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USA and USMC Counterinsurgency Center Blog

October 2008 SITREP

 

Director's Comments:

As you read this SITREP, I am visiting the COIN Training Center /CLC-A in Kabul and the COIN CFE in Taji, in order. Both organizations continue to emphasize the importance of focused and thorough pre-deployment training. They stress using the full range of capabilities - PRT, MiTT, PiTT, USAID and other agencies - to achieve mission success.  The offer remains in effect for you to send qualified trainers to either CLC-A (Kabul) and/or COIN CFE (Taji) for 3-4 months to assist and to get a ground-level view of COIN in operation.  The December SITREP will have more details on the theater requirements from the COIN COI identified during my visits to Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Other items of note:

  • Asymmetric Warfare Group has been doing terrific work and has contributed a lot of useful tools for the COIN fight.  I recommend the TTP Reports and Pocket Guides located on the AWG Website (requires CAC).
  • MAJ John Klug and his team at CADD are doing a great job on the new JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations. The first draft has been sent out for review and comments. Tentative publication date is 1 September 2009.
  • LTC David Fivecoat and his team at Ft. Benning are putting the final touches on FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, scheduled to be published 18 December, 2008.
  • The COIN Center posted a blog to elicit feedback on GEN Petraeus' question, "What did you learn from Iraq that might be transferable to Afghanistan?" Key points that came from the responses are:
    • Basic COIN principles of protecting the population, connecting the government with the people and permanently isolating insurgents from the population apply in either conflict but must be adapted for local conditions.
    • Shift emphasis from top-down (strong central government) to bottom-up (locally provided security) to leverage tribal structure in Afghanistan.
    • Seek neither to apply directly the Anbar strategy to Afghanistan nor simply surge more forces; more troops (2–4 BCTs) are unlikely to measurably change the effort with the current strategy.
    • Increase efforts in advisory and PRT initiatives to enhance Afghan capabilities.
    • Put an Afghan face on all CERP.  Use Jirgas to solicit needs from the local populace to bolster local government entities. Note: we continue to solicit additional feedback on this topic. We invite your comments on our blog entry titled "Money as a tool in COIN, mission enhancer or detractor?"

Thanks for your efforts in support of our troops,
Colonel Dan Roper

The rest of the (FOUO) SITREP can be found on our Sharepoint site (CAC Login Required).

Only published comments... Nov 12 2008, 03:01 PM by COIN Center

Comments

 

A researcher who would like to stay anon said:

1-- "connecting the government with the people. . ." is hard to do. Situation is similar to what Jeffrey Race describes in "War Comes to Long An." Huge disconnect 'tween govt and peeps; trying to link national>provincial>district> community is tough. The fundamental problem is conceptual.

2--"leverage tribal structure" will work in some areas, but not others because tribal structures are non-existent or weak. New actors, often Deobandi mullahs, seize and legitimize power in a community. AQ, TB, TTP, have waged a campaign (and before them the Commies), to eliminate tribal elders and traditional mechanisms of management and dispute resolution.

November 22, 2008 8:05 AM