

**NATIONAL STRATEGY
AND
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT**

**Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee
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**by
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Among the tasks before this Committee, none is more difficult than ascertaining what strategies may be appropriate over the long run for the U.S. in responding to terrorism, insurgency, and the regional wars of the Third World --that genre of recourse to violence for political purposes referred to these days as *low intensity conflict*.

What should be U.S. objectives?

What concepts or premises should guide us?

What shall be the means to our ends?

Strategic Challenges

I can not start our discussion, as some who have spoken before me have, with a brief characterization of principal threats to U.S. interests, because interests and threats relevant to my topic are so diverse as to defy compact generalization. The strategic challenges which I have been asked to address are surely not simply manifestations of the relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Rather, I might usefully begin with a reminder that no President since Franklin Delano Roosevelt has been able to avoid serious domestic political problems arising from involvements with the Third World. Moreover, a significant number of these difficulties, however aided and abetted by the Soviets, had origins in, and derived perpetrators from, radical political, religious, or racial forces beyond the Kremlin's control. And I might observe that Presidents Carter and Reagan have had to cope with some such non-Soviet crises which were without precedent. Trends are adverse. Future Presidents, with less relative national power at their disposal, will face

larger numbers of Third World antagonists with access to sophisticated armaments, impelled by militant nationalism, ethnocentrism, and sectarianism.

As I understand the trends --and I hasten to disclaim expertise concerning most-- we can expect, among the "less developed nations" of the Third World, future troubles which will stem from:

1. Industrialization. It is not clear how the fundamental economic transformations ongoing within the advanced industrialized countries --the substantial conversion from hard-good manufactures to service industries will affect Third World futures, but there is definite potential for presenting new military threats to U.S. interests, for exacerbating have/have-not differences, and for inducing high-volume migrations, as well as for opening new opportunities for trade. It is already evident that the growth of arms industries indigenous to the Third World has contributed to the worldwide proliferation of advanced conventional weapons; while the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. continue to be the main suppliers, Brazil, Israel, China, and India are now capable of exporting armament and munitions competitive in quantities and quality with those manufactured in NATO or in the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, it seems just a matter of time before a number of Third World nations will possess both nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them over ranges of a thousand miles or more.

2. Unbalanced growth. There is already more socio-economic dynamism among such rapidly industrializing giants as India, Brazil, or the People's Republic of China, or among industrializing mini-powers like South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, than in either the stagnated communist-bloc, or the much-slowed free, industrialized nations of the northern hemisphere. Controversy over markets, tariffs, credit, and international money management seems likely to heighten, and even to dominate other aspects of U.S. policy toward industrializing states. Perhaps as importantly, our progressively more aged population will contrast with their characteristically young populations, and we are apt to be perceived as a "status quo" power, obstructing rather than facilitating a brighter future.

3. Oil supplies and oil prices. The Middle East remains the only major source of petroleum fuels without substantial local claimants, and without high accessibility costs. Exploratory wells there typically produce 100 times what flows from similar wells in the U.S. The chances are that OPEC

will reassert itself as a major political-economic factor. But even OPEC reserves are limited, and the entire world is going to have to confront the reality that petroleum can continue to serve societies as it has over the past century only for a few decades to come. A shift to natural gas, coal, and nuclear power is inevitable, and is bound to have profound implications for U.S. national strategy.

4. New and more restive neighbors. The prowess of air transportation and modern information media have brought the U.S. into unprecedented intimacy with peoples worldwide. The recent waves of immigration, and the newsworthiness of Third World developments attest to these transformations. We live in an ever-smaller, ever more interdependent world, and find ourselves caught up in national, racial and religious quarrels for which our geography, history and mores have not prepared us. Even the most familiar international relations require redefinition in the light of current and portended realities: the premises which have heretofore governed U.S. relations with Mexico are questionably relevant for the future, for Mexico faces political, economic, and social urgencies which auger for both more internal instability and increasing tensions with the U.S.

5. Smuggled drugs. Most of the illegal narcotics sold in the U.S. come from Third World countries. The U.S. has not been able, as yet, to curtail illicit drug consumption at home, or to develop techniques for decisive intervention, on behalf of a friendly government, against narco-traffickers abroad.

6. Shrinking base structure. The divestiture of U.S. overseas military bases, which has been a hallmark of U.S. experience in the Third World over the last two decades, is likely to continue, and we are likely to become ever more dependent militarily on naval power and force projection from the U.S. itself to protect our interests abroad.

7. Exported violence. Whatever their rhetoric about "peaceful competition", the U.S.S.R. and its client states behave as though they are deeply committed to future political violence, and are determinedly preparing to foment, to augment, to support, or to capitalize upon it. The Soviet Union and Cuba, in particular, continue to train, year by year, thousands of young men and women from Third World nations for terrorism, insurgency, and subversion. Moreover, over the past decade, the presence and influence of Soviet Bloc nations has grown substantially in the Third World,

as the following charts attest:




Figure 1




FIGURE 2

Figure 1 and 2 suggest that sometime in the mid-'70's, strategists of the U.S.S.R., seeing the United States in the throes of Watergate, and perhaps encouraged by the War Powers Resolution and the Clark Amendment to believe that the U.S. did not intend to contest a more aggressive policy in the Third World, launched a vigorous effort to suborn developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Like their war materiel, their undertakings

were initially clumsy and trouble-prone; but they retrofitted in service, and today their overseas operations are quite serviceable. From the strategic point of view, the Soviets have managed "low intensity conflict" far better than the United States. They prefer to work low profile, preferably at the top. They are particularly adroit at installing their own or proxy command, communications, and intelligence systems. Their hand is often hidden, or clad in the velvet of humanitarian aid. They have an effective coalition strategy; their use of "fraternal nations" has been masterful. While their political and economic doctrines are patently vapid, and while association with them seems to offer to any Third World country only subjugation to a new, more oppressive form of imperialism, they probably consider it significant that the number of Marxist-Leninist garrison states in the Third World has grown. And now a Cuba-like Nicaragua is on the same continent with the United States.

But I hasten to reemphasize that the future security environment in the Third World can not be assessed only in East-West terms. There are ample indigenous causes for tension and violence, and year by year, armaments increase in range and lethality. It is possible to anticipate a time when nuclear weapons will be in the hands of Third World nations, such as Libya, Iran and Iraq, whose recent history has been marred by instability and international ruthlessness. For example, the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College published last summer a paper entitled: A World 2010. A Decline of Superpower Influence, in which the author, Charles W. Taylor speculates that national holdings of nuclear weapons might look like this:

YEAR 2010

POSTINDUSTRIAL

FRANCE [1]
 JAPAN [3]
 UNITED KINGDOM [1]
 UNITED STATES [1]
 WEST GERMANY [3]

ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL

ISRAEL [2]
 SOUTH AFRICA [2]
 TAIWAN [3]

TRANSITIONING INDUSTRIAL

ARGENTINA [4]
 BRAZIL [4]

INDUSTRIAL

CHINA [1]
 INDIA [2]
 PAKISTAN [2]
 NORTH KOREA [3]
 SOUTH KOREA [3]
 U.S.S.R. [1]
 VIETNAM [4]

PREINDUSTRIAL

EGYPT [5]
 IRAN [5]
 IRAQ [5]
 LIBYA [5]
 SAUDI ARABIA [5]

CHILE [4]

Weapons

[1] 2000+	[4] up to 100
[2] up to 1000	[5] up to 50
[3] up to 500	

The implications of these speculations are not pleasant to contemplate: a world in which trained terrorists and subversives abound, operating in league with drug cartels, in which irresponsible nations will possess devastating military power. There will probably be a decline in the ability of any U.S. President to influence events abroad, and an increase in the risks to national security with which our leaders, and the American people, will have to live. Sound strategy will be more important than ever.

Strategic Objectives

As you know, the President's Commission on Defense Management, the Packard Commission, recommended revision of the procedures by which defense budgets were prepared to emphasize the importance of the Commander-in-Chief's first eliciting from his principal advisers recommendations on national strategy, and his providing them guidance relating strategic ends to means. I believe that the Republic is indebted to the leaders of this Committee not only to the attention they are directing to these matters in this Congress, but to their role in enacting the Nichols-Goldwater legislation on national security management, and on national readiness for Special Operations and low intensity conflict. Clearly, to arm for the future, we need to bring to bear all we can learn from the past, all our intellect, all our ingenuity.

Many Americans, and some Senators, believe, since violence is inevitable in the Third World, so inflexible are societies and governments there, so intractable are the problems of overpopulation and livelihood, that the objective of the U.S. should be *non-involvement*. But we live today in a world so interdependent as to involve this nation with violence there, whether the President intends involvement or not, whenever:

- American citizens are assaulted, killed or held hostage.
- A representative democracy, respectful of human rights, faces violent extinction, or such a government might emerge from ongoing violence.

- American economic holdings are seriously threatened, or the regional climate of investment is severely impaired.
- It causes a considerable flow of refugees to the U.S
- It facilitates international criminals' preying upon U.S. citizens, as in cocaine trafficking.
- It engages significant geostrategic imperatives, such as access to fuels or raw materials, protection of sea or air lines of communications, or denial of military bases to the U.S.S.R. or its proxies.

To illustrate one approach to devising national strategy, let me offer an very hypothetical example, simply to show how one might proceed from presidential generality to budgetary specifics. A President might want to establish national objectives something like the following:

Illustrative Strategic Objectives

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L. Optimally, a community of free nations committed to open political systems, to eschewing political violence, and to respecting individual rights and freedoms. Minimally, reliable friends and allies committed to political ideals similar to our own, willing to act to preserve their independence and to help others whose freedom is threatened. As a corollary, fewer states affiliated with Moscow, or governed in ways inconsistent with our precepts of human rights and dignity, or wedded to political violence in any form.

M. Equitable trade, financing, emigration and aid policies within the community of free nations, coupled with concerted action against international criminality, especially illegal narcotics trafficking.

N. Concerted security arrangements within that community which shield political and economic developments consistent with Objectives A and B above.

O. Reduction in the risks to American citizens at home or abroad from international terrorists.

P. Security for international airways and waterways, and for access to fuels and raw materials.

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Strategic Concepts

Objectives say what we want to do, but strategy also requires articulating broad principles of how to do it, and considering with what to do it.

What concepts might be relevant to achieving the foregoing objectives? The President might want to consider some like these:

Illustrative Strategic Concepts

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17. Intelligence will be central to ascertaining the best course of action for the U.S. in any nation or region, and in any given contingency. Intelligence is what we can best provide any threatened friend or ally. Accordingly, first priority should be given to collecting and analysing information about people, places and events likely to affect achieving our objectives, and to disseminating intelligence to underwrite effective planning, diplomacy, and other actions.

18. Outside NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with few exceptions, the United States role should be to support another party, or a regional group, willing to act on its own behalf. Our main contribution should be to help others to help themselves. But our deeds and our word should leave no doubt in Moscow that use of Soviet military forces anywhere in the Third World will precipitate prompt counteraction, at a time and place of our choosing.

19. In supporting developing free nations, we must proceed

conscious of the real limitations upon our ability to act alone. Our aid should be selective, calculated to effect maximum deterrence among our antagonists, and greatest encouragement among our friends. We should try to obtain the cooperation of all advanced nations in proportion to their wealth, and to their economic and military capacity. Moreover, we should seek acceptance of responsibility by any free nation, whatever its wealth and state of development, to help another with money, manpower, or materiel, even if the donor can afford no more than token aid.

20. We should seek to obtain the cooperation of all nations to stop international terrorists, illicit arms shippers, and illegal narcotics traffickers. Particularly vulnerable terrorist targets, such as airliners and airports should be hardened by international compact. We should be prepared to support nations willing to cooperate, primarily with intelligence. And we should be prepared to act unilaterally as necessary ourselves.

21. We should maintain military readiness to attack with precision and discrimination to eliminate any direct threat to our homeland, but we should do so with mobile forces as independent of foreign basing as possible.

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Strategic Means

How can these concepts be translated into national power? Past Presidents, and occasionally the Congress, have translated a strategic idea --or "doctrine", as these are sometimes referred to-- into a capacity for action by one or more of the following:

(1) Reorganization. Setting up a special command apparatus to signify to prospective foes, and to Congress and the American people, watchfulness, and intent to use force if necessary. Examples are President Carter's establishment of the Joint Caribbean Task Force at Key West to meet anxieties generated by "discovery" of Soviet troops in Cuba in 1979, and President Reagan's assumption of the Carter Doctrine on the Persian Gulf by establishment of the U.S. Central

Command. An even more recent, and perhaps further reaching example, is the law establishing a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and authorities within the National Security Council to overwatch interagency actions on Low Intensity Conflict.

(2) Funding. Seeking extraordinary resource allocations to build new capabilities, as in the drive for a 600 ship Navy, or the Strategic Defense Initiative, or by canceling or postponing programs (e.g. B-1, Sergeant York).

(3) Diplomacy. Initiating action to alter strategic relationships by forming new alliances, revising old ones, or negotiating arms control agreements.

(4) Restructuring. Directing alterations of force structure as in the case of the recent Army initiative to form light infantry divisions, or the recent Congressional action to bolster Special Operations Forces.

(5) Redeployments. Changing the disposition of U.S. forces, such as moving the 7th Fleet to the Indian Ocean, or withdrawing a division from Korea.

This Committee has been at the center of strategic concept and action for the past several years. The attention you have directed to management of the Department of Defense, to the capabilities of our unified and specified commands, and most recently to organization to deal with SOF and LIC, has provided us all renewed strategic vision, and heightened awareness of what is necessary to pursue strategy, and, as importantly, what is superfluous or dysfunctional.

Since my charge was to discuss strategy appropriate for Low Intensity Conflict, I want now to focus on the recent legislation pertaining to that matter. The law gave a much needed boost to Special Operations Forces. It was an excellent example of addressing "how" in strategy, in that Congress mandated the establishment of a new unified command with a Commander-in-Chief, and a new Assistant Secretary of Defense, both charged with seeing to it that Special Operations Forces were properly

funded, structured, and readied for employment. If these do their job, they will also assure diplomatic action to guarantee access for SOF as needed.

But I doubt that the law did as much to enhance U.S. readiness for Low Intensity Conflict. The new Assistant Secretary of Defense has a legislated charter to concern himself with Low Intensity Conflict, but then virtually every other DoD official of comparable rank has overlapping responsibility, and Low Intensity Conflict is the concern of a number of Cabinet Officers other than the Secretary of Defense. The mandated Deputy National Security Adviser for Low Intensity Conflict is in a better position to deal with the interagency issues which LIC presents, and presumably the advisory board established by the law can assist the NSC in laying down a long range strategy for LIC. But unresolved are a wide range of questions, including how to organize to implement LIC strategy, how and for what to obtain funding, to what ends diplomatic action, and what forces where. To be sure, better SOF will help our LIC posture, but Special Operations are not synonymous with Low Intensity Conflict, and I fear that making SOF a better competitor for defense resources may make LIC less likely, in the shouldering among claimants, to receive the support it deserves within DoD, and less likely to attract Congressional interest.

As you well know *Special Operations Forces* are a unique set of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, with specialized training and equipment. *Low Intensity Conflict* is a form of warfare in which the U.S. deliberately accepts limits on the kind and amount of force it brings to bear. These distinctions occasion very different requirements and attitudes within the armed services, within the Department of Defense, and within Congress, as the following indicates:

	<u>Armed Services</u>	<u>DoD</u>	<u>SOF/LIC Law</u>
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES	Requires elites; services abhor elites	Prime actor	Supports, promotes; Provides ASD, CINC
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT	Requires non-elites; low priority	State Dept in charge; DoD in supporting cast	Constrains; provides NSC staffer, Board

Special Operations Forces have missions across the entire spectrum of war. Both U.S. SOF and their Soviet counterparts were conceived for the apocalyptic contingencies of World War III. Much of the capabilities with

which we endow our SOF have little or nothing to do with combatting terrorists, or training Third World forces to cope with guerrillas. Rather, SOF are organized and trained to lend an unconventional dimension to deterrence, and in particular to pose a threat of exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities to nationalist dissidence. To be sure, they are manned by the sort of individuals one would want on his team in any dangerous, chancy, unstructured operation, of the sort we have often had to mount in the Third World. But we must not equate SOF with counter-terrorist forces --although counter-terrorist forces are SOF-- and we surely must not consign them to the dustbin of "counterinsurgency". SOF are assuredly more catholic than "low intensity conflict."

It was the British, I believe, who first pointed out how useful it was for a nation possessing nuclear weapons to remind itself in its strategic doctrine that there are forms of conflict for which the possession of nuclear weapons is simply irrelevant --a number of possible cases of recourse to violence for political purposes which are unlikely to be deterred by a nuclear arsenal, nor resolved by its use. Frank Kitson's 1971 book, Low Intensity Operations, is a case in point. I do not know whether those who teach strategy at the Soviet equivalent of our War Colleges point out that the USSR's supporting international lawlessness, terrorism, and insurgency is a low risk, low cost way of achieving the stated objectives of Leninism. Soviet strategy in the Third World would certainly suggest that such is the case.

But note that the Soviets have not made extensive use of their "special operations forces" outside their borders (with the significant exception of Afghanistan). Rather, they have pursued their ends indirectly, through training, aid, and advice for Third World proxies, avoiding the employment of elite combat forces. The telling fact about the Soviet role in Central America is that two-thirds of their nationals in Nicaragua are in a military field-hospital in Chinandega: they appear before a people sensitive to foreign domination as benefactors.

The United States ought to approach low intensity conflict no less thoughtfully. We can not pursue our objectives in the Third World exclusively with the Peace Corps on the one hand, or the Green Berets on the other. We need a broader range of instruments for creating and maintaining the security shield for development than recourse to Special Operations Forces alone.

Two years ago I imposed on this Committee the following chart, a depiction of a continuum of possible wars, or war-like uses of violence in which U.S. interests might be involved:




FIGURE 4

The continuum is shown as broken to suggest that there is a categorical difference among conflicts pitting U.S. forces against those of the Soviet Union, or of another power armed with weapons of mass destruction and intercontinental ranges, and conflicts with lesser adversaries. After all, U.S. troops have not exchanged shots with the Red Army since it skirmished with the Michigan National Guard in the winter of 1918-1919, and going to war against the Soviets themselves would be to cross a significant, long-standing "firebreak." Similarly, we may be confronted with other enemies who could attack the U.S. itself with chemical or nuclear weapons. In this paradigm, "low intensity conflict" occupies the left sector, where probability of occurrence is high, but intensity, referring to use of weapons of mass destruction, relatively low. "Low intensity conflict" then includes both terrorism and guerrilla warfare, as the following diagram suggests (Figure 5):




FIGURE 5

Note that I categorize any use of conventional forces for fire support or maneuver as mid-intensity; hence, as I see it, Grenada and Tripoli are outside the rubric of "low intensity conflict" (but I know that there is not general agreement on that point).

We can now visualize what sort of forces one might need to enact the concepts for achieving our national objectives. There are two contextual imperatives: (1) strategic or national intelligence, which provides a means of assessing threats, of anticipating their actualization, is essential for deciding if, when, where, and how to commit U.S. forces; (2) mobile forces, especially naval forces which can collect intelligence and convey to potential adversaries our potential for using force should our interests so require. Admiral James Watkins, the former Chief of Naval Operations, used this construct for naval contributions to Low Intensity Conflict (Figure 5A):




Figure 5A

But if our fundamental goal is to help others to defend themselves, then our own forces would avoid direct action except in those rare circumstances where speed, surprise, or lack of alternative dictates the use of our own Special Operations Forces. Rather than engagement (fire support or maneuver), the force functions most likely to be needed ashore are security assistance, intelligence, and communications. On the following diagram (Figure 6), I have portrayed U.S. force functions in the order in which they are likely to come into play inside a country afflicted with Low Intensity Conflict:




FIGURE 6

I believe that adroit use of U.S. forces capable of performing the cited non-combatant functions in Third World countries might obviate the need to proceed beyond logistical support of indigenous forces to use of U.S. General Purpose Forces for fire support or maneuver.

I regret to say that professional colleagues have obscured this issue by justifying the Army's new light infantry division on the grounds of utility for "low intensity conflict." One way the Army's natural repugnance for elites manifests itself is in a propensity to advertise all infantry as elite, and to claim for light infantry attributes one would be pleased to have in Rangers or Special Forces.

The facts are, of course, that light infantry divisions were built for strategic mobility, designed to deploy in a specified number of C-141's for use in intercontinental force projection to meet conventional threats. Their training may harden them to SOF standards, but I find it hard to conceive of useful missions for light divisions in "low intensity" conflict. It is fallacious to assume that readiness for one form of warfare automatically insures readiness for another; I suspect that readiness to defend the defiles of the Zagros is questionable preparation for serving on a Mobile Training Team in El Salvador, or even for securing an airbase in Honduras. As for fighting, we would no longer be talking about LIC. U.S. combatants would transform the intensity of any conflict. Any time a U.S. infantryman dies in combat anywhere, we will be impelled to wage mid- or higher intensity

warfare, to use ordnance in quality and quantity which almost surely will escape sensible definitions of "low intensity."

The diagram emphasizes the importance of Security Assistance, Theater Intelligence, and Communications, and each deserve comment as elements of readiness for Low Intensity Conflict:

Security Assistance. The second of the "Illustrative Strategic Concepts" set forth above stressed helping others to help themselves. That is, of course, the fundamental premise of the "Guam Doctrine", a strategic concept which President Nixon and every President since has espoused. Given the increasing diversity of the world, and the growing limitations on American military power, such a concept reflects the only realistic way we can play an active role in the Third World. We and our friends face increasing threats from internationally supported subversion, terrorism and criminality. As a strategic response, we have little recourse beyond helping those friends to deal with the perpetrators within the framework of their own laws and culture. Our alternatives, passivity or unilateral action, are unattractive, and would almost surely eventuate in more violence, at higher levels of intensity.

My impression from teaching and speaking around the country is that most Americans agree that we ought to provide Security Assistance. But it does not seem to have solid support in the Congress. Security Assistance is provided for under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, as a part of "foreign aid." In the Budget, it is classified as "International Affairs" (Budget Function 150), not "national defense" (Budget Function 050). Twenty-five years of Congressional compromises have layered over the procedures for devising, reviewing, and justifying expenditures under the law to the point that, in my judgement, the resultant program is overly rigid, and no longer responsive to strategic reality. Let me be clear, however, that I believe that the several Administrations must bear responsibility for this state of affairs with the Congress.

In recent years, most Security Assistance funds have been spent as quid pro quo for overseas bases (e.g., Spain, Portugal, the Philippines, Korea), or to Cain/Abel pairings in which we seek to bribe one of a fraternal pair to eschew attacking another (e.g., Egypt/Israel, Greece/Turkey). Very little is left for Third World nations struggling with Low Intensity Conflict. The following chart (Figure 7) portrays how little is set aside for Africa

and Latin America; the diagram is based on figures which exclude Economic Support Funds, but show funds for Military Assistance, Foreign Military Sales Financing, and Training:

FY86 Security Assistance (proposed)




Figure 7

The Administration's total proposal for Fiscal Year 1986 Security Assistance (which are the latest figures I have to work with) amounted to some \$6 billion. But within that amount just 6 nations were allocated over 80%; Egypt and Israel received more than half:

FY 86 SECURITY ASSISTANCE	
<u>% Total Program</u>	
Egypt	22.0
Israel	33.0
Greece	7.6
Turkey	10.8
Portugal	2.7
Spain	<u>6.7</u>
Subtotal	82.8%

Figure 8

But issues concerning Security Assistance are much more profound than simply cutting the resource pie, or arguing over whether the pie should be bigger or smaller. Even if budgets were not likely to grow smaller over the coming years, the United States can no longer be of much material help to any Third World nation wrestling with Low Intensity Conflict because this nation no longer produces the sort of inexpensive, simple, rugged military equipment they require. Even more crippling, we charge too much for services, such as training and transportation.

Let me give an example: anyone who travels in the Third World appreciates that in most countries the sinews of nationhood include a fleet of rickety, but still-serviceable C-47 (DC-3) aircraft, built in the U.S. 3 or 4 decades ago. LIC crisis thrusts on any developing nation urgencies for use of air transportation --for them, those old two-engined, unpressurized C-47's constitute strategic airlift. But we now have no American-manufactured aircraft which is a modern equivalent of the C-47 in versatility of operations, simplicity of maintenance, ease of manning, or cost of operation. The current U.S. Air Force counterpart, the C-130, is much too complicated and demanding for most Third World countries, and when we present aid-clients C-130's, as we did to Chad a few years ago, we hang an economic millstone around their neck. Since 1966 there has been a recognized requirement within the U.S. armed services for a fixed wing air transport capable not only of freight and transport duty, but also use in medical evacuation, communications relay, reconnaissance, and fire support. Because of competing demands for funds, and the lack of a constituency for so modest an airlifter within the Air Force, we still have nothing to fill that requirement, a "Third World airlifter" to offer LIC-beleagured friends anywhere.

I do not see how any Administration could implement the "Illustrative Strategic Concepts" above without some substantial revision of the Foreign Assistance Act as it now stands, a revision which would permit the Administration to engage our military professionals and American industrialists in imaginative, extended research and development programs seeking rational sets of equipment germane to LIC, some of which might then be manufactured overseas by one of the industrializing nations of the Third World. The strategic objectives and concepts under discussion would be the more viable were we thus to extend the notion of collective security within the Free World to include cooperative programs for integration into our Security Assistance --meaning that we ought to set out, deliberately

and energetically, to help others help others.

Theater Intelligence. That intelligence plays a critical role in Low Intensity Conflict seems a truism, but there is a difference between the sort of intelligence which is available to the United States on a day-to-day basis, from our national collection systems or from our military forces in their normal pursuits, and the kind of detailed, fine-grain intelligence which can be generated by activating an intensive collection and analysis effort within one of the regional unified commands. The United States has had among its armed forces resources which might be used for such purposes, of proven efficacy, but currently scarce. By and large, they were brought into being for other purposes, chiefly as a hedge against high intensity conflict, and their diversion to LIC tasks entails acceptance of risk. Military intelligence units are often awkward to host abroad, equipped and manned as most of them are for missions in more intense warfare. Non-military intelligence services, and some Ambassadors, are understandably often reluctant to employ them. But I believe that developments in communications and processors (computers) now make it possible to contemplate new, economical intelligence architectures very different from the past.

Communications. To meet the exigencies of LIC, the President should seek, and the Congress should support, a National Command Communications System which makes possible secure image-conferencing among Ambassadors and CINC's abroad with officials of the several Departments and agencies in Washington, the better to exchange information and judgements, and to evaluate collectively fast-moving situations. State Department communications have, in my experience, been inadequate for the task; DoD communications are more versatile and reliable, especially for intelligence dissemination. Intelligence is, after all, information that has been sifted, transmitted, and placed between the ears of a decider or operator. But we will not have effective intelligence for LIC, in my view, until we remedy three major deficiencies in DoD communications:

(1) Most DoD assets have been reserved for the contingencies for mid- and high intensity conflict, and have been only reluctantly and sparingly made available for LIC situations.

(2) Most are expensive, complicated, and manpower intensive, buttressed as they are against electromagnetic pulse and the energetic high

technology countermeasures of a world-power adversary.

(3) Most are not welcomed in Embassies; diplomats have been prone to resist installing communications which they do not directly control.

But we are entering into an age of communications plenty; we need but a plan for exploiting technology. Communications for supporting LIC functions need not be provided at the expense of other missions, and need not be either expensive or complex.

Other Force Functions for LIC. Civic Action, the provision by military forces of aid to the populace, is a contentious undertaking. Most Ambassadors and AID Country Directors look upon it with suspicion that it lead to the military's usurping projects which should properly be performed by civilian agencies or the private sector. When it comes to using U.S. forces in civic action, these complications multiply. But if civic action projects be carefully selected, military forces will be assigned tasks only when and where there are no civilians to perform them. As far as U.S. forces are concerned, civic action projects overseas often provide opportunities for training unavailable in the U.S., given the EPA and other constraints on what military units, such as engineer battalions or well-drilling detachments, can do at home station.

I have mentioned four other "force functions --possible U.S. force contributions to coping with low intensity conflict:

Construction
Medicine

Mobility
Logistic Support

Were the Administration so to direct, and the Congress to support, I am convinced that the United States could:

- Acquire capabilities to communicate broadly and effectively with peoples anywhere on the surface of the globe.
- Greatly increase our own capabilities, and those of foreign governments, to develop and act on intelligence on terrorists, guerrillas, and international criminals.

- Develop and teach pioneering and construction techniques which could significantly change the orientation of foreign armed forces.
- Create similarly useful medical cadres and medical service organizations within foreign armed forces.
- Modernize and rationalize logistics within foreign forces, to the betterment of their military efficiency, and the improvement of their nation's economy.

The payoff for such a strategy would be more free nations, and confounded and deterred terrorists, insurgents, and traffickers. The payoff would be diminished chances that U.S. armed forces, SOF or any others, would have to be committed to combat.