

**Second Place Submission**

**Major Erick Sweet**

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**The True Meaning of Balance:  
The Leadership Challenge of Executing Full Spectrum Operations**

## **Abstract (Summary)**

As U.S. Army forces are asked to accomplish increasingly diverse and complicated missions as part of full spectrum operations, leaders are challenged to provide forces that are trained and ready to execute those missions. Short deployment timelines, mission complexity and eroding institutional knowledge all exacerbate the problem. Leaders are growing up in a single-minded environment where counterinsurgency is the name of the game and core war fighting competencies are slowly eroding. Are we falling into the age old trap of fighting the last war at the expense of being ready for the next one, or in this case fighting the current war at the expense of the next one? The Army of tomorrow demands adaptive leaders that can balance all aspects of full spectrum operations while maintaining mastery of traditional combat core competencies. In other words, Army leaders must find a way to be the jack-of-all-trades and master of all, not the masters of none. By focusing on the following five key areas, leaders can achieve full spectrum operational success without sweeping changes in force structure, troop strength or doctrine. These five areas are: focusing on core competencies, outsourcing to coalition partners and NGOs, improving indoctrination of junior leaders, leveraging combined arms training to its full capacity, and maximizing existing policies and doctrine to achieve full spectrum operational balance.

## **The True Meaning of Balance: The Leadership Challenge of Executing Full Spectrum Operations**

The 105 main gun thundered a round down range. Sergeant First Class Smith backed away from the sight and shook his head slowly. “Did we hit, Sergeant?” asked his company commander. “Nope,” he answered, “well to the right.” “What does that mean?” asked the young Captain. “It means that we are Q2 at best,” the Sergeant sighed. “Never done that before,” he muttered. “Q2?” the Captain asked. “It means we have to try again till we get it right. Haven’t you ever done table VIII gunnery before, sir?” Sergeant Smith asked. “Sergeant, I have been on two Iraq and one Afghanistan deployments so far in my career, but aside from OBC, this is the first time I have been to the field like this, let alone shot gunnery!” retorted the Captain. “Oh no!” groaned Sergeant Smith, “Can’t wait to see how we do with artillery fire and attack helo talk-ons next week.” “What was that?” asked the Captain. “Nothing, sir!” he responded quickly, knowing full well that the short comings of the crew were not the Captain’s fault. “It’s a good thing I decided not to retire,” he grumbled to himself as he grabbed the radio hand mic to report their miss.

While the previous vignette is fictitious, it does highlight a growing problem for Army leaders. That problem is how to successfully balance all aspects of full spectrum operations during a time of non-traditional war. The Army’s current op-tempo and a counterinsurgency (COIN) focus have produced an entire generation of leaders who know little beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. They are unbelievably adept at tailoring their resources to address the complex problems of a COIN environment, but at what price? As the Army looks forward to future conflicts, the atrophy of our most basic war fighting competencies heralds ominous tidings for potential future fights. Army leaders are faced with the daunting task of mastering all aspects of full spectrum operations while sustaining an ongoing COIN focused war. Thus, the question is: How do Army leaders maintain balanced readiness across a full spectrum of potential future conflicts without sacrificing the current fight, or vice versa?

This article will seek to first define the leadership problem as it relates to execution of full spectrum operations while sustaining a COIN-focused war for the foreseeable future. Second, business examples, historical precedence, and existing Army doctrine will be examined to highlight potential solutions. Lastly, specific recommendations will be outlined to achieve balanced full spectrum operational success during a time of protracted war.

## **The Problem Defined**

As the nation entered its eighth year of combat operations in Afghanistan and its sixth year in Iraq, Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey admitted that the Army was “out of balance.”<sup>1</sup> While most Soldiers understand balance to mean balancing family and profession, the true balance to which GEN Casey is referring is the ability to execute all aspects of full spectrum operations during a time of ongoing war. Specifically, he stated concern over how to maintain competency in basic traditional war fighting skills while simultaneously waging a COIN and stability focused war.<sup>2</sup> In fact, he specifically addressed the issue in his Army Training and Leader Development Guidance, stating that any unit home for greater than eighteen months should execute a minimum of 90 days of high intensity conflict training to re-gain lost war fighting skills.<sup>3</sup> This lack of balance is the product of a prolonged war against terror with a focus on COIN and stability operations. In accordance with the latest Army doctrine, COIN and stability operations comprise only a fraction of those competencies required under full spectrum operations.<sup>4</sup> While Army leaders have become adept at maneuvering the complex COIN battlefield, they have done so at the expense of their basic traditional war fighting skills. So, how can leaders better frame this problem of balance to better address full spectrum operational leadership solutions?

First, Army leaders must address what full spectrum operations really are. Loosely paraphrased, Army Field manual 3-0, *Operations* defines full spectrum operations as simultaneous defensive, offensive, stability, and civil support operations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to attain decisive results. The definition also acknowledges the importance of both lethal and non-lethal actions to achieve success in an ever changing operating environment.<sup>5</sup> In summary, full spectrum operations demand that Army forces be adept at a full range of skills, mission sets, and environments to achieve victory. Considering the scope and depth of full spectrum operations, Army leaders find their core competency list growing to include both traditional war fighting and nontraditional stability skills.

Previous Army doctrine focused almost exclusively on traditional offensive and defensive operations. With the introduction of nation-building and stability operations in the Balkan region in the mid-nineties, the Army soon

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<sup>1</sup> Tom Bowman, NPR.org, *America's Broken Army, Part 4*, “Army Chief Of Staff Casey Defends Iraq Decisions”; 15 January 2009; available from <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99397348> ; Internet; accessed 8 April, 2009.

<sup>2</sup> General George W. Casey, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, *Address to the 2008 Army Aviation Association of America Annual Convention*, National Harbor, Maryland, April 6, 2008.

<sup>3</sup> General George W. Casey, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, “Army Training and Leader Development Guidance”, August 13, 2008.

<sup>4</sup> FM 3-0 *Operations*, Chapter 3 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2008), 3-7 to 3-19.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 3-1.

recognized that basic war fighting skills were not sufficient to address the complex nature of stability operations. Civilian considerations such as governance, reconstruction, culture, and economics all reared their heads and demanded attention. The result was that Army leaders were forced to engage in a multitude of areas, many reaching well beyond the traditional combat roles they were used to performing. The American Soldier had become more than a warrior. He now had to balance his war fighting skills with new roles as an ambassador, government advisor, economic advisor, basic service provider, and cultural expert. In short, Army leaders had to be expert in high and low intensity combat operations, stability operations, and civil support operations; in other words, full spectrum operations. In many cases, leaders were poorly equipped or trained to perform many of these new roles. Most had to rely on personal initiative, trial and error, and good old on-the-job training to get it done.

Do these new roles fit with the Army's overarching mission? FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* opens its first chapter with the quote, "The primary mission of the Army is to fight and win the nation's wars."<sup>6</sup> However, if one were to read the actual Title 10 Army mission as outlined in FM 1-0, *The Army*, one would see that the true mission and mandate from Congress is broader in scope. This is evidenced by the Title 10 U.S. Code mission statement below:

"It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of -

- (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;
- (2) supporting the national policies;
- (3) implementing the national objectives; and
- (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States."

Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 3062 (a)<sup>7</sup>

While there is a clear reference to overcoming those that pose a threat to U.S interests, it is important to note that there is also room for execution of a multitude of other, different tasks as part of full spectrum operations. For example, it could be argued that a leader who finds himself or herself overseeing the installation of a sewer system in a Baghdad neighborhood is providing long-term stability for the Iraqi people in accordance with stated U.S. foreign policy. Thus the leader would be directly supporting the second and third tenets of the Title 10 mission and is therefore in direct support of the Army mission despite being well outside the traditional role of fighting and winning the nation's wars. The reality is that warfare is becoming more complex in nature, and now encompasses considerations not formerly associated with

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<sup>6</sup> FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, Chapter 1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2008), 1-1.

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Code, Title 10 – Armed Forces, Sub-title B – Army, Part I – Organization, Chapter 307 – The Army, Section 3062 – "Policy; composition; organized peace establishment", Sub-paragraph (a).

fighting and winning wars. While this interpretation of the Title 10 mission statement is certain to raise much discussion, one fact is clear: U.S. Soldiers will continue to be asked to perform roles beyond their traditional war fighting competencies for the foreseeable future.

If the Army will continue to conduct full spectrum operations for the foreseeable future, then the issue becomes how to properly prepare its forces. In many cases, op-tempo does not allow for training on all aspects of full spectrum ops due to the rapid turn-around times between deployments. Thus, units are forced to focus their limited training time on those skills most relevant to their next deployment. Since COIN and stability operations are the focus for nearly every operational deployment, those skills are highlighted. The Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) model attempts to address training for full spectrum operations by allocating separate core and directed mission essential task lists (METL). The core METL focuses on all aspects of full spectrum operations, while the directed METL narrows the focus based on known operational missions. The problem is that most units can only execute directed METL tasks due to short home station times, high personnel turbulence, and lack of equipment resources due to Reset. Thus, COIN and stability operations dominate home station training for most units. As such, traditional core combat competencies are eroding.

This fact is exemplified in a white paper authored by three former Brigade Combat Team commanders entitled, “The King and I.” The basic premise of the article is that the COIN operational focus and its accompanying requirements drive field artillery (FA) units away from their basic fire support core competencies, resulting in a potentially dire situation. These former commanders suggest that without quick and decisive action, there may be too few competent FA leaders capable of returning the FA force to an acceptable level of competency before the next conventional fight, or worse, that the branch will never recover its culture of providing accurate and timely fires.<sup>8</sup> This article exposes but one example of how basic war fighting core competencies have eroded during the ongoing war on terror. Nearly every Army unit has experienced some level of core competency erosion as a result of the ongoing COIN and stability focus. Many infantry units only execute one fire support exercise with their fire supporters before their next deployment, preventing effective synchronization of fires and maneuver. Aviation units seldom execute operations above the team level, thus degrading the ability to effectively mass reconnaissance or attack assets during high intensity conflict. In many cases,

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<sup>8</sup> COL Sean MacFarland, COL Michael Shields, COL Jeffrey Snow, White Paper, “The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders”, Document is not dated.

combat engineer units have not executed breaching operations, a basic combat function for combat engineer units, for months or even years.<sup>9</sup> Concern over combat skill erosion was echoed by the commanding general of the U.S. Army Armor Center at Ft. Knox, Major General Donald M. Campbell Jr., who suggested that the Army's focus on COIN has degraded many basic war fighting skills such as tank gunnery and basic maintenance functions.<sup>10</sup>

Exacerbating core competency erosion is the fact that an entire generation of leaders has grown up largely knowing only COIN and stability operations. Many leaders do not have high intensity experience from which to draw, and many senior NCOs, warrant officers, and officers that do have that experience are leaving the Army, moving up beyond the tactical level, or their institutional knowledge has atrophied. This degradation in traditional combat skills will be hard to reverse without sufficient resident expertise within the ranks. Just as the "King and I" article suggests, leaders without high intensity conflict training and tactical experience are soon to be battalion and brigade commanders. Their own COIN experiences will not enable them to train their formations on all aspects of full spectrum operations. In short, the focus on Iraq and Afghanistan has produced leaders with limited full spectrum experiences, and eroded combat competencies.

While the degradation of combat skills is troublesome, it is important to note that the Army's recent COIN and stability focus has some benefits as well. For example, leaders with Balkan, Iraq, and Afghanistan experience have developed superb flexibility, small unit independence, and adaptive leadership traits that spell success in any type of operation. These leaders have also been forced to experience the complex battle fields that are likely to persist in many future conflicts. Today's leaders are also far more adept at synchronizing multiple resources to achieve victory, including multi-national, joint, non-governmental, and interagency assets. This too is likely to translate well to other aspects of full spectrum operations. While each of these positives is encouraging, it does not fully compensate for the loss or weakening of traditional combat skills, and without direct action to reverse this problem, the Army will continue to see degradation in overall combat effectiveness.

Before exploring potential solutions to this balance issue, it is important to acknowledge that many obvious solutions are not feasible, at least not in the short term. For example, one solution might be to quickly increase troop

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<sup>9</sup> Steven Kolouch, Major, U.S. Army, Engineer Branch, Personal interview, February 11, 2009.

<sup>10</sup> Spenser Ackerman, The Washington Independent, "How Much Counterinsurgency Training?" November 11, 2008, Available from <http://washingtonindependent.com/17598/a-lesson-in-counterinsurgency> ; Internet; accessed 7 April, 2009.

strength within the Army to slow the op-tempo to allow for better full spectrum training preparation. However, this would require significant recruiting, retention, and budget increases to accomplish. Another solution might be to increase investment in technology systems to increase efficiency. This, too, is also fiscally impractical and counter-indicated by the increased human requirements in COIN and stability operations. A third solution is already in motion with a reduction in operational commitment in Iraq which will eventually relieve some pressure on existing Army units with respect to op-tempo and training time. This solution is problematic because of the corresponding uplift in troop strength in Afghanistan, thus producing a zero sum gain for the next two to three years. Most important, however, is the fact that all these solutions require significant time to implement. Senior civilian and military leadership are actively pursuing long-term solutions to address the current op-tempo, but none are likely to solve the issue in the short term. Thus, the Army must accept that these long-term solutions will do little in the near term to address the balance issue. Since the short term could mean several years, then the Army is obliged to address the issue of balance *now*, within current fiscal, personnel, and equipment resource constraints.

Therefore, based on the previous discussion, full spectrum operations leadership problem can be summarized into six parts. First, full spectrum operations include simultaneous execution of multiple complex mission sets with differing skill requirements, all of which achieve the Army's stated mission. Second, the Army will be asked to perform a myriad of roles across the full spectrum of operations for the foreseeable future. Third, the Chief of Staff's assessment is correct that the Army's balance between these roles is skewed. Fourth, a prolonged COIN and stability focused conflict has significantly eroded traditional core war fighting competencies. Fifth, COIN and stability operations have produced a generation of leaders with only stability and COIN experience. These leaders have internalized various skills as part of COIN and stability operations that do bode well for transition to other types of operations. Finally, any solutions will be constrained by limited Army financial, personnel and equipment resources. Now that the problem is defined, potential solutions will be explored.

## **Potential Solutions**

In analyzing the leadership problem of how to attain balance in execution of full spectrum operations, it is important to look beyond the normal scope of military solutions. Modern business, history and existing Army doctrine and policies all show promise in producing effective solutions. The following examples highlight some potential solutions and considerations for the problem of achieving full spectrum operational balance.

First, modern business acknowledges that to remain competitive in a firm's chosen market, the firm as a whole, as well as each of its employees, must recognize and concentrate on their core competencies.<sup>11</sup> If a company needs to be good at making laptop computers to compete, then it should focus on being good at lap tops, not main frames. Once a firm masters its core competency, then it can explore diversification. Similarly, if an employee is good at financial analysis, asking that employee to perform human resource functions may be problematic. Thus, firms and individuals must find what they must be best, and focus their efforts on those items. While this seems like an obvious statement, many firms experience difficulty in identifying and capitalizing on their core competencies. This leads to poor performance and loss of revenue over time. In military terms, this is the equivalent of mission failure. Some business models have suggested that core competency is more than pure knowledge. Knowledge is but the basis for action and eventually skill. To know something is one thing, to effectively execute it is another.<sup>12</sup> To properly gauge success in their stated core competencies, some firms have implemented a balanced score card to track and measure performance in pre-determined skills and competencies.<sup>13</sup> So what military application does this have for solving the full spectrum balance issue?

Loosely translating the above discussion into military terms, leaders must first identify core competencies to achieve full spectrum operational success. The recently published FM 3-0, *Operations*, FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, and FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* all make great strides in establishing effective operational doctrine to shape full spectrum operations. Specifically, FM 3-0 does a good job of outlining what the Army's operational and

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<sup>11</sup> Bai-Chuan Yang, Bing-Eng Wu, Pei-Gi Shu, Ming-Hsien Yang, "On establishing the core competency identifying model: A value-activity and process oriented approach," *Industrial Management & Data Systems*, *Wembley*: Vol. 106, Issue ½ (2006), pg 65, para 2.1.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, pg 60, para 2.1.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, pg 59, para 2.2.3.

general tactical core competencies are in its discussion of full spectrum operations.<sup>14</sup> However, the subordinate core competencies for tactical level combat, combat support, or combat service support units still require further definition. Additionally, traditional offense and defense doctrine should be revamped to address the current and future operational environments. What exactly are the core competencies for an engineer unit in stability operations? What are the core competencies for a civil affairs unit in high intensity conflict? The previous ARTEP and MTP manuals often served as the “balanced score cards” to assess unit readiness in each of its core competencies. These manuals need revision in order to serve that function again for the full gambit of full spectrum operations. While it is unreasonable to expect that any common doctrinal assessment tool can accurately address every possible competency required across all operational environments, it will provide a critical start point in defining the common core skills required. Many or most of these manuals are currently under revision to address the issues raised here, and once in place, these “balanced score cards” can help leaders focus their training and better assess readiness across the full range of full spectrum operations. Their effectiveness will be directly tied to their usage during CTC rotations and other capstone training events as the preferred metric for determining training status and readiness. While this may not solve the time issue for training, it will provide much needed focus for leaders to achieve specificity in what to train and to what standard.

A second potential solution modern business can offer is with respect to outsourcing. Outsourcing is defined as “the act of purchasing goods and services that were originally produced in-house from an outside supplier.”<sup>15</sup> For example, a firm may seek to outsource production of keyboards to install on their lap tops they produce rather than produce them themselves. They may also seek to outsource janitorial functions to a specialized janitorial firm, rather than maintain an internal janitorial staff. Outsourcing produces two key benefits. First, the firm can save money in salary and equipment if it outsources functions that do not support their core competencies. A firm that focuses strictly on keyboards may provide a better component at a lower cost than if the lap-top firm built the keyboards themselves. The second key benefit is that by outsourcing, firms can better concentrate on their core competencies. The end result is that the firm produces a better quality product at lesser cost. Again, how does this apply to solving the full spectrum balance issue?

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<sup>14</sup> FM 3-0, *Operations*, Chapter 3 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2008), 3-1 to 3-19.

<sup>15</sup> Roberta S. Russell and Bernard W. Taylor III, *Operations Management: Quality Competitiveness in a Global Environment*, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2006), 426.

Much like a firm seeking to reduce expenditures while increasing the quality of the product, the Army is seeking to reduce its time and resource commitments to increase its quality of its force. In other words, it is seeking ways to better support the mission while increasing its readiness across the complete range of full spectrum operations. One potential solution involves a loose application of outsourcing. Since we assume that the time and resources required to grow the Army in the short term are limited, one way to address our op-tempo and training issues is to build, maintain, and leverage coalition partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) better. In an effort to avoid a protracted discussion about the political and diplomatic complexities of building and leveraging coalitions, or the success or failure of previous administrations in that endeavor, we will simply acknowledge that coalition building is difficult and the forces provided do not always bring the capabilities we desire. That said, one can recognize the potential that coalition force and NGO involvement in current missions can provide to outsource certain mission actions.

For example, if NATO were to provide additional forces to the Afghanistan theater, several mission requirements could be outsourced to these NATO units. This would allow U.S. forces to concentrate on their stated core competencies of establishing a stable and secure environment and defeat of the Taliban, while elongating time between deployments to achieve better balance in full spectrum operations training. More specifically let's hypothetically state that NATO provided a Polish infantry brigade, an Italian reserve component logistics unit, and a German operational planning staff section. Further research and coordination with these units might show that the Polish brigade has extensive experience in base security, the Italian unit has a multitude of Soldiers with civilian airport administration expertise, and the German staff section is uniquely skilled at operational future plans. By identifying and capitalizing on these unit core competencies, leaders in Afghanistan could outsource base security in Kabul, APOD operations in Bagram, and select JTF J5 plans functions to these coalition additions. Each of these outsourcing actions would free up entire units or staff sections to focus on core competencies or to reduce deployment times to allow for better training focus on all aspects of full spectrum operations. Similarly, by coordinating and integrating various NGOs concerning humanitarian, agriculture, and human rights challenges, U.S. Army forces can outsource these critical mission requirements to organizations with the experience and training to best address them. This would free Army units to execute their stated core competencies. The more units and organizations we are able to integrate, the more relief is gained for U.S units with respect to op-tempo and focus on full spectrum core competencies. Again, we must recognize that this example is a gross over simplification of

how to integrate coalition units and NGOs, but it does highlight the potential benefit of leveraging them as an outsourcing solution to our balance issue.

A third potential solution can be garnered from the post-Vietnam issue of doctrine revision and leader indoctrination. The Vietnam conflict created an entire generation of leaders who knew small unit tactics, counterinsurgency, and jungle warfare quite well, but who lacked high intensity mechanized warfare experience to wage potential total war in Europe against the Soviet Union. Based on the events of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war in which Arab forces achieved significant military success against over confident Israeli Defense Forces (IDF),<sup>16</sup> TRADOC commander General William E. DePuy initiated a complete revision of U.S. Army doctrine.<sup>17</sup> Noting that IDF doctrine had stagnated prior to the 1973 Arab Israeli war and did not account for emerging anti-armor and air defense tactics employed by the Arabs,<sup>18</sup> DePuy sought to modernize Army doctrine to refocus leaders from Vietnam low intensity conflict to high intensity conflict in Europe.<sup>19</sup> While much of the resulting doctrine was denounced as too focused on war in Europe,<sup>20</sup> the process to revamp the doctrine did attempt to address an imbalance in leader competence, much like today. Moreover, the process of doctrine revision specifically attempted to address the erosion of high intensity mechanized warfare skill sets due to Vietnam. Considering the similarity to the issues facing the Army today, the events of the mid 1970s with respect to doctrine and leader indoctrination have direct application to the full spectrum operations balance issue.

Just as General DePuy recognized the competency imbalance in the post Vietnam Army, General Casey and others have recognized it during the Global War on Terror. Current Army doctrine revisions have effectively addressed many aspects of the balance problem. However, recognition and doctrine are only part of enacting a solution. Leaders today possess a limited breadth of experience, which while useful in its given scope, has limited application in other aspects of full spectrum operations. Without exposure to, understanding, and internalization of existing doctrine in all aspects of full spectrum operations, (referred to from here forward as “indoctrination”), leaders run the risk of becoming

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<sup>16</sup> Dr. George W. Gawrych, “The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory”, *H300: Roots of Today’s Operational Environment*, (Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 2008), 291-295.

<sup>17</sup> MAJ Paul H. Hebert, “Assessing the October War, 1973-1974”, *H300: Roots of Today’s Operational Environment*, (Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 2008), 301.

<sup>18</sup> Dr. George W. Gawrych, “The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory”, *H300: Roots of Today’s Operational Environment*, (Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 2008), 295-298.

<sup>19</sup> MAJ Paul H. Hebert, “Assessing the October War, 1973-1974”, *H300: Roots of Today’s Operational Environment*, (Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 2008), 301-308.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, 328-330.

singular in their scope of leadership experiences, much like many leaders in the post Vietnam era. Thus, a potential solution as derived from the events following the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 is to better indoctrinate leaders on the full range of full spectrum operations. The best Army doctrine ever written is useless if no one reads or understands it. More important still is affecting application of that doctrine. The benefit is that leaders better understand their core competencies and thus, they can more efficiently affect training as staff members or green tab leaders. They can speak a common language and internalize those key tenants of full spectrum operations that will achieve balance throughout their careers. A failure to indoctrinate leaves experience as the only mentor, which while powerful, has potential to be singular in scope.

One way to achieve effective leader indoctrination on all aspects of full spectrum operations is too elongate critical officer and NCO developmental schools to allow for full internalization of full spectrum operational doctrine. This may be a hard pill to swallow considering the enduring manpower shortage at all levels, but the reward may be worth the sacrifice. For example, in 2002 one branch chief suggested shortening or eliminating military decision making process (MDMP) training, stating to a group of Captain Career Course instructors that “We need to teach these Captains to do MDMP in five minutes,”<sup>21</sup> to which one of the instructors replied: “Yes sir, but how can they abbreviate a process they never fully understood in the first place?”<sup>22</sup> In other words, without proper time and effort dedicated to indoctrination, leaders will be unable to audibly follow that doctrine during mission execution. The vignette highlights a critical issue in proper indoctrination of our junior leaders. Many senior leaders take indoctrination of junior leaders for granted and seek to eliminate or shorten the indoctrination process to create time for applied tactical training. The reality is that both are equally important. As more leaders grow up without indoctrination, they create cultures in which doctrine is ignored and standards in execution of full spectrum operations vary greatly. Today’s junior leaders have become quite adept at solving complex problems without the benefit of applicable doctrine, however the cost is a lack of standardization and a singular focus on COIN and stability operations. This often results in learning the same lessons over and over, when proper indoctrination might have produced a standard start point.

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<sup>21</sup> Brigadier General E. J. Sinclair, Aviation Branch Chief, Meeting with AVC3 Small Group Instructors, Fort Rucker, AL, May 2004.

<sup>22</sup> CPT Erick W. Sweet II, Aviation Captain Career Course Small Group Instructor, Meeting with AVC3 Small Group Instructors, Fort Rucker, AL, May 2004.

For example, if a junior Captain were taught the major tenets of FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* at his or her Captain Career Course, and then asked to plan a high intensity conflict training event in concert with Lieutenants and NCOs at the same TRACDOC installation as part of their OBC, BNCOC or ANCOC courses, all three groups of leaders would gain valuable perspective on how to plan and execute full spectrum operations training. This indoctrination experience would prove invaluable as those leaders moved on to unit staff and leadership billets. While each post and unit will present unique challenges to training in terms of resources available, specific mission requirements and SOPs, the basics on how to plan and execute a major training event will be ingrained. Instead of learning how to plan and execute training from scratch, those leaders would have a basis of experience from which to draw, and they could produce far better training results. In other words, we have to train leaders how to train, particularly for full spectrum operations. In short, indoctrination of leaders at all levels as part of their NCOES and OES schools is one way to ensure proper balance across the range of full spectrum operations.

By examining how one sister service addresses the balance issue, yet another potential solution can be found to balancing full spectrum operations. A recent article concerned with Marine Corp combined arms training addresses concerns that the nature of current operations preclude units from continuing combined arms live fire training to the same degree as in years past. The article suggests that only through continued combined arms excellence can the Marine Corp remain relevant for all future conflicts, to include COIN. It states that the lessons learned in combined arms training pay dividends in COIN operations as well, due to the required mind set of leveraging all possible resources to achieve decisive victory.<sup>23</sup> As the premier proponent of combined arms warfare, the Marine Corp approach to training holds a valuable lesson for Army units as well.

In the Army, there is often a tendency to avoid overwhelming junior leaders with too many moving pieces in training. Thus, several enablers are introduced slowly over time to allow leaders to become familiar and comfortable with the basic stages of combat operations. For example, an infantry battalion may avoid integration of artillery, mortar, CAS and HUMINT team assets until platoon leaders and squad leaders have mastered the basics of dismounted maneuver. Similarly, logistics units may progress through convoy training and convoy live fire before attempting to integrate recon/attack helos or UAVs to clear the route ahead of the convoy. Another training approach may be to train maneuver

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<sup>23</sup> Blair J Sokol, "Combined Arms Training", *Marine Corps Gazette* (Quantico: USMC, December 2007), Vol. 91, Issue 12, pg. 32-35.

leaders on each aspect of combined arms operations piecemeal. For example, an armor company commander may train on tank gunnery and maneuver first, before progressing to a fire support coordination exercise followed by an air-ground integration exercise. This approach introduces elements of the combined arms fight sequentially to allow the junior leader to digest each piece in turn and then grow his or her ability with each exercise. While both methods are proven ways to develop a leader over time, it is the lack of time that may force a different approach.

In a time-constrained environment, maximizing training opportunities is critical; this is especially true with reference to high intensity conflict combined arms training. Since most units have little or no time to focus on non-COIN or stability tasks, units should consider integrating all aspects of combined arms operations from the outset. This may require a shift in the training paradigms employed by many units, but the flexibility and adaptability of today's junior leaders make them far more ready to master these challenges than current training plans would indicate. The generation that grew up playing complex video games and manipulating multiple media sources simultaneously are far more practiced at multi-tasking, given their level of experience, than many of their senior leaders were at the same points in their careers. Of course, ample time should be made for re-training in case of training shortcomings, but the combined time to train each aspect of a combined arms operation piecemeal or in sequence is far greater than integrating all elements from the outset. In the long run, integration up front will save training time. Additionally, units should seek to make every opportunity a combined arms training event. For example, an administrative movement to set up a training event could easily be turned into an air-ground integrated operation with a ground convoy integrating recon helos for route reconnaissance.

While these methods are not new to execution of effective training, they are particularly pertinent to achieving balance in training for full spectrum operations. In particular the ability to integrate multiple assets to achieve a dominating effect has application well beyond high intensity conflict. For instance, a junior NCO who learns how to leverage all weapon systems to defeat an armored threat can apply that same mental model to integration of NGOs, state agencies, and multi-national forces to achieve a focused effect in a stability environment. Thus, as the Marine Journal articulates, combined arms training has far reaching impacts well beyond traditional war fighting applications, and as such, should be maximized during home station training opportunities.

A final solution to achieving balance in full spectrum operations lies with current Army doctrine and existing Army policies. For instance, Army assignments personnel already seek to create stability for Soldiers and families by allowing for prolonged or repeated service at a single post. In addition to the familial benefits, this also provides critical training efficiencies. For example, a Captain who attends the career course and returns to the same division for a command assignment would be familiar with the training resources and procedures unique to that post, thus achieving efficiency in the planning and conduct of training. Thus, the current practice of allowing limited homesteading achieves some measure of balance with respect to training efficiencies.

Another existing mechanism that can help achieve balance is the use of ARTEP and MTP standards to certify and validate training. Although many of these manuals require revision as discussed previously, a return to set standards for training evaluation would make significant progress toward achieving balance. If a unit was considered non-deployable until it showed competence in all of its core and directed METL tasks, no unit would ever fully lose its ability to execute operations across the breadth of full spectrum operations. The key would be to ensure appropriate amount of time is allotted to train all aspect of the core METL, not just the directed METL. As previously discussed, the Army Chief of Staff addresses this in his training guidance stating that if a unit has greater than 18 months between deployments, at least 90 of those days should be focused on core METL tasks to maintain balance.<sup>24</sup> Regardless of whether the unit is training for core or directed METL tasks, validation and certification are a valuable tool to ensure the appropriate tasks and standards are achieved; a practice that has been slowly eroding over time.

Lastly, use of pre-scripted training packages can help staffs achieve efficiency in executing training across the full spectrum of operations. For example, many divisions post pre-scripted training packages for large scale training events like convoy live fire or dismounted squad live fire. These save leaders valuable time in that they provide targeting data, scenario scripts, and preparation requirements. These packages greatly reduce the staff work and preparation time required to execute a quality training event, and many are tailored to the post on which that unit will be training. Many packages have built in variables that allow units to increase or decrease the intensity and complexity based on their assessed level of training. Combined with leader tactical and deployment experience and a solid basis of leader doctrinal familiarity, pre-packaged training outlines have potential to be a powerful tool in achieving operational training balance.

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<sup>24</sup> General George W. Casey, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, "Army Training and Leader Development Guidance", August 13, 2008.

In summary, to regain balance in execution of full spectrum operations, several plausible solutions have been presented; some inspired by the military, and others not. While each has its limitations in addressing the balance issue, each does provide some measure of improved effectiveness within the given constraints of the current operational environment. Leaders will be challenged in the near future and beyond to achieve excellence in execution of full spectrum operations. Thus, regaining balance is of paramount importance.

### **The Way Ahead/ Conclusion**

In conclusion, the following five potential solutions to address the balance issue with respect to full spectrum operations are recommended. First, codification and concentration on the Army's core competencies would go a long way in achieving balance in full spectrum operations since it would clearly articulate what leaders need to train and to what standard. Second, leveraging external resources such as coalition forces and NGOs as a means to outsource certain aspects of ongoing operations may spell relief for over taxed units without the time to pursue full spectrum operational balance. Third, elongating NCOES and OES schooling to allow for proper indoctrination of our junior leaders may produce efficiency and institutional knowledge necessary to achieve the balance we seek. Fourth, pressing for integrated combined arms training has far reaching impact on achieving balance in all aspects of full spectrum operations. Lastly, homesteading, pre-packaged training plans and validation and certification using ARTEP and MTP standards will all help improve training efficiency and subsequently create balance across the full spectrum of operations.

While none of these proposed solutions are easy to implement, each holds some measure of attainable success without sweeping changes in funding, force structure or operational tempo. The Army must keep one eye on future fights in order to be ready for them. From colonial British forces during the American Revolution to pre-World War II France, history is riddled with examples of militaries that failed to adapt to the operational environments in which they operated, ultimately resulting in failure. More specifically, Army leaders cannot afford to mortgage future capability in an effort to address the current fight only. Army leaders must endeavor to grow leadership skills to cope with the specific challenges of today's and tomorrow's operational environments. In other words, Army leaders cannot fall into the age-old trap of fighting the last war at the expense of being ready for the next one; or, in this case, the Army cannot fight the current war

at the expense of the next one. In short, Army leaders must regain leadership balance with respect to full spectrum operations and become the jack-of-all-trades and master of all; not none.

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