GEN McChrystal provided his counterinsurgency training guidance to ISAF personnel on 10 Nov.  Beyond ISAF, the guidance is addressed to "Whom It May Concern" -- because the counterinsurgent Team in Afghanistan touches many outside the ISAF chain of command.  One notable "JIIM" entry is the Integrated Civil/Military Decision Making Structure, which consists of the U.S Dept of State, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and USFOR-A/ISAF. This is a Joint Interagency Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) cooperative leadership framework from the District level to the Regional Command level. See the entire document here.

Director's Comments:

As interest regarding future ISAF strategy and resourcing continues to increase (while Iraq remains lethal and complex), the COIN community has been redoubling its efforts to prepare counterinsurgents to operate in this incredibly demanding environment – an environment that demands a precise, granular, and local understanding of complex human terrain. Empowered with this understanding, leaders will be better able to develop security forces and institutions that work at local level, exploit seams among Taliban factions and Al Qaeda, and support the killing, capture, or separation of those who refuse to reconcile or reintegrate. Multiple engagements this past month helped us better understand these dynamics and will support ongoing efforts to prepare counterinsurgents for these challenges. Some highlights: Multinational Engagements: trips to Afghanistan, NATO, UK, France, Egypt, Italy, & France. Key overseas events included: visit to COIN Leader Course at COIN Training Center Afghanistan (CTC-A) and ISAF Regional Command (South), pre-deployment training to 7 (UK) Brigade preparing for Helmand and to Italian Alpini Brigade Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team preparing for RC (West); presentations to French Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, French Joint Doctrine Center and Staff College on U.S. COIN initiatives; coordination visit to US Army Africa; presentation to RUSI/UK Land Warfare Centre on "U.S. Army Institutional Adaptations to the Changing Operational Environment;" and regional cooperation presentation to Mid-Eastern and North African officers at NATO Defense College in Rome. Also had opportunity to support BRIGHT STAR in Egypt to facilitate exchange of COIN and stability operations expertise between USARCENT and the Egyptian Training Authority.

COIN Leaders Workshop on Afghanistan-Pakistan. From 27-29 Oct, 156 attendees heard perspectives from academia, media, and Pakistani Army – all experts with recent experience in the region, highlighted by keynote speaker, General Jim Mattis (Commander, Joint Forces Command). GEN Mattis offered superb insights on coalition operations to complement the lessons and historical context offered by other presenters regarding this tremendously complex security challenge. Would encourage you to review conference presentations and a summary of each presenter’s key points here.

As always, please continue to challenge us with your questions, comments, and recommendations – and thanks again for your efforts in support of our troops. That contact information is at the end of this SITREP. Click here to view the complete SITREP.

                    Colonel Dan Roper

Many years ago at zero dark stupid in the middle of nowhere at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown, small town boy and self described outdoors type Officer Cadet Harold Chadwick mistook me, Toronto city-slicker, for a bear and threw a large explosive device at me. I have often thought that perhaps the bear story was a scam and it was more like, "hey! There is that city slicker from Toronto, hand me the explosives." I will never know. Many years later, now Major Chadwick, Canadian Army, has thrown yet another potentially explosive device my way.

Maj Chadwick is working on a "COIN brief for dummies." And he would like to have one phrase or paragraph which will describe what CIMIC, PRTs and Psy-Ops bring to the COIN fight. Below is his draft. Further down is my crack at it.

He is asking that the COIN Community of Interest take at look at what he has presented and give him their input.

"Info Ops in COIN"
War is politics by other means. COIN is local politics as war. Winning in politics and war is all about addition. CIMIC and the PRT (supported by Psy Ops) do that addition. Adding friendlies. The BG and OMLT subtract from the enemy. Well targeted Psy Ops - as part of a wider IO strategy - divide the enemy. When we hurt civilians we multiply that enemy. What we are only now starting to get is how to do the math. When we get it right we add friendlies and divide then subtract, enemies. Eventually we reach the tipping point where the enemy are seen as simply a lunatic fringe."

Maj Harry Chadwick


"COIN Math for Dummies"
Carl Von Clausewitz said that, "war is politics with the addition of other means." COIN is a form of conflict that can only be won through defining political and implementing solutions. Its practice at the local level is the manifestation of the politics of war. In order to better understand the theory of COIN and the contribution of PRTs, I propose this equation. In a conflict where the people decide who wins, the political aim of COIN is to gain popular support for the host nation government; it is a war of addition. CIMIC and the PRT - supported by Psy Ops campaign – underlined by securing the population, provide that addition whether that be village-by-village or person-by-person. The Battle Group and OMLT underline security to the population and subtract from the enemy. Well targeted Psy Ops - as part of a wider IO strategy - acts as a force multiplier and acts to separate the population from the insurgents. When our actions hurt civilians we multiply that enemy in a tit for tat spiral of violence. What we are only now starting to realize is how to do the math. When we get it right, we gain the support of the population and divide them from the insurgent while subtracting enemies (those that cannot be reconciled). Eventually, if we maintain the high moral plain, maintain our legitimacy, and minimize non-combatant casualties, we will eventually exhaust the insurgents and reach the tipping point where the enemy are seen as simply a lunatic fringe."

LCol JJ Malevich

Let’s hear your input.

LCol JJ Malevich, Canadian Exchange Officer, Director of COIN, US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center

Part II

Many have contacted the SFA office in search of a police training POI. Here is the start.

1st Battalion, 5th Marine's AAR slides.

We obtained two great PowerPoint presentations that are just right for the troops: lessons learned matched to photographs. One lesson learned picture tells a thousand stories? One is from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines titled "COIN in Helmand Province, After the Clear – Thoughts and Tips on Non Kinetic Actions." See it here. The second is from Afghan National Army, LTG Zazai, the Corps commander for the ANA 205th Corps, titled "The Counterinsurgency Fight in 205th Hero Corps". Click here to view.

JCISFA briefing slides.

"Free and fair elections in Afghanistan is not a mission, it is the mission!" That is the message that I passed on with regards to Election Planning preparation for the recent Presidential Elections in Afghanistan at every meeting that I had with security forces in Afghanistan or Washington when I was the security advisor to the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan in 2008. I often felt that my council was falling on deaf ears. In fact, I was once told by a very high ranking ISAF officer that, "we are running a war here and that is the priority, not support to elections." Wrong answer Sir! In a counterinsurgency, political legitimacy is the main effort! Until Afghans are able to choose their political representatives and have faith in their government and its institutions, all fighting is for naught and will spiral into an unending cycle of continuous fruitless violence.

So, what happened this year? Polling centers were opened but not secured; this led to ballot stuffing. In the spaces in between polling centers, Taliban were able to set up roadblocks in order to prevent Afghans from reaching the polling centers. It is not as if we could not have seen this coming. In 2005 it was well known that in Paktia and Paktika there were more "voters" than people that lived there. In the conservative south, there were more women voters than in any other part of the country. In this election, men showed up with sacks of voter registration cards for women in order to "vote for them."

The Electoral Complaints Commission declared so many ballots fraudulent that the IEC was forced to schedule a run-off to take place between President Karzai and his closest competitor Abdullah Abdullah, on 7 November. Electoral fraud has caused the legitimacy of the Karzai Government to suffer in the eyes of Afghans and the domestic audience of troop contributing nations on which Afghanistan depends upon. This has increased voter apathy and distrust from among the electorate. The legitimacy of the IEC and the impartiality of its Chairman, Mr. Lodin has diminished and further weakened its effectiveness as an impartial, effective body that inspires public confidence. Allegations of interference by western officials at the Electoral Complaints Commission (EEC) have weakened its stature as well. No public institution has gone untainted in the wake of this fraud-riddled election.

On 1 November, Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai’s only rival, pulled out of the run-off in protest, leaving the field clear for a Karzai victory. The run-off has now been cancelled.

So, where does this leave the counterinsurgency? Well, come 8 November, President Karzai will still be the President of Afghanistan. In spite of his loss of support both internally and internationally, this is not a good or bad thing. In short, time will pass and we and the Afghans will soon be concerned with more important things like who is dating which Hollywood/Bollywood starlet. The departure of President Karzai is not the solution to what ails Afghanistan and his removal will no more fix the problems of Government legitimacy than the removal of President Diem improved the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese Government in 1963. Government is bigger than the president alone.

Next year, there will be two more elections: Parliamentary and District. It is paramount that these elections take place in a climate that is free and fair and seen to be so by the Afghan people.

What needs to be done? Presently, rather than being appointed by the Parliament, the IEC is appointed by President Karzai. Thus the members of the IEC are beholden to the President for their jobs and Chairman Lodin made no secret of the fact that he wanted President Karzai to win. The IEC needs to be revamped and the appointments need to be done by an impartial body.

The Afghan Constitution which covers electoral law is flawed with regard to unworkable electoral timetables and runoff dates. In the last election, the unrealistic election date of 22 April allowed President Karzai to play with the IEC and the international community. Next year’s elections need to take place in mid to late October when the fighting season has died down and civil service penetration is at its height. To date, President Karzai has refused to appoint the Constitutional Commission, mandated by the Bonn Agreement which monitors and fixes constitutional irregularities of which there are many.

The system of Single-Non-Transferrable-Vote which does not allow for political parties is further retarding the development of the Afghan Parliament because it ensures that each of the 349 members is an island unto himself with no central direction or long term party policy. Political parties need to be brought into the process

Voter apathy is at its height. A concerted voter education and IO campaign needs to take place in order to attempt to explain elections and re-establish some form of legitimacy and faith in the system between Afghans and their government.

It is essential that district elections take place next year. In 2005 they were cancelled and district governors were appointed -- many of which did not represent the interests or enjoy the support of locals. The district is where people live and in Afghanistan all politics are local.

Next year, election security will require a full court press by all security stakeholders. The security model that I advocated has three rings of defence: Afghan police at the polling centers and villages; Afghan Army and highway police in the areas between population centers; and ISAF operating with the Afghan Army in those outer spaces. In order to make this work, all hands need to be at the pump. This is not an economy of force operation! Roads must be clear in order to facilitate voting, and only those polling centers that are secured and have an international presence, i.e. ISAF personnel, should be allowed to open.

I am a soldier, so I know that the natural inclination is to fight, but fighting for the sake of fighting will bring no end. In this type of war political legitimacy is key and next year’s local elections will be more important to Afghans then this year’s presidential elections, even if less newsworthy. It is not "a mission" in 2010, it is "the mission" and it is a "no fail" mission.

LCol JJ Malevich, Director of COIN, US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center, Canadian Exchange Officer.

152 military, civilian, joint, interagency and academic participants explored the fine points of counterinsurgency theory and application during the first day of the COIN Leader Conference at the Battle Command Training Facility, Fort Leavenworth. Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, as well as Special Forces, Active Duty and Reserve, institutional, International Officers and many others provided dialogue and engaged with insights and probing questions. LCol John Malevich opened the workshop with COIN doctrinal principles applied in the Afghanistan context. University of Southern California presented the counterinsurgency and stability operations training simulation, UrbanSim, and SGM Rob Haemmerle gave the audience an in-depth look at biometrics and application in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region. See Fox news coverage here. Look for workshop presentations and lecture materials at the COIN Knowledge Center later this week.

As reported in our COIN SITREP last week, the COIN Center conducted a COIN and Security Force Assistance seminar for 130 Italian Army senior unit leaders of the Alpini Brigade. The unit is scheduled for Operational, Mentoring & Liaison Team (OMLT) rotation to Regional Command (West) to mentor and advise 207 ANA Corps. See the Armed Forces Network news article here, and also photo collage. The COIN Center continues to invest instruction and COIN knowledge to our coalition partners next month as well by conducting instruction at the NATO Joint Force Training Center, Poland. More about that in a few weeks…

JP 3-24, released 5 October 2009, “provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. . . .” In so doing, the publication draws heavily from FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Although the introduction to JP 3-24 recognizes that “religious ideologies” are a factor in exciting core grievances, the publication devotes little attention to those factors. Even the fact that the JP links religion and ideology into “religious ideologies” is problematical. Some would argue the two are distinct because religion is morality-centered and is based upon a sacred text, a commitment to a God or gods, and, quite often, a view of an afterlife. Ideology, on the other hand, more reflects ideas about life and culture and can be somewhat abstract.

Sebastian Gorka, military affairs fellow at the Foundation for Defense Democracies, expressed his concern about the publication’s lack of focus on the role of religion in insurgencies. He noted that the joint publication mentions religion only four times, while FM 3-24 mentions the word nineteen times. Considering that religion plays a significant role in on-going insurgencies (although that is currently a subject of debate), the lack of ink devoted to the topic in the joint publication is astounding.

Gorka further argues that religion is not a core grievance, as JP 3-24 asserts. What the JP should address, he added, is the strategic question of how religion feeds ideology. That, he says, it fails to do.

Religion has been used for hundreds of years to further causes. “In the name of religion” can be quoted for millions of deaths. As soldiers, how do we gain understanding of the role of religion in our current fights? How do we counter an enemy who may have a religious basis to his struggle against established governments? These are questions that JP 3-24 does not address.

LTC Storm Savage Chief Counterinsurgency Integration US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center

Now that the ISAF Commander GEN McChrystal’s COIN Guidance has been published and his report to the President has been submitted, many political observers have penned their suggestions on what needs to be done in Afghanistan. Two of the most noteworthy are: Max Boot and his piece from Commentary Magazine “SPECIAL PREVIEW: How we can win in Afghanistan” and “Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan” by Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond.

You can read Max Boot here.
See Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond here (PDF file).


Image at top left side of this blog post can be found at this site link.

President Obama is on the verge of making a policy decision on the future strategy of the COIN fight in Afghanistan. Before looking at a possible strategy, I think we should take a hard look at Afghanistan and sacrifice a sacred cow that we all took as gospel.

Afghanistan has been called the “graveyard of empires.” That is some impressive IO phrase. It makes us fear failure in Afghanistan because it foreshadows the collapse of the whole western world -- not just Afghanistan. As scary as that prospect is, this specter is a figment of our imagination.

I think what is never mentioned is that the greatest empire that went to grave was the Afghan Empire itself. The British themselves smashed the Afghan Empire when, in 1837, it formed an alliance with the Sikhs in order to prevent the Afghans from retaking its former empire which went to Peshawar and Quetta. Thanks to the British, the sun would permanently set on the Afghan Empire, never to rise again.

Yes it is true that the British did have some setbacks in Afghanistan, but I think we need to examine the motives of the British with regards to Afghanistan. Afghanistan was in fact, nothing more than a buffer between its “jewel” India and the Russian Empire. It never intended to colonize or control Afghanistan. Dividing the Pashtuns along an artificial border represented a classic strategy to ensure that not only would the Afghan empire remain smashed but would also facilitate a cross border insurgency to prevent a Russian expansion south of the Hindu Kush. It worked superbly in the 1980’s.

The Afghans celebrate 1919 as its Independence Day, but it is independence from what? There were no British troops on Afghan soil in 1919. The real story is that Aminullah thought that he could take advantage of unrest in India and British post-war fatigue to retake the former Afghan territory in what is now Pakistan. He launched a three pronged attack into British territory through Khyber, Quetta and Kurrum. His attack was stopped dead by the British. What’s more, Kabul and Jalalabad were bombed by no less than Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris, future commander of the RAF’s Bomber Command in WW II. The Afghans quickly sued for peace. The British, being practical, realized that with Russia in turmoil as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution it was no longer a threat. Therefore, interference in Afghanistan was no longer worth the effort. So with the treaty of Rawalpindi, Afghanistan was given control over its foreign affairs. The British also stopped supporting the Afghan Government financially. In this instance, Afghanistan does not seem to have broken another invading empire, but merely lost its usefulness because of a change in the geostrategic situation.

Next would be the Soviets. Leonid Brezhnev, ordered the Soviet invasion to bring down the brutal Afghan communist president, Hafizullah Amin, in 1979. The intention was to stabilize the situation so troops could be home within months, leaving military and other advisers -- backed by huge economic and logistical support -- to build a communist government that could stand on its own feet. Although the Soviets never lost a battle, the Afghan government they had supported lacked legitimacy and never managed to gain the support of the Afghan people. So, President Gorbachev pulled out Soviet forces leaving the Afghans to their fate. I don’t think we can say the Soviet empire was smashed by the Afghans, rather the Soviets realized they had backed a loser and cut their losses. The subsequent disbandment of the Soviet Union was long overdue and came about because communism was a flawed system that failed even to produce enough toilet paper or diapers for its population.

What is the so-what here? First, a change in the Afghan mission will not signal the end of Pax Americana. Second, we need to see Afghanistan for what it is. Like the British, our approach has to be practical no matter what David Gallula wrote in 1964. We will not make a Dubai in the Hindu Kush; keeping out AQ would be mission success. Do we need to stay there in order to accomplish that? Has lack of occupation forces in Haiti prevented us from interjecting ourselves when the situation becomes critical? Finally, we need to take a page out of the Soviet Lessons Learned book and realize that until the Afghan Government establishes its legitimacy all of our COIN efforts will fail regardless of how many troops we deploy to Afghanistan.

LCol JJ Malevich, Director COIN, US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center, Canadian Exchange Officer.

Director’s Comments:

The COIN Center has been actively engaged in shaping enduring efforts for irregular warfare, training for SFA, Transition Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and the role of PKSOI with respect to CAC (ACP DPs 110 and 140 and TCP DP 36). COIN Center has provided workgroup members and leads to collaboratively work with Army stakeholders to bring sensible recommendations to the Army leadership for decision.

The COIN, SO, and SFA Branches continue to support Human Terrain Teams and CALL Theater Observation Detachments deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. We also continue our monthly discussions with battalion and brigade commanders during their pre-command courses. This interaction acquaints participants with the latest COIN/SO/SFA doctrine as well as with mission requirements for the Advise and Assist Brigades.

Our monthly virtual brown bags continue to generate great interest. Our September brown bag discussed the “conflict ecosystem” using a model developed by the New Zealand Army. Our October presentation covered the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in counterinsurgency operations. You can see the brown bag presentations here.

We are finalizing preparations for our COIN Leaders Workshop, 27-29 October. The workshop will focus on COIN operations in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, there will be presentations on the use of biometrics and on simulations for training. GEN James Mattis, CG, USJFCOM will present remarks and conduct a Q&A session. I encourage you to go to coin.army.mil, click on Leaders Workshop, and read more about the workshop. Follow the discussions on the COIN blog-site as we capture salient points for our community of interest.

As always, I encourage you to contact directly our offices with questions or comments. That contact information is at the end of this SITREP. Click here to view the complete SITREP.

Thanks for your efforts in support of our troops,
Colonel Dan Roper