



## Preface

In October 2006, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center published a volume of selected articles in conjunction with the release and distribution of the Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Subsequently, numerous articles have been written exploring other dimensions of counterinsurgency not treated, or not well understood, when the first volume was published. These articles reflect both the vastly expanded range of knowledge and experience that U.S. land forces have obtained as well as the painful cost of such lessons with regard to fighting and defeating insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Many outline the first-hand lessons learned in the current operational environment. As the Intellectual Center of the Army, the Combined Arms Center recognizes the importance of sharing these first-hand documents. The Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center) and editors of Military Review have designed this second collection to complement the recently released FM 3-0, Operations and the soon to be released Counterinsurgency Handbook (produced by the COIN Center); FM 3-24.2, Counterinsurgency Tactics; FM 3-07, Stability Operations; and FM 3-28, Civil Support. While doctrinal field manuals lay out principles and supporting theory for dealing with the asymmetric aspects of warfare inherent in insurgency conflicts, these articles are intended to provide specific lessons and observations drawn from operations in the field.

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
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**Cover Photo:** (FRONT ) U.S. Army SSG James Warren provides security from a rooftop during a combined patrol in the Shula district Baghdad, Iraq, 18 June 2008. (U.S. Army, SPC Charles W. Gill)  
(BACK) A group of Iraqi children look on as a U.S. Soldier from 1st Brigade Combat Team, 6th Infantry Division, assigned to Task Force Regulars practices balancing a plate of bread on his head in the Jameela market area of the Sadr City district of Baghdad, Iraq, 31 May 2008. (U.S. Air Force, TSGT Cohen A. Young)



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George W. Casey, Jr.  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

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