

SPEECH BY L/GEN GORMAN TO C&C
FT LEAVENWORTH, 21 JAN 81

Those of you with recent experience in Germany will understand the difficulty that the 8th Division has had with its sobriquet. "Pathfinder," auf Deutsch "Pfadfinder," communicates as "Boy Scout," so, whenever I was introduced in German, I always came across as the Commander of the 8th Boy Scout Division. I sought in vain to explain something of the history and traditions of the Division to my German colleagues, and I vividly recall on the occasion of a meeting downtown with the Oberburgermeister getting involved in trying to explain the Division motto, which is "These are My Credentials". The motto stems from an event in 1944 when a general from the 8th Division went to take the surrender of the German officer commanding the long besieged garrison of Brest, and the German commander demanded that the Pathfinder General, show his credentials. Pointing over his shoulder to three riflemen with M-1s standing behind him the General said, "These are my credentials." The Oberburgermeister listened patiently to me, and in subsequent remarks himself sought to explain all of that to the members of the city council. He chose, and this sort of shows you the hazards of translation, he chose, rather than a literal translation of "these are my credentials", to use the biblical quotation "Am Fruchten, kann mann sie erkennen" -- "By their fruits ye shall know them." Major Willer, my introducer, is indeed one of my credentials as Commander of the 8th Division, and he and I both wish to report that the Oberburgermeister's fruit version is wide of the mark.

My purpose here today with you is to proceed on from remarks that were made to you, as I understand it, by General Warner, the Commander of USREDCOM, and General Otis, the DCSOPS. As I have it, both of these commented to you about joint operations and referred in particular to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force with which I have some passing familiarity and at least a remote responsibility. I appear before you today as a contributor to your strategic studies course. I have been provided the advanced materials that you students in the course have received, which I have perused with interest. I understand that at least some of you have already met and discussed the subject of this talk, which has to do, in particular, with the US strategy in the Middle East. The remainder of you, I gather, will be tackling that topic for the first time today. I think those of you who have taken a glancing blow at the subject will agree with me, at the outset, that we're dealing here with a very thorny problem. There aren't any ready answers; at least, I can assure you there aren't any in Washington, so if you found any here in Leavenworth let me know. The purpose of my talk is not to provide answers so much as it is to indicate to you how, conceptually, we are approaching the problem, to outline for you the considerations that we

have brought to bear; to lay before you some of the ideas or planning factors, as well as to describe the procedures that we use in planning, to the end that you will have some notion of how it is that we, in Washington, go about addressing so difficult an undertaking as prospective military operations in Southwest Asia.

TASK: YOU LISTEN TO ME TALK

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Now, I also noted with interest as a former TRADOC trainer, that the training developers had gotten into the tissue-issue.

TASK: YOU LISTEN TO ME TALK

CONDITION: AM, BIG BEDROOM, UNCLASSIFIED

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I am pleased that the conditions are a morning talk as opposed to an afternoon talk, when the numb feeling in your nether extremities tends to get into the space between your ears. I want you to appreciate both in this front-end discussion and in our subsequent dialogue/question and answers, that I have agreed to do this on an unclassified basis. That will impose upon me certain strictures. I've been, because of my recent experience in the CIA, so used to thinking classified that I scarcely present a greeting card to a friend without putting a classified cover on it.

TASK: YOU LISTEN TO ME TALK

CONDITION: AM, BIG BEDROOM, UNCLASSIFIED

STANDARD: FINISH TOGETHER

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In any event, if you get through listening before I get through talking, we didn't do it right.

**DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
MIDDLE EAST ASSESSMENT (P 514-5)**

- U.S. INTERESTS/OBJECTIVES IN ME? IN SWA?
- THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS/OBJECTIVES IN REGION?
- DECLARATORY OR AGREED COMMITMENTS TO ME/SWA?
- CONFLICTS BETWEEN ME/SWA COMMITMENTS AND OTHER GLOBAL INTERESTS?
- CURRENT U.S. POLICY IN ME/SWA?
- CURRENT U.S. MILITARY POSTURE SUFFICIENT?
- UNILATERAL FORCE OF RDF CONCEPTS VIABLE WITHOUT RELIABLE REGIONAL FORWARD BASES?
- WHAT CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY AND MILITARY POSTURE ARE REQUIRED?

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Now, these, as I understand it, were the sort of questions you were asked to address. These are all tough issues, and once again, I don't have any quick and ready answers. All I can do, I think, is show you how we're thinking about the answers.

SLIDE 5-

Let me be clear at the outset that there are probably as many approaches to this problem as there are experts offering opinion on it. For instance, some in the oil community regret that we are attempting to talk in Washington about military operations in Southwest Asia. They profess to believe that regardless of who, politically, is in charge of any one of the oil producing nations we will be able to buy oil from them, and they believe that militarizing the problem would be exactly the wrong way to go. They would prefer simply to deal with OPEC on their own terms, and to buy the oil on whatever basis they are able to work out through the world oil market. Similarly, the Department of State, and some Ambassadors in the region rue the fact that we are even discussing military operations in Southwest Asia, as they believe that militarizing the problem may in fact create political conditions the very opposite of what we would intend to promote via such military operations. And, of course, the intelligence community would have you believe that forwarning is the crucial element in the equation--there is a great deal to be said for that. We have been badly surprised in this region. The history of our intelligence undertakings in the Middle East is as bad as that of anybody else: the 1973 war to point, the fall of the Shah to point. Everyone of the other responses listed have their advocates. I want to spend some time today, not

addressing the top responses because those are outside of my purview. Rather, I want to talk to the lower range of responses because those are all matters upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been called upon to provide advice, this is what the Joint Staff does.

Now, if I had to select one visualization of the problem, I would use this one. The arrows are drawn proportionate to the volume of the flow of oil, and I think that this shows you vividly the prominence of the Perian Gulf area in the world oil supply. Note, though, that the amount of oil that flows into the United States is about as much as we get out of Nigeria or a number of other places around the world. In other words, Persian Gulf oil is not significant for the United States itself. Note, too, that the bulk of it flows to Western Europe, and another prominent portion of it goes to Northeast Asia. Now, I scarcely need to remind this audience

that the United States is pledged to the defense of Western Europe and pledged to the defense of Northeast Asia. The security of those two regions depends importantly upon access to that oil. You cannot run the economies of Western Europe, or the economies of Northwest Asia without it. It is the dependence of our allies upon Southwest Asian sources of oil that really lies at the root of US military concern for Persian Gulf oil.

Let's, if I may, take you back to US military policies since World War II. We came out of the war, of course, with a monopoly on the nuclear weapon, and a strategy of providing for defense of the homeland, essentially through nuclear deterrence. By 1947, however, it came apparent that military policy was vacuous, for thereby we would risk the fall of one or several of the European countries with whom we were closely tied, culturally, economically, and politically. So beginning in 1947 we began a steadily increasing American commitment

to the defense of Western Europe, which matured into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its military instruments. I underscore the fact that at the time we embarked on that commitment with the Truman Doctrine, the Vandenburg Resolution, and the Marshall Plan, we did not have the military forces to execute the policy. In fact, NATO's military arm came into being in 1948, within a month of Louis Johnson's being sworn in as Secretary of Defense, and when the United States was heading for the defense budget of 1949, it's historic post-World War II low. We had fewer divisions, fewer ships, fewer wings on duty in the active forces than at any time since. We certainly had no force, to speak of, in Western Europe to back up our declarative policy. By 1952, however, that had all changed and changed rather dramatically. In effect what we did was to bring back into being the mechanisms that had assured us victory in World War II. We got Dwight David Eisenhower out of retirement, dusted off his old shoulder patch, brought into existence again Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE) and went back into business with the coalition that had won victory in World War II. We could draw upon very useful precedents with coalition warfare, and residual overseas forces and base structure -- not much, but to be sure, we had a structure in Europe with which to start. By 1952 the security of Western Europe was buttressed not only by nuclear weapons, but by the presence of newly mobilized American divisions on the ground in Western Germany.

SLIDE 8-

Similarly, you will recall, the policy that we pursued in the Far East after World War II. The Joint Chiefs of Staff went on record in 1947 that the United States should not commit itself to the defense of South Korea, we then pulled our troops out of Korea. In 1950, early in the year, the Commander in Chief in the Far East, General MacArthur, and the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, both on separate occasions, re-enunciated as US policy that the US defensive perimeter ran through Japan down through Okinawa, included Taiwan, but that it specifically excluded the Asian mainland. North Koreans, listening closely to these pronouncements, acted. In June of 1950 they drove across the 38th parallel into South Korea. President Truman, in a remarkable and courageous decision, turned around our military policy and strategy, and sent American forces to the assistance of the Republic of Korea. Again,

our forces were not ready. There were four Army divisions in the Pacific, all undermanned, badly trained, and poorly equipped, the Air Force was not in much better shape. And yet, within a matter of months, June to September, again evoking a combination that had won the war for us in the Pacific, General MacArthur was able to build forces to mount the amphibious landing at Inchon, to crack into the rear of the North Korean invaders, to drive them back across the 38th parallel. Thereafter, building upon those forces, many of them newly mobilized, building upon the base structure and the depots in Japan, we have maintained a military presence in Japan and on the Korean peninsula which has assured the security of Northeast Asia.

Let no one in this auditorium doubt the importance of the security of Northeast Asia to that of the United States. Japan is, today, after Canada, our largest trading partner. Yet US forces in the Western Pacific are now fewer in number (and I am speaking of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) than at anytime since 1945.


In recent years we have come to speak of US strategy as a "one and one-half war strategy", referring thereby to a military policy which underwrites a capability to fight a major war on the continent of Europe, plus another war, seen

by the planners as something less demanding in another place, notably Northeast Asia. But, of course, events have conspired to render that particular formulation of American strategy as obsolescent, outdated, and inadequate, at least since the Iranian revolution 1978-1979.

SLIDE 9-


Where we are today, ladies and gentleman, is that the United States has at least three strategic zones or prospective theaters of war other than the defense of the United States and Canada: a strategic zone in Europe and the North Atlantic; a strategic zone in Northeast Asia; and now a strategic zone in Southwest Asia. It is the latter, of course, that poses for us the greatest challenge. Where is the coalition, the precedent that we can evoke usefully to underwrite a military policy for the region? There is none. Where are the bases? As you will see in my subsequent remarks, they are few and far between. Where are the successes, the military concepts that we can evoke to

provide for the defense of our interests in this region? There are none. They will have to be devised, made up as we go along, conceived by planners. Ladies and gentlemen, whether you realize it or not, you, in a very short time, some or maybe most of you, will be involved in this planning, in one way or another. Even my good host, the doctor, is one of a group of planners challenged here as they have seldom been challenged, for medical insufficiency, as we shall see in a moment, is one of the grave shortcomings that we have to cope with in contemplating military operations out there.



This is a region which has been a traditional meeting place between the civilizations of the West and the civilizations of the East. I trace on this map the campaigns of Alexander around 330 BC. As you can see, he made a landing in Asia Minor, driving down through Turkey into Mesopotamia. Here the Battle of Arbela. Then on down into Babylon, in what is now Iraq and thence across into Persia. This is near Susangerd, where recent tank battles have


been taking place. Thence through the Persian gates to Persepolis, the Capitol of Persia, near the Iranian city of Shiraz, north up through the present site of Tehran, through the Caspian gates into what is now Afghanistan, down through Afghanistan, Pakistan into India. The Battle of Hydaspes, familiar to many of you, took place on the Hydaspes River, a tributary of the Indus. Thence back out of India and Pakistan to Persepolis again, and then back to Babylon, where he died in 323 BC. Alexander's Greece was a western power who attempted to modernize the Persians and came a cropper because of inability to cope with the intricacies and uncertainties of Persian politics. This map is also interesting because I think it communicates usefully to you some of the realities of the terrain in the region.



Here is another map of Iran, drawn to scale on a map of the United States. Up near Seattle you can make out faintly the city of Tabriz. Tabriz sits adjacent to the Soviet-Iranian border, it is the site of the Iranian ordnance school, a school which incidentally was unique in that the

faculty included American, British, and Soviet military, in addition to the officers and NCOs of the Shah. Tabriz, on the border, had been under Soviet dominion as recently as 1945. Soviet armed forces in Tabriz were removed through action of the United Nations, in one of its first interventions against a threat to international security after the establishment of peace in 1945. Directly to the north of Tabriz lies what the Russian armed forces refer to as the Transcaucas Military District. Now, the Transcaucas Military District has been, as you intelligence experts I think will agree, a kind of backwater of the Soviet forces. It was the sort of a place to which you send the Major, after you tell him "you're going to go far, Major." It was the last to receive any modern gear; it didn't train very much; it was sort of a sleepy outpost of the Soviet empire. Well, all of that has changed and changed dramatically over the past two years. The Transcaucas Military District got an infusion of talent from the group of Soviet and German forces direct, officers and NCOs. It greatly enlivened its training and began to take aboard quantities of new and modern equipment for its motorized rifle divisions, for the artillery, for the frontal aviation, and for the communicators. You see some of their late model communications gear down there. In brief, they have built up a force that has high offensive potential.

And yet, for that force to contemplate an operation through Tabriz to Bander-e-Abbas, which lies on the Strait of Hormuz, down at the southern extremity of the Persian Gulf. Bander-e-Abbas would be, in effect, paydirt, the warm water port that all Russian Empires have desired throughout history. But to do that they would have to conduct a land campaign that would be the equivalent of attacking from Seattle to Albuquerque across the Rockies--a rather interesting military undertaking.



The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been concerned with the defense of this region for a long time. I show you here a map that dates from 1952. The underlying features of the map are contemporary, but the data in red, are taken from a briefing presented to the Secretary of State in 1952. A group from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by General Omar Bradley, went over to the Department of State. My predecessor the J-5, who also happened to be named Bradley, General Slayden Bradley, presented their strategic concept for the defense of the Middle East. Their concept,

which they called the Defense of the Outer Ring, depended upon bringing into being forces that could defend positions from Bandar Abbas in Iran (and there you see the Straits of Hormuz, the putative objective of the Soviet campaign just discussed) up to the Sylian Pass in Turkey. Their strategy was plainly a coalition strategy, for efficacy, it relied upon Turkish and Iranian divisions. Ruandiz, incidently, is the pass through which one passes to Arbela, where Alexander fought his battle. The Sinon, Partak and Kormamabad passes were recent objectives for Iraqi forces driving into Iran. In effect, if you want to cutoff the oil rich region of Iran you seize Ruandiz pass. One can hold the passes through the Zagros Mountains with relative ease. Also, interestingly, in this strategic concept the Joint Chiefs of Staff drew upon plans that had been prepared by the British Chiefs. In their appreciation of the Middle East, very similar to this, they talked about an outer ring, positioned on the terrain features shown, and an inner ring, but the inner ring was drawn around the Suez Canal and embraced what we would call today Israel and Jordon. It elided concern for the oil areas. By 1952 it was clear to the strategic planners of the United States that our policy had to look to defense of those oil fields, which are the dark areas around the Persian Gulf. So perhaps as you look strategically at the region, you may wish to at least start at that outer ring position; it worked in 1952, and I find it strikingly contemporary in the work that I pursue in Washington.

"CARTER DOCTRINE"

LET OUR POSITION BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR: AN ATTEMPT BY AN OUTSIDE FORCE TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION WILL BE REGARDED AS AN ASSAULT ON THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. IT WILL BE REPELLED BY USE OF ANY MEANS NECESSARY, INCLUDING MILITARY FORCE.

PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER
STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS
23 JANUARY 1980

022-12

In his State of the Union message, just one year ago, the President of the United States stated that we would use military force, if necessary, to preclude the establishment of Soviet hegemony, or that of any other outside power, over the Persian Gulf region. Now, there are a lot of people in the press, television, and in the Congress, who profess to be worried over the fact that United States Armed Forces do not have the capability to do much about that. Again I underscore my earlier remark that the declaratory policy of President Truman in 1947, and indeed his later decision to intervene in Korea, were scarcely based on a firm basis of military capabilities, I would represent to you that our capabilities to act on President Carter's declaratory policy of 1980 are far greater than were those of the Armed Forces of 1947 or 1950.

SLIDE 14-

Our interests in the area are these, simply stated. You should appreciate, however, that this simple formulation may obscure a whole forest of difficulties. For example, we are supportive of the political independence of the state of Israel, and that is an objective far removed from the purposes of many of the states in the region, particularly the Arab states. We would support by any and all means a stable relationship among the states of the region, but you need to remember how violence prone the region is: Lebanon, versus Syria, Syria versus Jordan, Arabs versus Israelis, Arabs versus Persians, Iraq-Iran war, etc. Beyond it all, however, going back to my earlier map, we have an interest in preserving access to oil for ourselves and for our allies. Now let me amend, slightly, an earlier remark. I pointed out that oil on the Persian Gulf was not crucial

to us: that's true in absolute terms, but we get our oil from the world market. Were internal instability in a major oil producing nation to cause a perturbation in the world oil market, or were there to be a war in the Persian Gulf region of such magnitude that the tankers would no longer traffic in the Persian Gulf, or such that the Lloyds of London raised their insurance rates so that ships would not go in to remove the oil, in such instances, we, along with our allies, would suffer, and suffer grievously. We have stored collectively, the United States, Western Europe, Japan, somewhere between 100 and 200 days supply, at peacetime consumption rates. If we were involved in military operations at the same time, if there were simultaneous crises in this region that interrupted the flow of oil and some other military crisis which upped our oil consumption, of course, those supplies would go substantially less far.

SLIDE 15-

Here are the threats to US interests in the region. I have arrayed them in the order of probability of their occurrence. It goes without saying that many of the nations in the region are threatened from within, and that none of them are proof against external threats. US concerns, as far as military planning is concerned, however, are directed to the lower two threats, the least likely case, if you will. Much of, almost all of, our military policy is designed to deter Soviet intervention in the region, to deny them the useful fruits of such intervention, to defend the region if need be against such intervention and, of course, if we enter, to defeat Soviet forces.

Now, to be sure, we are involved in buttressing the security of states in the region against intra-regional conflict. You are aware of the deployment of our E3A AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia to assist in the air defense of that nation, as an example. We are also, to a certain extent, involved one way or another, with Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and a number of other states in the region. Our fundamental purpose, however, remains to extend the mantle of our security to the region to deter Soviet intervention, confident that if we can do that we have made it possible for states in the region themselves to deal with the first two threats.

SLIDE 16-

Now, as one proceeds from those sort of general statements of objectives to questions on how to structure US forces, on what kind of force you need, on what should be their doctrine, and so on, one has to confront these sorts of issues. I don't believe that I need to emphasize to those of you here who are in any sense professionals in land warfare, how crucial the answers to these questions are. The naval planner and the air force planner may tend to regard some of these questions as less than acutely important at this time, something that can be deferred sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. That is, they hold that once we get involved we can sort these matters out. But these questions are crucial to land forces and have to be answered in our planning now.





Figure 1. A Model for Defense Planning

* POLICY GUIDANCE FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING SPECIFIC
 - JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP)


I am going to impose upon you a very complicated diagram which appeared recently in the Chief of Staff's Weekly Summary. It is a diagram from which General Meyer likes to talk, and I hope I am not preempting any of his discussion. But it is central to my telling you how I go about doing my joint business. Up here in the shaded area, I show that part of the planning process in Washington wherein we receive civilian guidance for resolving the issues that I listed on the previous slide. The civilian leadership of the United States, identified here as the National Command Authority (NCA)--referring to the President, Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council, (NSC)--provide specific guidance to the military forces through the Office of the Secretary of Defense, OSD, in two forms: one is through the so called Consolidated Guidance. This ladies and gentlemen, is guidance which bears on requirements and futurities; that is what

it is we are going to buy in the future, as opposed to capabilities, that is what we can do today. The latter is dealt with through the Policy Guidance for Contingency Planning, a document supplemented by a series of oral transactions, usually between the Under Secretary for Policy and yours truly. The guidance comes down indicating what kind of capabilities the Secretary believes we ought to have. He speaks, of course, to us through the Under Secretary, presumably with the full authority of the NCA and the NSC. In turn, as we act on that guidance, the Chiefs of Staff brief back to the Secretary what they have done about it, and again that usually takes the form of an oral transaction between me and the Under Secretary for Policy.



The next step in the process is to take the Policy Guidance for Contingency Planning and translate it into useful guidance for the use of the fellows that actually

do the planning, the Commanders in Chiefs, like General Warner or General Kelley. In doing that, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the Services, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and the Coast Guard, provide guidance in the form of a document called the Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP).



The Chiefs, looking at missions and resources, provide guidance in the JSCP for the preparation of contingency plans. And these pertain, ladies and gentlemen, again, to capabilities, current forces already provided for in the budget (we say current and budget because it means not only the forces that are in existence today, but those that will be provided for in the coming fiscal year). Obviously, in preparing these plans, the CINC's have to examine the fundamental alternatives that are available for planning

purposes, which might dictate (1) forces which are firepower heavy, that is to say, have a lot of naval and air units; (2) which are heavy with indigenous forces, that is to say, pursuing a coalition strategy, depending heavily upon our providing assistance to forces already in the region, or which are (3) manpower heavy, with lot, of land forces, or which, of course, could include forces equipped for nuclear warfare. There are other options, but these are the major ones.

Now again, going back to an earlier remark, naval and air forces tend to look pretty much alike. No matter what option you select, there are just more of them in some options than there would be in others. But it makes a devil of a lot of difference how you structure the land force depending upon the option that you select. Note also that there is a continual problem of fitting the mission to available resources; that is what this feedback arrow implies. The guy that's doing the planning, General Kelley, or any other CINC, would come back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to address misfits (note also that there is a feedback loop where they can let the Joint Chiefs of Staff know that the guidance they got at the outset is inadequate). That would permit me to go back to the Under Secretary, or get the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally to address the Secretary in order to get that guidance changed if need be.

FRAMING A FEASIBLE STRATEGY

- **BOUNDS ON FORCES**
 - **COMPETING MISSIONS WORLDWIDE**
 - **OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY**
 - **ABILITY TO DEPLOY AND SUSTAIN**

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We then proceed to framing the strategy, and by that terminology I mean trying to find a strategy that fits the guidance and is doable. The first planning step (I would commend it to you, indeed, in any kind of planning that you are doing, whether it's at battalion level, or at the one-over-the-world work that we do in J-5) involves our looking for the bounds on our forces, or as it's referred to locally, the limiting factors. First thing we run across of course is that there are numerous demands on American forces other than the demands for a particular theater, which is why I began this discussion by running you through all that history of NATO and Northeast Asia. We also have to examine the operational capability of the forces, particularly land forces, because the mission and capabilities that we ask of the land force commander determines how we build that force

mix. As we shall see that critically effects our ability to deploy these forces and to sustain them once they are deployed.


POWER PROJECTION ADVANTAGES

<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>
• PROXIMITY	• STRATEGIC AIRLIFT
• SUBVERSIVE/INTELL NETWORKS	• SEALIFT
• MILITARY MATERIEL READILY AVAILABLE FOR AID	• SEA-BASED AIRPOWER
• REPUTATION AS SUPPORTER OF 'PROGRESSIVE FORCES'	• AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT FORCES
• 7 AIRBORNE DIVISIONS	
• SURROGATES	

022-122 0

Let me talk a little bit about the latter two points just to give you some idea of the range of considerations that bear on those two issues. First of all, a net assessment of our ability to put forces into Southwest Asia vis-a-vis these comparisons is germane. We have definite advantages in absolute terms, power. US strategic airlift dwarfs that of the Soviet Union, our sealift is significantly greater, our seabased airpower is clearly superior, our amphibious assault forces are plainly better, although the Soviets are modernizing their naval infantry and coming along quite rapidly. The USSR, on the other hand, has all of the points listed on your left going for it.

SEALIFT TO THE PERSIAN GULF




US			USSR		
ORIGIN	DISTANCE(NM)	DAYS	ORIGIN	DISTANCE(NM)	DAYS
BERBERA	1,800	4	ADEN, PDRY	1,500	3
DIEGO GARCIA	2,100	4	LATAKIA, SYRIA (W/SUEZ)	3,600	9
MOMBASA	2,500	5	CAM RANH BAY	4,200	9
SUBIC BAY	4,700	10	SEVASTOPOL (W/SUEZ)	4,800	10
NORFOLK (W/SUEZ)	8,100	18	VLADIVOSTOK	6,400	13
NORFOLK (W/O SUEZ)	12,100	25			
OAKLAND	10,700	22			

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If you were to look at sea distances, however, you can begin to see how distance affects the equation. From our pivotal Pacific base in Subic Bay in the Philippines, into the Persian Gulf region is about ten days. Incidentally, this chart is, I believe, calculated at sixteen knots, which may understate our wartime capability, for if you steam at max speed and don't take into account oil consumption, you probably get there faster. But these are useful planning figures. Note that that is about the same steaming time as the Russians need to move materiel out of Sevastopol down through the Suez and into the Persian Gulf region. The significance of that, of course, is that Sevastopol is the region from which the Russians have been shipping the bulk of military equipment that they have been providing to the Ethiopians and other clients in the Middle East. Some of


those other time factors are important for you to understand. From either the US east coast or the west coast it's more than twenty days—a long way. Note also, that Berbera in Somalia, Mombasa in Kenya, and Diego Garcia are pivotal to our strategy or posture in the region. Notice also Cam Ranh Bay: those of you who served there should recognize that it is now a naval station for the Soviet Navy.

SOVIET VS US AIRLIFT CAPABILITY: f (RANGE)



Now, I made the point that Soviet airlift capability is dwarfed by that of the United States, and that is true. At comparable ranges, at any given range, we can lift a lot more than the Soviets can. But the range from the United States to the Persian Gulf puts us way out here on our curve, while the Soviets operate right here on their curve, lifting just about twice as much as we can in the same time into the Persian Gulf region. They are operating on the short end of their curve and are able to use their tactical airlift for strategic purposes.


REQUIREMENTS VS CAPABILITIES



Similarly, if you put both airlift and sealift together, and you compare that with your ability to input men and materiel into the region over time, you quickly discover that your ability to deliver to the theater is substantially less than what commanders would like to deliver to the theater in the same period. The shape of these curves is driven, first, by the relatively small inputs that one gets with airlift alone; then the slope increases rather dramatically as sealift begins to take effect. I think you are all aware that we have prepositioned at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, for example, seven ships full of military equipment for a US Marine force which could be brought to bear in Southwest Asia in four or five days; that helps to run the slope of the curve up. Note also, however, that there is an area which portrays materiel

things and folks being lifted to areas other than the Persian Gulf. These deployments would cover the prepositioning of military airlift command personnel and gear to assist in the onward passage into Southwest Asia, the positioning of fuel at enroute airfields, and conceivably the implementation, at least in part of other contingency plans. For example: raising the readiness of forces in Europe at the same time that we go into Southwest Asia. Let's face it plainly, if we have to go into Southwest Asia given the circumstances under discussion, we will be confronting the Soviet Union directly. American forces have not been in combat with the armed forces of the Soviet Union since 1919. The day when that combat is threatened, that will, as was the case in Berlin, be a day in which we face crossing a strategic threshold of some magnitude, and obviously we have to take that into account in our plans.

RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE CONSTRAINT PROFILE (U)



This chart would normally have marching across the top division equivalents referring to land forces, Army or Marine, and tactical fighter wings, referring to Air Forces (Air Force, Marines, and conceivably Navy). Plotted against these, the planners would have to array the limiting factors, or constraints, which put the bounds on how many division equivalents or how many wings, etc, you can get into the region. I've listed on the left some of the more important constraints that bear on our present capability. You'll note also, that as planners, we discriminate among capabilities that would have some risk to other theaters. For example, at the top is listed the water capability we could deploy to Southwest Asia with some risk to other theaters. The cross-hatched areas indicate where we could deploy only with great risks to other theaters; for example, major end items or POL dispensing equipment fall into that category. As we proceed with planning for these operations, we identify constraints or limiting factors precisely so that we can go back to the Secretary of Defense for his requirements planning, saying we need to buy more water equipment, or we need to buy more repair parts, or we need to improve our ammunition posture, or we need to deal structurally, as this indicates here, with the insufficiency in our present force structure for operations in a primitive theater.


Going back in history of the strategy of the military policy of the United States since 1947, we have been dealing, by and large, with theaters in which we had an existing base structure and in which we were able to appeal to indigenous forces for substantial amounts of what is referred to, clumsily, as host nation support. To put it bluntly, the nations of Western Europe underwrote most of the activities that the United States Army provided for itself in World War II, the port companies, and the medical infrastructure, the truck companies, the transportation capabilities. Today, for example the POL dispensing system in Europe is a NATO system underwritten by NATO infrastructure. None of such will be available to us in this theater, or relatively little will be available from indigenous sources. To talk about hauling coal to Newcastle, we'll have to haul millions of tons of oil out there. Why? Because what is there is not in the form of JP4 or JP5 or other militarily usable POL products. Even so, we've got one devil of a dispensing problem once we get it there.

FRAMING A FEASIBLE STRATEGY

- **BOUNDS ON FORCES**
 - **COMPETING MISSIONS WORLDWIDE**
 - **OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY**
 - **ABILITY TO DEPLOY AND SUSTAIN**

- **AVAILABILITY OF SUPPORT**
 - **FORWARD BASING**
 - **ATTITUDE TO REGIONAL STATES**
 - **ALLIED SUPPORT**

Coming back to the bounds on our strategy, and how you frame that strategy the mention of host nation support takes us directly to a consideration of what would be available from our allies or friends. Well, the first and foremost concern, as was the case in Europe and Northeast Asia, is basing. There we also have encountered formidable obstacles and attitudes. In the first place, the picture out there has changed drastically since 1950, when we first started strategically to look to our posture in the Middle East.




You look in vain on that map, ladies and gentlemen, for any of those dark triangles, because there aren't any; there wasn't any Soviet presence in 1950.

**NAVAL FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO
U.S. AND SOVIET NAVIES - 1980**



Thirty years later, the picture has changed, and changed from our perspective, very much for the worst. Some of our recently negotiated arrangements are shown there. Incidentally, we refer to those arrangements as providing facilities, not bases, meaning that they remain under the sovereignty of the nation with whom we have negotiated them. We also imply with the terminology as sort of temporary, modest presence. We have negotiated facility arrangements with Kenya, with Somalia, and we propose to assist Somalia in modernizing to some extent the naval base at Berbera. We have negotiated facility arrangements with the Sultan of Oman, and, of course, we have had a long standing arrangement in Bahrain for the use of our naval forces. The UK's Diego Garcia, down in the center of the

Indian Ocean, is the mainstay of our presence in that area. The Soviets are much better positioned, obviously, than they once were, with strong positioning around the Straits of Bab el Man Daab, at the mouth of the Red Sea, and a strong position in Southeast Asia enroute to Vladivostok.



Now, I show this as perhaps the most useful single depiction, other than the oil chart, in of all of these slides-in an attempt to portray how an air line of communication would be established from the United States into Southwest Asia. You are talking about, an order of magnitude of 100 flights a day. You are not going to fly all of our aircraft, all of the way without stopping; we just don't have enough tankers to do that. So we need enroute airfields. Those airfields, obviously, have got to have stocks of petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and maintenance facilities sufficient to sustain such a flow of aircraft. Here I show

an air line of communication coming out of the United States, transiting the Atlantic, stopping perhaps at the Azores, elsewhere in Portugal, Spain, Morocco, Italy. But the straight route, to Egypt and thence to Southwest Asia, that's the preferred way. Now, because any one of the airfields on that route today does not have enough POL stocked, and doesn't have enough apron room to handle that volume of traffic, you need a lot of enroute stops, a lot of alternates. Weather alone would dictate that for prudence sake. And obviously, you don't want to have the stream go back through the same enroute fields, because that complicates all of the aforementioned POL and space problems. So, you have to think about this as a kind of a triangular relationship with the outbound flights going in on one route and then the returning flights being routed back through Europe. We will need to have our allies in Europe tolerate overflight and use of our NATO bases, and to assume with us the consequent risks of Soviet-Warsaw Pact reaction. This may be the most vexing problem that we face, because we're not dealing here with new prospective allies, we are dealing with our traditional allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, trying to communicate to them our desperate need. In order to build a military posture in Southwest Asia, we need to use bases that were established for the defense of Western Europe and the North Atlantic. We've got to have those, if we're going to have a viable policy.

My staff officer explained to me, in no uncertain terms, that I had to stop talking by 11:00 and I assured him that I was used to getting across my message in 20 minutes or less. I'm sort of in the position of Mr. Breznev, who raised Cain because a speech that had been written for him to deliver to the Presidium had been particularly long, and all the bulls in the PolitBoro had gotten restive. He laid it on the staff that next time he wanted a half hour speech. This job was given to a young major who had newly joined; the major wrote the speech, and practiced the timing; he even got a guy that mimicked Breznev to read it, so that he thought he had the timing down. Breznev went out and talked for an hour and half, came back in, and again raised hell. They brought out the young major, and this was just before he was sent to the TransCaucasus. He told Breznev that he had followed procedure exactly; he had written the speech, he had practiced it, he had tested it, and submitted it to the Chairman's office in triplicate. But Breznev had read the original and the two carbons.

FRAMING A FEASIBLE STRATEGY

- **BOUNDS ON FORCES**
 - **COMPETING MISSIONS WORLDWIDE**
 - **OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY**
 - **ABILITY TO DEPLOY AND SUSTAIN**
- **AVAILABILITY OF SUPPORT**
 - **FORWARD BASING**
 - **ATTITUDE TO REGIONAL STATES**
 - **ALLIED SUPPORT**
- **TIMING IS CRITICAL**
 - **NCA DECISION**
 - **POWER PROJECTION SPEED**
 - **PREPOSITIONING**

We may have been ill advised, ladies and gentlemen, to use the terminology Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, because timing is indeed critical in our responding to any threat in the Middle East. Now we can, within current capabilities, respond rapidly. General Warner is fond of saying that if we can't have the better part of a division out there within 72 hours, there is legitimate reason to question our professionalism in meeting our responsibilities. He and I think we can but the quickness of response is less the issue than our ability to sustain the force once it is there, and less the issue than fundamental decisions about what it is that you want the force to do once it is on the ground. Nonetheless, the points that are made on the bottom of the chart are important. The speed of decision will be pivotal. And the point on prepositioning, as in the case of the near term preposition ships, indicates that we can make substantial money, substantial strategic coin, if you will, by prepositioning some or all of the gear that we need in the region as a surrogate for having a base structure there. That prepositioning can be, as we have demonstrated with the seven ships at Diego Garcia, that is, aboard vessels.

Now, I'm going to stop talking at this juncture so that we'll have a few minutes of questions at the end. There is a great deal more, obviously, that needs to be said about this whole issue. There are profound differences to which I

have earlier alluded in the approaches of the Armed Services to planning for this business. They are not the differences, however, that are portrayed in the press. I find much closer identity of view between Marine planners and Army planners, than I do with my colleagues of the Navy or the Air Force, and we could perhaps explore those differences in your questions. One might wish that those differences did not exist. Certainly some in Congress and some in the press would have it otherwise; they would have us go the Canadian route, eliminate all distinctions among the Armed Services, put everybody in a sailor suit and wish your problems away. (Sort of like the manufacturer that wished he could hire machinists with micrometers for left hands). But the fact of the matter is that sailors and airmen come with a whole set of prejudices, attitudes, traditions, and sound ideas about the employment of their forces which just happen to be different from those of us who have to deal with the land force problem. So I, as the joint planner, and you who will succeed me in this planning business, just have to live with the fact that there are differences, profound differences, among the Services, important differences in approaching a planning task such as we have here. And I would say for the good of the nation we ought to preserve, guard, and listen carefully to those different voices as we tackle this task. Let's stop for a break if we can.

QUESTION: This may be a little bit low in this strategic planning levels for you, but a little while ago we deployed some forces to Egypt. On the front page of the paper a couple of our sterling soldiers made the comments that, "I got dirt in my rifle", and "my uniform was the wrong color". I was wondering what your feelings are on that and how things like that can happen.

LTG Gorman: I am the co-chairman of a group in the Department of Defense that is known as the Power Projection Coordinating Group. This is a group that meets at least every other week. It includes all the public affairs people, the congressional liaison people-the guys that are concerned with external relations. I made a set of representations to the group within the past two weeks in which I read a number of such statements and said it is deplorable that that is the best face we can put on in what was a very significant deployment. The last time that we had forces in the Middle East, land forces, was Lebanon in 1958. The exercise you refer to was a military exercise, conducted with the Egyptian Armed Forces. It involved the Egyptian Air Force, the United States Air Force, and our own land forces, including elements of LTG Kelley's command. Perhaps the most useful comment on the exercise came from the Egyptian side and it was to the effect that they found the exercise very reassuring. Their greatest apprehensions, it

seems, lies in the prospect of their having to relive the relationship that once existed between them and the Soviet Union. They remarked that at all echelons, from company commander up to the most senior Egyptian that visited that exercise (and who subsequently came to the United States to communicate the same message) that they were delighted with the professional bearing of our soldiers and officers. They were particularly delighted with the relationship that had been struck again at all echelons between the two forces. And what the force did was great: the FTX included a combined night air assault. I've run a few of those operations, but I did it all with US pilots and US forces, and I can tell you it is difficult enough to try and coordinate that thing with your own troops. What they did was a rather remarkable professional achievement, and I regret with you that what came out of it was somewhat distorted. There really is a story to be told and I think one of the lessons we should learn from that kind of an exercise is to work very hard to get the entire story out to the public.

QUESTION: Can you tell us something of the decision that was involved in committing the AWACS system to Saudi Arabia, and what the reactions of the nations in the region were to that?

LTG Gorman: I have to speak very carefully for obvious reasons. First, those of you who are familiar with the Saudi defense system are aware that the defenses of Saudi Arabia, particularly the air defenses of Saudi Arabia, are oriented fundamentally to the south and to the north. They are not clustered in the northeast. When the war broke out between Iraq and Iran, the Iranians were quick to point out that this was a conspiracy launched by the United States; and that (a) we were using the Arabs as our chosen instrument and that (b) therefore, the Iranians would have everyone know that they were going to punish all concerned. Not very good news for the Saudis whose oil shipping facilities at Ras Tanura and other places along the coast, lie just forty minutes from the nearest Iranian air base, where there were clustered a good number of the F-4s that we had provided the Iranian Air Force. Therefore, the Saudis came to us, and asked that we do something to help them provide for improved air defense. They had seen the AWACS before. Some of you may be aware that this is the second deployment of the E-3A to Saudi Arabia as we had put it in before in the instance of a threat from Yeman. The Saudis knew the capabilities of the system, asked for it, asked also for TPS-43 radars to extend their early warning net. But they also knew that the AWACS was the quickest way of establishing sure surveillance out over the Gulf, so that they would have the early warning

that would permit them to scramble their F-5s in order adequately to provide for the defense of their country. We were able to respond affirmatively to that request and there are four E3As still deployed in Saudi Arabia, still performing the function of providing early warning to their Air force.

QUESTION: I spent the last three years in Air Force Studies and Analysis. One of the problems that we've always been studying is the difference between capabilities and requirements, whether it be movement by sealift or by airlift. One of the questions that I've always been asked is since you do not have the capability to move at the requirement, what impact does that have on the outcome of the war. I never had the answer, sir, and I was wondering if you might have one.

LTG Gorman: I made the point earlier that we ought to preserve the distinction among the Services. I'll respond on two planes, but let me first deal with the institutional issues. The other day at the farewell ceremonies for Secretary Brown, the Honor Guards representing the Coast Guard, the Air Force, the Navy, the Marines, and the Army were arrayed in order from the most junior to the most senior of the services. In the finale, after playing "Auld Lang Syne," they played the music of each of the Services on down the line and I found myself thinking the refrain of "off we go into the wild blue yonder--nothing can stop the

Army Air Corp". I often tell what is no doubt an apocryphal story of the former Chief of Staff of the United States Army, Malon Craig. It is reputed that General Malon Craig, on his death bed in the late forties, gathered his family around him for his last farewells. There he lay, the maciated old soldier, trembling hands on the counterpane, his son leaned over and he said, "Dad, do you have any last words for the Army?", and he said, "Yes, we should never have let the bastards out of the Signal Corp."

But let me respond on a different plane, to thank God for the Air Force, because if it had not been for the serious attention that has been given to the issue of air lift during all the years when that was not number one on anybody's hit parade, we would not have today the capabilities that were evident in last falls Autumn Forge exercise series, where the 82nd Airborne Division conducted an airdrop into Central Europe directly from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. And I can say that all the rapidity that is in the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force stems, by in large, from that careful regard for the requirements for airlift and the defense of some that the Air Force has undertaken, by in large, on behalf of the Army. We have a lot of tension between the two Services because, you know, almost invariably the Army doesn't think they put enough in their budget for that purpose. But you have to say, on balance, that they have defended our interests remarkably well.

We're about to go into another round of controversy over this with the so called Congressionally mandated study of airlift, which is an attempt to project a scenario, sort of like that chart that I showed you earlier in which the US would have to use a lot of airlift in a great hurry. It asks the question "what's the most efficient way of responding to the scenario, what mix of aircraft for airlift, and types of ship for sealift, and sealift and airlift considered together is best for the United States?" We have a rather large number of folks in the Joint Staff, J-5 and J-4, working with the Air Staff, the Army and the Navy Staffs, coming up with an answer to that. You'll be reading about this particular study, as this is the one in which the next generation airlift aircraft will be at issue. You'll be reading a great deal about that in the months to come. That study is very germane to the considerations that I put before you here, and central to our acquiring a capability to respond to a situation such as we now face in Southwest Asia. Let me emphasize, that by the time you get to where I am, there is very likely going to be some different circles on those charts of strategic zones, very different circles, and they are very likely to be as remote and as unstructured, in terms of base infrastructure, as Southwest Asia is for us today. We are going to need that airlift and we're going to need an Air Force that is doing cogent

planning, and an Air Staff that knows how to sell a next generation airlift machine to the Congress of the United States.

QUESTION: On your chart you showed the vast quantity of Persian Gulf oil going to NATO countries. What is their attitude towards insuring the availability of that oil and are we doing any planning with them along the same lines as you discussed.

LTG Gorman: I will leave Friday for the annual NATO Planning Symposium. Unless the new administration comes forward with a civilian delegate, I will be the ranking member of the US team from Washington. This is the annual get together that does the spade work for the spring Ministerial Meeting, which establishes policy for the NATO countries. I hope to be able to get at least a proxy from the incoming administration to go over there and discuss with NATO the set of considerations that I've put before you here today. Indeed, many of the same slides will be in play, if I get this proxy. I believe that it is absolutely crucial that we carry the message to NATO, that minimally we need their support for enroute access and return access for basing. You will recall that in 1973 there was much discussion in the European press about the United States using Europe as an aircraft carrier for its military ventures in the Middle East and a lot of objection to our withdrawing materiel from depots in Germany, for example, tanks, APCs, ammunition

items, etc, and moving them to Israel. We've got to lay the ground work for getting, minimally, NATO's acceptance to taking a far different attitude toward all of that. We need the enroute access, we need them to provide stocks of POL assistance with maintenance to handle the high flow, we need certainly their tolerance of our using depots in Europe for contingencies in the Middle East. Both stocks of ammunition and materiel in Europe are, after all, halfway there. And we need, moreover, a far more constructive approach to coming to grips with the oil crisis than we have seen from them thus far. To give you one quick example, the country that has suffered the most from OPEC oil price rises within NATO is Turkey. And that chart of the outer ring strategy demonstrated that no military position that we could take up in the Middle East would mean much unless Turkey's security is better assured. And yet Turkey today has something less than a weeks supply of oil, and Turkey's economy is racked by the oil price rises. So NATO, in self interest, it seems to us military planners, ought to take a direct interest in succoring Turkey in her present extremes. And there are a number of other cases where the same thing might be true.

QUESTION: I, too, have been dying to ask the following question of someone in the higher level representing, by the way, the infinitesimally small jewish lobby in Fort

- Leavenworth. Is consideration being given to the possibility that Palestinian westbank autonomy or independence might lead to Soviet penetration of the area?

LTG Gorman: Last Monday, as it happened, I found myself at a breakfast meeting of the foreign policy seminar of the Anti-defamation League of B'nai B'rith Washington. I was, to my surprise on the podium along with former Defense Minister Rabin and Senator Scoop Jackson. In fact Senator Jackson and I did a "Pat and Mike Show" in which we answered such questions as, "General, to what extent does antisemitism figure in American strategy?" Let me answer that question, and then I'll come around to the west bank. To my knowledge, aside from the modest tremor that ran through the policy community back when General Brown made his statement about who owned the banks, antisemitism has figured in American strategy and policy only in the sense that there is virulent antisemitism in the Mid East among many of the countries that we wish would ally themselves with the United States. It is indeed a major bar to our making progress with our relations with the Saudis or the Omanis or with any of the other Moslem countries of the region. So it is a factor with which we have to reckon constantly. And indeed, it figures in answers to other related questions, as you know. "Why don't we go further and faster with the Israelis, for example, use bases in the Sinai?" It's precisely

because our Arab colleagues wouldn't tolerate that, or would drastically and balefully affect the relations between us and the oil producing states. So we go very slow with that kind of business. Now, on the specific issue of the west bank policy and its relationship with Soviet penetration. A way to respond to that is to say that the Soviets pursue in the Middle East, as they do in many regions of the world, a policy of unrelenting pressure. They push hard at every place they possibly can. They push as hard as they can, and they will go as far as they can without meeting resistance. Henry Kissinger is very vocal on this point, most recently on his swing out through the area as the, quote, unofficial, unquote, representative of the new administration. He emphasized that one cannot understate the danger to any part of that region of the extension of Soviet influence. They will go as far as the locals let them go, and, further, the locals have learned, to their sorrow, that a close relationship with the Soviet Union usually adds up to a disaster for themselves. The Soviets soured their relations with the Egyptians by heavy handed Slavic treatment of the Egyptian Arabs. The Soviets similarly fouled their own nest in Somalia. There is some indication that they may be enroute to doing the same thing in Ethiopia. So the history for the Arabs ought to be plain: buy into that and buy a lot of grief. Nonetheless, as is the case in Libya and Syria, as was the case with Iraq, the leadership of some or several Arab groups may see no prospect save a close communion

with Moscow. There may be those in the Palestinian movement who would make league with the devil. What we've got to do is keep in front of such leaders the history of Soviet policy in the Mid East and do what we can to offset or mitigate the effects of such influence.

QUESTION: Why does the US seem to hesitate to ask the NATO allies to identify or commit combat forces to support us in any action we might go into in the Middle East and also, what are we doing to get the Japanese to play their part in this same problem?

LTG Gorman: You have to understand that the United States isn't united: there are all kinds of voices within our own government, and with NATO. Many in Washington and Western Europe will be quick to say that the problem in the Middle East is economic: never mind who runs the country, they'll sell us oil if we pay enough, and we'll pay any price rather than have a Soviet-US confrontation in the Middle East. Many in Washington and Western Europe will say that the problem is political and there has to be a way, they will say, of balancing Arab, Israeli, and Persian interests and animosities so as to bring about a state of affairs which will permit us to have access to oil. That kind of tight political rope walking is better, by far, than our throwing the 82nd Airborne, or the 101st, or the 1st Marine Division around the Middle East. To put it bluntly, many of those

sentiments have been echoed in Foggy Bottom. Many of them had adherents in the National Security Council Staff. Many of them have supporters on the staff of the Secretary of Defense. But understand that these are differences of opinion among reasonable men. The guys who argue this way are not scurrilous, they are not dumb. They are indeed, many of them, much better informed than some of us in uniform, and they speak, in many cases, from years of experience in dealing with the nations in the area. They are voices, therefore, that have to be heard and reckoned with, and taken into account as we plan. That's what makes this policy and planning game what it is, a moving game, in which you must be prepared to cope with all kinds of views other than what's described in the usual manual on military staff planning. You just have to be able to deal with diversity. It's not because they don't want us to succeed in what we set out to do, it's just that they want to be certain. And they should be supported in that their point of view is considered by the National Command Authorities when and if they make a decision to commit forces. I hope that that is all thought through before we send the first soldier into combat.