



New Format for the Newsletter



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Special points of interest:

- The Army's future in dealing with irregular challenges requires a coherent approach to developing DOTMLPF-P solutions and to ensure both SOF and conventional forces have all they need to plan, prepare, execute and assess future operations and activities.

Dear Irregular Warfare Customer,

We, like many of you, are working through the budgetary constraints and manpower reductions associated with the end of OIF/OEF conflicts. As we plot our course forward, we have opted to reduce the frequency of our newsletter production from a monthly to a quarterly event. This helps strike a balance in resources, accessibility and quality of product. As always, we welcome your input on how we can better address your interest, but trust you will find this month's letter to be Bold, Audacious, and Provocative.

Thank you for your interest in our product.

Army Irregular Warfare Center


Going Big by Getting Small

“This in-depth look at steady state US engagement abroad before the shooting starts is of vital importance. The current US strategic quandary is how to sustain or increase our standing in the world as power paradigms shift under our feet. Common to all analysis on this topic is one consistent theme: limit large wars and optimize pre-conflict engagements abroad.” Admiral (US Navy, Ret.) Eric Olson, from the foreword “Going Big by Getting Small”

“An operational art of engagement is forming, if slowly. The contours of engagement-centric operational art are emerging in form and practice across armed services, in all combatant commands (COCOMS), and within the interagency.”

Going Big by Getting Small examines how the United States Special Operations Forces apply operational art, the link between tactics and strategy, in the non-wartime, steady-state environments called Phase Zero. With revised and innovative operational art constructs, US Special Operations offer scalable and differentiated strategic options for US foreign policy goals. This book analyzes light footprint special operations approaches in Yemen, Indonesia, Thailand, and Colombia.

When a large military presence may be inappropriate or counterproductive, Colonel Brian Petit makes the case for fresh thinking on Phase Zero operational art as applied by small, highly skilled, joint-force teams coupled with interagency partners. The past decade (2002-2012) of operations focused on large-scale, post-conflict counterinsurgency.



Less publicized, but no less important in this same decade, was the emerging application of nuanced campaigns, actions, and activities in Phase Zero. These efforts were led or supported by special operations in countries and regions contested, but not at war.

This book fills a gap in the literature of how to adapt the means, method, and logic of US military foreign engagements in a diplomacy-centric world with rapidly shifting power paradigms. Going Big by Getting Small is not a yarn on daring special operations raids, nor a call for perpetual war. It is the polar opposite: this book contemplates the use of discreet engagements to sustain an advantageous peace, mitigate conflict, and prevent crises.

Optimizing Foreign Internal Defense to Counter Dark Networks

Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates are not the only non-state threats to United States interests at home and abroad.

The U.S. and its global partners are threatened by a multitude of religious and political Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), Transitional Criminal Organizations (TCOs), and other malign actors and networks. In the conduct of their activities, these actors and groups exploit the environmental instability inherent in ill-governed spaces to further achieve their purpose. Although their purposes vary, *dark networks* are inconsistent with the values and laws of the nation-states and serve catalysts for instability. As the world becomes increasingly connected, so do illegal and covert dark networks.



“Repressive tactics by security forces, corruption, and unwillingness to address grievances push the people away from the state and pull them toward the dark networks.”

To read more, please go to:

<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/optimizing-foreign-internal-defense-to-counter-dark-networks>

Historical Perspective: Unconventional Warfare in Communist Strategy

In 1962 Raymond L. Garthoff wrote this compelling article for Foreign Affairs Magazine. It's easy to imagine what an updated version of this article might cover with regards to Al Qaeda.



Unconventional warfare has become all too conventional, even if it is not yet adequately understood. It is paradoxical that the coming of mighty engines of war that literally extend war "out of this world" and threaten violence measured in megadeaths should, in fact, lend strength to the resurgence of a kind of hostilities marked by poisoned bamboo spears, bazooka ambushes and civil war. In a recent

article in these pages, the nature and dimensions of the problem have been thoughtfully analyzed. In the present discussion, I should like to focus attention on a series of 12 propositions derived from study of Communist theory and practice regarding the seizure of power by unconventional warfare.

Our starting point should be the fundamental role that internal war and unconventional warfare play in general Communist world strategy. On that foundation, we can examine Communist views on the expediency of waging unconventional warfare under various conditions, and on operational strategies likely to be used in cases where it is deemed feasible and desirable. Finally, it will be useful to take a closer look at guerrilla warfare in particular as a technique, in past and future Communist practice, for waging internal war. Thus we shall move from looking at unconventional war in Communist doctrine to looking at Communist doctrine on unconventional warfare.

Follow this link to read more:

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23419/raymond-l-garthoff/unconventional-warfare-in-communist-strategy>

THREATS AND THE WORDS WE USE: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT BY DAVID MAXWELL

"All forms of warfare: nuclear, conventional, and unconventional are complex and the US must adequately prepare for them all, balancing the training and resourcing for each. Perhaps most important policy makers and strategists must possess the intellectual rigor to understand, explain and address these threats with policies and strategies that will serve US interests. To illustrate this I offer this thought experiment. Pull out a pad of paper or open a blank word document. Now, choose any threat in the world that the United States or its allies face, from Al Qaeda to Iran to drug cartels to North Korea to Syria, to Boko Haram or Al Shabaab or any other threat of interest and importance.



Now, go back and see if you used any military doctrinal terms or defense-speak buzzwords. If you have, go back and start over. You can only use common English words that people outside of the defense community will be able to understand."

Read More: <http://warontherocks.com/2013/11/threats-and-the-words-we-use-a-thought-experiment/>

"Very simply, "internal," "unconventional," "irregular"- "class"-war is of the essence of Marxist-Leninist theory, hence at least theoretically at the base of Communist strategy."

David S. Maxwell is the Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University. He is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel with 30 years of service.

COIN Doctrine Under Fire

The vaunted counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy promoted by retired Gen. David Petraeus that guided the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has come under renewed and caustic criticism from one of its reluctant practitioners, both as a general and diplomat. “In short, COIN failed in Afghanistan,” said Karl Eikenberry, the retired Army lieutenant general and former chief of Combined Forces Command Afghanistan who was later U.S. Ambassador to Kabul.

Eikenberry dissected and dismissed the COIN doctrine as applied in Afghanistan in a recent article for Foreign Affairs, published by the Council on Foreign Relations, titled “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan.”

Eikenberry also took on what has come to be known as the “COIN Bible” – the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, or FM 3–24, co-authored by then-Lt. Gen. David Petraeus and then-Lt. Gen. James Amos, now commandant of the Marine Corps. The “clear, hold and build” strategy out-



lined in FM 3–24 called for individual soldiers and Marines with the qualities of a modern-day “Lawrence of Arabia,” versed in languages and attuned to the culture and politics of the host nation, Eikenberry said. “The typical 21-year-old Marine is hard-pressed to win the heart and mind of his mother-in-law,” Eikenberry said. “Can he really be expected to do the same with an ethnocentric Pashtun tribal elder? Moreover, T. E. Lawrence specialized in inciting revolts, not in state building.”

Read more here:

<http://www.dodbuzz.com/2013/11/19/coin-doctrine-under-fire/>

LTG (USA, Ret) Karl Eikenberry is the William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and a faculty member of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. He is also an affiliated faculty member with the Center for Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law, and researcher with The Europe Center. Prior to his arrival at Stanford, he served as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from May 2009 until July 2011, where he led the civilian surge directed by President Obama to reverse insurgent momentum and set the conditions for transition to full Afghan sovereignty.

What do you think?

Is the military capturing all of the pertinent lessons from the last decade of war?

Send us an email at


usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil

Learning for the Next War

Nathan Finney recently blogged on capturing pertinent lessons from war in “Providing enduring value to the force”.

“Following the publication of the recent article “COIN Doctrine Under Fire,” I was lucky enough to ‘listen in’ on an enlightening conversation on one of the dozen listservs I frequent. While debating the merits of counterinsurgency, the list began discussing the value of capturing the pertinent lessons

from a war...during and immediately following the conflict. On the discussion were of the authors of both the Army’s pre-eminent volume on Desert Storm and the first solid look at Iraqi Freedom.



“After all, regardless of the limitations of our enemy, we fought a classical ground maneuver war with far reaching strategic objectives using the equipment (the Big Five in particular) designed for that type of war. We vindicated the Reagan era buildup. We validated AirLand Battle doctrine. We demonstrated the extraordinary talent and collective performance of the All-Volunteer Force. In the face of the strident Air Force claims to have won the war single-handedly we could readily cite the immutable effects of the overwhelming ground maneuver that swept the south of Iraq clean of all combat forces.” With all that said....This is only eight or nine months of conflict including the touted 100 days of combat. Extremely difficult to draw meaningful parallels to the nearly nine years of OIF and over twelve of OEF.

To read more click here: <https://medium.com/the-bridge/99d07ce20d63>

Future of Warfare in a Post-COIN Conflict Climate

A Small Wars Journal discussion with Dr. David Kilcullen on his recently released book “Out of the Mountains. The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla”, Oxford University Press, 2013. Dr. Kilcullen was interviewed by Mr. Octavian Manea, who is pursuing, as a Fulbright student, an MA in International Relations with a focus on global security and post-conflict reconstruction at Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.

Dr. David Kilcullen is the founding President and CEO of Caerus Associates LLC, a strategic design consultancy with a focus on the overlapping problems of conflict, climate change, energy, health and governance. His academic background is in the political anthropology of conflict in traditional societies. His doctoral dissertation, completed in 2000, is a study of the impact of insurgency on political development, and draws on extended residential fieldwork with guerrillas, militias and local people in remote parts of Indonesia, New Guinea and East Timor. He is the author of numerous schol-

arly articles and books, including *The Accidental Guerrilla* (2009), *Counterinsurgency* (2010), and *Out of the Mountains* (2013), all from Oxford University Press.

“The future is hybrid and irregular conflict combining elements of crime, urban unrest, insurgency, terrorism, and state-sponsored asymmetric warfare—more Mumbai, Mogadishu, and Tivoli Gardens—and we had better start preparing for it”. (David Kilcullen)

Click here to read more:

<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/future-of-warfare-in-a-post-coin-conflict-climate>



We're on the Web!
<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/AIWFC/>



AIWC
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Irregular Warfare Community Events

- 30 Jan.** Army IW Ctr Web-Seminar, China and Water Issues, DCO
- 13 Feb.** Army IW Ctr Web-Seminar, Cyberterrorism, National Defense University, DCO
- 27 Feb.** Army IW Ctr Web-Seminar, Cyber and Electro-Magnetic Activities, ARCYBER
- 13 Mar .** Army IW Ctr Web-Seminar, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, DCO

Updates to the AIWC Web-Seminar Schedule are on the AIWC AKO here: <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/40235241>

Contact the AIWC staff to obtain links for the IW Center Seminars at usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil