanon War, five months of fighting did not exhaust stores that were at least six years in the making. Again, Iran has had much more time to prepare such stockpiles. Should it become necessary to search the villages, it is likely that the enemy will use civilians as shields, a common asymmetric tactic, and that the collateral damage of anything less than surgical attacks upon densely populated centers would likely outweigh the tactical benefits to an invader. In any case, an invading force should have sufficient troops at hand to seal off and clear these population centers should an occupation be contemplated.

The 2006 Lebanon War highlighted the successful use of asymmetric warfighting tactics in the face of a technologically superior adversary. Iran has been using the lessons learned in that conflict to prepare its own personnel for the possibility of a ground invasion. Military preparedness is a hallmark of successful diplomacy. As negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program continue, the United States should acknowledge the evolution of Iran’s ground tactics and have a plan to address this reality, should the need arise. **MR**

---

**NOTES**


3. Given the nature of the publication, this article only draws upon open sources. It is important to note that the Iranian government is known for generating misinformation about its military capabilities. For example, it doctored a photograph of a recent missile test to misrepresent the number of missiles successfully deployed. Nevertheless, this article has looked to a variety of sources to provide a nonclassified perspective on Iran’s changing tactical doctrine. As LTG Sam Wilson, U.S. Army, retired, former Defense Intelligence Agency director, noted, “Ninety percent of intelligence comes from open sources. The other ten percent, the clandestine work, is just the more dramatic. The real intelligence hero is Sherlock Holmes, not James Bond.” Quoted in David Reed, “Aspiring to Spying,” *The Washington Times*, 14 November 1997, Regional News, 1, cited in Richard S. Friedman, “Open Source Intelligence,” *Parameters* (Summer 1998) <www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/88summer/sum-essa.htm> (5 April 2010).

4. Iranian leaders have also studied the lessons that Iranian-supported insurgent forces have learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom. From the military training of the Badr Brigade (now the Badr Party) during its Saddam Hussein-era exile in Iran to the supply of explosively formed projectiles, Iran has been able to test its tactics and equipment during the coalition’s presence in Iraq. In testimony to Congress in April 2007, GEN David H. Petraeus, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, stressed Iran’s involvement in Iraq: “[Iranian operatives in Iraq] were providing substantial funding, training on Iranian soil, advanced explosive munitions and technologies as well as run-of-the-mill arms and ammunition . . . in some cases even a degree of direction[.] . . . And again, there’s no question . . . that Iranian financing is taking place through the Quds force.” Anthony Cordesman and Martin Kleiber,
34. Ibid., 117.
35. Ibid., 115.
41. Cordesman with Sullivan and Lessons, 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, 85. (“Hezbollah proved to be better trained and more ready than most guerrilla forces, which may say a great deal about the quality of Iranian training and doctrine in this area.”)
45. Matthews, 19.
49. “Hezbollah as a North Korea-Type Guerilla Force,” <intelligenceOnline.com>, no. 529, 25 August-7 September 2006, <www.intelligenceonline.com/archives/p_som_archives.nsf/num/5288year2006&sub-archives> (5 April 2010). North Korean advisors also reportedly lent their expertise to the project; an Israeli intelligence report concluded that Hezbollah was “believed to be benefiting from assistance provided by North Korean advisers, according to a July 29 report in al-Sharq al-Awsat. The report quotes a high-ranking Iranian Revolutionary Guard officer, who stated that North Korean advisers had assisted Hezbollah in building tunnel infrastructure, including a 25-meter underground tunnel.” Matthews, 21, citing “North Koreans Assisted Hezbollah with Tunnel Construction,” Terrorism Focus, 3 issue 30 (1 August 2006), 1.
54. As they moved rapidly toward a hill overlooking a possible Hezbollah escape route, a massive IED explosion beneath a Merkava 4 tank, sending heavy chunks of steel up to 150 yards away, instantly killing the crew of four. As rescue teams rushed forward to retrieve the bodies of the dead tank crew, two other IDF soldiers died during a vicious firefight with Hezbollah.” Matthews, 36.
56. “Iranian-manufactured antitank missiles with a double tandem-type warhead weighing 55 to 60 kilograms extinguishes the relative visibility in the middle and rear portion of the Sagger, has range of 3,000 meters (1.86 miles) and can penetrate 400 mm; the Raad-1, an Iranian version of the Saggar with a tandem warhead, has a range of 3,000 meters (1.86 miles) and can penetrate 400 mm (16") after rearface shielding; the Tooghan is an Iranian version of the TOW, has a range of up to 3,750 meters (2.33 miles) and can penetrate 550 mm (22") steel armor: “Hezbollah as a Strategic Arm of Iran,” Intelligence and Terrorism Center at the CSS, 8 September 2006, <www.terrorism-info.org/malam_multimedia/English/ning/n/html/hezbollah_e1b.htm> (5 April 2010).
58. Ibid., 109.
59. Ibid., 64.
For information on how to submit an entry, go to http://militaryreview.army.mil
INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT Iran has embarked on a course that will lead it to develop nuclear arms in the near future has reintensified the debate about the ways the world should react to such a danger. Questions concerning ways to deal with the proliferation of nuclear arms are of course not limited to Iran, but also include other nations or groups that might employ nuclear arms, especially North Korea and terrorists.

Four possible responses are commonly discussed in dealing with Iran: engagement, sanctions, military strikes, and deterrence. Engagement has been tried, especially since the onset of the Obama administration (and previously by European governments) but so far has not yielded the desired results. Sanctions are deemed an unreliable tool, as some nations, especially China, have so far refused to authorize them. Also, sanctions, in the past, have often been readily circumvented and have not generated the sought-after effect, even when imposed on nations that are more vulnerable than Iran, such as Cuba and Syria. And sanctions may help solidify the regime in place and subdue democratic opposition. Military strikes are said to be likely to fail. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated on 13 April 2009, “Militarily, in my view, it [a bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities] would delay the Iranian program for some period of time, but only delay it, probably only one to three years.”

Hence the growing interest in deterrence, that is, in tolerating a nuclear-armed Iran but keeping it at bay by threatening retaliation in kind should it use its nuclear weapons. Although the Obama administration has not formally embraced this position, several observers believe that this is the direction it is headed. Indeed, a statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Thailand on 22 July 2009 was understood as implying such an approach. She stated, “If the U.S. extends a defense umbrella over the region, it’s unlikely that Iran will be any stronger or safer, because they won’t be able
to intimidate and dominate, as they apparently believe they can, once they have a nuclear weapon.” In an interview with the Wall Street Journal on 5 March 2010, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former National Security Advisor, also called for such an umbrella as the way to deal with Iran.

Retired General John Abizaid, former head of U.S. Central Command, put it as follows: “We need to make it very clear to the Iranians, the same way we made it clear to the Soviet Union and China that their first use of nuclear weapons would result in the devastation of their nation. I don’t believe Iran is a suicide state. Deterrence will work with Iran.”

Fareed Zakaria, the editor of Newsweek International, a Washington Post columnist, and a frequent TV commentator, is a leading advocate of deterrence. In his article “Don’t Scramble the Jets,” he argues that Iran’s religious leaders comprise a “canny (and ruthlessly pragmatic) clerical elite,” and that military dictatorships like the one that is now forming in Iran “are calculating. They act in ways that keep themselves alive and in power. That instinct for self-preservation is what will make a containment strategy work.” Among academics, Columbia University professor Kenneth Waltz has written that “It would be strange if Iran did not strive to get nuclear weapons, and I don’t think we have to worry if they do. Because deterrence has worked 100 percent of the time. After all, we have deterred big nuclear powers like the Soviet Union and China. So sleep well.”

A State Department official, who asked that his name not be used, pointed out that the United States is already providing to its allies in the Middle East countermeasures, such as positioning batteries of Patriot missiles, that might be employed to discourage Iran from using its nukes—but not from acquiring them.

In the following paragraphs, I focus on the question of whether deterrence might work and, if not, what kind of military strike—if any—could have the required effect.

Rational Actors?

One of the few points on which there is wide agreement is that for deterrence to work, the leaders of the nations that command nuclear arms must be rational. The same holds for terrorists who may acquire nuclear arms one way or another. In effect, a small cottage industry has developed of popular authors and researchers who argue that both heads of states and terrorists do act rationally, and thus—fearing retaliation from other nuclear powers—they will not employ their nukes. (To those who may ask, if nations such as Iran do not intend to use their nuclear arms, why would they go through the cost and risk of acquiring them—these rationalist mavericks respond by explaining that the nuclear weapons serve these nations by fending off attacks against them.)

Rationalist champions of deterrence often draw on the same assumption as mainline economists do: that people are rational. One way economists protect this assumption from obvious criticism is by using one data point to assess both the intentions and the actions of the person involved. Thus, economists have argued that if a person who never drank wine—and had no intention of drinking wine—suddenly purchased a bottle of wine, this must have been a rational choice—because otherwise why would he have bought it? And they state that when a person chooses to become a criminal, he “must have” weighed the pros and cons and made a rational decision that being a criminal was the optimal choice. As Nobel Laureate George Stigler pointed out, “A reason can always be found for whatever we observe man to do,” which “turns utility into a tautology.”

This approach violates a basic tenet of science—that propositions are to be formulated in ways that can be falsified. Using the same academic sleight of hand, the champions of deterrence maintain that whatever the leaders of a nation do is rational, because one can find some reason according to which their actions make sense. However, this line of reasoning would also make dropping nuclear bombs and ignoring the effects of retaliation “rational”—say, because, like Herman Kahn, the leaders believe that their nation will fare better in such a
war than their enemy, or because such bombing would bring about a rapture that provides a shortcut to heaven.

The champions of deterrence further defend their position by suggesting that the only alternative to being rational is to be irrational, which is treated as tantamount to crazy. They then argue that Iran’s leaders, terrorists, and even Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il are not insane people. They demonstrate this by showing that these leaders react, in sensible ways, to changes in the world around them.

For instance, by far the most conciliatory offer made by Iran regarding its nuclear program was made in May 2003, after the U.S. military wiped out Saddam’s army within a few weeks with few casualties, something Iran had been unable to do even after an eight-year-long war. It is also when Iran was told in no uncertain terms by the president of the United States that it was on the same short list of members of the “Axis of Evil.” In short, Iran had reason to expect to be attacked. Because by these proponents of deterrence, actors can act only either purely rationally or purely irrationally, showing that the leaders of Iran and other rogue states respond to changes in facts and are not insane seems to prove their assertion that they are rational.

Other scholars who have studied terrorism further uphold this line of thinking by explaining that terrorists act strategically and not irrationally. In an article entitled “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” UCLA professor Robert F. Trager and Columbia doctoral candidate Dessislava P. Zagorcheva observe that “The assertion that terrorists are highly irrational is contradicted by a growing body of literature that shows that terrorist groups . . . choose strategies that best advance them. The resort to terror tactics is itself a strategic choice of weaker actors with no other means of furthering their cause.” Further, in “Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review History,” Stanford professor Martha Crenshaw reports, “There is an emerging consensus that suicide attacks are instrumental in or strategic from the perspective of a sponsoring organization . . . They serve the political interests of identifiable actors, most of whom are non-states opposing well-armed states. This method is mechanically simple and tactically efficient . . .”
The trouble with this line of reasoning is that it makes a jump from showing that the rulers of countries such as Iran and North Korea, as well as terrorists, are not irrational—they have clear goals, find means suitable to their goals, and respond to facts and logic—to assuming that they hence act rationally, and reach the same conclusions as the observers do from changes in facts.

However, leading sociologists, notably Talcott Parsons, have long pointed out that there is a third category of decisionmaking and behavior, which they called “nonrational.” This may at first seem like typical academic hair-splitting, a weakness that is rather prevalent among social scientists. In this case, though, it points to a major category of human behavior, where people act in response to deeply held beliefs that cannot be proven or disproven; for instance, their sense that God commanded them to act in a particular manner. People have long shown that they are willing to kill for their beliefs, even if they will die as a result. True, they respond to facts and pressures, but only as long as those factors affect the ways they implement their beliefs—not the beliefs themselves. Thus, a religious fanatic Iranian leader may well believe that God commands him to wipe out Tel Aviv, may calculate whether to use missiles or bombers, and what season to attack, but not whether or not to heed God’s command to kill the infidels.

In “Can Iran Be Deterred? A Question We Cannot Afford to Get Wrong,” National Review Deputy Managing Editor Jason Lee Steorts writes, “[Iran’s] religious zealotry causes it to exaggerate the significance of issues that are, objectively speaking, only tangentially related to its interests. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for instance, has no direct bearing on Iran’s security, but much of the regime sees it as fundamental to Iranian interests and even to Iran’s identity as a Muslim nation.” This is an example of nonrational, not irrational, thinking.

Nonrational behavior is not limited to one faith. The Israelis, for instance, who have been criticized roundly on many accounts, are usually not considered irrational. But they have a strong Masada complex, which led their forefathers to kill each other and commit suicide, rather than surrender. This is more than an idle piece of history. Many Israelis still hold to this fatalistic belief, further reinforced by the narrative about Samson, who pulled a building down on himself in order to kill his enemies, and by the strong commitment to “never again” go “like lambs to the slaughter” as Jews did (in the Israeli view) during the Nazi regime. Israelis model themselves after those few Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto who fought the Nazis—despite the fact that they had no chance of winning—until the bitter end. Such beliefs might lead Israel to attack Iran even when rational considerations indicate that such an attack would be extremely detrimental. Such an attack would serve their beliefs and is rational in this technical sense—but the beliefs themselves are based on nonrational commitments that one cannot argue with on the basis of facts and logic, and thus cannot be reliably deterred.

Does the Past Predict the Future?

Related to the rationality thesis is an argument based on the historical record. Waltz writes, “It is now fashionable for political scientists to test hypotheses. Well, I have one: If a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests. That is 100 percent true, without exception, over a period of more than fifty years. Pretty impressive.” In “Containing a Nuclear Iran,” Zakaria writes, “Deterrence worked with madmen like Mao, and with thugs like Stalin, and it will work with the calculatingocrats of Tehran.”

Such arguments fail on several grounds. First, as we learn in Logic 101, the fact that all the swans you see are white does not prove that there are no black ones. The fact that so far no nukes have been employed (since 1945, after which the deterrence system was instituted) does not prove that no such incident will occur in the future. This is especially true as the number of actors increases and they include a number of fanatics.

Moreover, the historical record reveals several occasions in which nations governed by leaders who are considered far from irrational came dangerously close to nuclear blows. India and Pakistan earned this dubious title several times. John F. Kennedy almost hit the “launch” button during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Moshe Dayan nearly did as well, readying the Israelis’ nuclear arsenal for use in the Yom Kippur War. Mao planned to drop a nuclear bomb on the U.S.S.R. during a 1969 border dispute.
The pro-deterrence champions point to the same incidents as demonstrating that deterrence did work; after all, the various nations pulled back from the brink, albeit some at the very last moment. However, as I see it, heads of states have shown themselves in the past to be very capable of making gross miscalculations that cost them their lives, their regimes, and all they were fighting for—take Hitler, for instance. Similarly, the Japanese, when they attacked Pearl Harbor, believed that they would be able at least to drive the U.S. out of their part of the world. And both the Germans and the French completely misjudged the course of World War I. History is further littered with numerous, less grand miscalculations, from Bernard Montgomery’s “a bridge too far,” to Lord Cardigan’s charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War, to Pickett’s charge in the American Civil War. Note that to start a nuclear war, only one miscalculation is required; once an order to strike is executed—there is no room for reconsideration. In contrast, the miscalculations cited required days and months and in some cases years of holding on to the same mistaken strategy. And still heads of states persisted. In other words, it is many times easier to fall into a nuclear showdown than to carry out a misadventure using conventional weapons.

Above all, there are no iron laws in history. What did not happen before provides no guarantee that it will not happen tomorrow. It is hence rational to apply here the rule that if the potential disutility is very large, avoiding it must govern the decision, even if the probability of suffering that disutility is very low. A simplistic way to highlight this point is to note that rational people will happily accept a bet for $1 if the probability of winning is 99 out of 100. They will do the same for $10, and even $100—but not for $1,000,000. The reason is that although the probability of losing remains the same and is very small, the cost of losing is so high (assuming those who bet will have to pledge their future income as collateral) that the disutility is so great that it makes sense to refuse such a bet. Only a reckless gambler would accept such a wager. Obviously, the disutility of being attacked with nuclear arms is so high that even if the probability that deterrence will fail is very low,
it makes sense to go a long way to avoid it. In plain words, we had better be safe than sorry.

I should add that the matter of probabilities is essential here. Many of the champions of deterrence use hedged wording to explain that the risk of attack is very low. In “Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model,” George Mason economist Brian Caplan writes, “While millions believe that they earn vast rewards in the afterlife if they engage in terrorism or—better yet—suicidal terrorism, only a handful put their lives on the line.” Well, a handful may well suffice. Similarly, when Waltz writes, “I don’t notice that many religiously-oriented people act in ways that will result in the massacre of thousands of people. I think people are people. I don’t think heavenly rewards motivate very many people,” one cannot but note that many hundreds of thousands of people have been slaughtered because of one faith or ideology or another; Armenians by Ottomans, Jews by Hitler, Russians by Stalin, and many more. And even if not “many” people are motivated by heavenly rewards, it did not take many terrorists to bring down the Twin Towers, nor will it take many to place and activate a nuclear device in one of our cities.

As one Coast Guard commander told me, “The best way to bring a nuke into the U.S. is to put it into a ton of cocaine.” In short, given that nobody is really denying that there is small probability of a very great disutility, we had better seek to prevent the proliferation of nukes than grow to learn to live with them.

Side Effects: Undermining the Norm

Clearly the more nations that command nuclear arms, even if one disregards the differences in the mentalities and predispositions of those who now seek nukes compared to older members of the club, the greater the danger that some nation will employ these catastrophic weapons. The champions of deterrence scoff at this danger and stress that rather few nations have acquired nukes over the last decades, in contrast to the fear voiced early in the nuclear age. Thus, President Kennedy observed that soon there might be “10, 15, 20” countries with a nuclear capacity. And C.P. Snow wrote at the time that, unless there was a nuclear disarmament, a nuclear war would be “not a probability but a certainty.” Actually, over the decades that followed, a considerable number of countries capable of developing nuclear weapons have refrained from progressing down this road, including Canada, Sweden, Italy, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Although it is true that proliferation has been slower than some initially predicted, those who draw on this fact to claim that we have nothing to worry about disregard the fact that we are at a tipping point at which the old restraining regime may give way to a nuclear free-for-all. For decades, we were able to promote a taboo on nuclear weapons, well depicted in The Nuclear Taboo by Brown University professor Nina Tannenwald. Major segments of the population of the world and their leaders embraced the precept that nations should refrain from acquiring nukes, and that giving them up was the desired policy. When President Obama called for a world free of nuclear weapons and promised that the U.S., working with Russia, would move toward zero nukes, he was widely cheered. The taboo is at the foundation of a treaty signed by 189 nations, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Both the taboo and the treaty were undergirded by various diplomatic and economic measures, as well as some arm-twisting.

In recent years, though, as North Korea thumbed its nose at the NPT and Iran seemed increasingly to move toward developing nuclear weapons, the taboo has weakened and respect for the NPT has waned. Moreover, the champions of deterrence in effect argue that the taboo and treaty are so yesterday, that more and more countries will obtain nukes, and that we ought to get over it, adjust to the world as it is now, and move on. Thus, Texas A&M University professor Michael Desch writes, “If [during the Cold War] we could live with those rogue nuclear states [the Soviet Union and China], which were willing to sacrifice millions of their own people to advance an eschatological ideology, there
If Iran can be stopped, we may be able to save the nuclear abstinence regime.

is scant reason to think Iran poses a more serious threat . . . To paraphrase the subtitle of Stanley Kubrick’s great nuclear satire Dr. Strangelove, it might just be time to stop worrying and learn, if not to love, at least to tolerate the Iranian bomb.”

As I see it, the taboo and treaty are indeed being tested, but it is too early to write them off. If Iran can be stopped, which in turn would increase the chances that we could pressure North Korea to reconsider its course, we may be able to save the nuclear abstinence regime. In contrast, there is little doubt that if we allow Iran to develop nukes, other nations will seek them, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and, some believe, even Jordan. Also, as a countermeasure against North Korea, Japan and South Korea would not be far behind if the taboo is broken so flagrantly in the Middle East. Brazil and Argentina may well also follow suit as more and more “important” nations acquire nukes. In short, applying deterrence to Iran rather than trying to dissuade it from developing nukes in effect entails opening the world to truly large-scale proliferation that would significantly increase the probability of nations coming to nuclear blows and terrorists finding places to get their hands on nukes.

Side Effects: Shield and Blackmail

Even if Iran never drops its nukes on anybody, once it demonstrates that it has acquired them—say, by testing them—these weapons would have considerable consequences for our security and that of our allies. Desch correctly reports, “The concern is that once Iran develops a nuclear capability, it would become even more aggressive in supporting terrorist groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in Gaza . . . Finally, many Americans fear that once Iran fields a nuclear weapon, it will become ever more meddlesome in Iraq.” The side effects of allowing Iran to obtain nukes are well spelled out by Emanuele Ottolenghi, the executive director of the Transatlantic Institute in Brussels. I hence quote him at some length. He writes—

The fact is that an Iranian bomb would enable Tehran to fulfill the goals of the revolution without using it. A nuclear bomb is a force multiplier that, as U.S. President Barack Obama aptly said, constitutes a ‘game changer.’ Iran’s success will change the Middle East forever—and for the worse. Under an Iranian nuclear umbrella, terrorists will be able to act with impunity, and its neighbors will enter into a dangerous arms race. Less understood are the dynamics that will emerge if Iran chooses not to use the bomb against its enemies. It matters little that Tehran may act rationally. If Iran goes nuclear, the Western world will have to negotiate a Middle East Yalta with Tehran—one that may entail a U.S. withdrawal, an unpleasant bargain for the smaller principalities of the Gulf’s shores and an unacceptable one for Israel and Lebanon’s Christians.

Last but not least is the risk that Iran, or some other rogue nation, will slip a nuke or two to terrorists, or they will obtain one without consent of the leaders with the help of one group or another, such as the Revolutionary Guard. The champions of deterrence argue that it suffices to deter such nations from sharing nukes with terrorists for us to declare that if terrorists use such weapons, we will hold responsible the nation that provided them. However, this argument assumes a much more reliable level of nuclear forensics than we command so far. We may well be unable to determine the source of a bomb, or it will take months, after which striking a nation with nuclear bombs in cold blood may well not seem a very credible counterthreat.

One hardly needs to elaborate any further that even if Iran can be deterred from employing its nukes directly, there are strong reasons to favor an Iran without nukes.

Costs of Prevention

So far, the discussion has focused on the question of whether an Iran equipped with nuclear arms poses a serious security threat that cannot be reliably deterred by the threat of a second strike. However, even if one agrees that Iran does pose a significant threat, one still must ponder the costs of the only viable alternative to deterrence—a military strike.
Opponents of a military strike argue that (a) the location of some key sites may not be known; (b) several sites are well protected; (c) some of the sites are in highly populated areas, and bombing them may cause a great number of civilian casualties; (d) in the past, bombing such sites was not very effective, and the bombing might delay the development of nuclear programs only slightly or even lead Iran to accelerate its program in reaction, and refuse all future inspections by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency); (e) some even warn that bombing fully fueled nuclear plants could release radioactive materials into the atmosphere, resulting in disastrous levels of illness, deformity, and death among the population, both immediately and in years to come.

The fact that all these objections deal with bombing nuclear sites points to a different military option. It is one that has not been discussed in public so far and at first blush may seem controversial. Note should be hence taken that it has been previously employed, indeed on several occasions. The basic approach seeks not to degrade Iran’s nuclear capacities (the aim of bombing) but to compel the regime to change its behavior, by causing ever-higher levels of “pain.” It starts with demanding that Iran live up to its international obligations and open up its nuclear sites by a given date, to demonstrate that they are not serving a military program. If this demand is not heeded, the next step would entail bombing of Iran’s nonnuclear military assets (such as the headquarters and encampments of the Revolutionary Guard, air defense installations and radar sites, missile sites, and naval vessels that might be used against oil shipments). If such bombing does not elicit the required response, the bombing of select dual-use assets will be undertaken, including key elements of the infrastructure, like bridges, railroad stations, and other such assets, just the way the U.S. did in Germany and Japan in World War II. (The reference is to dual-use assets, that can be bombed at night, even after proper warning, to minimize civilian casualties, and not to purely civilian targets such as was done in Dresden and Tokyo.) If still more tightening of the screws is needed, Iran could be declared a no-fly zone, the way parts of Iraq were even before Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. This kind of military action is akin to sanctions—causing “pain” in order to change behavior, albeit by much more powerful means.

Note that the location of these assets is known, that it matters not if one misses some, that they are not well hidden nor well protected, and bombing them will not unleash radioactive materials. In short, from a strictly targeting viewpoint, they are much less problematic than nuclear sites.

Critics are likely to argue military action will help those in power in Iran to suppress the opposition, or make the opposition support the regime. However, the regime is going all out to repress the opposition anyway, and a weakening of the regime, following the military strikes, may provide an opening for the opposition. Moreover, experience in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, the U.S.S.R., and Burma, among other countries, shows that we tend to exaggerate the likelihood that the opposition will win against brutal domestic regimes. Also, as the head of the reformers made clear to me when I was his guest in Iran in 2002, the reformers do not plan to fold the nuclear program. All this suggests that trying to figure out the vagrancies of Iranian domestic policies should not be allowed to determine our foreign policy when vital national interests are at stake.

Above all, we cannot delay action much longer if we are to prevent Iran from crossing a threshold after which a military option will become much more dangerous to implement—for us and for them.

Legitimacy?

In considering the way other nations and international institutions, especially the UN, would react to such a policy, one must distinguish between the acts of deciding to exercise a military option and deciding the specific kind of military action it will
be. This discussion assumes that military action of some kind has been deemed necessary and ordered by the president, after due consultation with our military authorities, has been authorized by the U.S. Senate, that allies have been consulted, and that the U.S. government decided that it must act even if no UN approval can be obtained. Given all this, I see no reason the UN would be more likely to approve striking the nuclear sites than it would be to approve increasing the “pain” by striking military assets, and if need be, dual-use ones. Critics may argue that the behavior-changing approach amounts to “total” war, while striking the nuclear sites entails only “limited” war. However, this distinction has been largely erased in recent years, and it is particularly inappropriate in this case, given that an attack on nuclear sites may cause considerably more collateral damage than the suggested option.

Coping with Side-effects

Critics of a military strike fear that Iran will retaliate by unleashing Hezbollah and Hamas, making our lives more difficult in Iraq and Afghanistan and disrupting the supply of oil to us and to our allies. These concerns do not apply to the decision of which military mode is the proper one, but to the question of whether a military option should be considered in the first place. In response, I suggest that a nation that holds that it cannot cope with such countermeasures should not only forego its claim to the status of a superpower, but also cease to see itself as much of an international player.

In short, engagements and sanctions are very unlikely to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power. Hence, increasing attention is devoted to containment. It may well work, but given the high disutility of a nuclear strike by Iran, even a relatively small probability that Iran may use its nukes is unacceptable. The argument that the rulers of Iran are not irrational disregards that quite a few national leaders have in the past “bet” their lives and regimes and lost. Hence, a military option should not be off of the table. However, bombing Iran’s nuclear sites might not be the most effective one. MR

M8 armored cars, provided to Iran under the Mutual Assistance Program, pass a camel train near Teheran, 19 December 1956.
AT THE VORTEX of Jim Frederick’s *Black Hearts: One Platoon’s Decent into Madness in Iraq’s Triangle of Death* (Harmony Books, New York, 2009) is a gripping account of a single incident involving some of the most despicable actions by U.S. Soldiers since the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam. On 12 March 2006, four members of 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry, 101st Airmobile Division, planned and committed the brutal rape and murder of a 14-year-old Iraqi girl and the cold-blooded execution and mutilation of her and her family, to include her 6-year-old sister. After cover-up by the four perpetrators and at least one member of their chain of command for several months, a private first class from the platoon overheard an off-hand remark implicating one of the perpetrators and reported his suspicions to his chain of command. Subsequently, all four of the men were charged and convicted.

While a single horrendous event is at the core of Frederick’s narrative, *Black Hearts* is more than just a thorough, detailed, well-researched, journalistic investigation into the criminal actions of a few men. *Black Hearts* is a study in leadership—mostly bad leadership. Against a documented background of grueling combat conditions, which places the effects of leadership—both good and bad—into vivid relief, Frederick acts for us as Dante’s Virgil, only instead of a descent into Hell proper, he takes us into the Triangle of Death, where we watch as the effects of a pattern of poor leadership behavior and irresponsible decisions compound over time, and we cringe as the battalion and its Soldiers are dragged into a dark, valueless abyss.

Admittedly, the conditions were appalling: During its year-long deployment to Iraq, elements of the 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry (1-502) got hit by or disarmed approximately 900 roadside bombs and were shelled, mortared, or received small arms fire almost every day. Twenty-one Soldiers from the battalion were killed during this period, and nine of them came from 1st Platoon, Bravo Company. Of the 135 Soldiers in Bravo, 51 of them did not complete the year-long deployment because they were either
killed, wounded, or transferred. The battalion did not have sufficient strength to accomplish its mission, so in addition to being attacked regularly, they were relentlessly overworked and exhausted. Forty percent of the battalion were treated for mental or emotional anxiety while in country.

Appropriately, Frederick begins his research “from the bottom up.” He conducts extensive interviews with the members of the platoon, company, and battalion, and without adding his own evaluative commentary, allowing these Soldiers to report actions, outcomes, and feelings in their own words. Using careful, even-handed reporting, to include verbatim quotations, Frederick chronicles how the actions of leaders at all levels—from the Department of Defense, to the Coalition Provisional Authority, through the division and brigade, and on down to the battalion—contributed to the organizational climate that allowed this crime and the subsequent cover-up to occur.

*Black Hearts* is, in the final analysis, a profoundly chilling study of military leadership gone bad, and bad leadership in combat makes for a disaster. As a journalist, Frederick does not make recommendations regarding effective and ineffective leadership behaviors, but rather describes the behaviors of various leaders, and then, through interviews, provides reports from the mouths of subordinates on the impact various actions had on morale, unit cohesion, and mission accomplishment. Frederick’s commitment to detail and organization are brilliant, allowing the perceptive reader to share the frustration and hardship that members of this unit experienced in a climate of dysfunctional leadership. *Black Hearts* invites its readers to spend long frightening nights on undermanned and isolated guard posts and to accompany squads on patrols looking for roadside bombs during the most dangerous period of the Iraqi occupation. We, as readers, are invited not only to empathize with members of the 1-502, but to vicariously experience the exhaustion, the frustration, the sense of abandonment, the anger, the rebellion, and occasionally, the palpable fear that members of the battalion experienced daily for a year.

Frederick’s narrative provides numerous detailed examples of poor leadership behaviors that eroded morale and unit cohesion, and it is useful to look at a couple of them here. The commander of the 1-502 is a central figure in *Black Hearts*, and it is incontrovertible that his behavior was especially dysfunctional. Leaders who refuse to listen to suggestions from their subordinates unhinge any hope of unit cohesion. Even if the commander’s selected courses of action are always the best ones—which is a preposterous supposition—the arrogance of not listening to team members denigrates them. Leader arrogance is the mortal enemy of unit cohesion, and the disenchantment of subordinates can sometimes do more to destroy a unit than enemy weapons. In this case, the battalion commander did not simply refuse to listen to his company commanders or senior noncommissioned officers, but he berated, abused, and publicly ridiculed them whenever they spoke up. His actions completely destroyed any notion of team.

Unlike in mathematics or engineering, in the domain of social discourse, processes are often more important than the content they embody. Good leaders recognize that the methodology by which decisions are reached can often be more important than the decisions themselves. This does not imply leading democratically or by vote, or that a commander must in any way abrogate his or her authority in order to lead well. The process I refer to from the previous example involves encouraging dialogue and making subordinates know that their ideas were listened to and considered, regardless of whether they become part of the final decision or not. In the end, commanders must still choose the course of action they believe to be best in terms of mission and personnel. When a commander makes a final decision following an inclusive leadership process, subordinates feel respected and important, regardless of which decision the commander chooses. It is crucial that our military leaders understand leadership as a social skill, rather than a logical or mathematical-based, decision making one. In Frederick’s study, we see subordinates regularly
demeaned, denigrated, alienated, and ignored for making suggestions. Respect is always a two-way street, and the person responsible for directing traffic is the leader. In this case, the battalion commander did not respect his subordinates and was reviled in return.

On another occasion, following the deaths of a squad leader and team leader, the battalion commander lectured members of the platoon about how these men were responsible for their own deaths, telling the comrades of the deceased: “When are you going to face up to why Staff Sergeant Nelson and Sergeant Casica are dead? Because they were not doing the right things.” He did this despite the findings of a formal Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigation that the deaths of these men could not have been prevented by alternative actions. (Incredibly, ignoring the AR 15-6 conclusions, the brigade commander likewise blamed the deceased for their own deaths.) When some of the men tried to point out to the battalion commander “other factors” that were contributing to the high casualties, such as a lack of logistical or engineering support from the battalion, they were met with a barrage of verbal abuse about making excuses and being whiners. Publicly blaming Soldiers who were killed in combat for their own demise seems to have been a pattern for this battalion commander, and it is easy to imagine the intense loathing this must have inspired in the survivors who had lost friends. Again, Frederick permits us to feel their pain.

Another example of poor leadership processes has to do with separating the important from the trivial. Frederick provides numerous examples where persons in authority would show up at isolated military outposts where the men had been attacked relentlessly and badly overworked and rail at them for cigarette butts on the ground, or unshaved facial hair. In one example, after 56 hours since having any “downtime,” a squad returned to their forward operating base expecting to get some rest, but were instead directed to escort an officer to various polling locations so he could meet local officials and shake hands with voters. When they finally returned, “dirty, delirious, strung out, and aching for sleep” they were upbraided for not having shaved. On another occasion a platoon leader responded to a field grade officer that his men had barely enough water for drinking in the 110 degree heat, and that there was none available for shaving.

In yet another example, Frederick narrates how after one Soldier was killed while manning a checkpoint and two others were captured, members of the same platoon (among others) searched nonstop for days trying to find their missing comrades. When they finally returned to their base exhausted, not having found their comrades who they presumed were being tortured, the only greeting they received from their leaders was the battalion’s command sergeant major yelling at them. As the squad leader put it: “The first thing the sergeant major does is yell at us about the JSB [Jurf al-Sukr Bridge] being dirty. The very first thing. He doesn’t pull the guys together and say ‘hold your heads up, we’ll do what we can to find these guys.’ Neither does the battalion commander. Something to unify the platoon. It didn’t happen. All that happened was the men got yelled at.” The sergeant major then ordered the squad leader to get all his men out of bed to pick up cigarette butts.

Military persons all know that personal appearance and cleanliness are important indicators of good units. But good leaders also realize that such superficialities are not themselves problems! Rather, they are symptoms of other, larger problems. In this case, poor cleanliness and unkempt appearance were indicative of low morale, a lack of organizational values, and utter exhaustion from being overworked. Incompetent leaders are, characteristically, more comfortable dealing with problems such as cigarette butts or facial hair than with real problems such as low morale and the disenchantment of Soldiers.

Leaders at all levels must inspire respect. Subordinates will not effectively follow those who they detest or do not respect. Unfortunately, leaders sometimes believe that it is a subordinate’s duty to respect them. Respect for the office or a position is a fleeting phenomena that is quickly supplanted by experience and interaction with the person occupying the position. Respect is crucial because while Soldiers (or wild beasts) might fight tenaciously to save their own lives, this is sorely inadequate for our professional Army. We expect our Soldiers to fight just as tenaciously for the lives of their comrades and the success of their mission. When Soldiers feel disenfranchised from their leaders, they lose any sense of loyalty to organizational goals.

An obvious question readers may have upon completing Frederick’s book concerns whether
members of the chain of command, especially some of the officers and senior officers from brigade on down, should also bear some culpability for the actions of the four men who were convicted. I don’t believe so. While some members of the chain of command were grossly incompetent, they were not unethical, and this is more of an indictment of our military training and certification programs than the character of the leaders in question. Unlike the murderers and rapists they led, these leaders were not bad people, just deplorable leaders.

Would better leadership at battalion and company levels have prevented the criminal acts of the four members of 1st Platoon? No one knows the answer to this question, and Frederick does not overtly venture an opinion, but it seems uncontroversial that better leadership would have reduced the likelihood of such acts.

Frederick suggests other factors that contributed to the battalion’s ineptitude:

- The decision, at the Department of the Army level, to grant large numbers of “moral waivers” (one for every four recruits) in order to meet recruiting goals was irresponsible. One of the perpetrators of the murders and rape had dropped out of high school in the 10th grade, been arrested twice for drugs and alcohol by the time he was 19, and had served time in a juvenile detention center for one offense and in jail for another. He was well known for his verbal tirades denigrating “n-----s,” Jews, northerners, foreigners, and other groups to which he did not personally belong. He had been granted a moral waiver to enlist.

- The pressure at the highest levels to reduce combat strength without a corollary adjustment in the mission was a disaster. Even when insurgent attacks were on the rise (from 26,500 to 34,000 in 2005), General Casey, the U.S. military commander for Iraq, “unrelentingly, consistently, and adamantly pushed for fewer troops in Iraq.” This obdurate, single-minded focus on a particular policy which, based on the evidence, must have been motivated solely by politics rather than the tactical reality on the ground, was irresponsible.

- The opulence and excesses of the living conditions in the Green Zone was preposterous and had a detrimental effect on the morale and attitude of front lines troops when, while visiting on business, they witnessed military and civilians tanning by the pool, playing Frisbee, being able to choose among several fast food stands such as Burger King and Pizza Hut, and being served lobster and steak in the dining hall. Frederick’s interviews point out that front-line Soldiers were constantly berated for rolling up their sleeves or taking off their helmets in scorching heat.

- Decisions made (against strong objections) by L. Paul Bremmer, leader of the Coalition Provisional Authority, to bar from government employment everyone who had been with Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party and to dissolve the entire Iraqi military and national police force were disastrous. The first decision, according to Frederick, “jettisoned the midlevel doctors, bureaucrats, and engineers who actually provided essential public services to the people on a daily basis.” The second decision, made in the face of even more opposition, put “between 500,000 and 900,000 people, the majority of them armed and now humiliated men, out of work—on top of the already 40 percent of Iraqi adults estimated to be jobless.”

Going to war can entail violating the most fundamental human prohibition—the killing of innocent people—in order to achieve a political objective. Accordingly, the means permitted to achieve political outcomes through the use of force come with serious mandates and prohibitions, which must be enforced even when Soldiers, and the leaders themselves, are tired, dirty, angry, and scared. It would be good for our Nation and our military if the examples of bad leadership exposed by Jim Frederick in Black Hearts become a subject of study in our military education system. As a Nation, we really do need to learn from our mistakes, the lessons of which are, in this case, available to us because of Jim Frederick’s hard work.

MR
In a coming-of-age tale, his youth and the road before him uncharted. But for Graves it symbolized a pursuit of youth. For readers, embarking on a wholly unremarkable period—pre-war boyhood (Purgatorio), wartime manhood (Inferno), and post-war enlightenment (Paradiso), Graves’ “coming of age” journey through life is eerily reminiscent of Dante’s description of his passage to salvation, as the author grapples with the complexities of social class distinctions, the horrors of war, and the emergence of the liberated mind.

Graves began his journey in his boyhood home of Wimbledon, embarking on a wholly unremarkable and, at times, seemingly aimless pursuit of youth. For readers, this period of the author’s life is easily overlooked; the writing often seems disjointed and the flow pointless. But for Graves it symbolized a significant time, when life was fresh and the road before him uncharted. In a coming-of-age tale, his youth represented an existence without defined purpose, his own Purgatory.

Within days of the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, Graves began his descent into the Inferno, accepting a special reserve commission with the Royal Welch Fusiliers. The posting to such a historic regiment was a matter of great pride for Graves, who remained class conscious throughout his life. The Royal Welch Fusiliers were one of the most honored regiments in the British Army, earning “twenty-nine battle-honours on its colours” since being formed in 1689 under the reign of William III. But the stark reality of the Western Front soon set in upon Graves, as the horrors of war surrounded him. During this period, his realistic, often graphic wartime poetry earned him a reputation as a soldier’s poet; Graves published his first collection of poems, Over the Brazier, in 1916.

On 20 July 1916, Graves’ descent culminated with the Battle of the Somme, where he was gravely wounded in an artillery barrage. His lung pierced by a shell fragment, Graves lay near death—official reports listed him as killed in action during his initial evacuation from the front. His description of his journey from the field hospital to England can be interpreted to represent his ascension from the Inferno; other than a brief return to France, the war was over for Graves.

During what could loosely be interpreted as the beginning of Graves’ enlightenment period, he continued his exploration of life. In 1918, he married his first wife, Nancy Nicholson, and fathered four children in the next five years. Professionally unsuccessful, Graves was “continuously and depressingly dependent upon hand-outs” while apparently suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. In 1926, he accepted a position as a poetry professor at Cairo University, and set sail for Egypt with his family and the American poet Laura Riding Gottschalk. Upon their return less than a year later, Graves took up residence with Riding; her influence on Good-Bye to All That is unmistakable. Their relationship, and the writing of the memoir, marks Graves’ shedding of his former life and the start of life anew.

Graves retells his service during the war with remarkable clarity. Sparring no details, Graves describes the horrors of the trenches so vividly that readers can almost feel the mud suck at their boots and taste the stench of death around them. The prose is crisp and articulate, and Graves’ world comes to life with palpable realism. Through his eyes, Graves draws the readers deeper into his war, his personality, and the lives of the men around him. More so than any other aspect of the book, his ability to create a literary diorama of war-torn France makes Good-Bye to All That an unforgettable memoir. Few writers can weave their words into such a vivid tapestry of life and death; Graves does this with a singular skill that readers will appreciate. However, readers should also be forewarned that there are different versions of Good-Bye to All That available for purchase. The original manuscript was remarkable for Graves’ raw honesty, his willingness to recount his experiences while they were still fresh in his mind. He significantly revised Good-Bye to All That over the years, publishing another version in 1957 that excised good portions of the original while adding new material that created deep suspicions among his colleagues. His reasons for revising the classic memoir vary, but are likely a reflection of “a decisive new alignment of ideas, thoughts and feelings” and the simple fact that his tumultuous relationship ended years earlier. In 1995, Berghahn Books republished an annotated version of the original manuscript, returning

A modern classic. The quintessential war memoir. An incredibly prolific writer, Robert Graves penned more than 140 literary works during his life, ranging from expressive poetry to acclaimed fiction to revered translations of Classical Latin and Ancient Greek. Yet none of these was as influential, captivating, or enduring as his autobiography, Good-Bye to All That, which recounts his early life in England, his experiences in the trenches of France during World War I, and his insatiable quest for meaning in life.

There is a sense throughout Good-Bye to All That suggesting the strong influence of Dante Alighieri, whose literary sway was resurgent during this period. Robert Graves conveys the epic flavor of The Divine Comedy, chronicling his life in three distinct periods—pre-war boyhood (Purgatorio), wartime manhood (Inferno), and post-war enlightenment (Paradiso). Graves’ “coming of age” journey through life is eerily reminiscent of Dante’s description of his passage to salvation, as the author grapples with the complexities of social class distinctions, the horrors of war, and the emergence of the liberated mind.

Graves began his journey in his boyhood home of Wimbledon, embarking on a wholly unremarkable and, at times, seemingly aimless pursuit of youth. For readers, this period of the author’s life is easily overlooked; the writing often seems disjointed and the flow pointless. But for Graves it symbolized a significant time, when life was fresh and the road before him uncharted. In a coming-of-age tale, his youth represented an existence without defined purpose, his own Purgatory.

Within days of the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, Graves began his descent into the Inferno, accepting a special reserve commission with the Royal Welch Fusiliers. The posting to such a historic regiment was a matter of great pride for Graves, who remained class conscious throughout his life. The Royal Welch Fusiliers were one of the most honored regiments in the British Army, earning “twenty-nine battle-honours on its colours” since being formed in 1689 under the reign of William III. But the stark reality of the Western Front soon set in upon Graves, as the horrors of war surrounded him.

During this period, his realistic, often graphic wartime poetry earned him a reputation as a soldier’s poet; Graves published his first collection of poems, Over the Brazier, in 1916. On 20 July 1916, Graves’ descent culminated with the Battle of the Somme, where he was gravely wounded in an artillery barrage. His lung pierced by a shell fragment, Graves lay near death—official reports listed him as killed in action during his initial evacuation from the front. His description of his journey from the field hospital to England can be interpreted to represent his ascension from the Inferno; other than a brief return to France, the war was over for Graves.

During what could loosely be interpreted as the beginning of Graves’ enlightenment period, he continued his exploration of life. In 1918, he married his first wife, Nancy Nicholson, and fathered four children in the next five years. Professionally unsuccessful, Graves was “continuously and depressingly dependent upon hand-outs” while apparently suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. In 1926, he accepted a position as a poetry professor at Cairo University, and set sail for Egypt with his family and the American poet Laura Riding Gottschalk. Upon their return less than a year later, Graves took up residence with Riding; her influence on Good-Bye to All That is unmistakable. Their relationship, and the writing of the memoir, marks Graves’ shedding of his former life and the start of life anew.

Graves retells his service during the war with remarkable clarity. Sparing no details, Graves describes the horrors of the trenches so vividly that readers can almost feel the mud suck at their boots and taste the stench of death around them. The prose is crisp and articulate, and Graves’ world comes to life with palpable realism. Through his eyes, Graves draws the readers deeper into his war, his personality, and the lives of the men around him. More so than any other aspect of the book, his ability to create a literary diorama of war-torn France makes Good-Bye to All That an unforgettable memoir. Few writers can weave their words into such a vivid tapestry of life and death; Graves does this with a singular skill that readers will appreciate.

However, readers should also be forewarned that there are different versions of Good-Bye to All That available for purchase. The original manuscript was remarkable for Graves’ raw honesty, his willingness to recount his experiences while they were still fresh in his mind. He significantly revised Good-Bye to All That over the years, publishing another version in 1957 that excised good portions of the original while adding new material that created deep suspicions among his colleagues. His reasons for revising the classic memoir vary, but are likely a reflection of “a decisive new alignment of ideas, thoughts and feelings” and the simple fact that his tumultuous relationship ended years earlier. In 1995, Berghahn Books republished an annotated version of the original manuscript, returning...
Graves’ masterpiece to bookshelves around the world.

Following the First World War, the exploits of the Royal Welch Fusiliers were widely chronicled by those who served with the regiment in combat. In addition to Graves’ manuscript, medical officer James C. Dunn penned the epic *The War the Infantry Knew*, while fellow special reservist Frank Richards published *Old Soldiers Never Die*. Together, these works capture the nightmare of the trenches in the Great War, casting the dark shadow of death over the futility of the conflict’s static warfare.

*Good-Bye to All That* is a rarity among modern literary works, remaining in print continuously since Graves first published his memoirs in 1929. This is as much a testament to the quality of the writing as the author’s candor. As a master of English literature, Graves was capable of crafting his life’s tale with grace and skill. In doing so, he merged a coming-of-age story with a startlingly frank war memoir, all set against a backdrop of a lifelong search for personal identity. The result was a symphony of life that resonates with many readers regardless of background or experience.

LTC Steve Leonard, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

---

**BOOK REVIEWS**


In *Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State*, Garry Wills examines the gathering clouds of secrecy that now enshroud the executive branch of American federal government. According to Wills, these clouds began forming with the creation of the Manhattan Project, a program perceived as so critical to national security that Roosevelt kept it a secret from his own vice president. From that point forward, Wills traces the growth of executive power throughout the years of the Cold War, when its defenders hid mistakes from Congress and the public behind a shroud of national security that rarely fooled our enemies. According to Wills, the entire edifice derived from “bomb power,” the presidential authority to employ nuclear weapons. The author contends that during an era of impending doom, such power was too important and time-sensitive to share with Congress.

Wills focuses on the growing tendency of American presidents to abandon their constitutional obligations in favor of “executive privilege.” For support, the author assembles a series of historical anecdotes, ranging from plots, coups, and assassination attempts to domestic spying, legalized torture, and undeclared wars. This is familiar ground for students of Cold War history. Wills, however, presents these events in a fresh light, demonstrating how presidential power has expanded to such a degree that White House lawyers have repeatedly insisted, with a disturbing degree of success, that the executive branch is exempt from restrictions clearly stated in the Constitution. In his final chapter, Wills presents the now-familiar excesses of the most recent administration, from renditions to domestic spying to torture, as proof that this trend is getting worse.

The author’s breezy narrative gallops through these well-worn tales in engaging fashion, but his rapid survey leaves no time to dwell on other, relevant perspectives. How, for example, did the emergence of the presidential “bomb power” influence the strategy of our Cold War enemies? Wills briefly mentions Castro’s desire for nuclear missiles while discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis, but makes no mention of how “bomb power” influenced other leaders, such as Mao and Khruščev. The author also ignores contrarian examples, such as the 1975 abandonment of Vietnam and the congressionally imposed restrictions on President Clinton’s deployment of American troops to the Balkans.

Presented in context and subjected to serious analysis, this litany of ambition, arrogance, and stunning incompetence would constitute a compelling indictment of the modern American political system. Too often, however, Wills seems to settle for low-hanging fruit, generally avoiding such complex topics as arms control or the Arab-Israeli wars in favor of familiar episodes such as the Bay of Pigs, the secret bombing of Cambodia, and the Iran-Contra scandal. These examples illustrate the scope of presidential power and prevarication, but their familiarity echoes the unresolved disputes of the past, occasionally overshadowing Wills’ larger argument about the Constitution.

If Wills’ writing leaves readers hungry for more, he nevertheless offers a thoughtful introduction to the malignant side effects of victory in the Cold War. As America pursues victory in another “long war,” these issues will demand further examination. *Bomb Power* offers an interesting place to start.

LTC William C. Latham, Jr., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

---

**THE CLAUSEWITZ DELUSSION: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward)**, Stephen L. Melton, Zenith Press,
What will the U.S. military take away from its painful experience in Iraq and Afghanistan? Will it learn the appropriate lessons or will it return to dysfunctional thinking that has cost so much blood and treasure over the last eight years? This is the central question Stephen Melton seeks to answer in his new book, The Clausewitz Delusion. As a retired Army officer and tactics instructor at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Melton brings more than a key player in the critical debate about the conception. Melton provides credit for involving the Command and General Staff College faculty in the debate about what the Army should look like after disengagement from our current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope this book becomes one of the many articles, blogs, and letters that will make the Leavenworth faculty, an important voice and a persuasive force in the Army's strategy. Melton deserves credit for for the Command and General Staff College faculty in the debate about what the Army should look like after disengagement from our current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope this book becomes one of the first of many articles, blogs, and letters that will make the Leavenworth faculty a key player in the critical debate to come.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The war in Afghanistan does not stop neatly at the impossible border with Pakistan. Al Qaeda and the Taliban take sanctuary just over the border in Waziristan where they rest, heal, rearm, train, and plan before they again launch into Afghanistan. Osama bin-Laden is rumored to have taken sanctuary in the area. Tribesmen and nomads wander freely over the putative border with little constraint. The area itself is rugged and hard to govern. Yet, it once was governed effectively. The British Indian Army and political administration dealt with this troubled area, where they suppressed several uprisings and defeated an invasion. They brought effective governance to the fractured inhabitants.

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Roe, Ph.D., is a seasoned soldier of the British Green Howards, and a two-tour veteran of Afghanistan. He has the career infantryman's appreciation of terrain, time, and distance. He also has the historian's grasp of the interaction of events and culture. He further has a good understanding of us "Yanks," since he graduated from both the Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Roe has provided an excellent account of British tribal management through subtle containment, not direct control.

British governance in the frontier region with Afghanistan relied on indigenous forces, indigenous leadership, incentives, and the occasional application of armed intervention and punishment. Political officers (foreign area officers), who had served with the British Indian Army and had undergone intensive university and on-site education in language, history, geography, and culture served for lengthy periods to keep their area quiet and to influence tribal politics. Their tours of duty could involve a decade or more and the political officer actually became the expert on his area. The author is a first-rate guide throughout this process.

Then there are the fights—the insurrection of 1897, the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the Fakir of Ipi rebellion, and the numerous raids and ambushes. Lurking in the background are agents of the Kingdom of Afghanistan, the Russian (later Soviet) Empire, the German Empire and the Third Reich, and the Persians and the Turks. Roe weaves this all together in a well-told account. He provides the military historian's perspective to this period with a reasoned view and an easy reading style.

The book is a must-read that has application for coalition planners and governments, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan. I strongly recommend his book to planners, historians, and military professionals alike.

LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The book is a must-read that has application for coalition planners and governments, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan. I strongly recommend his book to planners, historians, and military professionals alike.
Historically, post-conlict defense spending has declined. The author argues that the United States is losing its global strategic edge to competitors (other countries, organizations, and movements) in a world increasingly filled with varied and frequently disconnected threats that further complicate national security. Before developing his argument, the author provides a well-researched historical perspective on how nations such as colonial Britain and France went about establishing and maintaining their strategic advantage (e.g., devising such things as the elaborate national census that counted everything from cattle and horses to another nation’s ships, and the development of sophisticated tax regimes that provided for national defense and colonial expansion).

The author says it is essential the U.S. remain the preeminent global power, not only to protect its national security interests, but also the mutual interests of its Allies. He advocates increasing U.S. agility, decision making speed, and efficiency in the utilization of the instruments of national power as the “way ahead” to decisively meet the aforementioned challenges.

In support of his position, Berkowitz details the technological, geopolitical, economic, military, developmental, and demographic trends shaping the security environment. He notes that while government spending as a percentage of the U.S. economy has remained constant over the years, the portion spent on defense has declined. Historically, post-conflict defense spending settles between 10-15 percent below expenditures predating the conflict years; he adds that this tendency will have to change.

In the end, increasing defense expenditures must coincide with an expanding economy. This will require the U.S. to invest extensively in advanced education in order to produce high value-added jobs that maximize GDP growth.

Furthermore, in light of the ever-shrinking pool of qualified 18-year olds to meet its military requirements, the United States will increasingly depend on technology and soft power approaches to problem solving. As a means of illustrating the need for a more rigorous soft power approach, Berkowitz notes that the State Department’s budget is a mere $500 million to promote America’s image around the world, while the U.S. movie industry’s annual worldwide revenue is $25 billion. His concern is whether this is the image we want to project.

He also believes government officials have devolved into indecisive and risk-averse people in an era when decision speed has become critical. An extension of this phenomenon is that the U.S. government has become increasingly slow in filling the staffs of new presidential administrations. They now average eight months to fill the top 500 positions. Finally, he believes threats are changing faster than our ability to develop the means to counter them. “When you try to forecast threats two decades ahead because your weapon takes twenty years to develop, it is not analysis. It is fortunate telling.” All of the aforementioned vulnerabilities must be rectified.

Although the book comes up short in detailing a tangible approach to overcome these challenges, it certainly mounts a well-supported argument that they exist. This fact, coupled with the historical perspective provided early in the book, the way the author develops his argument, and the ease in which the reader can follow it makes this a worthwhile read, particularly for those interested in strategic and security studies matters or serving in a like capacity.

LTC David A. Anderson, Ph.D., USMC, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas


Gregory D. Koblentz, as deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program and assistant professor of government and politics in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University, has the background and insight to provide a comprehensive analysis of biological warfare and its complex role in international security. Koblentz’s book is well organized, well researched, and written in a way that allows readers to follow his analysis with little or no background in the biological sciences or international security. The book includes a list of acronyms and scientific terms to facilitate understanding of the writing for those who are unfamiliar with the terminology.

Koblentz used UN reports, articles published in scientific journals, and intelligence agency reports to support his analysis. He provides a brief background of biological weapons and their relationship to international security and presents events that led to the argument for Iraq’s possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction program. Koblentz reminds the reader of the importance of biological warfare as it pertains to international security.

Through discussions of the international verification process and limited civilian oversight, Koblentz makes an argument for the complex nature of biological warfare. One challenge in verifying the weapons is the difficulty in differentiating between offensive, defensive, and multi-use programs. Also, there is the issue of limited civilian oversight of biological warfare research and development because of the secretive nature of biological weapons programs. Examples from the former Soviet Union, Russia, and Africa, show how difficult it is for civilians to oversee programs that tend to be managed autonomously by the military.

Human error and misinterpreted information can cause the true nature of a biological weapons program to be inaccurate even though much time and energy has been spent iden-
tifying the adversary’s capabilities. The process the United States and its Allies used to identify the former Soviet Union’s and Iraq’s biological weapons capabilities showed the complexity in which information is gathered, shared, and analyzed.

Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security is an insightful book that meets its objective in educating the reader about the significance of biological warfare and its relationship to international security. Mikheil Saakashvili’s top priority was territorial integrity, which meant the outright acquisition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. James Sherr pointed to President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s restoration of the state, feeling of national pride, and removal of a sense of humiliation as reasons for Russia’s actions. Russia was also emboldened by NATO actions in Kosovo, which “removed any pretense from Russia’s democrats that NATO was a defensive alliance.”

As relations worsened between Russia and Georgia, Saakashvili was the one on the diplomatic offensive, one which Russia worked around or ignored. Johanna Popianevski notes that the “premeditation argument” of who planned the conflict points to Russia as does “who fired the first shot” and “who carries the burden of proof.” Georgia has record of Russian advances on 7 August into South Ossetia (which Russia has not refuted), and Russia breached Georgia’s sovereign border. Russian Pavel Felgenhauer notes that Georgia’s parliament has scrutinized events but that no public hearing on the conflict has occurred in Russia. Russia planned the conflict in such a way that it would be viewed as a Georgian aggression by the international community.

The Guns of August 2008 is a well-written examination of the many aspects of the conflict and one that will be found on the book shelves of those studying the conflict for years to come. It remains to be seen whether the Russians will hold public hearings on the conflict and thus offer more insights.

Tim Thomas,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Ralph Peters writes books as fast as other mortals write newspaper articles. This is not surprising when we realize that his nonfiction books are generally anthologies of articles, most of which had already been published in popular magazines or newspapers. This is not to say that his work lacks interest. On the contrary, he has taken on the role as the curmudgeon of the foreign policy and military establishments, you are sure to find some stimulating and politically incorrect ideas, mostly directed against the “liberal” wing of the government and the press, but sometimes at what he almost always perceives as a tradition-bound and inflexible military bureaucracy.

As always, Peters’ sympathies are clear. He takes the side of the Soldier or Marine in the foxhole who attempts to carry out orders as best he or she can despite indecisive leaders and contradicting policies while encumbered by restrictive rules of engagement, foreign alliances, and legal entanglements. This current crop of readings lacks substance, and each reading is on average only two or three pages long, long enough to state an opinion but not enough to provide a reasoned argument based on clear facts.

Perhaps the most provocative offerings are “Wishful Thinking and Indecisive Wars,” “Learning to Lose,” and the “Geezer Brigade,” respectively on the problems posed by a lack of understanding of the realities of warfare and especially of Islamist terrorism; a somewhat confused rant against military education, which nonetheless calls for linguistic expertise in the operational force; and an interesting appeal for the creative use of retired military personnel—not contractors—to augment the active force. Articles about the civilizational conflict between Christendom (now “The West”) and Islam provide a historical perspective, which today is often ignored or misunderstood. Unfortunately, Peters’ analysis takes the form of broad-brush generalizations that gloss over important qualifiers.

One of Peters’ pet peeves is his distaste for what he sees as an out-of-touch academic establishment, which might explain his complete lack of documentation. This is fine
if the only goal is to provide an opinion, but in the struggle for ideas, there are few truly new things under the sun and citations provide proof that you have properly done your homework, that you have engaged an existing body of knowledge and other thinkers, both in depth and breadth before formulating your argument. This effort, of course, is time consuming and painful nuts-and-bolts work, but it’s necessary.

Endless War will undoubtedly be purchased by Peters’ loyal fans. But at the suggested retail price, others would do well to read the essays in their original publication venue, or check the book out of the local library for casual and occasionally stimulating reading.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D., USAR, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


*The Hawk and the Dove* is an engaging history and biography about two major players in the Cold War: Paul Nitze and George Kennan. Born just three years apart, these two Cold War protagonists lived long enough to witness the dissolution of the Soviet Union and died just months apart (Nitze in 2004 at age 97; Kennan in 2005 at 101).

Throughout his long career in and out of government, Nitze was known as a man of action rather than a deep thinker. His credits include serving as vice chairman of the Strategic Bombing Survey during and after World War II, director of Policy Planning for the U.S. State Department (the second person to hold the post; Kennan was the first, with Nitze serving as his deputy); principal author of National Security Council Report NSC-68, which shaped U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War; and cofounder of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Kennan, by contrast, was almost universally regarded as a sage, even by those who disagreed with him politically. His greatest source of fame was his authorship, under the pseudonym “X,” of a 1947 Foreign Affairs article titled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” though his reputation in the State Department had been established a year earlier with his writing of the “long telegram” from Moscow, which presaged some of the arguments that would later appear in the “X” article. Both writings offered incisive historical and psychological analysis of the Soviet Union, its history and leaders, and it earned Kennan his next job as director of Policy Planning. It was in this position that he, along with Nitze and others, designed a program of post-war European aid that would come to be known as the “Marshall Plan.”

The author, Nitze’s grandson, presents a well-balanced perspective of both Nitze and Kennan, their friendship and rivalry, spanning six decades, and their variously converging and diverging views on national strategy that earned Nitze the appellation “Hawk” and Kennan “Dove.” As evidence for these labels, the author notes how Kennan regretted the popular interpretation of his word “containment” as being military in nature, whereas Nitze argued that the “doing” of containment must be through the application or threat of military force.

*The Hawk and the Dove* is well researched and well written. Thompson’s access to both Nitze’s and Kennan’s private papers reinforces a historical narrative that is far from dry history. There are a number of surprising anecdotes that garnish the story. For example, Nitze’s uncle, Paul Hilken, was involved in a German sabotage incident in New York’s Black Tom Harbor in 1916, and Kennan’s uncle, also named George, traveled to Russia in the 19th century and authored several books on Tsarist Russia.

This engaging and readable book is recommended for anyone who wants to better understand the history of the Cold War and the issues that endure from that time.

**Clark Capshaw, Ph.D., Alexandria, Virginia**


Cora Sol Goldstein’s *Capturing the German Eye* is ostensibly about American propaganda in occupied Germany. The book focuses on the discussions and forming of American policy regarding Germany, its war guilt, how to combat Communism, and the role of the military government in Germany. The occupation of Germany is a success story. Goldstein argues that American propaganda had a vital role in countering German militarism and virulent nationalism (though it should be noted that the 8th Air Force and the Red Army also helped).

Goldstein’s emphasis is on film, print and artistic expression, and propaganda during the brief period between World War II and the Cold War. Immediately after the war, simply being anti-Nazi was enough for the Office of Military Government U.S. in Germany to license and allow a German artist or author to work. This changed by 1948 and 1949 as the freedom was not extended to Communist artists and writers who were denied the materials to publish anti-American works.

Much of the book discusses disagreements about denazification. The Truman administration and the Army felt the Germans should be confronted with their guilt and held collectively responsible for the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes. This attitude led to an aggressive policy of publishing photographs of concentration camps and films like *Mills of Death* (*Todesmühlen*).

However, the policy was not popular among Germans, particularly as the Soviets were blaming capitalists for Germany’s misery rather than popular support of the Nazi party. The Germans even expressed a preference for Soviet-run Radio Berlin over the BBC and Radio Luxemburg because Radio Berlin was not as “unfriendly.” American propagandists soon backed off.
blaming Germany in order to rally support against the Soviet Union. Germans didn’t really start to blame themselves for the Holocaust until war trials for atrocities on the Russian front in the early 1960s.

Visual propaganda emphasized and informed the ideal values of the United States. Only films that gave a positive look at American culture were allowed into German theaters. Goldstein looks at some interesting test cases, including a short cartoon titled The Brotherhood of Man. This film proclaimed that all races were equally gifted and could excel if given the same opportunities. Interestingly, the film was prevented from being shown, because, as undersecretary of the Army William Draper, Jr., bigotedly argued, the film was scientifically flawed and untrue.

The most glaring flaw in the book, which happens to be about visual propaganda, is the low quality and number of illustrations. There are only 16 pages of black and white photographs (mostly pictures of concentration camps, generals, and artists). More pictures would have been useful, particularly as the text frequently discusses and analyzes works of art that are not depicted in the book.

Capturing the German Eye is interesting from a historical standpoint and useful for a psychological warfare and nation building perspective. Its short length and narrow focus prevent it from being the definitive work on the occupation of Germany, but it does shed light on the use of visual propaganda. The book also shows how governmental policy can change the use of propaganda and how informal relationships between soldiers and artists can shape the cultural scene of an occupied nation. This is an important lesson for an Army that is trying to influence a largely illiterate Afghanistan.

John E. Fahey, Fairfax, Virginia


Nicholas Evan Sarantakes’ Allies Against the Rising Sun covers a period in World War II history that has not received much attention. In this book, he explores British and Commonwealth strategies against Japan from the perspectives of the Allies. The author, a U.S. Naval War College professor, has written two previous books about the end of World War II in the Pacific. He extensively researched the subject and has delivered a superb history and analysis.

Sarantakes sets out to answer three questions. Why did the Commonwealth nations wish to contribute forces to the defeat of Japan when their people were tired of war and desired other options? Why did the United Kingdom want to participate in the operation against Japan? And, why did the United States agree to British and Commonwealth participation even though it meant displacing American units that had more firepower? Sarantakes answers these questions with his analysis.

The book’s strength lies in the author’s portrayal of the principal civilian and military decision makers. He believes “most histories present individuals as ‘plastic figures’ and want to present the people as ‘human beings’ with real lives and emotions, living and working under some of the most trying conditions imaginable.” In this aspect, he succeeds brilliantly. The major players come alive in the book as Sarantakes discusses their strengths and weaknesses and how they affected the decision makers. The reader realizes that even with high-stake decisions, people are not beyond human frailties. Despite policy and political differences, the author shows that the nations in fact were united.

Allies Against the Rising Sun is thus an examination of coalition warfare. Sarantakes makes extensive use of notes, diaries, and autobiographies of the decision makers. The book offers an excellent portrayal and study of strategic decision making, the complexity of national interests, and the interplay between the main players. The author looks at both sides of the issues and confronts some previous conclusions about this period of history, in particular the use of the atomic bomb and the invasion of Japan. These decisions have always sparked controversy and Sarantakes offers his analysis based on the evidence he uncovers.

In the end, this book is about civil military relations, the compromises leaders make, and how political interests can affect military operations. The price nations are willing to pay to further their interests is especially telling. The author is frank and pulls no punches. For example, he labels “stunningly irresponsible,” Australia’s decision to remain on good terms with General Douglas MacArthur even if it meant sending Australian troops on a dubious operation. Overall, the book is an engaging history that covers operational, political, and diplomatic problems. I recommend it to all readers.

LTC Robert Rielly, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


During the Pacific War, the Japanese navy followed its prewar plans and pursued a decisive encounter with the American fleet. There are numerous examples of Japanese commanders’ operational and tactical improvisational brilliance from the attack on Pearl Harbor to the Battle of Tassafaronga. However, the prewar plans deserted them in the final period of the war. The pursuit of a decisive naval victory led to the destruction of their naval air power in the Philippine Sea and the devastation and isolation of their surface fleet at Leyte Gulf.

The battle of Leyte Gulf unfolded in three parts: the battle in the Surigao Strait, the battle to protect the transport ships, and Halsey’s pursuit of the Japanese aircraft carriers. Surigao Strait, a confusing night action, is portrayed as the last
clash of the battleships. The defense of the transports is presented as an example of American bravery against great odds helped along by the Japanese naval commander’s tactical indecision. Halsey’s pursuit of the Japanese decoy fleet is proclaimed an error.

Tully expands his study of Surigao Strait through the use of original Japanese records and the testimony of Japanese survivors. He also uses U.S. Navy records to provide strategic and operational justifications and a balanced view of the battle. By comparing American and Japanese records he has eliminated some of the discrepancies in the historical accounts of this confused battle. As at Midway, the Japanese were plagued by a plan that was too intricate, orders that were constantly changing, and communications that posed intractable problems.

The Americans had their own confusions resulting from divided commands and troubled communications. Nevertheless, through all the confusion, both American Admiral Oldendorf and Japanese Admiral Nishimura concentrated on their respective missions, which led to the battle in Surigao Strait. As Tully reconstructs the operational and tactical levels of warfare on both sides, it becomes obvious that the Americans had only partially figured out the Japanese navy’s goal, which was the destruction of American transports as they were landing troops on Leyte. The U.S. did not fully understand that Japan was taking a bold, if not foolhardy, gamble.

Tully’s narrative is clear and clarifies a confused night battle in restricted waters. He disputes several perceived truths about the battle by giving the reader a complete record of what each ship was doing at each stage of the battle. In the end, Nishimura had only one destroyer remaining as the sole survivor of his force. Tully’s careful battle reconstruction sheds light on the way ships were lost and also on the way U.S. and Japanese navies thought through their planning processes.

The Battle of Surigao Strait sheds light on the tactical and operational levels of the battle and helps explain the Japanese military’s opposition to surrender after the fall of the Marianas. In many parts of their empire—China, Korea, and Southeast Asia—they had not been defeated.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Seoul, Korea


On 3 February 1945, Myron King and the crew of a B-17 Flying Fortress known as Maiden USA set out to bomb targets in Berlin. Maiden USA’s crew was able to get bombs away, but shortly after, ran out of luck. Badly hit by flak and with two engines out, King had to decide whether to try to make it to Sweden or head east for the approaching Russians. He chose the latter.

McDonough’s narrative is told as a flashback from his decision to head for Russia. It is also a history of the Maiden USA’s aircrew and its capable leader. King and his crew survived 21 combat missions including their ill-fated 21st mission. Eventually, the entire crew returned to the States, but not without tribulations that were beyond getting shot down. The U.S. Army tried and found King guilty of interfering with Russia, an American ally. King’s crime was that he admitted onto his aircraft a person who he believed to be a Russian translator but who turned out to be a Pole fleeing for his life. The story has the twists and turns of a good mystery and reveals a little-known tale of U.S. air operations to and from the Soviet Union and a great deal about the nature of the alliance.

COL Gregory Fontenot, USA, Retired, Lansing, Kansas


Reading more like a whodunit novel than historical nonfiction, Robert Edsel’s The Monuments Men: Allied Heroes, Nazi Thieves, and the Greatest Treasure Hunt in History, tells the story of the Nazis’ theft and concealment of Europe’s art treasures during World War II and the subsequent Allied recovery efforts. Actual campaigns and battles serve as a backdrop to the search and recovery of the stolen treasure.

The theft of art is as old war itself and continues to be relevant in today’s crises. The authors make extensive use of first person interviews; public and private historical collections; and books, articles, and other research. As the title indicates, The Monuments Men: Allied Heroes, Nazi Thieves, and the Greatest Treasure Hunt in History tells the story of the birth and maturity of a little-known World War II Allied unit called the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (MFAA) section, which was eventually comprised of personnel from both British and American commands. MFAA drew its staff from fine arts academia and servicemen from across America whose expertise included museum directors, curators, art scholars and educators, artists, architects, and archivists. The telling of their remarkable stories is long overdue.

The Nazis planned and executed the theft of Europe’s art treasures to satisfy Adolf Hitler’s vision of Germany as the world’s center of great art. Even though the Nazis were anti-Semitic, it did not prevent them from making their first theft target the great European Jewish art collections. In the end, the Monuments Men were successful in recovering and returning a significant amount of treasure to the rightful owners. However, many priceless pieces have still not been recovered and some were unfortunately destroyed (including the fabled Russian Amber Room).

Recent experiences of looting at the Iraqi National Museum in 2003 seem to support creating a permanent U.S. Department of Defense organization similar to the MFAA. At a minimum, protecting cultural treasures and artifacts would require
increased emphasis during operational planning and execution as part of full spectrum operations.

The Monuments Men reads like a contemporary mystery novel. The story is fact-based and well worth the reader’s time and attention.

James Burcalow,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Robin L. Rielly’s Kamikazes, Corsairs, and Picket Ships: Okinawa, 1945 is a book about America’s military defense against a fanatical suicide campaign in the seas around Okinawa in the waning days of World War II. This relevant book discusses the U.S. military’s wartime response against a highly organized suicide campaign that was mounted using the latest weapons and technology and orchestrated by Japan’s government and military. The U.S. Navy learned from this experience—and the resulting doctrine for fleet air defense has changed little since.

Rielly, a specialist in Japanese studies and author of a number of books brings a scholar’s attention to detail to the task. The book is organized in a military history fashion; it introduces a topic then proceeds to descriptions of men and machines before addressing the campaign proper. By the time readers arrive at the chronological operational narrative of the campaign, they will be completely familiar with the intimate details and organizations of the opposing sides. This makes the book extremely useful as a reference resource.

In Chapter 3 the narrative takes off from an accountant-like discussion of tactics, techniques, men, and equipment. Rielly provides a day-to-day/blow-by-blow narrative of the entire campaign. In the final chapter, he takes a retrospective look at the campaign in a crisp “lessons-learned” fashion and highlights critiques raised earlier in the narrative. The author concludes that the Americans, given the shock of the size and organization of the Japanese campaign, performed credibly in adjusting their tactics and procedures to meet the new threat. The problem is that the chapter is too short and neglects to offer any criticisms of Japanese errors. Rielly also makes it clear that the Japanese did not see their actions as “suicidal” but rather as a form of special tactics—a perspective that has particular poignancy for today.

The book has minor flaws. Principal among these is the failure to fully discuss U.S. fighter tactics. In particular is the famous “Thach Weave” two-plane tactic that became the standard fighter tactic for all Allied air forces after 1943. The only inkling of an Allied advantage in tactics comes from a Japanese pilot’s quote that says the two-plane tactic was “hard to beat.” That said, the book provides a gritty combat narrative. However, for a Japanese perspective of the operational analysis of the campaign, readers will have to go elsewhere. Reilly’s book will naturally appeal to naval officers and aviators, but its insights on how to combat terror warfare have relevancy for a much broader audience.

CDR John T. Kuehn, Ph.D., USN, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


I think one of the most difficult tasks any historian can take on is to write a definitive regimental history and maintain objectivity. John McManus takes this on with gusto and produces an extremely readable account of the 7th Infantry Regiment.

McManus refers to the regiment by its nickname “Cottonbalers,” a name earned in the Battle of New Orleans in 1814, where, firing from behind cotton bales, they decimated the attacking British regulars. His account of the 7th in the Mexican War demonstrates that it was no “walkover” but a hard fought, bitterly contested affair. McManus relates the 7th’s Civil War service, especially the major battles of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg, as well as the 7th’s campaign against the Nez Perce in the Battle of Big Hole. In addition to defeating the Spanish in combat, the “Cottonbalers” had to fight the effects of heat, spoiled rations, and malaria.

McManus relates numerous first-hand accounts of combat in his treatment of World War I and World War II. However, in an attempt to show the horror of combat, his history starts to sound like historical fiction (e.g., “20mm anti-aircraft guns, inflicted terrible wounds on infantrymen, shredding abdomens until guts hung out and trickled halfway down walls, sawing off arms and legs too.”). The book is technically sound with a few minor exceptions. McManus questions the nickname “Cottonbalers” based on the fact that British cannonballs bounced off the cotton bales in the Battle of New Orleans. Contrary to his view that the cannonballs would have set the bales on fire, probably the vast majority, if not all the British cannonballs, were the solid, non-exploding type. Likewise, he says later that grape shot was “a weapon designed more for wounding than killing.” A hit by even one of a golf ball-size shot would have killed. Finally, his description of the Higgins boats used in the World War II landings is puzzling. He talks about the plywood nature of the “early Higgins boats” and says that later boats used in the Allied victory in World War II were made of steel. At least the ones I saw in Normandy (used on D-Day) were still made of plywood.

Regardless of these oddities, McManus’s research appears first rate, using the National Archives, memoirs, and assorted sources from the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning. However, I question the book’s jacket description that the
ANNOUNCING the 2010 General William E. DePuy Combined Arms Center Writing Competition

“Building Rigor and Relevance into Home Station Training”

While commander of the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) from 1973 to 1975, General William E. DePuy established the first Army-wide standards for individual and collective training and education. This year, we seek ideas to continue his vision of educating leaders at all levels to creatively respond to future unknown conditions, threats, and resources. Submissions should be original, well-researched essays 3,500 to 5,000 words long.

★ Contest closes 28 June 2010 ★

1st Place $1,000 and publication in Military Review
2nd Place $750 and consideration for publication in Military Review
3rd Place $500 and consideration for publication in Military Review
4th Place $250 and consideration for publication in Military Review
Honorable Mentions $100 and consideration for publication in Military Review

For information on how to submit an entry, go to http://militaryreview.army.mil
LAND OF THE MORNING CALM

Dillon Staas

Oh gentle, loving people of the land of morning calm,
Hold sacred your new freedom, and listen to my psalm.
The seed of many nations came from far across the sea,
And paid a price on your behalf, for freedom isn’t free.

The gripping fear, the stench of death, no longer fill your mind.
The horrors of a battlefield have all been left behind.
Your children, dreaming peaceful dreams, safe in your arms each night,
Wake with a smile of innocence, to face the morning light.

Your homes, secure on quiet streets, bring comfort to the soul.
From verdant hillside terraces to valleys down below.
Your mountain streams, now running clear, without a trace of red,
No sound you hear, no crying from the dying and the dead.

So when good fortune smiles on you and fills your heart with cheer,
Remember those who fought and died and left their futures here.
Give thanks to them and make a special place within your heart,
That you and they, forever friends, shall never drift apart.

Dillon W. Staas, Jr., of Lima, Ohio, served in the Army from 1947 until 1953, including three years in Occupied Japan and a year in Korea with the 8055 Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH).